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Jacob Bernays. Un philologue juif

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John Glucker
, 
André Laks

IV. Études sur la philosophie grecque

Antisthenes’ Prometheus Myth

Menahem Luz

Texte intégral

I wish to thank Prof. J. Glucker and Dr. T. Fenton for advice on an earlier version of this paper; its conclusions and any errors are my own; also thanks to the University of Texas at Austin for the use of their fine facilities during my sabbatical.

  • 1 G. Giannantoni, Socraticorum Reliquiæ (henceforth ‘Giannantoni, SR'), II (Napoli 1983), p. 357-359 (...)
  • 2 SR, II, fr. 96, Caizzi, fr. 27 = E. Sachau, Inedita Syriaca, Halle 1870, pp. 33 (Syriac text, whose (...)
  • 3 Themistius’ oration was probably delivered in Byzantium c. 380 A. D. (Bücheler, op. cit., p. 438) a (...)

1Little remains from Antisthenes’ dialogues known by the name of Hercules, although they had a considerable literary influence1. The longest complete fragment derives from Themistius’ oration, On Virtue, whose Greek is unfortunately lost2, but whose substance survives in an early Syriac version3. R. Mach has recently done much service in replacing Gildemeister’s translation of the Syriac with a more accurate one in Latin although that too is not free from error. I would like to examine the fragment anew and, at the same time, to offer a fresh translation of it.

  • 4 Cleanthes can be regarded as a major source in the transmission of our other citations from the Her (...)

2Themistius’ oration is a discussion of «arete, that is the excellence of the soul» (Sachau, p. 17), which is examined from the view-point of a number of schools (p. 8-29). The passage preceding our fragment, however, involves a discussion of such Stoic topics as Stilpo the Megarian (p. 30) and the virtue and prudence exemplified by Crates, Diogenes and Cleanthes (p. 32). This would much suggest that Themistius has employed some Stoic source for his following quotation from Antisthenes on this same theme (p. 33)4. Our fragment is here cited (Sachau’s line numbers in italics):

  • 5 «Reason» (malîlûthâ from root melâ = logos), and not prudentia (Mach), but rather «Vernunfmässigkei (...)
  • 6 The description of this way was promised on p. 21, where it is ascribed to Socrates, Antisthenes, v (...)

3«(5) But if you wish to know truly (6) that reason5 is an exalted thing, it is not on Plato (7) and Aristotle that I call as witnesses, but (8) on the wise Antisthenes. He it is who taught this way6 (9) for thus he says:

  • 7 «Your toil» (‘amlak), not «Handlungsweise» (Gildemeister), but labor tuus (Mach, referring to the e (...)
  • 8 «things of the world» (sabûthâ de ‘olmâ) rather than Mach's humana. Likewise, in the things of the (...)
  • 9 ‘his mind's reason and prudence’ (malîlûth hûnâ we ‘arîmûtha) rather than Mach's mentis suae pruden (...)
  • 10 Literally, «in these weaknesses and narrownesses»; perhaps κενὰ καὶ ἀσθεν(...)

4Prometheus said to (10) Hercules, ‘Your toil is very contemptible7 in that you are occupied with the things (11) of the world8 for you have abandoned concern for what is greater than (12) this (world). Indeed, you will be no complete man until (13) you learn those things which are more exalted than humans. But if you learn (14) these things, then you shall learn of human things too. But if (15) you learn only of what is here, you will wander like the wild beasts.’ (16) He then whose diligence is in the things of the world (17) and who has enclosed his mind’s reason and prudence (18)9 in what is weak and narrow10, is no wise man, as (19) said Antisthenes, but is like an animal (20) that takes pleasure in a dunghill» (p. 33, 5-20).

  • 11 I retain Sachau’s orthographic points; the non-Syriac, but Hebrew-Aramaic readers may note that her (...)

5To facilitate the text, I append a Hebrew transliteration of the Syriac11:

Image 10000000000001C8000001A31C843FF2513EB9D8.jpg

6This is the standard quotation for the fragment; but previous to Giannantoni, scholars were largely oblivious to the fact that Themistius directly continues with some lines which are pertinent to our subject:

7«(20) Indeed, exalted are all (21) heavenly things and it is befitting that we have exalted thought about them; (22) but if you are not persuaded by that man, raise (23) your sight to heaven and think on how much is the space from here to there» (p. 33, 20-23).

Image 10000000000001AA0000006D4C158E5831EDD496.jpg

8It is fairly clear from the text where our fragment begins (1.9: «Prometheus said...»); but one may wonder for what arbitrary reason the scholars have supposed that it ends at line 20 («in the dung-hill»)? A definite outer limit for the subject matter may be indicated by Themistius’ words to his audience (in the plural) in 1.22 («but if you are not persuaded by that man» - scil., Antisthenes). Yet there is no real reason for dismissing lines 20-21 as part of our fragment as well. Furthermore, there are two point that may confirm this more positively:

    • 12 a) lam is an untranslated «particle used in quoting another’s words» (Jennings-Gantillon, Lexikon t (...)

    On philological grounds, it seems that the two particles in 1.20, g’er lam, here indicate a continuation of a quotation12.

    • 13 We are promised a proof that «reason is exalted» (1.5-6) which emerges only in 1.20-21 and not in t (...)

    On contextual grounds, it may be understood that lines 20-21 are a logical extension of lines 16-20 and thus a continuation of what is directly ascribed to Antisthenes in lines 19-2013.

  • 14 Unlike Cleanthes, Antisthenes and the Cynics had little time for formal science. Cf. Luz, op. cit.,(...)

9However, while future discussions of Antisthenes, should quote the continuation of our fragment in lines 20-21 along with the standard extract from Themistius, I have serious doubts concerning Giannantoni’s addition of 1.22-23. While Themistius obviously indicates the end of the fragment in 1.22, the continuation in 1.23-24 have astronomical/astrological implications, that are alien to Antisthenes, and more akin to Cleanthes’ interests and his Stoic interpretation of the dialogue14. However, by omitting 1.23-24. we can obviate part of the criticism discussed by Giannantoni, in that Prometheus could not otherwise express Antisthenes’ own opinion.

