1From the late 20th century on, analysis of value conflict has been one of the key features of many different works on security, -surveillance- and risk-related studies. Therefore, a broad array of issues, ranging from designing/ implementing security policies and setting up surveillance mechanisms to constructing/broadcasting security threats and introducing risk management principles in the crime control realm, have been addressed through the lens of their impact on human rights and rule of law. Yet, while relevant field research sought to encompass criminal and deviant phenomena as different as political violence, organised crime, youth delinquency, urban violence, illegal immigration, and antisocial behaviour, value conflict springing from controlling deviant and criminal behaviour in a sport context remained underexplored.

2Recent rise of interest in security issues in relation to sports mega-events, and doping, (Klauser, 2008; Boyle and Haggerty, 2009; Fincoeur, 2009; Bennett and Haggerty, 2010; Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010; Bajc, 2011) is more than welcome then, but should not draw our attention away from the fact that the question of whether and to what extent everyday sport-related surveillance mechanisms infringe rule of law in the name of the protection of certain social values has only been of interest to a handful of scholars usually working on football-related violence (Armstrong and Hobbs, 1994; Tsoukala, 1995, 2001, 2003, 2008a, 2009; Armstrong and Giulianotti, 1998; Pearson, 1999, 2005; Stott and Pearson, 2006; James and Pearson, 2006).

The rise in surveillance mechanisms

3In front of the unwillingness and even failure of sports authorities to efficiently deal with football-related violence, in rise across Europe since the early 1970s, from the mid-1980s on governments and European bodies introduced an array of increasingly risk-focused security measures that more often than not rested upon intelligence gathering due to expanding use of CCTV cameras and undercover policing. In full compliance with the provisions of the 1985 European Convention on football-related violence (Council of Europe, 1985), which were later on taken up by UEFA1, domestic law makers and the Council of the EU, policing of football supporters targeted both « known » and « potential » troublemakers.

4In broadening the definition of the target population to encompass both offenders and deviant persons, the drafters of the European Convention reveal the strong influence exerted on them by the then rising risk-focused crime control model, which was shifting the target of the social control apparatus from delinquent persons to deviant ones, members of allegedly risk-producing groups (Feeley and Simon, 1992; Ericson and Haggerty, 1997; O’Malley, 2000; Shearing, 2001; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Hörnqvist, 2004). From then onwards, far from being a mere continuation of prior forms of controlling deviant behaviour, usually located at the margin of ordinary policing and tolerated as long as they did not exceed implicitly established thresholds of acceptable policing, such a targeting of deviant, « potentially threatening » football supporters was overtly supported by domestic and transnational law makers who, in introducing relevant provisions in domestic law, institutionalised control of deviance (Tsoukala, 2009, p. 72f).

5Domestic surveillance and control mechanisms, ranging from CCTV cameras inside and outside football stadia to undercover policing and intelligence gathering and exchange expanded then exponentially, thus establishing a broad control of deviance in many different European countries. In the early 2000s, the growing importance allowed to risk-based policing practices led to the EU-wide establishment of national football information points for coordinating and facilitating the exchange of intelligence between domestic law enforcers in connection with international football matches (Council of the EU, 2002).

6Compulsory intelligence-led policing thus gradually became one of the key points of domestic and transnational counter-hooliganism strategies in the EU.

7While this rise in intelligence gathering reflects broader patterns of shifts in policing methods and practices across Europe (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997; Della Porta and Reiter, 1998; Norris et al., 1998; Lyon, 2001; Jones, 2002), it should be borne in mind that in the case of football hooliganism institutionalisation of control of deviance is even more powerful because personal data is often entered in police databases following the implementation of what I have called elsewhere « football bans on suspicion » (Tsoukala, 2009, p. 111f). The latter encompass the various forms of administrative football banning orders that are in force in many continental European countries and the English football banning orders on complaint. Notwithstanding their differences (mainly with regard to procedural guarantees, the place allocated to the judicial, maximum length, and domestic or international scope), these football banning orders share one key point: in relying solely on reports made by police or intelligence officers, they seek to circumvent or, in the English case, to alleviate judicial control2 in order to impose liberty-restricting measures3 that are resting upon suspicion instead of evidence. In this respect, they may all be seen as formally introducing direct punishment of deviant behaviour.

A law-abiding process?

8Ongoing normalization of institutionalised control and direct punishment of deviant behaviour due to growing expansion of the abovementioned surveillance mechanisms suggest in turn significant shifts in social values ranking. Protection of human life, property, and public order has entailed jeopardising, if not negating, of privacy, presumption of innocence, principles of legality and proportionality of penalties, and freedom of movement. These value conflicts emerge when football supporters are turned into key targets of the social control apparatus because of their belonging to an allegedly risk group.

9In fact, their vague designation as « potentially » threatening’ people entails the recourse to equally vague criteria when gathering relevant intelligence since personal data may be entered in police files for an array of loosely defined reasons. Being structured around the subjective assessment of the dangerousness of a given behaviour in a given context, the latter often justify or follow the implementation of a « football ban on suspicion », thus creating a legally definable bridge between the control and punishment of deviance. This bridge is further strengthened when the law provides that breach of such football bans is arrestable offence punishable by a prison sentence and/or a fine4. In certain countries, such as the UK, the number of football banning orders on suspicion remains high but relatively constant during the last years5, while in other countries, such as France, where these football bans used to be marginal, their number is rising6.

