The abandonment of the “dominant position” condition of article 102 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union?
p. 561-577
Texte intégral
I. Introduction
1Article (hereafter “Art.”) 102 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereafter “TFEU”)1 prohibits “Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position”. Art. 102 of the TFEU does not stipulate “Any abuse by one or more undertakings of [its or their] dominant position”. However, it is interpreted to only prohibit “abuse” by dominant undertakings. Therefore, Art. 102 of the TFEU cannot prohibit “abuse” by non-dominant undertakings. If it should prohibit such conduct, the “dominant position” condition should be deleted.2 This paper examines the validity of this argument.
2First, we will clarify the structure of Art. 102 of the TFEU and will examine the basic views about “dominant position”, “abuse” and the connection between them (Ⅱ). Second, we will view the interpretations that the drafters of Art. 102 of the TFEU, the European Commission (hereafter “Commission3“) and the Court of Justice (hereafter “CJEU”) give about “dominant position”, “abuse” and the connection between them (Ⅲ). Finally, we will examine what conduct cannot be prohibited by Art. 102 of the TFEU because of the existence of the “dominant position” condition, whether such conduct contains the conduct that Art. 102 of the TFEU should prohibit, and whether the “dominant position” condition should be deleted from Art. 102 of the TFEU (Ⅳ).
II. Outline of Art. 102 of the TFEU
A. Text of Art. 102 of the TFEU
3Art. 102 of the TFEU stipulates as follows:
4“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.
5Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
- (a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;
- (b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
- (c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
- (d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
B. Abuse
6Art. 102 of the TFEU (a) - (d) lists examples of “abuse”.4 Therefore, “abuse” must contain them, but can contain other practices as well. In general, “abuse” is classified into exploitative abuses and exclusionary abuses.
7Exploitative abuses are typically defined as conduct whereby undertakings unfairly profit from their trading partners using their “dominant position” (e.g., excessive pricings)5 (α). Exploitative abuses also contain conduct whereby undertakings harm their trading partners without profiting from them (e.g., refusal of supply)6 (β) or constrain their trading partners’ freedom of action (e.g., exclusive dealing agreements)7 (γ).
8In any case, exploitative abuses cause harm to the trading partners. It is sufficient that the conduct concerned is in danger of causing harm to the trading partners.8 In addition, it is important for verifying the above γ-type abuses that the conduct concerned is in danger of causing the exclusion of competitors.9
9Exclusionary abuses are defined as conduct whereby undertakings restrict the competition in a relevant market by excluding their competitors from the market.10 Exclusionary abuses can be classified into two categories: conduct whereby undertakings indirectly exclude their competitors from the relevant market through exploitative abuses (exploitation with exclusionary effect [Ausbeutung mit Behinderungseffekt]11 or indirectly exclusionary abuses [abus d’éviction indirect]12) or conduct whereby undertakings directly exclude their competitors from the relevant market, not through exploitative abuses (directly exclusionary abuses [abus d’éviction direct]13).
10In any case, exclusionary abuses exclude competitors from a relevant market, and it is sufficient that the conduct concerned is in danger of excluding competitors.14
C. Dominant position
11Art. 102 of the TFEU prohibits “abuse” under the “dominant position” condition, but does not define “dominant position”. In contrast, Art. 66 in the ECSC Treaty, which was signed before the EEC Treaty was signed, already regulated the conduct of dominant undertakings and defined “dominant position (position dominante)” as a position that “shields undertakings from an effective competition”. Art. 22 in the German Act against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, hereafter “GWB”), which was established in the same year as the EEC Treaty, regulated the conduct of market-dominant undertakings and defined “domination of market (Marktbeherrschend)” as a situation where undertakings “have no competitors or aren’t exposed to any substantial competition”.
12The German drafters of Art. 102 of the TFEU proposed to define “dominant position” in the text of Art. 102. The French drafters, however, opposed this proposition, for if it was accepted, the draft of the GWB would influence Art. 102 of the TFEU, in which case German jurisprudence and practical work on the GWB might excessively influence Art. 102 of the TFEU.15 As a result, Art. 102 of the TFEU does not define “dominant position”. Thereby, it can be applied while matching the effet utile principle and the evolution phase of the EU16.
13Focsaneanu posited another reason why the drafters of Art. 102 of the TFEU did not define “dominant position” in Art. 102 of the TFEU: the drafters grasped the other meaning of “dominant position” in Art. 102 of the TFEU than the meaning of “dominant position” in Art. 66 in the ECSC Treaty and “domination of market” in Art. 22 of the GWB.17 He thus argued that “dominant position” should not be defined in Art. 102 of the TFEU using the concept of competition which these provisions use. However, this interpretation has not been generally accepted.
