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Rethinking Canadian Aid

Stephen Brown
Molly den Heyer
David R. Black

Section III: Canada's Role in International Development on Key Themes

Chapter XIII. Canada’s Fragile States Policy: What Have We Accomplished and Where Do We Go from Here?

David Carment et Yiagadeesen Samy

Texte intégral


1Though bold and innovative, the Canadian International Development Agency’s (CIDA) early investments in fragile states analysis and network development held the organization to a level of high expectation, which has clearly failed to materialize in the form of a more effective policy. While sad for some, CIDA’s demise and absorption into the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) is even more unfortunate because its mandate, goals, and objectives were never properly understood or realized by the Harper government. If CIDA’s fragile states policy has not been a success, it is not for lack of trying by individuals within CIDA.

  • 1 Baranyi and Khan, this volume, examine Canadian assistance to five specific conflict-affected and (...)

2Our main argument is that CIDA faced serious conceptual, political, and organizational challenges in designing and implementing its fragile states policy. Though Canada allocated a significant and increasing amount of aid to fragile states in the last decade, the government squandered the opportunities for effective programming in fragile states due to those challenges.1 The newly created DFATD has unfortunately failed to realize early investments it made in fragile states and, rather than reinvigorate Canada’s engagement, the Harper government has essentially abandoned them. For example, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) failed to live up to its expectations and has been essentially sidelined. Even if it is perhaps too early to tell what will actually happen, the June 2014 announcement of Canada’s new priority countries for its aid is perhaps indicative of a shift towards commercial interests, rather than an increased focus on the most fragile states.

3Impatience for results and a lack of understanding of what the Canadian government was supposed to do in the most fragile situations have clearly played a role in this gradual abandonment of policies on fragile states. To be sure, state fragility is largely an abstract conceptualization that defies easy interpretation and compartmentalization and does not lend itself to simple analysis and policy prescription (Carment et al. 2010). Fragile states analysis is not an exact science, but the absence of a well-grounded, continuous assessment and functional networks for doing proper program evaluation and monitoring in the Canadian case have made policy prescription and implementation even more problematic.

Canadian Aid Allocation to Fragile States

4To our knowledge, no one has systematically tracked the amount of Canadian aid allocated to fragile states and compared it to other donors’ assistance. The Canadian case is in fact not unique in this respect. Even though many fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS) are among the largest recipients of bilateral aid from the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/DAC) donors, the latter do not clearly report what proportion of their aid goes to FCAS. For example, we could not find any direct data from USAID on the proportion of its aid that goes to FCAS.

5The International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), a subsidiary body of the OECD/DAC, has been monitoring financial flows from all DAC member countries to fragile states since 2006. In its 2012 report, INCAF uses a list of forty-seven countries classified as fragile, derived from the World Bank/African Development Bank/ Asian Development Bank harmonized list of FCAS for 2012, and the Fund for Peace’s 2011 Failed States Index. INCAF reports that ODA to fragile states by all DAC member countries was US$50 billion (or 38 percent) in 2010 (OECD 2012, 43).

  • 2 Canadian aid data was obtained from the North-South Institute (2013).
  • 3 This is not an unfair assumption because countries tend to remain fragile for long periods of time (...)

6Using the INCAF list, which covers the period 2000–10, we find that Canadian aid to these fragile states went from 18.2 percent in 2001 to 38.4 percent of Canada’s aid budget in 2010.2 If we also assume that this list is valid for 2011 and 2012, the proportions are 34.5 percent and 30.7 percent respectively.3 We thus see a clear upward trend in Canadian aid allocated to fragile states over the decade, with a peak of 40.4 percent in 2006. Similar to findings for DAC donors as a group, Canadian aid to fragile states is also highly concentrated, indicating the presence of aid darlings and orphans. For instance, in 2010, the top five recipients of Canadian aid among the INCAF list of forty-seven fragile states (Haiti, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Sudan) received almost 55 percent of the funding allocated.

  • 4 David Carment is principal investigator of this project and Yiagadeesen Samy senior research assoc (...)