  • 15 Cf. the punctuation in the translations of Gildemeister and Mach; 1.16-20 are «as said Antisthenes» (...)

10A more obvious point sometimes overlooked in discussions of our fragment concerns its literary style. It is fairly clear that Antisthenes is quoted only from a point in the Hercules where he cites a set-speech of Prometheus (1.10-15), but he seems to be also quoted as speaking in persona in lines 16-21 (cf. 1.19)15. The latter would then be Antisthenes’ personal interpunctuation after the speech of a character in his dialogue (and possibly also before any reply made by Hercules to Prometheus). Both these points can be supported from other sources as we know that:

  1. Antisthenes’ dialogues had a rhetorical flavour and thus were probably marked by his use of set-speeches.

    • 16 S R, II, VA95; Caizzi, fr. 28-where Antisthenes interjects a remark on Achilles’ picture; D. L., VI (...)

    In at least one instance, Antisthenes is known to have introduced a character of the Hercules in person16.

  • 17 F. Dümmler, Antisthenica, Berlin 1882, p. 6 n. Cf., e.g., Xenophon, Symp., I, 1; Mem., 1.1. Aeschin (...)

11However, Dtimmler also raised the hypothesis, that these mythological scenes were examples raised in a discussion by Antisthenes, rather than composed as independent episodes of the dialogue itself. However, either possibility could allow Antisthenes’ to interject his own remarks in the middle of the discussion although the usage of other Socratic writers was to raise myths as part of a dialogue form17.

  • 18 Dio, Or., VIII. 3. Cf. E. Weber, «De Dione Chysostomo Cynicorum Sectatore», Leipziger Studien, IX. (...)
  • 19 Dio may derive his joke on typhos from Antisthenes (Caizzi, fr. 97a-b, 151 and p. 96 n.) compare Di (...)

The context of our passage, is, however, more difficult to assess since Themistius is our only source where this Prometheus episode is attributed to Antisthenes. According to Themistius’ probably Stoic sources, Antisthenes seemingly used Prometheus to prove that reason is an exalted thing (above, n. 5) and thus as a positive mentor of Hercules. Some scholars, however, have denied this and, relying on Dio Chrysostom, have maintained that Antisthenes painted a figure of Prometheus in a more negative aspect - subsequently changed by Themistius or his tradition18. Dio indeed describes a meeting between Hercules and the sophist, Prometheus, who is tortured by popular opinion and suffers not from the traditional eagle, offspring of Typhon, but from his own typhos and contentiousness19: τὸν δὲ Προμηθέα, σοϕιστήν τινα, ἐμοὶ δοκεImage 10000000000000080000000FD265E28844373B75.jpgν, καταλαβών (scil., ὁ ἩρακλImage 10000000000000080000000F07744FC2FCC4C40F.jpgς ὑτὸ δοξης ἀπολλύμενον, νImage 100000000000000B0000000FC18BCD8ACB6A461F.jpgν μὲν οἰδοImage 100000000000000B0000000FC18BCD8ACB6A461F.jpgντος αὐτImage 100000000000000A0000000F7789B14F01A68189.jpg καὶ αὔξοντος τοImage 100000000000000B0000000FC18BCD8ACB6A461F.jpg ἤπατος ὁπότε ἐπαινοImage 10000000000000080000000FD265E28844373B75.jpgτο, πάλιν δὲ ϕθίνοντος ὁπότε ψέγοιεν αὐτόν, ἐλεήσας καὶ ϕοβήσας <...> ἔπαυσε τοImage 100000000000000B0000000FC18BCD8ACB6A461F.jpg τύϕου καὶ τImage 10000000000000080000000F07744FC2FCC4C40F.jpgς ϕιλονικίας (Dio, Or., VIII, 33).

  • 20 Höistad, op. cit., p. 59, n. 7, summarizing Weber; but J. W. Cohoon (Dio Chrysostom, I, Loeb Librar (...)

12There are signs that this tradition may be connected with that of Themistius although Dio does not claim to quote Antisthenes and there is an obvious contrast between both accounts. Since, according to Dio, it is Hercules who relieved Prometheus of his vanity, it has been suggested that we read into our Themistius passage not the words of Prometheus to Hercules (as explicitly indicated in our fragment), but rather the words of Hercules to Prometheus, the sophist, whom the hero admonished. It has thus been suggested that one «quite simply changes the subject and complement in the Themistius text»20.

  • 21 Hercules’ wandering on his exploits is traditional (H. J. Rose, A Handbook of Greek Mythology, Lond (...)
  • 22 Them., Or., XXVII, 338b-c (Downey-Norman, II, p. 163, 12-17); also Or., XXVI, 323 c (Downey-Norman, (...)

13I think, however, that an unprejudiced reader will find that the text of our fragment will not bear out such a change. The words «your toil» (1.10), can be but remotely connected with Prometheus’ sufferings, but do have a special meaning when spoken to Hercules (see above, n. 7). Furthermore, the remark, «you shall wander like the wild beast» (1.15), can only have reference to Hercules when addressed by Prometheus21. We should thus conclude that our original text did refer to Prometheus’ admonition of Hercules, and not vice versa. Moreover, we cannot still maintain that Themistius took Prometheus for a sophist as did Dio; for he uses Prometheus’ admonition as part of his witness that reason is exalted (1.5-8), and in a discussion of reason and prudence (1.17). Now elsewhere, Themistius had similarly attributed to Prometheus the role of the one who sowed the seeds of logos, nous and phronesis in man’s soul22. We thus cannot understand him as referring to anything other than a positive philosophical figure of Prometheus.

  • 23 Cicero, Tusc., V, 8.10; Theophrastus, in: schol. in Apoll. Rhod., II, 1248 (Wendel, p. 212). Here P (...)
  • 24 Julian, Or, VI, 182 c-d.