14The relevant market without “dominant position” is considered as having a sufficiently competitive structure, so the competition authorities do not need to intervene.18 This is why Art. 102 of the TFEU prohibits “abuse” only by dominant undertakings. The undertakings’ conduct must be controlled by competition as far as possible, but dominant undertakings’ conduct is not controlled by competition (competitive pressure). Therefore, the competition authorities need to intervene in the dominant undertakings’ conduct.19 Art. 102 of the TFEU only prohibits “abuse” by dominant undertakings, who have the room to exhibit conduct that is not sufficiently controlled by competition (nicht mehr hinreichend vom Wettbewerb kontrollierte Verhaltensspielraum), and this room enables dominant undertakings to carry out exploitative abuses and exclusionary abuses.20
D. Connection between dominant position and abuse
15Art. 102 of the TFEU stipulates as follows: “abuse […] of a dominant position” in the English version, “to abusively use a dominant position (d’exploiter de façon abusive une position dominante)” in the French version and “abusive use of a dominant position (missbräuchliche Ausnutzung einer beherrschenden Stellung)” in the German version. Except for in the English version, the word “use” is used, which seems to demand some connection between a “dominant position” and “abuse”.21 Such a connection can be considered in two ways: if undertakings do not hold a “dominant position”, they cannot carry out “abuse”, namely “Conditio sine qua non” (behaviour causality [Verhaltenskausalität])22; or if undertakings hold a “dominant position”, they can carry out “abuse” (normative connection [normativer Zusammenhang]).23
16The normative connection is accepted, regardless of whether behaviour causality is accepted. For example, if dominant undertakings acquire the power to carry out “abuse” from their “dominant position” and then carry out “abuse”, this power contributes at least to the risk that “abuse” will be carried out (normative connection), regardless of whether the power actually contributes to an action of “abuse” (behaviour causality). The above risk is the risk that dominant undertakings will carry out exploitative abuses and/or exclusionary abuses, i.e. harm their trading partners and/or exclude their competitors from the relevant market.
17If Art. 102 of the TFEU demands behaviour causality between a “dominant position” and “abuse”, it only prohibits conduct that dominant undertakings can carry out. If it only demands a normative connection between a “dominant position” and “abuse”, it prohibits the conduct that not only dominant undertakings but also non-dominant undertakings can carry out, but Art. 102 of the TFEU only prohibits conduct of dominant undertakings. That does not mean that Art. 102 of the TFEU prohibits the “dominant position” itself. Art. 102 of the TFEU only imposes norms to prevent conduct that can realise the danger inherent in the “dominant position” of dominant undertakings. This is why the normative connection is called “normative”.24
III. Formation and application of Art. 102 of the TFEU
A. Drafters’ view
18According to preparatory work (travaux préparatoires) of Art. 102 of the TFEU, the German drafters argued that a market-dominant position itself should not be directly regulated by Art. 102 of the TFEU25 because it was not acceptable that German-led companies were being taken apart.26 In contrast, the French drafters argued that a monopoly itself should be directly regulated by Art. 102 of the TFEU27, as small and medium-sized French companies could not sufficiently compete with the highly concentrated German-heavy industry at that time.28 Eventually, the drafters decided that Art. 102 of the TFEU does not regulate a “dominant position” itself but only the “use” of it, as it was necessary for Europe to reorganise its companies and create national champions in order to compete internationally and prevent American companies from dominating the European market.29
19It was Hans von der Groeben, the president of the Common Market Committee, who created the draft that, with a few modifications, became the final provision of Art. 102 of the TFEU.30 His draft stipulated “An undertaking which is exposed to no competition or is not exposed to any substantial competition in the whole area of the common market or a considerable part of it is prohibited from abusing the market-dominant position within this market in such a way that the conduct concerned affects the trade between Member States […] ”.31 He added, “the more complete a monopoly is, the less the competition which could be restricted or eliminated is. Therefore, in the case of a monopoly, the exclusion of the competition cannot be prohibited; only the abuse of the market-dominant position can be prohibited”32 and “Such practices [as exclusion of the competitors from the market] […] reflect a situation of intense competition rather than a situation of restrictive competition”.33
20According to the drafter’s view, first, a “dominant position” is characterised by a market without any competition or any substantial competition that is the target of such restrictions of competition as exclusionary abuses. Therefore, Art. 102 of the TFEU is not suitable for the regulation of exclusionary abuses restricting the competition in the relevant market where the dominant undertakings hold their “dominant position” (hereafter “dominated market”). Second, Art. 102 of the TFEU regulates the negative effects caused by the restriction of competition in a dominated market, i.e. exploitative abuses. Therefore, Art. 102 of the TFEU is unsuitable for the regulation of directly exclusionary abuses.34
B. The Commission’s memorandum in 1965
21In 1965, the Commission issued a memorandum entitled “The Problem of Concentration of Enterprises in the Common Market (Le Problème de la Concentration dans le Marché Commun)”35 (hereafter “Memorandum”) and clarified the meaning of “dominant position” and “abuse” while considering the applicability of Art. 102 of the TFEU to the concentrations of enterprises.