7To check the robustness of these findings, we also examined aid allocation to the top forty and top fifty (to get a rough match with the INCAF list) fragile states, using the annual fragility ranking produced by the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) project.4 CIFP uses a definition that captures the multi-faceted nature of fragility by bringing together the interrelated aspects of poverty, conflict, and fragility (Carment et al. 2010). The resulting CIFP fragility index provides an annual cross-country fragility ranking, as well as several subcomponents of fragility. As a result, the list varies from one year to the next, as the rankings of countries change over time.

Figure 1: Canadian Aid Allocation to Fragile States, 2001–2010

Figure 1: Canadian Aid Allocation to Fragile States, 2001–2010

Source: Authors’ calculations

8As we can see in Figure 1 above, using the ranking produced by CIFP yields a very similar trend to the one obtained when using the INCAF list. Canadian aid allocation to the top forty or top fifty fragile states (as a percentage of total Canadian aid) has increased over the period 2001–10 from 22.3 percent and 31.4 percent in 2001 to and 48.5 percent in 2010, respectively. The year-on-year changes also indicate that volatility in aid allocation is a problem, again something that has been noted elsewhere for aid allocated by DAC member countries to fragile states (Carment et al. 2008).

9In the next two sections, we discuss the reasons that have prevented Canadian aid from being effective in these fragile situations.

Conceptual and Organizational Challenges

10The complexity of dealing with, and responding to, fragile situations is reflected in the way CIDA has generally allowed “a thousand flowers to bloom,” to support partner organizations, academics, and NGOs that work on state fragility. Indeed, when it first appeared on the scene, as an idea in search of a policy, just around 9/11, the concept of state fragility brought with it a new and complex understanding of how donors and civil society interact and use analysis to support their policies. Given CIDA’s prior investments in conflict analysis, peacebuilding, public policy, and consultations with civil society, it could be assumed that the agency would have been prepared to address these challenges. Such was not the case, for a couple of reasons.

11First, if one examines the evolution of CIDA’s fragile states analysis and policy, we see that initially at least the organization relied on a number of initiatives that emphasized transparency, collaboration, and value-based analysis. This is because, at the time, CIDA turned to the academic, humanitarian, and NGO community to build analytical support for its policy developments. The truth is that a lot of the momentum and investments made during this period were either squandered or forgotten as various donors, including CIDA, scrambled to shift their emphasis from support to civil society (1994–2002) to state building (2003–14) with the onset of the Iraq war following 9/11 (Carment et al. 2010).

12A second conceptual problem is the way unstructured information reached the general public through modern technology, especially the Internet. State fragility as a concept is relatively abstract and mostly unclear in terms of cause and effect. However, its manifestations are more obvious. On the one hand, the unfiltered messaging through modern media of these symptoms worked to heighten public expectations for appropriate, effective, and timely responses to political crises, human rights violations, insurgency, complex emergencies, and natural disasters. On the other hand, media outlets typically picked up such events and retransmitted unstructured reporting, long before governments were able to construct the “situational awareness” necessary to develop a coherent and constructive policy.

13The net result was a rather weak organizational response by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), which appeared to thrive on “situational ambiguity” and “institutional waffling.” Faced with a raw and unstructured flow of information and lacking certainty about the causes of such events, the most expedient policy choice for Canada was to sit and wait until compelled to act by international mandate, public pressure, or political instruction. Bold, decisive, forward-looking action was in short supply. For all intents and purposes, DFAIT appeared perfectly happy to follow and not lead. This applied equally to the development and application of specific fragile states analytical tools and policies, and to operational response strategies. For its part, CIDA had already laid out a comprehensive plan to develop Country Development Planning Frameworks (CDPFs). CDPFs were supposed to align with nationally owned poverty reduction strategies. In most cases, however, fragile states did not have these policy strategies because they are typically incapable of developing them. However, DFAIT and CIDA seldom worked well together. Such planning was shown to be ineffective and rarely applied because coherence and integration were anathema to the DFAIT and CIDA work ethic.

