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    Plan détaillé Texte intégral 1) The Imagination in the Critique of Pure Reason 2) The Ideal of Beauty 3) Aesthetic Normal Idea 4) The Aesthetic Normal Idea and the Comprehension of Forms 5) The Position of the Aesthetic Normal Idea in the System Notes de bas de page Auteur

    Esthétique et logique

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    How Far Can the Sensation Think? – An Inquiry into the Immanuel Kant’s Aesthetic Normal Idea in his Critique of Judgment

    Yasukuni Sato

    p. 71-83

    Texte intégral 1) The Imagination in the Critique of Pure Reason 2) The Ideal of Beauty a) Accessory Beauty b) Ideal of Beauty 3) Aesthetic Normal Idea a) The Aesthetic Normal Idea as a Standard b) Idealism and Empiricism c) The Possibility of the Aesthetic Normal Idea 4) The Aesthetic Normal Idea and the Comprehension of Forms 5) The Position of the Aesthetic Normal Idea in the System Notes de bas de page Auteur

    Texte intégral

    1) The Imagination in the Critique of Pure Reason

    1In this paper, I want to discuss the human capacity to think through forms, not through words. I will consider this issue with the help of Immanuel Kant’s concept of “imagination (Einbildungskraft)” as guidance. It is well known that among his three Critiques, Kant puts greatest emphasis on the capacity of “imagination” already in the Critique of Pure Reason. He calls the capacity the “productive imagination” and considers it to be one of the epistemic subject’s a priori capacities along with our intuition and understanding. If the imagination is, however, essentially our capacity to produce images (Bilder), that is, the capacity that strongly concerns forms, then Kant’s discussion in the Critique of Pure Reason is not necessarily convincing. In his first Critique, Kant introduces the capacity of imagination in the section of “the transcendental schema” in Book II “Analytic of Principles” of the first Division “transcenddental analytic”1. In the section, the imagination is presented as a capacity that combines two things of completely different nature – i.e., on one hand, the various contents of our intuition which is guided by passiveness and, on the other hand, our linguistically structured understanding which is, by contrast guided by activeness; the capacity of imagination hence must have a mediating third element that is homogeneous with the category, on one hand, and with appearance, on the other, that is to say, that is “intellectual (intellektuell)” on one hand and “sensible (sinnlich)” on the other. This mediating third element is characterized as something schematic – something that is called “the transcenddental schema”, which is produced by the “imagination”. In Kant’s writing, the idea is worded in such a delicate phrasing as “this representation of a universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept”2. For example, Kant presents the fact that we have the image of a triangle in a general manner, not particular triangles in a concrete manner, and also the fact that we have the image of a dog in general that goes beyond particular images of a dog.

    The concept ‘dog’ signifies a rule according to which my imagination can delineate the figure of a four-footed animal in a general manner, without limitation to any single particular forms such as experience, or any possible image that I can represent in concreto, actually presents. This schematism of our understanding, in its application to appearances and their mere form, is a technique concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze.3

    2To have our empirical recognition of a dog, it is not sufficient just to have particular sensible experiences of a dog and the images stimulated by these experiences; there must be a mediating universal concept applicable to all fourfooted animals in general. This concept however is not a concept of pure understanding, that is, a concept on the level of the categories, but is distinctively characterized as “a technique concealed in the depths of the human soul”. But we should keep in mind that this way of grasping schemata is a side issue in the Critique of Pure Reason and that the mainstream argument for schematism is rather about the way of understanding schemata as subsumed under a category. In that respect, his whole argument implies that the theme of form basically does not fit well with the line of argument presented in his Critique of Pure Reason. By great contrast, the theme is discussed elaborately as a main subject in the Critique of Judgment.

    2) The Ideal of Beauty

    a) Accessory Beauty

    3We can see a clear difference in Kant’s way of discussing the imagination in the Critique of Pure Reason and that in the Critique of Judgment. Simply put, in the third Critique, Kant considers the imagination to be closer to the intuition. In the first part of the book, Kant presents a discussion on the issue of aesthetic (ästhetisch) judgments, and in that discussion the capacity of imagination plays a principal role. There, Kant pushes the logical judgments to behind the scene and instead starts to discuss openly as a primary topic the judgments by the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, i.e., the judgments of taste. He calls the objects of the judgments of taste “free beauty”. But during the course of Kant’s arguments, we come across rather subtle issues that seem less related to the pure judgments of taste, though they may still be in the scope of the issue of aesthetic (ästhetisch) judgments.