14However, while it can be shown that Dio altered his tradition, it would seem that Themistius had good precedent for his interpretation of Prometheus’ role in a discussion of reason as exalted and celestial (1.6, 20 and 21). An early tradition makes Prometheus the one who had’ caelestium divina cognitio’ and who was the source of philosophy for mankind23. Themistius’ figure of Prometheus in our fragment and Orations XXVI-XXVII (above, n. 22) is in fact similar to Julian’s Cynic interpretation of Prometheus who distributes logos and nous to mankind24.

  • 25 Cf. Pherecydes (FGrH, IA3, F17); Herodorus (FGrH, IA31, F13-14); Hoistad, op. cit., p. 29, 57, 70. (...)

It would thus seem that Themistius would not have radically altered his tradition when he made Prometheus a philosophical figure involved in a discussion of «the mind’s reason and prudence» (1.17). Not so much can be said for Dio, however, who admits in so many words that «it seemed to me» (ἐμοὶ δοκεImage 10000000000000080000000FD265E28844373B75.jpgν) that Prometheus was a sort of sophist. It would thus appear that Dio was the one who reinterpreted his tradition, and not Themistius. Dio does, none the less, add some information which can help us reconstruct the dramatic background of the episode in Themistius. He continues in the above passage to refer to the myth in which Prometheus advises Hercules not to go after the golden apples of the Hesperides, but rather to send Atlas in his stead (Apollodorus, Bibl., II, v, 11). Much of this myth was given an ethical significance at various times and Dio’s tradition conforms when he makes Hercules have no need for the apples as man has no use for apples made of gold (Or., VIII, 34)25.

  • 26 In the following argument, I will ignore the 19th century comparison of Hercules-Prometheus to Plat (...)
  • 27 Caizzi, fr. 108a-113 (especially fr. 109a). See Guthrie, op. cit., p. 307-308.

15Prometheus’ role in this dialogue would thus seem to have been not only that of a philosophical figure, but also that of a positive influence on the hero, who encountered him on his quest for the golden apples26. We should, however, particularly examine his criticism of the hero since it is known that Antisthenes made Hercules an example to prove that toil (ponos) was a good thing (Diogenes Laertius, VI, 2)-although its ethical value presumably depended on the circumstances (cf., e.g., Xenophon, Symp., IV, 35). Our fragment, however, makes Hercules’ toil very contemptible because of his concern for worldly things (1.10-11); and since such concern is compared to animal pleasures (1.16-20), we should understand that Hercules had, as it were, vitiated his toils through his concern for worldly pleasures. Now this is precisely the point which we can detect in Antisthenes’ fragments where he says that one should pursue those pleasures which come after ponoi, and not those which come before (Caizzi, fr. 113). Furthermore, Antisthenes rejected physical pleasure and attributed the pursuit of them to the ignorant27 just as our fragment compares those who pursue worldly things (1.6) to the unwise and the animal who takes pleasure in dung (1.18-20). We could thus understand the ethical content of our passage to mean that Hercules’ toil was contemptible since he was pursuing pleasure first and that the hero was unwise because of this.

  • 28 On phronesis as a defence-wall of the soul, see Caizzi (fr. 63, 88, 91), who notes the connection w (...)
  • 29 D. L., VI, 13 (Caizzi, fr. 88, 63) from Diodes.
  • 30 Both Bücheler (op. cit., p. 450-452) and Dittmar (op. cit., p. 304) compare Heraclitus speaking aga (...)
  • 31 Plato, Resp., 363d; D. L., VI, 39 (Diogenes); Dio, Or., IV, 31 (on Hercules), 104; Them., Or., XX, (...)

16At another level, we can discover a more positive aspect in Prometheus’ criticism - especially in his attempt to turn the hero towards reason and prudence. We may firstly note that Prometheus’ admonition, that «he ... who has enclosed his mind’s reason and prudence in weak and narrow things is no wise man» (1.17-18 and above, n. 8), does resemble Antisthenes’ own favourite siege-metaphor of the soul, which has been thought to have been employed in this dialogues elsewhere28. In this metaphor, Antisthenes describes the walls of the soul as steadfast and without breach (Caizzi, fr. 90). Elsewhere, he states that phronesis is a most sure wall of defence for it does not crumble, nor is it betrayed - and we should construct walls of defence in our own impregnable reasonings (logismoi)29. In these terms, we can reconstruct our fragment to mean that the wise man does not «enclose his mind’s reasoning (cf. logismos) and prudence (cf. phronesis) in weak and narrow <walls>» (1.17-18) as in concern for worldly things (1.16). It is particularly significant that he who does so is said to be like an animal that takes pleasure in dung (1.19-20)-a point connected by some with Heraclitus30. However, the latter’s example of men who take pleasure in dung seems to be employed, if at all, out of its original relativistic context since it is here used to describe those who are ethically ignorant (1.17-18). Our fragment’s use of this comparison is in fact closer to the way in which Plato and the Cynics ironically employed the Orphic concept of wallowing in mud in order to describe «the uninitiated» in wisdom and virtue31. It is thus more likely that our fragment refers to those who have not fortified their soul with reason and prudence as they were uninitiated in virtue and like the animals who wallow in dung.

  • 32 On Virtue, p. 33, 24-34 (Sachau). Themistius continues to discuss celestial motions and distances ( (...)

17It is especially interesting that Hercules is here exhorted to learn what is more exalted than humans (1.13) since a cardinal feature of the Hercules was that arete was learnt (Diogenes Laertius, VI, 10; 105). However, although our fragment is indeed cited in a general discussion of arete, it seems more likely that here Hercules was meant to learn reason(ing). Themistius’ introduction to it, for instance, promises to prove that «reason is an exalted thing» (1.6) so that we can make the most sense out of Prometheus’ words when we interpret «exalted things» to mean «exalted reasonings (logismoi)». Prometheus, for example, advises the hero that if he were to learn exalted things, then he would learn of human things as well - but that he would wander like the beasts if he were to learn only human things (1.13-15). These lines would make the best sense when the hero is meant to learn exalted reasonings for only thus could he learn of human things as well - but that he would indeed be like an (unreasonable) beast, were he learn only of human affairs. Moreover, Themistius’ and probably Antisthenes’ concluding words to our passage note that it befits man to have exalted thought about heavenly things (1.20-21). By the same token then, we should understand man’s goal as to have reasonable thought about the heavenly things since Themistius continues from here to interpret this to mean that man is aware of the distance from heaven and contemplates the sun, moon, and stars with quietude (viz., in tranquil reason)32.