14Many noted a perceived need in the donor community for a greater degree of coordination among themselves, and Canada was no exception. In response, CIDA developed, among other things, a Post-Conflict Needs Assessment tool, in order to establish and align its policies with national priorities and to agree upon a division of labour that included the government and national civil society. However, CIDA used such an approach in only a few cases, and at the latest stages of conflict, such as Haiti and Sudan. Surprisingly, Afghanistan was not exposed to the same level of rigorous analysis and planning, despite the huge amounts invested there.

15More generally, when one considers the ambitious plans CIDA (2008a) laid out in its core guidance document, it is quite clear that conceptual clarity and organizational robustness were primary goals in principle and rhetoric. Under Paul Martin, CIDA spoke of whole-of-government approaches and using new instruments such as the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) to more effectively engage fragile states. CIDA recognized that there was a need to have a strong operational capacity to deliver aid in flexible and responsive ways, including through Program Support Units.

16At the OECD/DAC level, with the exception of the INCAF working group (which is a forum for knowledge sharing and learning across various donors, and tracks resource flows to fragile states), none of the initiatives has been properly realized. The Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation Network, which was meant to mainstream conflict prevention and peacebuilding in development cooperation, is now a portal for training, but has been usurped by INCAF as a shared analytical resource.

17Similarly, the Harper government halted, within a year of being elected in 2006, the whole-of-government initiatives, including the engagement of civil society and support of knowledge networks. Canada Corps, an interdepartmental body based within CIDA to promote good governance, mutated into the Office for Democratic Governance for a brief period and was then abandoned in 2007. Neither CIDA’s Policy Branch nor its geographical branches fully incorporated the available analytical tools and networks it had helped develop into its operational decision-making processes (CIFP 2006).

18When we consider how much analytical capacity the Canadian government has abandoned since 2005, it is sobering and disappointing, to say the least. These include several tools such as the “Conflict and Peace Analysis and Response Manual” (FEWER 1999) and the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA), which were never fully operationalized and integrated into policy making. The potential impact on CIDA policy of its own Peacebuilding Unit, DFAIT’s GPSF (abandoned in 2013), and CIFP, to name a few, were also never fully internalized. Indeed, prior to 2006, CIDA’s fragility policy was informed by other related initiatives that it supported and funded, including all those enunciated in the International Policy Statement (Canada 2005) – namely the Responsibilities Agency, the Human Security Agenda, the GPSF, and START. Yet, despite previous attempts by CIDA, along with its domestic and international partners, to build continuity and consistency, the road travelled was uneven and inconsistent, occasionally heading off into dead ends and unending roundabouts.

19The best example of this failure is the scandal-plagued PCIA initiative, also known as the Conflict Sensitivity Approach, which, had it been properly realized and managed, would have made CIDA a leader in the field of fragility analysis. The ingredients for success were there. Between 1997 and 2003, CIDA’s Peacebuilding Unit, under the direction of Susan Brown, played a key role in advancing the role of analysis, assessment, and conflict-sensitive programming in conflict-plagued regions. Together with a number of international partners, a variety of NGOs, the Africa Peace Forum in Kenya, the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Uganda, and the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies in Sri Lanka, CIDA pioneered the PCIA initiative. Domestic partners included the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and DFAIT’s Peacebuilding and Human Security Division.

  • 5 FEWER’s integrated approach has since become the basis for a number of methodological frameworks e (...)

20The PCIA initiative sought to create a series of tools to aid in programming and policy decision making. Though not concerned with fragile states per se, the initiative’s focus on early warning and early response, driven by objective analysis and risk assessment, clearly had much in common with recent efforts to enhance monitoring and assessment capability in fragile state environments. The PCIA initiative also sought to enhance research and policy networks in Canada, bringing together academics, policy makers, and members of the NGO community with expertise in monitoring and responding to conflict. Again, though the remit to monitor and assess fragile state environments went beyond issues of peace and conflict, the latter were nonetheless important pieces of the fragile state puzzle. Similarly, the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) methodology was built on the understanding that no single analytical approach, whether data- or judgment-based, was capable of adequately capturing the complexity of risk potential or of providing a sufficient foundation upon which to develop policy-relevant early warnings.5 The key contribution of the FEWER network was making explicit the fact that early warning represents a proactive political process whereby networks of organizations conduct analysis together in a collective effort to prevent likely events from occurring.