    4One example of these less related issues is “accessory beauty (anhängende Schönheit)”, as opposed to free beauty, which Kant discusses in the Section 16, i.e., the second half of the argument about the third Moment of the judgments of taste presented in the “Analytic of the Beautiful”. Accessory beauty means such a quality obtained in the case we make a judgement of an object in light of the determination of what it has to be, i.e., the concept of its end, so as to find the object to be perfect in that respect. It presupposes a concept and hence is not the same as the beauty based on the pure judgments of taste. In judging the beauty of a horse, a building or else, there are cases in which we do so according to its concept: for example, a horse’s speed in the case of judging the beauty of a horse or a building’s comfortableness in the case of judging a building. Needless to say, it is to our great intellectual benefit to take the viewpoint of this accessory beauty. But since that is part of our “rational judgment”4, it cannot be called pure beauty. In the Section 17, however, Kant discusses the kind of beauty that is very similar to the accessory beauty but not completely in accord with it, under the name of “an ideal of beauty”. The argument Kant presents there is quite interesting in light of its relationship with the imagination.

    b) Ideal of Beauty

    5First, Kant starts his argument with the examination of the grounds upon which the subjective acts such as the judgments of taste are universally communicable. He then points out that the judgments of taste are made not by imitating others taste, but by grounding their determination on the judging subject himself. The judgments are often considered as “exemplary (exemplarisch)”5. From there, Kant makes a small logical leap and examines the natures of “the highest model (Muster) of taste” and “the archetype (Urbild) of taste”. The “model” and “archetype” are considered to be in our mind as mere “ideas (Ideen)”. On that assumption, Kant continues, “the representation of an individual existence as adequate to an idea” is called “an ideal”6; that is to say, the “ideal of beauty” signifies our idea on the model of beauty expressed in a concrete form. Further, it is characterized as “reason’s indeterminate (unbestimmt) idea” concerning “a maximum (ein Maximum)”7 as it is properly put for the term “ideal”. Although it belongs to the realm of reason as it is called an “idea”, it is at the same time defined as “indeterminate”. It thus rests not on a concept, but on “exhibition (Darstellung)”. This faculty of exhibition is identified with the capacity of imagination. An ideal of beauty is hence called “an ideal of the imagination”8. We can say that the schematic (figürlich) knowledge before it is linguistically expressed as a concept is assumed under the title of the “ideal of beauty”. The “ideal of beauty” is clearly distinguished from the accessory beauty, since it is based on the imagination. On the other hand, this “ideal of beauty” is not a “vague beauty (vage Schönheit)”, but has the aspect of being the beauty that is determined by the concept of objective purposiveness (finality, Zweckmäßigkeit). In that respect, it is more than a mere object of a pure judgment of taste, and is expressed with such a rather subtle phrasing as the object of a “partly intellectual judgment of taste”.

    6Where can we find the “ideal of beauty” thus conditioned, then? He answers the question by saying that we can find it a human being.

    Only what has in itself the end of its real existence […] admits […] of an ideal of beauty.9

    7And he continues to argue that there are two factors involved in this ideal of beauty. These two are:

    • the aesthetic normal idea (ästhetische Normalidee)10
    • the rational idea (Vernunftidee)

    8We have no difficulty understanding (2). It is nothing but the idea of practical reason. “The rational idea makes the purposes of humanity, insofar as they cannot be presented in sensibility, the principle for judging his figure”11. In human forms and conducts, we see the manifestation of the mind of a human who carries out Practical Reason, “the visible expression of moral ideas that govern men inwardly”12. On a person’s benevolent facial expression is manifested his merciful nature; on a person’s calm and manly face is manifested his inner mental strength to pursue ethical goals without indulging himself in emotional idleness. Kant contends that this idea is a moment that constitutes the ideal of beauty.

    9More difficult to comprehend is the (1) (i.e., the aesthetic normal idea). Kant argues that this aesthetic normal idea has to be distinguished from the ideal of beauty; the idea is not equivalent to the ideal of beauty, but is nothing more than one moment that constitutes the ideal of beauty. What is it, then? And why does it have to be discussed here in this context?