  • 33 D. L., VI, 105 (Caizzi, fr. 23) from the Hercules; VI, 12 (Caizzi, fr. 71 and n.). Also F. Decleva (...)

18When we therefore read that Hercules will be no complete man until he learns exalted things (1.12-13), we should understand that his arete is not complete since he has not yet learned of reasoning. Such a conclusion would mean that not only was arete learnt in this dialogue, but also logismos. Since the latter is also an impregnable wall of defence, it would be that which makes virtue something that cannot be lost (anapobleton) in this dialogue and a weapon not to be confiscated (anaphaireton hoplon)33. If our hero were then to learn reasoning, he would establish his virtue on a strong foundation and not enclose it «in what is weak and narrow».

  • 34 D. L., VI, 11 (Caizzi, fr. 70 and n.) - «a Socratic strength» reminds us of Antisthenes’ Hercules t (...)
  • 35 Caizzi, fr. 64 and n. = SR, II, VA163; Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini, Firenze 1989, f (...)

19There is one fragment from this dialogue, however, which poses a problem and has to be reconciled with the above interpretation: «Virtue is self-sufficient for happiness and needs nothing in addition save for a Socratic strength; virtue is of deeds and has need neither for very many arguments (logoi pleistoi) nor lessons»34. Since it is well established that arete was learnt according to the Hercules, this fragment could not mean that virtue has no need for any arguments at all, but rather that its teaching was in a few («not very many») arguments. This is partially substantiated by Caizzi’s reconstruction of an old fragment with new evidence where those about to become good men have to train their bodies with exercises and their souls with logoi35. Here the training of the soul with logoi is a prerequisite for those on the road to virtue. The advance of Hercules on this road would then also need a training in (not very many) logoi - and if my interpretation of Themistius is correct, this would be in «reasoning». The hero’s virtue would, as the above (n. 34) has it, be of deeds, which, however, would prove to be what Prometheus calls «contemptible toil» if not accompanied by a few basic logoi on reasoning. Such an interpretation must still be reconciled with the first section of this fragment, where virtue «is self-sufficient for happiness» with no need for anything else save a Socratic (moral) strength. This could not mean that Hercules’ virtue would have no need for anything else to produce it since it has, as we have seen, a need for a few logoi. Rather his virtue has no need for anything else but a moral strength to carry it through when already acquired.

  • 36 Caizzi, fr. 69 n. ; Guthrie, op. cit., chap. X.
  • 37 Cf. Caizzi, fr. 64 and n., p. 110 (ὁ δὲ ϕιλόσοϕος τὴν ϕύσιν ἐξσιμερο(...)

20Hercules’ moral strength would be in his natural nobility which he would have used also for the production of virtue when he learned arete. Otherwise, it would be difficult to imagine how Antisthenes could claim at one and the same time: «Virtue is learnt and the same people are nobly born (eugeneis) who are also virtuous (enaretoi)» (Diogenes Laertius, VI, 10-11). On the surface, this fragment enunciates two slogans that were generally polarized in the fifth century: that of arete acquired through learning and that of arete as the product of physis and the prerogative of the eugeneis36. On the whole, it would seem more probable that Antisthenes could have combined both ideas in the way he did if he had suggested that arete was acquired by those with a natural propensity (Socratic strength), as in the case of Hercules, but only when they had been taught what virtue and reason were37.

  • 38 Cf. S R, II, VA 92; Caizzi, fr. 24a-c and n.; Höistad, op. cit., p.36. But note: Antisthenes is not (...)
  • 39 Hercules’ meeting with Chiron (Caizzi, fr. 24a-c) is included in a story on Chiron’s wound (Ps-Erat (...)

21If my argument is so far correct, this would mean that our testimony from Themistius reflects a description of Hercules who, though in possession of a natural Socratic strength, had not yet fortified his soul with reasoning. Were the hero to learn a few lessons in this, he would understand human affairs as well as completing his education. Until then, his deeds would be void and lack true virtue. A number of problems, however, are raised by our fragment: 1) Themistius’ classification of the human and exalted is not known from our extant fragments; 2) It has generally been supposed that Hercules had learnt arete from the wise Centaur, Chiron38, prior to his encounter with Prometheus - whose criticism of our hero would thus call for some explanation39. Hercules’ activities before meeting him would here be really a dramatic corollary of Antisthenes’ explanation of the way in which we acquire virtue.

  • 40 Höistad, op. cit., p. 58-he also compares to Themistius: Dio’s human education as mikra kai asthene (...)

22Höistad has proposed an interesting parallel to our fragment: Dio Chrysostom ascribes to Diogenes a system of «double-education» for Hercules (Or., IV, 29-31)-that of daimonios paideia and that of anthropine (29), whereby whoever has the former will easily acquire the latter in a few easy lessons (31). Höistad is, in my opinion, correct to compare this to lines 13-14 of our fragment, where learning what is exalted enables man to learn what is human as well40 - although I would add that «the divine» need once more be reason if it is to help one understand human paideia after a few easy lessons. However, where I would disagree with Hôistad is in his claim that Prometheus taught Hercules divine paideia while Chiron taught him arete. Firstly, Dio is quite clear in classifying the virtues (andreia, megalophrosyne) under divine paideia (30-31) so that whoever taught Hercules the latter would have also taught him arete. Secondly, the classification in Dio is not one of divine education and arete, but one of divine and human education.

23Now the divine education in Dio has some distinct parallels with my own interpretation of the background to Themistius. Not only does it, as we have seen, help one to understand human education as a type of reason, but it is also characterized as follows:

  1. It cannot be confiscated (οὐδεὶς ἂν... ἀϕέλοιτο, IV, 32) just as virtue is anaphaireton in Antisthenes.

  2. It is acquired by a man like Hercules who is noble by nature (ὃστις ἂν ἐκείνην τὴν παιδείαν ἔχῃ καλImage 100000000000000D0000000F6AD4978328F01ADD.jpgς πεϕυκώς, IV, 31) just as the eugeneis are the virtuous in our fragments.