  • 6 Compare the original intent of PCIA (Bush 1998, 2013) with the final product (Conflict Sensitivity (...)

21Unfortunately, both the PCIA and the FEWER projects were never fully implemented, despite millions of dollars being spent through international and Canadian partners to support their rollout and development. The PCIA was modified so significantly that in the end it bore little resemblance to its original objective, which was to evaluate the impact of development assistance on conflict and fragility.6 PCIA tools paid for by CIDA through the CIFP project were also never applied. They were not even taken up by CIDA’s private sector and industrial relations units, where they could have played a role in strengthening multinational corporations and their corporate social responsibility obligations. DFATD has shown no interest in developing these tools, preferring to depend on foreign capacities such as those developed by Washington-based think tanks.

Political Challenges

22At the same time as the above issues became more complex and difficult to apprehend, the ability of CIDA to respond in a timely and appropriate manner to emerging fragile states problems decreased. In retrospect, the political challenges that it faced were probably more acute than anything related to the conceptual and analytical problems outlined above. Rare is the example where CIDA ever made a straightforward and compelling case for immediate, swift, and directed action – in spite of over twenty-five years of investment in preventive strategies, legal doctrines, and tools and capabilities for prevention and early warning. Indeed, a more compelling case can be made for developing bureaucratic responses that tend to be biased towards addressing symptoms, while deeper structural and cultural factors and related power asymmetries were left to unfold more or less on their own. For CIDA, this result is partly a consequence of a default or “lowest common denominator” political strategy in which efforts were made to be the least offensive to the largest number of people and partner countries, regardless of what the evidence suggested.

23Indeed, since 2008, CIDA has emphasized the need for more effective democratic systems, respect for human rights, and gender equality (CIDA 2008ab), but has very little to show for efforts in the most egregious cases of state fragility (such as the aforementioned Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Sudan). This is mostly because the rhetoric rarely matched the reality, despite significant amounts of money being spent. The impact of such efforts, if any, was modest and the desire to pursue the least controversial policies was preferred over taking a hard, focused, and purposeful line (National Post 2012; Toronto Star 2013).

24In brief, despite being handed an excellent opportunity to stake new ground on state fragility after 9/11, CIDA faced an existential identity crisis more serious than any other major bureaucracy in the Canadian government. It faced two problems in this regard. First, CIDA has always been an easy target for criticism. It has been expected to deliver stability, security, and economic development to vastly underdeveloped fragile states, while still being held accountable to both Canadian taxpayers and its political masters. However, CIDA’s Policy Branch never really tried to make the case that its aid was having a meaningful impact. The fact that CIDA had within its own leadership circles those who wanted it to integrate fully with DFAIT was not helpful. It is difficult to strike a bold independent course when that process is being undermined internally.

  • 7 DFAIT (whose contributions were historically focused on the regional, political, and diplomatic si (...)

25This was certainly the case in Afghanistan, where CIDA was criticized for not meeting its objectives and DFAIT, despite having failed to deliver on its promises of regional stability, was not (Maloney 2008; National Post 2012). In particular, Pakistan’s influence on Afghanistan was all but ignored by the Canadian government – even though that country’s impact on Afghanistan would have been DFAIT’s responsibility.7 It is possible that Canada’s representatives on the ground knew all along that Pakistan was undermining the Canadian mission, but their views apparently did not influence the policy process back in Ottawa (Carment 2011). In all aspects of policy making, from strategic analysis to public debate and intergovernmental cooperation, Canada appeared to have had no significant internal evaluation of or policy on Pakistan and the region until it introduced a rather undersized and somewhat superficial Canada Border Services Agency–led border training program in 2008, and initiated and supported the Dubai Peace process around the same time.

26The second problem was the continuing lack of real and genuine interest within the donor community, but within CIDA in particular, in evidence-based decision making other than that which is narrowly focused on the state and state security. This major lack of interest characterized the Canadian government even before the election of the Conservatives in 2006, but has been acutely problematic since then. To recognize this as a genuine dilemma is, on one hand, to come to terms with the political nature of response (let alone effective response) by donor agencies. On the other hand, no self-respecting policy analyst at CIDA publicly decried the lack of space for decisions formed on the basis of good empirical evidence. That fact and the unwillingness at the political level to do things based on evidence unless it is expedient have been disconcerting. Canada’s failure to heed the evidence may well come home to roost as the situation in the Middle East worsens.