    3) Aesthetic Normal Idea

    a) The Aesthetic Normal Idea as a Standard

    10With regard to this aesthetic normal idea, Kant first points out that it is characterized by the “individual intuition of imagination”13 just as its term “aesthetic” implies; it thus functions only on the level of aesthetic judgments. On that basis, he says, it serves as a standard (Richtmaß) to judge the form of humans that belong to a certain animal kind when judging an ideal of beauty. It follows from that that we can have this aesthetic normal idea for animals other than humans as well, and that in that respect this is not exactly identical with the ideal of beauty. The question that arises then is from where this standard is derived. This question gets us involved in the conflict between idealism and empiricism.

    The normal idea of the [figure or] shape of an animal of a particular kind has to take its elements from experience. But the greatest purposiveness in the structure of that shape resides merely in the judging person’s idea; and it is this greatest purposiveness – the image on which nature’s technique was, as it were, intentionally based, and to which only the kind as a whole but not individual by itself is adequate – which would be suitable as the universal standard for judging each individual of that species aesthetically. And yet this idea and its proportions can be exhibited as an aesthetic idea fully in concreto in a model image.14

    11It seems to be quite natural that whether it is a man or a horse, the elements to constitute a normal idea for it must depend on our empirical knowledge. But, at the same time, our aesthetic judgments are not merely rooted in our experiences, but also have to assume a certain universal standard which includes each individual but simultaneously goes beyond these individuals – a standard that belongs to the domain of ideas that transcends mere experiences. That idea is expressed here as “the greatest purposiveness in the structure of that shape”. It is interesting to see the term “purposiveness” in this paragraph, but we should notice here that the purposiveness does not mean the “purposiveness without the representation of end” as in the case of the pure judgments of taste. It is rather grounded on the idea of a man or a horse, and moreover has the aspect of “greatest” purposiveness, i.e., of the objective purposeveness which is not simply subjective but must assume “nature’s technique”. Nevertheless, it has to remain to be an aesthetic idea. That is why it retains the ambiguous nature of being “concrete” and simultaneously being a model image. Given this line of thought, we can see that the aesthetic normal idea has quite a delicate theoretical position; it is as if it is hovering between the realm of empiricism and the realm of idealism, or between the aesthetic domain and the intellectual domain. More important, it is the imagination that plays a primary role in acquiring aesthetic normal ideas. Kant asserts that the function of the imagination is incomprehensible as long as it is discussed in terms of concepts, and elucidates as follows:

    Notice how in a manner wholly beyond our grasp our imagination is able on occasion not only to recall, even from the distant past, the signs that stand for concepts, but also to reproduce an object’s image and shape from a vast number of objects of different kinds or even of one and same kind. Moreover all indications suggest that this power, when the mind wants to make comparisons, can actually proceed as follows, though this process does not reach consciousness; the imagination projects, as it were, one image onto another, and from the congruence of most images of the same kind it arrives at an average (ein Mittleres) that serves as the common standard for all of them.15

    12Suppose that we speak of the ideal of beauty about an adult male; that will decide on the definite set of the proper height, the proper weight, the proper size of his nose, the proper size of his eyes, and so on. This is meant by the term “average”. How do we get that idea of an “average”, then? His answer is that we make comparisons on empirical facts, by recalling past experiences through our imagination. On that occasion, the imagination performs projections of numerous images, though the process may not be conscious.

    b) Idealism and Empiricism

    13This may sound to be a convincing argument. One may well reasonably wonder, however, that the acquiring of an average is then explained away purely empirically, and doubt that if so, that would fit in Kant’s theory. To recall past experiences and derive from them a model image – that sounds exactly like what empiricists contend. In fact, in this context, Kant presents a view that accepts differences between normal ideas in race, nation, time period, etc., as seen in the example that black people or Chinese people have different normal ideas from Europeans – a view that is more inclined to the view of empiricism. Yet, Kant barely stops there and never goes farther; he states that the normal idea is never of empiricist nature:

    This normal idea is not derived from proportions that are taken from experience as determinate rules. Rather, it is in accordance with this idea that rules for judging become possible in the first place.16

    14According to Kant, the normal idea is not determined simply and straightforwardly by empirical data as empiricism claims, but, contrary to that, it is in accordance with the normal idea that it is possible to have rules for judgment and thus to be able to make judgments. Based on this argument, he presents the following idea, which we can take as his conclusion:

    It [the normal idea] is the image for the entire kind, hovering between all the singular and multiply varied intuitions of the individuals, the image that nature used as archetype (Urbild) on which it based its productions within any one species, but which it does not seem to have attained completely in any individual. The normal idea is by no means the entire archetype of beauty within this kind, but is only the form that constitutes the indispensable condition of all beauty, and hence merely the correctness (Richtigkeit) in the exhibition of the kind.17

    c) The Possibility of the Aesthetic Normal Idea

    15One can see, if one wishes, here Platonic Ideas reemerging, disguised in their modern form under the light of Critique philosophy. True, the conception that the “model image” is based on the normal idea in us certainly reminds us of the characteristic of idealism which should be originated from Platonism. But it appears to be so because he has pushed the empiricist stance to the utmost limit. Kant revives the ancient theory of ideas only after carefully sifting it through the Critique philosophy, i.e., the intellect of modern science. Given this understanding, we can safely say that this concept of normal idea has obtained the possibility that goes beyond what Kant originally intended to set forth. That is not just because the ideas of image, model image and archetype under discussion played significant roles later in German Idealism and schools of Phenomenology, but also because it is possible to take that they have such theoretically broad scopes as cover from today’s scientific morphology, structuralist biology and even empirical sciences such as cognitive science.

    16J. J. Gibson’s theory of “affordance” is one good instance for the modern theoretical implication. According to him, our visual perceptions are formed with an indispensable moment of “invariants” that, remaining at the base of ever-changing retinal images, continue to give unchanging information about an object18. It is certainly feasible to connect the theory of cognitive processes that requires the concept of “invariants” thus considered with Kant’s view of normal idea. By the same token, we can see the modern significance of the normal idea in the fact that cognitive science as an empirical science, which attempts to explicate the human cognitive processes by comparing them with artificial intelligence, has to introduce, in “comprehending a whole as a whole”, such notions as “prototype”, “top-down” and “schema”, all of which can be related to the human innate ideas.

    4) The Aesthetic Normal Idea and the Comprehension of Forms

    17Given my above argument on the aesthetic normal idea in the Critique of Judgment, we can see that Kant’s position on this concept hovers over the boundary between empiricism and idealism. Accordingly, we start to see that Kant’s dualistic framework such as the relation between intuition and understanding, his ways of defining or determining concepts and his theoretical coherence are on the verge of collapsing. It is true that there is a similarity between the “accessory beauty” and the “ideal of beauty” in that they both oppose to the pure free beauty, but there is clear difference between them in that the “accessory beauty” is guided by concepts whereas the “ideal of beauty” is guided by the imagination. How are they related in light of the whole system of the Critique of Judgment? – Kant’s writing does not give us a clear answer. Meanwhile, we may well have a more fundamental question of why we need the “ideal of beauty”; it is hard to comprehend why we need it, given an assumption in the “critique of judging of beauty” that the “dignity of humanity” can be demonstrated only with the pure judgments of taste about the “free beauty”.

    18Seen like this, it seems obvious that the accounts in this part of the Critique of Judgment expose a lot of theoretical weakness or fragility. Nevertheless, that does not diminish the importance of this work. To the contrary, it is in this weakness that we can see the sign of great intellectual productivity. One good example is his argument of the capacity to comprehend the “model image” of which the aesthetic normal idea takes charge, though that may be out of the scope of Kant’s original contention.

    19In addition, we have to note that, as seen in the expression “the greatest purposiveness in the structure of that shape”, Kant introduces the concept of purposiveness in the context in which he discusses the principle of the comprehension of forms. Forms or shapes are hard to grasp as long as mechanistic reductionism is applied; for reductionism merely gives us a collection of piecemeal parts instead of the whole form or shape. The grasp of forms or shapes is hence left to teleology, whose way of comprehending forms is our next subject.

    5) The Position of the Aesthetic Normal Idea in the System

    20In the first Part “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” of the Critique of Judgment, the task of comprehending the purposiveness is assigned to the imagination in the context where Kant discusses the judgments of taste, whereas in the second Part “the Critique of Teleological Judgement” it is assigned to the reflective judgements (or the reflective power of judgement). I find here an insurmountable gap between these two arguments, and think it quite inevitable to bridge them.