    • 41 On something like divine and human teaching in Antisthenes, see Caizzi, fr. 173; on the lessons of (...)

    It is easy (IV, 29) and has no need for manifold logoi (38) just as virtue has no need for many logoi in Antisthenes41.

24Höistad would then be correct to see Dio as derived from Antisthenes and to understand Prometheus as teaching something like Dio’s divine education-as long as it is clear that here is meant the completion of the natural virtues with a few logoi on reason. If this is so, then we may well suspect that Themistius’ learning human things would likewise correspond to Dio’s human paideia. The latter is, as we have seen, «small and weak» (IV, 29) as in Themistius (above, n. 40). Moreover, our fragment has Hercules wander like the beasts if he learns only human things (1.15) while, in Dio, the sophist, who professes human education, is made to wander (peplanemenos) like dogs at the hunt and to lead the man (like Hercules) astray as well (IV, 33-34, 37).

25Dio, however, makes it clear that human education consists of booklearning and grammata (IV, 30), but is full of «many dangers» and apate since it can «wear out» those already virtuous (33, 38) - while reading «very many books» does not in itself contribute towards virtue (30). Nonetheless, human education does have an ethical value in such a system of «double -education» although the man like Hercules will learn from it only its «chief and most important points» in a few lessons (31, 33, 38). In fact, human education is here meant to have an integral part in the formation of the virtuous man since «it must necessarily (anankaia) be added to that (divine education) if things are to become all right» (29-30). Surprising as such an ananke may at first sight appear in this context, it becomes abundantly clear in a similar passage from the Tabula Cebetis. Here the daimonion bids the people learn first what is useful from pseudopaideia (consisting of grammata and other human lessons as in Dio) and only then are they advised to turn to true paideia - although the Tabula later expresses Stoic (?) reservations about the nature of such an ananke in this command (Tab. Ceb., 1 1-13, 32-33). As in Dio, there are many dangers of apate and plane for the experts who study very many grammata (13, 34-35) and one is advised to learn from them only what is useful as an ephodion for the road to virtue (32-33). Both these texts then describe the basic lessons of human culture as a useful part of the virtuous man’s introduction to education: in Dio, it is a necessary part and in the Tabula, it is a prescribed preliminary. Both also see great dangers in studying too much of it.

  • 42 Caizzi, fr. 66 and n.; op. cit., p. 85.

At least two points of this discussion of human education can be found to correspond to the fragments of Antisthenes. The latter seems to have given a warning concerning the dangers of grammata in much the same terms as Dio and the Tabula: γρὰμματα γοImage 100000000000000B0000000FC18BCD8ACB6A461F.jpgν μὴ μανθάνειν ἔϕασκεν ὁ Ἀντισθένης τοὺς σώϕρονας γενομένους, ἵνα μὴ διαστρέϕοιντο τοImage 10000000000000080000000FD265E28844373B75.jpgς ἀλλοτρίοις (Diogenes Laertius, VI, 103)42. The fact that Antisthenes here speaks of those who have become temperate makes it clear that he refers to the value of grammata in the case of those who have already achieved virtue and not those who «are about to become good» and still at the stage of training their souls. Since, however, arete cannot be lost, the dangers described here cannot refer to the ‘perversion’ (diastrephesthai) of the temperate by others’ works, but rather to what Dio calls «the twisting around (periagein)» of the virtuous man by the sophist and his «wearing him out» (Or., IV, 33). In fact, the Tabula uses a phrase remarkably like that of Antisthenes to explain why the students should learn from pseudopaideia at all: ἵνα μὴ εἰς ἕτερα παρασπImage 100000000000000D0000000F6AD4978328F01ADD.jpgνται (33). Antisthenes could thus be seen as supplying these texts with their idea of the dangers of studying much human learning after the acquisition of virtue. It is also perhaps possible that their criticism of those who read many books and the various experts reflects Antisthenes’ criticism of experts in human learning (Caizzi, fr. 61, 158, 173).

26Of greater importance for our fragment from Themistius is the value of human education as a preliminary study to the divine in Dio since we have seen that Hercules has not yet achieved reason and is, presumably, at the stage just after human studies. In one of the fragments of the Hercules, Antisthenes expresses his own personal approval of Achilles (above, n. 16) who as a paidion, did well in serving Chiron for the sake of paideia (Caizzi, fr. 28). Since Achilles is a small child here, it is more likely that his education was in the basic lessons of human education than in the divine. In fact, to judge from an anecdote, «philosophy of the gods» would be taught by Antisthenes at a later stage of life when rhetoric was normally taught by others (Caizzi, fr. 173). In this section of the Hercules, Antisthenes would then be expressing his approval of Achilles’ readiness to serve for the sake of his basic human paideia - a point which the philosopher could not make without first also approving of these type of lessons themselves.

  • 43 Plu., de E apud Delphos, 387d. Cf. SR, III, 287d.

It would thus seem that the value of human education as a basis for Achilles’ arete in this dialogue would correspond to its value in the system of ‘double-education’ recorded in Dio and the Tabula. It would therefore make good sense if Hercules likewise studied human culture during his stay with Chiron. This tradition may possibly be reflected in Plutarch’s account of Hercules, who has not yet freed Prometheus and had not even discoursed with the sophists in the company of Chiron and Atlas (οὐδὲ τοImage 10000000000000080000000FD265E28844373B75.jpgς περὶ Χείρωνα καὶ Ἄτλαντα σοϕισταImage 10000000000000080000000FD265E28844373B75.jpgς)43. If this suggestion is correct and Hercules did learn of human education under Chiron, it would give added point to Prometheus’ criticism of the hero in Themistius by explaining Hercules’ activities prior to his encounter with him and connecting them with the system of «double-education».

  • 44 For background, see: Knaack, in: RE, VI, 1 s.v. «Eratosthenes» cols. 377-81; J. Martin, Histoire du (...)