27Perhaps advocacy and the incredible force that thousands of blogs represent can generate change in fragile states, but they are clearly not enough to elicit behavioural and attitudinal change within the Harper government. It is a sad fact that the Harper government does not draw on structured and systematic analysis to generate policy (Carment and Samy 2010). Most frameworks are used for the purposes of lobbying and advocacy, but these should not be mistaken for operational response.

28The reality for CIDA was that it invested in fire inspectors (and fire brigades for when the inspections fail or are ignored), but not enough in the political processes around how it helps build all kinds of different buildings (extending the fire analogy to states and other structures that are supposed to create security). To complicate this further, the response to violence, armed violent conflict, and fragility tends to be more controversial politically than responding to health pandemics or even a humanitarian crisis. CIDA did not even do ex ante assessments in order to “do no harm” where it was working.

29Tackling the structural problems of fragility has been the biggest challenge for CIDA, in part because no politician will reap any political gain. Paradoxically, information about impending problems is always heard, but rarely heeded. As a result, the default policy and operational response is not so much to ignore these warnings as to limit the response to what is politically expedient, rather than to undertake the steps necessary to be able to respond at the level that would be needed over the long term to deal with deep-seated structural risks.


  • 8 The so-called New Deal for international engagement in fragile states is an innovative model of pa (...)

30As aid flows increased since the early 2000s and larger funding envelopes became available for fragile states, donors were in a position to do immense good. However, they can also do harm if they fail to assess the impact of their actions. In fragile contexts, donors such as Canada have an even greater responsibility to ensure that aid is carefully monitored by applying impact assessment tools at every stage. This would help countries at the bottom of the fragility spectrum, including those that have signed up for the New Deal, improve their political, economic, and social indicators.8

31As argued and explained above, CIDA, despite good intentions, faced several challenges in designing and implementing its fragile states policy. When it comes to realizing all the earlier work, conceptual development, and network building, its policy on state fragility was weakened to the point that by 2006 it could no longer claim leadership in the area. Evidence of this failure includes the failure to mainstream effective early warning and early response properly into the policy domains of government agencies; pockets of expertise are largely dwindling, and there remains limited synergy and sharing. Most of the support to the development of fragile states initiatives has been picked up by other donors. Canada has forfeited its leadership role in network development. The implications are significant for the inclusion of Southern perspectives into Northern decision-making processes, because the South has civil society networks to which Canada is no longer connected.

32Ad hoc, unstructured, and unsystematic approaches to state fragility within the Canadian government persist. Failed and fragile state policies are usually not informed by regular situation analyses. Where such analyses are factored into programming, it is often a “one-off” exercise or an external analysis that does not reflect local perspectives. The impact of prevention activities has been reduced because of a lack of coordination and strategy emanating from the Harper government, which is not interested in public policy. Frequently, key actors (including NGOs, governments, multilateral organizations, and civil society groups) operate in isolation and do not properly coordinate activities across sectors. This often results from a lack of common analysis and the lack of multi-agency planning forums for the development of joint prevention strategies. An important step would thus be the creation of an independent research body to provide crucial evidence-based frameworks and benchmarks for evaluating aid effectiveness, as well as critical analysis tools in support of aid allocation decisions.



Bush, Kenneth. 1998. “A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Development Projects in Conflict Zones.” Ottawa: IDRC.

Bush, Kenneth. 2013. “A Genealogy of PCIA: Setting PCIA within the Context of its Constitutive Evaluative Practices.” Internet, Accessed November 16, 2013.

Canada. 2005. Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World. Development. Gatineau, QC: CIDA.

Carment, David. 2011. “Afghanistan and the Regional Blindspot.” Embassy, January 26.

Carment, David, and Yiagadeesen Samy. 2010. “Haiti without Tears: Getting Aid Right.” Policy Options, April: 57–63.