22First, the Commission presented the view of the research group they consulted on the above subject. This view states that “there is a dominant position on a given market when one or several undertakings can have an effect in the essential way on other economic agents’ decisions by means of an independent strategy so that a workable and sufficiently effective competition (concurrence practicable et suffisamment efficace) cannot appear and be maintained on the market. […] there is an abusive use of a dominant position when the holder of this position uses the possibilities resulting from this position in order to obtain profits which would not be obtained in the case of workable and sufficiently effective competition”.36
23This view (hereafter “Memorandum view Ⅰ”) defines “abuse” as exploitative abuses37 and “dominant position” as the power to carry out exploitative abuses (hereafter “exploitative power”). Therefore, there is a normative connection between them; however, this view only says “use” and does not further explain the connection between a “dominant position” and “abuse”.
24Second, the Commission stated its view as follows: “First, […][the domination of market] is an economic power [.] […] When an undertaking can exclude the other competitors from the market […], this undertaking already has a dominant position [.] […] The cause of the existence of a dominant position can be the production, the distribution or the financial power”,38 “[t]here is an abusive use when the behaviour of the undertaking constitutes objectively a culpable behaviour with regard to objectives provided by the treaty”,39 and “abuse” contains “the competition of price designed to exclude a competitor which does not have sufficient financial means to bear sale below cost for a long time from the market”.40
25This view (hereafter “Memorandum view Ⅱ”) defines “abuse” as exclusionary abuses and “dominant position” as the power to conduct exclusionary abuses41 (hereafter “exclusionary power”). Therefore, there is a normative connection between them; however, this view does not explain the connection between a “dominant position” and “abuse” in detail.
C. Precedent
1) Abuse
26The CJEU has interpreted “abuse” as exploitative abuses and exclusionary abuses.
27In the United Brands case,42 the CJEU interpreted “abuse” as exploitative abuses, using almost the same phrase as that in the Memorandum view Ⅰ.43 This established precedent is referred to in the other exploitative abuses case.44
28In the Continental Can case,45 the CJEU referred to Article 3 (f) in the EEC Treaty,46 which embodies “objectives provided by the treaty” on Memorandum view Ⅱ,47 and then interpreted “abuse” as restrictions of competition (exclusionary abuses48): “ [Art. 102 of the TFEU] is […] aimed […] at […] [practices] which are detrimental to […] [consumers] through their impact on an effective competition structure, such as is mentioned in Art. 3 (f) of the treaty. Abuse may therefore occur if an undertaking in a dominant position strengthens such a position in such a way that the degree of dominance reached substantially fetters competition”.49 This interpretation was criticised because it makes it possible for Art. 102 of the TFEU to prohibit a (large) restriction of competition regardless of the means utilised to realise it.50 In the Hoffmann–La Roche case,51 CJEU added that Art. 102 of the TFEU prohibited the restriction of competition “through recourse to methods different from those which condition normal competition”.52
2) Dominant position
29In the Hoffmann–La Roche case, the CJEU interpreted “dominant position” as “a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained in the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately of the consumers”.53
30In this established precedent, first, a “dominant position” is limited to “economic strength”, like in the Memorandum view Ⅱ. Such power can be caused by size, economic importance and/or the political network of a multinational combine,54 but a “dominant position” should be viewed from the standpoint of competition in a relevant market.55 Second, the power to “prevent effective competition being maintained” can be interpreted as exclusionary power and the power “to behave to an appreciable extent independently” can be interpreted as exploitative power.56 According to the word “by” in the above precedent, the latter power seems to be a necessary condition for the former power. If so, the exclusionary power grasped by a “dominant position” is limited to the power that is brought by exploitative power.
