1 Une partie de ce chapitre s’inspire en partie de travaux déjà publiés dans Claire Sanderson, Perfide Albion ? L’affaire Soames et les arcanes de la diplomatie britannique, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 2012. Spécialiste de la politique étrangère britannique au xxe siècle, ses recherches portent sur la diplomatie et la politique de défense britanniques, sur les relations diplomatiques et militaires entre la France et la Grande-Bretagne, et sur la Grande-Bretagne dans les relations internationales. Parmi ses publications : L’impossible alliance ? France, Grande-Bretagne et défense de l’Europe 1945-1958, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 2003. Perfide Albion ? L’affaire Soames et les arcanes de la diplomatie britannique, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 2012.
2 Committee on Representation Overseas, 1962-63 (Plowden Report), Cmnd. 2276, 1964, paragraphe 18, p. 5.
3 Ibidem, paragraphe 44.
4 Ibidem, paragraphe 45.
5 Malgré la création du FCO, le terme Foreign Office est encore utilisé de manière très courante.
6 John Dickie, Inside the Foreign Office, Londres, Chapman, 1992, p. 43.
7 Ibidem, p.43.
8 En réalité, l’un des Premiers secrétaires se chargeait de cette question.
9 Review Committee on Overseas Representation, 1968-9 (Duncan Report), Cmnd. 4107, juillet 1969.
10 Inner Area of Concentration.
11 Outer Area of Lesser Concentration.
12 Review Committee on Overseas Representation, 1977 (Berrill Report), Cmnd. 7308, 1977.
13 « Its challenge to the notion of a distinctive role for diplomats focused attention, and remains the key question which any enquiry into the role of the FCO has to answer », Sir David Logan, KCMG, Foreign Affairs Committee, 8 janvier 2011, disponible sur :
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmfaff/665/665vw20.htm
14 Jeremy Black, A History of Diplomacy, Londres, Reaktion, 2011, p. 249.
15 Anthony H.M. Kirk-Greene, « Accredited to Africa: British diplomatic representation and African experience, c.1960-95 », Diplomacy and Statecraft, XI, 2000, pp. 82-83, ibidem.
16 John Dickie, op. cit., p. 43.
17 Robert Boyce, « Le Foreign Office et l’Europe (1919-1931), Professionnalisme et préjugés », in Laurence Badel, Stanislas Jeannesson et N. Piers Ludlow (dir.), Les administrations nationales et la construction européenne, une approche historique (1919-1975), Bruxelles, P.I.E.-Peter Lang, pp. 71-72.
18 Ibidem, p. 73. Lire aussi Robert Boyce, « Britains’s First ‘No’ to Europe: Britain and the Briand Plan, 1929-1930 », European Studies Review, volume 10, n°1, 1980, pp. 17-45.
19 Notamment, « Une vision et un comportement dépassé d’un monde britanno-centrique », Claire Sanderson, op. cit., p. 47.
20 John W. Young, Twentieth Century Diplomacy, A Case Study of British Practice, 1963-1976, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 227.
21 Robert Boyce, op. cit., p. 87.
22 Ibidem.
23 Ibidem, p. 88. Lire aussi Robert Boyce, « Economics and the crisis of British foreign policy management, 1914-1945 » in Dick Richardson et Glyn Stone (dir.), Decisions and Diplomacy: Essays in Twentieth-Century International History, Londres, Routledge, 1994, pp. 9-41.
24 « Reshaped »; lire Ian Hall, « ‘Building the Global Network?’, The reform of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office under New Labour », The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, voluùe 15, n°2, pp. 228-245.
25 £5.5 milliards contre £2 milliards pour le FCO en 2009-2010, par exemple. HM Treasury, Budget 2009, Building Britain’s Future, 2009, p. 241, in Ian Hall, op. cit., p. 230.
26 Mary Dejevsky, « In a globalised, connected world, do we still need the Foreign Office ? », The Guardian, 30 décembre 2013.
27 Jeremy Black, op. cit., p. 249 ; 252.
28 « They were not competitors, but mutual winners in the expansion of diplomatic activity, each with a place in maximising the country’s diplomatic influence », in John W. Young, op. cit., p. 227.
29 « Designed to transform the FCO’s culture, replacing inherited traditions of thought and practice with new ones believed better suited to contemporary world politics », in Ian Hall, op. cit., p. 228.
30 « The loss not only of a unique capability, but also of the FCO's institutional memory, lack of which is now a significant weakness in FCO policy-making », Sir David Logan, op. cit.
31 Ibidem.
32 Ian Hall, op. cit., p. 228.
33 FCO, Better World, Better Britain, 2008, in Ian Hall, op. cit., p. 233.
34 « A reorientation from an organisation principally concerned with building knowledge about foreign societies to one concerned also about issue-specific areas », Ian Hall, op. cit., p. 233.
35 Ian Hall, op. cit., p. 234.
36 « A reflection of the changing context of foreign policy-making and New Labour commitments to involve business, NGOs, think tanks and others in foreign policy debate », Ian Hall, op. cit., p. 235.
37 « Designed for the world of de-centralised global governance rather than conventional international relations. » I. Hall fait référence ici à l’article de David Chandler, « The Security-Development Nexus and the rise of ‘Anti-Foreign Policy’ », Journal of International Relations and Development, volume 10, 2007, pp. 362-386, in Ian Hall, op. cit., p. 241.
38 « Hollowed-out », Ian Hall, op. cit., p. 241.
39 Ibidem.
40 « If we had followed [the instruction] to the letter we would have broken off work trying to promote British companies overseas. We were told that the only thing that mattered was inward investment », Sir Ivor Roberts in Ian Black et Richard Norton-Taylor, « Put away the croquet mallets, diplomats told, and start selling UK plc to the world », The Guardian, 23 juillet 2010.
41 Mary Dejevsky, op. cit.
42 « [to] inject a new commercialism into the work of our Foreign Office and into the definition of […] international objectives, ensuring that we develop the strong political relationships which will help British business to thrive overseas », in Ian Black et Richard Norton-Taylor, op. cit.
43 Sir David Logan, op. cit.
44 John Dickie, The New Mandarins. How British Foreign Policy Works, Londres, I.B. Tauris, 2004, p. 41, in Ian Hall, op. cit., p.234.
45 FCO, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Business Plan 2003-6, Londres, HMSO, 2002, p. 7, et FCO, Better World, Better Britain, 2008, p. 26, in Ian Hall, op. cit., p. 234.
46 « William Hague’s now annual double-act with Angelina Jolie illustrates both the extremes to which the Foreign Office has got to go to draw media attention and the blurring of the lines between the FCO’s responsibilities and those of DfiD », Mary Dejevsky, op. cit.