    21A philosopher in modern Japan, Kiyoshi Miki (1897-1945), who studied with Heidegger in the 1920’s, worked on this issue in the 1940’s, and we can follow his endeavor in his unfinished work The Logic of the Imagination. Miki took the imagination as “uniting the logos and the pathos”19, and examined the creativity of the imagination in myths, systems, technologies and in the experiences in which nature and society are grasped from the teleological viewpoint, as he aimed at answering the question “in what way does the issue of the reflective judgements have to develop toward the logic of the imagination?”20. Although Miki’s project was grand, ambitious and significant one striving to establish a comprehensive intellectual system with the help of the concept of imagination, unfortunately it was left unfinished due to his sudden, tragic death in 1945. That may imply that the background culture in modern Japan was not rich enough on the whole, but here in this paper, inspired by his stimulating project, I attempt to bridge the above two arguments using the concept of “aesthetic normal idea” as my guidance.

    22In the main body of the Critique of Judgment, the imagination and the reflective judgements seem to be divided by a large gap, unlike in “the first Introduction” in which not only the logical judgments but the aesthetic judgments presuppose the reflective judgements assuming their close relationship. However, in the context in which Kant detaches the imagination from the control by the judgments of taste, we can find the role of bridging the two in the concept of “aesthetic normal idea”. We can then understand that, in examining the ideal of beauty, Kant presents the route to the logical comprehension of the objective purposiveness of nature, by highlighting the intellectual functions of aesthetic normal idea.

    23Given this understanding, with respect to our pursuit to find the continuity between the first Part and the second Part of the Critique of Judgment, we can say that the concept of “aesthetic normal idea” provides us with a media that enables the detachment or release of the imagination from the judgments of taste, that is, the promotion of the imagination from the aesthetic judgments to the logical judgments. But, at the same time, I must point out that there are cases that suggest there is another development that goes in the opposite direction. They are the arguments that Kant presents in “Introduction VI” of the third Critique. In the section, when Kant discusses “the conceived harmony of nature in the manifold of its particular laws with our need of finding universality of principles for it”21, he asserts that in case the harmony is recognized as the form of purposiveness in observing nature, it will give us a feeling of pleasure. We do not, and cannot, get a feeling of pleasure simply by means of the recognition through the categories as is discussed in the Critique of Pure Reason. We can get a feeling of pleasure only when various empirical natural laws (each of which is obtained through the categories) can be embraced through the power of judgments by one principle. The judgments working here are, of course, reflective judgments. It becomes clear that a feeling of pleasure here is clearly distinguished from one in the judgments of taste, and that it always accompanies to the comprehension of purposiveness on the logical level.

    24What I can point out here is this: while the above-mentioned aesthetic normal idea implied the release of the imagination from the judgments of taste, the recognition of a feeling of pleasure accompanied to the logical judgments of purposiveness is directed in a completely opposite direction. My whole discussion tells us, however, that they both indicate a common area that unites the subjective purposiveness and the objective purposiveness as well as aesthetic purposiveness and teleological purposiveness, while they show the opposite directions.

    25It has thus turned out that the concept of “aesthetic normal idea”, which was previously believed to belong to the imagination but did not necessarily have a clear theoretical position, plays a significant role of integrating the first Part and the second Part of the Critique of Judgment into one coherent theoretical system. Also that will lead us to another project of finding specific structures for the intermediate layers between the distinct conceptual recognition and the opaque life experiences – between understanding and intuition, thereby looking into the unique intellect that is working unknowingly in these layers. This way of understanding Kant’s work may deviate from the official construction of Kant’s theoretical system, but, nevertheless, I strongly believe that it will present us with a new potentiality of Kant’s thoughts – a possibility that we can go beyond our epistemological standards.

    26It is true that paying close attention to the layer of our unconsciousness was one of the popular theoretical moves in the 20th century. But it seems to me that the concept of unconsciousness in that century, which was crystallized under the influence from Marx and Freud, has been tainted too much by the idea of repression or violence. Given the insight, I think it is quite desirable to reinstate the philosophy or thoughts on a more sound and more productive unconsciousness or unawareness, which I truly believe is accomplished by or with Kant’s theory of imagination.

    Notes de bas de page

    1 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B177, A138. For the quotations from Kant’s three Critiques, I cite the page numbers from his original texts or writings. Regarding the Critique of Pure Reason, I indicate the first edition with the letter A and the second edition with B as is customarily done following the P.H.B. notation: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Riga, 1781/1787.