10In all cases however, these measures usually concern people who have not been caught committing offences. In France, for example, a Circular of the Ministry of the Interior (Ministry of the Interior, 2007) specifies that administrative football bans7 are not targeting criminal behaviour but any behaviour that is generally threatening to public order. In Belgium, police officers admittedly preferred having recourse to short administrative football bans instead of admonestations, thus ending up with many young football supporters having their personal data being entered in police files despite the fact that they had not committed any offence (Tsoukala, 2008b).

11Moreover, though the rules may vary from one country to another, personal data is usually stored for five years. This discrepancy between the length of the initial penalty and the duration of the storage of intelligence has a considerable impact on the freedom of movement in the EU. In fact, given the obligation to transmit information on football bans to countries staging international football matches or tournaments (Council of the EU, 2003), people hit with administrative football bans and wishing to attend an international fixture may have their freedom of movement restricted well after the period of duration of the initial penalty has come to an end.

12The effects produced by the turning of suspicion into a key factor of counter-hooliganism go beyond the intelligence realm to influence ordinary social life. In France, for example, the law provides that information on football supporters hit with administrative football banning orders may be transmitted to sports authorities. In wishing to enhance the dissuasive effect of these bans, the latter have decided to revoke the licences of amateur football players and/or the membership cards of football supporters concerned.

13This EU-wide control and punishment of deviant behaviour becomes all the more worrisome when we consider interoperability of police databases. In Greece, for example, police files on known and potential football hooligans are believed to be also useful for any police officer investigating on the far left and/or anarchist milieu (Mastrogiannakis, 2010). At the EU level, from the early 2000s on the Council has repeatedly considered that national football information points could, should the need arise, exchange information regarding other matters besides sporting events (Council of the EU, 2001, 2006). Far from being exceptional, this position actually complies with present internal security strategy of the Council, as is clearly shown by a 2010 Note that places interoperability of police databases at the core of the future European Information Exchange Model (Council of the EU, 2010).

Concluding remarks

14It should be borne in mind that in a context characterised by growing politicisation of security-related issues in the post-bipolar era (Waever et al., 1993; Bigo, 1994, 2002, 2008; Lipshutz, 1995; Huysmans, 1995, 2004, 2006; Anderson, 1996; Buzan et al., 1998; Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002; Ericson, 2007), rise in risk-focused crime control policies (Garland 1985; Feeley and Simon 1992; Ericson and Haggerty 1997; De Giorgi 2000; Shearing 2001; Mary and Papatheodorou 2001; Silver and Miller 2002; Johnston and Shearing 2003; Hörnqvist 2004; Papatheodorou and Mary 2006), and incremental development of private policing (Bayley and Shearing, 1996; Ericson and Haggerty, 1997; Loader, 2000; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Dorn and Levi, 2007; Loader and Walker, 2007), all European countries have criminalised football-related violence and sought to control it by having recourse both to public and private security agencies. Relevant surveillance mechanisms are embedded then in many different security policies that usually comply with prevailing anticipatory risk-focused crime control patterns.

15Consequently, jeopardising of rule of law is potentially limitless to the extent that it comes as logical outcome of the very rationale of risk-focused crime control. In fact, as I have analysed elsewhere (Tsoukala, 2010), anticipatory, that is, pre-offence action in the crime control realm turns offence-grounded rule of law principles somewhat meaningless to the eyes of security agents managing present risk-oriented surveillance systems. In other words, presumption of innocence, legality and proportionality of penalties have been conceived and guaranteed in relation to an offence. When a person is being punished in the name of suspicion, that is, in the absence of any offence, rule of law cannot but be discarded.

16It is noteworthy however that counter-hooliganism has not raised particularly vivid criticism amidst civil societies despite the fact that administrative football bans presently hit several thousands of football supporters across Europe. Due to practical reasons, absence of civil reactions to these surveillance mechanisms cannot be discussed here. Certain facets of this social indifference, namely the role played by the constant negative media representation of football hooligans in creating « threatening social figures worth of exclusion and punishment », have been analysed elsewhere (Tsoukala, 2009). Nor is it possible to fully analyse here the reasons lying beneath apparent consent of targeted groups. It would suffice to say that, in the latter case, explanations are arguably related to an array of frequently overlapping factors that will only be sketched below.

17Firstly, football supporters’ traditional distrust to authorities frequently prevents them from having recourse to civilian or public bodies likely to ensure protection of civil rights and liberties. Secondly, with the exception of the UK, football supporters’ inter-group relations remain so weak and marked by longstanding rivalries that creation of a federating body prone to defend football supporters’ rights at national level has been practically impossible. Lastly, preservation and further acquisition of material gains fuels consent among football supporters, who for example may be rewarded with annual season tickets if they denounce troublemakers. Of course, submissive behaviours cannot be blamed in themselves for expanding surveillance in the sport context. But, when combined with lack of criticism on the part of the rest of civil society, apparent assent amidst target groups does consolidate and even legitimate growing normalisation of restrictions on civil rights and liberties.