27Our main testimonies dealing with Antisthenes’ description of Hercules’ stay at Chiron’s «school» are preserved in a highly complex tradition related to the late (third-fourth century A. D.) epitome of Ps.-Eratosthenes. Various Aratea and Germanicus scholia may reflect an earlier version of the epitome, or its sources44. At any rate, this epitome cites Antisthenes’ Hercules from a point where the hero comes to stay with Chiron and listens to him (Caizzi, fr. 24a) - the epitome continuing to add how both held conversations (homilountes) in reference to its own myth on Chiron’s wound and elevation to the stars as the constellation Centaurus (Ps-Erat., Cat., 40). Although Ps.-Eratosthenes has nothing to say concerning the subjects which Hercules heard from Chiron, we do possess two Germanicus scholia which make it quite clear that originally the whole of the Centaur’s teaching programme was indeed devoted to the normal «cycle» of human learning. The third-fourth century scholia Basiliensia note:

  • 45 A. Breysig, Germanici Caesaris Aratea cum Scholiis, Berlin 1867, p. 90, 17-19; the late schol. Stro (...)

a quo [scil., Chirone] Aesculapius medicinam, Achilles citharam, in astrologia Herculeslitteras didicisse dicantur etc45.

  • 46 On archetypes: C. Robert, Eratosthenis Catasterismorum Reliquiae, Berlin 1878, p. 209; on conflatio (...)

28This early scholium is based on material which antedates the 2nd-3rd century Ampelius, who abbreviates much the same account (Liber Memorialis, II, 9). We cannot, however, say that Ampelius and this scholiast simply complete the epitome’s citation from Antisthenes since Ps.-Eratosthenes refers to the tradition of those scholars who identified Chiron with the constellation Centaurus (Cat., 40), while Ampelius and the scholiast are in the tradition of those other scholars who identified Chiron with Sagittarius-thus corresponding to a totally different section of Ps.-Eratosthenes (Cat., 28 fin.) although there would have been much conflation between them. The tenth century schol. Strozziana do correctly represent a combination of both these traditions by quoting Antisthenes alongside our information on Chiron’s educational programme (above, n. 45). It is, nevertheless, uncertain whether this scholiast does, in fact, represent the ‘archetypes’ of the earlier scholia, or is merely a late conflation46.

  • 47 FGrH, IA31, F13 (Herodorus); Libanius, Or., XIII, 48 (421) = Norman, II, p. 80-81; Luz, op. cit., p (...)

29The least, however, that we can say is that there was a tradition parallel to Ps.-Eratosthenes, but earlier than his extant epitome, which made Chiron teach purely human education and which was combined with citations from Antisthenes in much later times. This tradition on Chiron’s educational programme does correspond to what we found concerning Antisthenes’ education of Achilles. There is certainly no doubt that Hercules was meant to study under Chiron too - the problem being whether Hercules was meant to have studied human education and more precisely, ‘in astrologia litterae’. Our Themistius fragment can in fact be found to correspond to at least two point of this Germanicus tradition. If Hercules was meant to have studied human education under Chiron, it would virtually mean that Prometheus’ invective was inspired not only by Hercules’ occupation with worldly things (1.10-11), but also by his failure to complete his study of human things (1.15) under Chiron with a quick crash course on the divine. This would not necessarily mean a denigration of Chiron’s figure of the philosophical Centaur who taught arete to the heroes. Rather, it is Hercules’ failure to complete his education that is called in question - and with it, of course, the position of human education beyond its basic grammata. That the Aratea Latina take these litterae to concern astrologia is not an entirely novel idea. There are signs for the existence of this tradition even in pre-Antisthenean tales concerning Hercules47. However, in effect it ultimately reflects Themistius’ Stoic sources for the transmission and interpretation of this fragment. It is true that Antisthenes himself remarks in our fragment, that «exalted are all heavenly things and it is befitting that we have exalted thought about them» (1.20-21). However, we have seen that for Antisthenes, the «exalted» refers to the «reasonable» in a philosophical and ethical sense. Themistius, on his part, interprets «heavenly things» in reference to «heaven» itself (1.23), thus taking «exalted thought» to refer to the man, who, in tranquil (reason), contemplates the sun, moon and stars (1.24-25). If Themistius’ interpretation of these lines were correct, then Hercules could have originally come to Prometheus boasting an education in astrologia litterae, and for this have been rebuked by the Titan. However, it is unlikely that Antisthenes himself would have taken this simpliciter unless he made Prometheus point out to Hercules that any study of the celestial was not one of truly exalted (reason), the only thing that we should learn and apply to the study of the celestial. At the moment, however, this aspect of Hercules’ education must still remain mute at least as far as Antisthenes is concerned.

30I will here briefly close with a tentative proposal for reconstructing the position which our fragment occupies in the Hercules. The hero is endowed with a natural Socratic strength and turns to the philosophical Centaur for education in virtue. He is taught some basic lessons in human grammata in order to learn how to defend himself from human learning in the future. Without understanding reason, however, Hercules’ arete is still incomplete as is shown by his occupation with human things (as the golden apples?). He encounters Prometheus who rebukes him for still seeking things of false value. He is shown the true value of reason and its place in double education.

Notes

1 G. Giannantoni, Socraticorum Reliquiæ (henceforth ‘Giannantoni, SR'), II (Napoli 1983), p. 357-359 (frs. 92-99), III (Napoli 1985), notes p. 283-294; F. Decleva Caizzi, Antisthenis Fragmenta, Milan-Varese 1966 (henceforth ‘Caizzi, fr.’), frs. 22-28. Older editions in: FPG, II, p. 274-275; H. Dittmar, Aischines von Sphettos, Berlin 1912, p. 300-304. On its influence: M. Luz, «The Transmission of Antisthenes' Hercules in Hellenistic Philosophy and Literature», in: Hellenistic Philosophy (ed. C. Boudouris, Athens 1994); R. Höistad, Cynic Hero, Cynic King, Uppsala 1948, p. 47 ff., 64 ff. (and bibl.).