Carment, David, and Yiagadeesen Samy. 2012. “Throwing Aid at Afghanistan is Not Working.” Embassy, July 18.

Carment, David, Yiagadeesen Samy, and Stewart Prest. 2009. “State Fragility and Implications for Aid Allocation: An Empirical Analysis.” Conflict Management and Peace Science, vol. 25, no. 4: 349–73.

Carment, David, Stewart Prest, and Yiagadeesen Samy. 2010. Security, Development and the Fragile State: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Policy. London: Routledge.

CIDA. 2008a. “An Internal Guidance Document for Development Cooperation in Fragile States.” Gatineau, QC: CIDA.

CIDA. 2008b. “Thought Leadership in Development: A Sampler of CIDA-Supported Knowledge Work and Innovations.” Gatineau, QC: CIDA.

CIFP. 2006. “Failed and Fragile States: A Concept Paper for the Canadian Government.” Internet, Accessed November 16, 2013.

Conflict Sensitivity Consortium. 2012. How to Guide to Conflict Sensitivity. Internet, Accessed November 16, 2013.

FEWER. 1999. “Conflict and Peace Analysis and Response Manual,” 2nd ed. London: Forum on Early Warning and Early Response.

Maloney, Sean. 2008. “Time to Reassess Canada’s Foreign Aid,” Policy Options. September: 28–34.

National Post. 2012. “Canada’s $1.5B Afghanistan Aid Effort Divorced from Reality according to Damning, Previously Unreleased Documents.” October 12.

North–South Institute. 2013. Canadian International Development Platform. Internet, Accessed November 16, 2013.

OECD. 2012. Fragile States 2013: Resource Flows and Trends in a Shifting World. Paris: OECD.

Toronto Star. 2013. “Canada Spent $10 Million for Security at Afghan Dam Project.” March 13.


1 Baranyi and Khan, this volume, examine Canadian assistance to five specific conflict-affected and fragile states: Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Mali, Pakistan, and Palestine (West Bank and Gaza).

2 Canadian aid data was obtained from the North-South Institute (2013).

3 This is not an unfair assumption because countries tend to remain fragile for long periods of time and most are still classified as fragile by various organizations.

4 David Carment is principal investigator of this project and Yiagadeesen Samy senior research associate. The CIFP project has received funding from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Department of National Defence, and CIDA, among others.

5 FEWER’s integrated approach has since become the basis for a number of methodological frameworks employed by the UN system and national governments.

6 Compare the original intent of PCIA (Bush 1998, 2013) with the final product (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium 2012).

7 DFAIT (whose contributions were historically focused on the regional, political, and diplomatic side of the ledger) and CIDA had complementary international mandates and significant programming and operational resources for crisis response and fragile states. DFAIT’s START and GPSF were supposed to support important targeted responses to international crises, peacebuilding, conflict prevention, security-system reform, and associated democratization work, as well as coordinate whole-of-government responses to natural disasters and complex emergencies.

8 The so-called New Deal for international engagement in fragile states is an innovative model of partnership between FCAS and their DAC development partners. Signed by forty countries, including Canada, it sets out five peacebuilding and state-building goals that are based on principles of country leadership rather than the dictates of the donor community.

Table des illustrations

Titre Figure 1: Canadian Aid Allocation to Fragile States, 2001–2010
Légende Source: Authors’ calculations
Fichier image/jpeg, 87k


Professor of International Affairs at Carleton University and has over eighteen years’ experience in policy relevant research on fragile states, conflict prevention, mainstreaming risk analysis, and aid allocation. He led a CIDA-funded initiative on mainstreaming research on failed and fragile states into policy making over the 2005–08 period. He also served on the OECD/DAC’s working group on fragile states. He has developed risk analysis training workshops for NGOs in Africa, Asia, and Europe. He is the editor of Canadian Foreign Policy Journal

Associate Professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University. He is also a Distinguished Research Associate with the North–South Institute in Ottawa. Samy holds a PhD in Economics and his fields of specialization are international trade and development economics. His current research focuses on aid and state fragility, aid and taxation, and income inequality. He recently co-edited (with Rohinton Medhora) the 2013 issue of the Canada among Nations series, which was on Canada–Africa Relations


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