    2 B180, A141.

    3 Ibid.

    4 Kant, Critique of Judgment. Translated by Werner S. Pluhar, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1987, p. 77 (Kritik der Urtheilskraft, Berlin, 1799 [dritte Auflage], p. 51)

    5 Ibid., p. 79 (53).

    6 Ibid., p. 80 (54)

    7 Ibid.

    8 Ibid.

    9 Ibid., p. 81 (55).

    10 Pluhar translated “Normalidee” as “standard idea”.

    11 Ibid., p. 81 (56).

    12 Ibid., p. 84 (60).

    13 Ibid., p. 81 (56).

    14 Ibid.

    15 Ibid, p. 82 (57).

    16 Ibid, p. 82 (58).

    17 Ibid, p. 83 (59).

    18 Gibson, Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1979, p. 76 sq.

    19 Miki, Complete Works, vol. 8. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1967, p. 109.

    20 Op. cit., p. 452.

    21 Critique of Judgment, 26 (Kritik der Urtheilskraft, XXXVIII).

    Auteur

    • Yasukuni Sato

      Open University of Japan

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    Noël Mouloud

    1989

    Études sur la genèse du système scientifique moderne

    Études sur la genèse du système scientifique moderne

    Rudolf Stichweh Fabienne Blaise (trad.)

    1991

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    1 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B177, A138. For the quotations from Kant’s three Critiques, I cite the page numbers from his original texts or writings. Regarding the Critique of Pure Reason, I indicate the first edition with the letter A and the second edition with B as is customarily done following the P.H.B. notation: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Riga, 1781/1787.

    2 B180, A141.

    3 Ibid.

    4 Kant, Critique of Judgment. Translated by Werner S. Pluhar, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1987, p. 77 (Kritik der Urtheilskraft, Berlin, 1799 [dritte Auflage], p. 51)

    5 Ibid., p. 79 (53).

    6 Ibid., p. 80 (54)

    7 Ibid.

    8 Ibid.

    9 Ibid., p. 81 (55).

    10 Pluhar translated “Normalidee” as “standard idea”.

    11 Ibid., p. 81 (56).

    12 Ibid., p. 84 (60).

    13 Ibid., p. 81 (56).

    14 Ibid.

    15 Ibid, p. 82 (57).

    16 Ibid, p. 82 (58).

    17 Ibid, p. 83 (59).

    18 Gibson, Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1979, p. 76 sq.

    19 Miki, Complete Works, vol. 8. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1967, p. 109.

    20 Op. cit., p. 452.

    21 Critique of Judgment, 26 (Kritik der Urtheilskraft, XXXVIII).

    Esthétique et logique

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    Esthétique et logique

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    Sato, Y. (2012). How Far Can the Sensation Think? – An Inquiry into the Immanuel Kant’s Aesthetic Normal Idea in his Critique of Judgment. In C. Morel (éd.), Esthétique et logique (1‑). Presses universitaires du Septentrion. https://doi.org/10.4000/books.septentrion.64719
    Sato, Yasukuni. « How Far Can the Sensation Think? – An Inquiry into the Immanuel Kant’s Aesthetic Normal Idea in His Critique of Judgment ». In Esthétique Et Logique, édité par Charlotte Morel. Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses universitaires du Septentrion, 2012. https://doi.org/10.4000/books.septentrion.64719.
    Sato, Yasukuni. « How Far Can the Sensation Think? – An Inquiry into the Immanuel Kant’s Aesthetic Normal Idea in His Critique of Judgment ». Esthétique Et Logique, édité par Charlotte Morel, Presses universitaires du Septentrion, 2012, https://doi.org/10.4000/books.septentrion.64719.

    Référence numérique du livre

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    Morel, C. (éd.). (2012). Esthétique et logique (1‑). Presses universitaires du Septentrion. https://doi.org/10.4000/books.septentrion.64649
    Morel, Charlotte, éd. Esthétique et logique. Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses universitaires du Septentrion, 2012. https://doi.org/10.4000/books.septentrion.64649.
    Morel, Charlotte, éditeur. Esthétique et logique. Presses universitaires du Septentrion, 2012, https://doi.org/10.4000/books.septentrion.64649.
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