2 SR, II, fr. 96, Caizzi, fr. 27 = E. Sachau, Inedita Syriaca, Halle 1870, pp. 33 (Syriac text, whose pagination I use); R. Mach, in: Downey-Norman, Themistii Orationes, III, Stuttgart (BT) 1974, p. 43 (text and Latin trans.); GildemeisterBücheler, «Themistios Περὶ ἀρετς», Rheinisches Museum, 27, 1872, p. 480-481 (German trans. and notes).

3 Themistius’ oration was probably delivered in Byzantium c. 380 A. D. (Bücheler, op. cit., p. 438) and translated into Syriac in the sixth cent. (R. Duval, La littérature Syriaque, Paris 19073, p. 266-267), probably by Sergius of Rasa ‘in (A. Baumstark, Geschichte der syrischen Literatur, Bonn 1922, p. 169).

4 Cleanthes can be regarded as a major source in the transmission of our other citations from the Hercules for completely independent reasons; Luz, op. cit, p. 118-120.

5 «Reason» (malîlûthâ from root melâ = logos), and not prudentia (Mach), but rather «Vernunfmässigkeit» (Gildemeister), viz. ratio.

6 The description of this way was promised on p. 21, where it is ascribed to Socrates, Antisthenes, various Cynics and Stoics (who may be the source here).

7 «Your toil» (‘amlak), not «Handlungsweise» (Gildemeister), but labor tuus (Mach, referring to the erga of Hercules and his ponos in Antisthenes (cf. Caizzi, fr. 19 = D. L., VI, 2). «Contemptible toil» may translate oligou axios (cf. the Syriac version of Them., On Friendship, 48.18, 19 Sachau = Or., XXII, Downey-Norman, II, p. 52, 16) although Plato may suggest mataios ponos (Pl., Ti., 40d).

8 «things of the world» (sabûthâ de ‘olmâ) rather than Mach's humana. Likewise, in the things of the world’ (debesabûthâ de ‘olmâ) rather than Mach's rebus humanis in 1.16 below. The distinction between them will be important.

9 ‘his mind's reason and prudence’ (malîlûth hûnâ we ‘arîmûtha) rather than Mach's mentis suae prudentiam calliditatemque suam (cf. above n. 5 on malîlûthâ).

10 Literally, «in these weaknesses and narrownesses»; perhaps κενὰ καὶ ἀσθεν (Them., Or., XXXIII, 358d), or μικρὰ καὶ ἀσθεν (Dio, Or., IV. 29-see below, n. 40). In mythology, Hercules does encounter Prometheus in his search for the golden apples (Hygin., II. 5; Dio, Or., VIII. 34), which may be the object of Prometheus’ derision in Themistius.

11 I retain Sachau’s orthographic points; the non-Syriac, but Hebrew-Aramaic readers may note that here two points over a letter indicate a plural, while one dot over a verb indicates a present tense, and one under it a past.

12 a) lam is an untranslated «particle used in quoting another’s words» (Jennings-Gantillon, Lexikon to the Syriac New Testament, Oxford 1926, 112; also K. Brockelmann, Lexikon Syriacum, 1928, p. 366);
b)
gêr (deriving from Greek gar) is an expletive or causal particle (Jennings-Gantillon, op. cit., p. 47; Brockelmann, op. cit., p. 114), and here introduces a new statement rather than a cause.

13 We are promised a proof that «reason is exalted» (1.5-6) which emerges only in 1.20-21 and not in the fragment as it is normally cited.

14 Unlike Cleanthes, Antisthenes and the Cynics had little time for formal science. Cf. Luz, op. cit., p. 118; F. Dümmler, «Zum Herakles des Antisthenes», Philologus, 50, 1891, p. 290 n. 4.

15 Cf. the punctuation in the translations of Gildemeister and Mach; 1.16-20 are «as said Antisthenes» (1.19) and not ascribed to Prometheus.

16 S R, II, VA95; Caizzi, fr. 28-where Antisthenes interjects a remark on Achilles’ picture; D. L., VI, 1 (= Caizzi, fr. 7 and n.); W. K. C. Guthrie, The Sophists, Cambridge 1971, p. 311.

17 F. Dümmler, Antisthenica, Berlin 1882, p. 6 n. Cf., e.g., Xenophon, Symp., I, 1; Mem., 1.1. Aeschines of Sphettus, like Plato, does not seem to have spoken in persona in his extant fragments.

18 Dio, Or., VIII. 3. Cf. E. Weber, «De Dione Chysostomo Cynicorum Sectatore», Leipziger Studien, IX. 1, Leipzig 1886, 240; Dümmler, op. cit., p. 290. But see also: SR, III, 285; Hôistad, op. cit., p. 59; Caizzi, fr. 27 n. (p. 96).

19 Dio may derive his joke on typhos from Antisthenes (Caizzi, fr. 97a-b, 151 and p. 96 n.) compare Dio’s reuse of Prodicus’ «Choice of Hercules» where the hero stands between «Peak Royal» and «Peak Tyrannous named after Typhon» (Or., I, 67); also Them., Or., XXII, 280b (Downey-Norman, II, p. 71). The allegory itself can be traced as far back as Pherecydes’ Typhon (FrGrH, IA 3 F7; J. G. Frazer, Apollodorus, I, Loeb Library, 1921, 228, n. 2).

20 Höistad, op. cit., p. 59, n. 7, summarizing Weber; but J. W. Cohoon (Dio Chrysostom, I, Loeb Library 1932, p. 396, n. 1) would strengthen Weber by reading phrenosas for phohesas in Dio above - although the tragic pair of eleesas and phobesas is suitable here.

21 Hercules’ wandering on his exploits is traditional (H. J. Rose, A Handbook of Greek Mythology, London 1974, p. 205 et seq.) and popular among the Cynics (e.g., Ps.-Lucian, Cyn., 12-13) although it is not attested in Antisthenes’ frgs.

22 Them., Or., XXVII, 338b-c (Downey-Norman, II, p. 163, 12-17); also Or., XXVI, 323 c (Downey-Norman, II, p. 138).

23 Cicero, Tusc., V, 8.10; Theophrastus, in: schol. in Apoll. Rhod., II, 1248 (Wendel, p. 212). Here Prometheus gives man more than the crafts (Aeschylus, P.V., 254; Pl., Prtg., 322d).

24 Julian, Or, VI, 182 c-d.

25 Cf. Pherecydes (FGrH, IA3, F17); Herodorus (FGrH, IA31, F13-14); Hoistad, op. cit., p. 29, 57, 70. Here Dio’s reference to the need (deisthai) and use (ophelos) for the apples of luxury (Or., VIII, 34) seems especially Cynic, if not Antisthenean (Xenophon, Symp., IV, 39-44).

26 In the following argument, I will ignore the 19th century comparison of Hercules-Prometheus to Plato-Antisthenes (see: SR, III, 285 n.).

27 Caizzi, fr. 108a-113 (especially fr. 109a). See Guthrie, op. cit., p. 307-308.

28 On phronesis as a defence-wall of the soul, see Caizzi (fr. 63, 88, 91), who notes the connection with the Hercules (p. 110, 114). With this metaphor, cf. D. L., VI, 12 on virtue as a hoplon (FPG, II, p. 274).

29 D. L., VI, 13 (Caizzi, fr. 88, 63) from Diodes.

30 Both Bücheler (op. cit., p. 450-452) and Dittmar (op. cit., p. 304) compare Heraclitus speaking against the man who delights in the mire (Athenaeus, V, 178 f), but this belongs to his discussion on swine who enjoy mud unlike men (Vorsokr.5, 22B 13) and is part of a relativistic argument (Kirk-Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge 1964, p. 190; W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, I, Cambridge 1978, p. 445 n. 2).

31 Plato, Resp., 363d; D. L., VI, 39 (Diogenes); Dio, Or., IV, 31 (on Hercules), 104; Them., Or., XX, 240c (= Downey-Norman, II, p. 14, 19 (in contrast to Hercules); Julian, Or., VII, 238; VI, 217. On Antisthenes and the mysteries, see: Caizzi, fr. 162 and n. ; Höistad, op. cit., p. 58.

32 On Virtue, p. 33, 24-34 (Sachau). Themistius continues to discuss celestial motions and distances (p. 34, 1-4). Though Antisthenes is not known for any interest in astronomy, Themistius’ interpretation of the heavenly (1.21) may imply that Cleanthes is his source for Antisthenes.

33 D. L., VI, 105 (Caizzi, fr. 23) from the Hercules; VI, 12 (Caizzi, fr. 71 and n.). Also F. Decleva Caizzi, in: Studi Urbinati, 28, 1964, p. 85.

34 D. L., VI, 11 (Caizzi, fr. 70 and n.) - «a Socratic strength» reminds us of Antisthenes’ Hercules the Greater, or On Strength and his Hercules or On Prudence or Strength (D. L., VI, 16, 18). So also «virtue is of deeds (ergo)» reminds us of Hercules’ erga as arete. See also Caizzi (op. cit. above, n. 33, p. 67) on the ergon-logos contrast in Antisthenes.

35 Caizzi, fr. 64 and n. = SR, II, VA163; Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini, Firenze 1989, fr. 18, 1T, p. 237.

36 Caizzi, fr. 69 n. ; Guthrie, op. cit., chap. X.

37 Cf. Caizzi, fr. 64 and n., p. 110 (ὁ δὲ ϕιλόσοϕος τὴν ϕύσιν ἐξσιμερο) - new fragment).

38 Cf. S R, II, VA 92; Caizzi, fr. 24a-c and n.; Höistad, op. cit., p.36. But note: Antisthenes is not explicitly accredited with Chiron’s education of Hercules, which is only in schol. in Theocr. Id., XIII, 9b (FGrH, IA31, F17).

39 Hercules’ meeting with Chiron (Caizzi, fr. 24a-c) is included in a story on Chiron’s wound (Ps-Eratosthenes, Cat. 40); but his encounter with Prometheus is dependent on the latter (Apollodorus, Bibl., II, v. 4, 11; Diodorus Sic., IV, 12 fin.). See Rose, op. cit., p. 72-3, n. 59-60; Escher, in: RE, III, 2, s.v. «Chiron».

40 Höistad, op. cit., p. 58-he also compares to Themistius: Dio’s human education as mikra kai asthenes (Or., IV, 29 - above, n. 10) and his comparison of the sophist to dogs (33-34).

41 On something like divine and human teaching in Antisthenes, see Caizzi, fr. 173; on the lessons of philosophy, fr. 177, 174, 21a-b, 38. Höistad (op. cit., p. 159-60) correctly compares this theme in Dio to the Tabula Cebetis examined below. See also: J. F. Fitzgerald - L. M. White, The Tabula of Cebes, Cambridge 1983, p. 23; D. Pesce, La Tavola di Cebete, Brescia 1982, p. 81.

42 Caizzi, fr. 66 and n.; op. cit., p. 85.

43 Plu., de E apud Delphos, 387d. Cf. SR, III, 287d.

44 For background, see: Knaack, in: RE, VI, 1 s.v. «Eratosthenes» cols. 377-81; J. Martin, Histoire du texte des Phénomènes d’Aratos, Paris 1956, p. 38 ff., 63 ff; H. Le Bourdellès, L’Aratus Latinus, Lille 1985; A. Le Boeuffle, Hygin l’Astronome. Paris 1983, I-XVIII.

45 A. Breysig, Germanici Caesaris Aratea cum Scholiis, Berlin 1867, p. 90, 17-19; the late schol. Strozziana repeat the above adding cuius hospitio Hercules usus, sicut Antisthenes dicit etc. (Breysig, op. cit., p. 178, 9-10). Breysig believes that the name of the hero who studied astrologiam had dropped out; but there is no reason to change the text as Hercules is known to have studies this (below, n. 47).

46 On archetypes: C. Robert, Eratosthenis Catasterismorum Reliquiae, Berlin 1878, p. 209; on conflation: Dittmar, op. cit., p. 302-303.

47 FGrH, IA31, F13 (Herodorus); Libanius, Or., XIII, 48 (421) = Norman, II, p. 80-81; Luz, op. cit., p. 118-119.

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