31The potential of exploitative power seems to be enough for undertakings to accept exploitative power. Potential exploitative power refers to the power that enables the undertakings concerned to exclude their competitors and then maintain exploitative power.57 In other words, it is exclusionary power that enables the undertakings concerned to maintain exploitative power.
3) Connection between dominant position and abuse
32In the Hoffmann-La Roche case, first, the CJEU stated that “the interpretation […] that an abuse implies that the use of the economic power bestowed by a dominant position is the means whereby the abuse has been brought about cannot be accepted”58 (α). Second, the CJEU seemed to interpret “dominant position” as exploitative power and exclusionary power (β). Third, the CJEU interpreted “abuse” as conduct that “influence[s] the structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of competition is weakened”59 (γ). In the Continental Can case, the CJEU stated, “the question of the link of causality […] which […] exists between the dominant position and its abuse, is of no consequence, because the strengthening of the position of an undertaking may be an abuse”60 (δ).
33The statements (α), (γ) and (δ) are interpreted as stating that the CJEU does not demand to verify that behaviour causality exists between a “dominant position” and exclusionary abuses.61 According to (β), a normative connection may exist between “dominant position” and “abuse”.62 In addition, behaviour causality may exist between a “dominant position” and exploitative abuses through reference to profits obtained in the case of a competitive market.63,64
34According to (γ) and (δ), the CJEU demands that exclusionary abuses restrict competition remaining in the relevant market influenced by a “dominant position” (hereafter “the residual competition”65). That is, the (potential) restriction of competition caused by “abuse” and the restriction of competition caused by a “dominant position” are accumulated66. Such a connection between a “dominant position” and exclusionary abuses (hereafter “accumulative connection”) means that a “dominant position” brings the state of the residual competition to a relevant market and thereby indirectly affords the dominant undertakings the possibility of restricting the residual competition. In this sense, the accumulative connection is regarded as a normative connection and imposes on dominant undertakings “a special responsibility not to allow their conduct to impair”67 the residual competition.
35The relevant market influenced by a “dominant position” (hereafter “practically dominated market”) contains not only a dominated market, but the relevant market that is distinct from the dominated market (hereafter “other market”68) under certain conditions.69
IV. Limits of Art. 102 of the TFEU and solutions
36According to the CJEU’s view, first, a “dominant position” contains all exploitative power, which is characterised as an economic strength and viewed from the standpoint of competition in a relevant market. Second, a “dominant position” contains all exclusionary power, which is characterised as above exploitative power.
37First, Art. 102 of the TFEU can prohibit all exploitative abuses of dominant undertakings, but a “dominant position” cannot contain exploitative power that is not characterised as an economic strength. Therefore, Art. 102 cannot prohibit exploitative abuses of undertakings that hold exploitative power that is not characterised as economic strength, e.g., in my opinion, exploitative power characterised as tangible strength.
38However, Art. 102 of the TFEU prevents negative effects caused by the restriction of competition (“dominant position”), i.e. exploitative abuses and thereby plays a role in supplementing such regulation on the restriction of competition as cartel or merger regulation. Therefore, Art. 102 must be able to prohibit such effects (exploitative abuses), regardless of whether dominant undertakings hold exploitative power that can be characterised as an economic strength.
39Therefore, in relation to the regulation of exploitative abuses in Art. 102 of the TFEU, the “dominant position” condition should not be deleted because the regulation of exploitative abuses presupposes the existence of a “dominant position”. Additionally, “dominant position” should not be limited to the power characterised as an economic strength and should be interpreted as containing all exploitative power viewed from the standpoint of competition on a relevant market, regardless of whether exploitative power is characterised as an economic strength. For example, exploitative power that is characterised as a tangible strength gives the holder room to utilise it that is not sufficiently controlled by competition. Therefore, a “dominant position” should contain such power.
40Second, Art. 102 of the TFEU does not prohibit all exclusionary abuses by dominant undertakings but only prohibits those that restrict the residual competition. Additionally, a “dominant position” cannot contain exclusionary power that does not reach present or potential exploitative power. Therefore, Art. 102 of the TFEU cannot prohibit exclusionary abuses that restrict the competition on the practically dominated market that is not influenced by present or potential exploitative power. However, such exclusionary abuses should be prohibited in some cases, e.g., where they cause the same degree of restriction of competition as that caused accumulatively by “abuse” and a “dominant position” or where exclusionary abuses restrict “competition in tipping markets”.70
41According to the drafters’view, Art. 102 of the TFEU seems to be intended to prevent the negative effects caused by the restriction of competition in a dominated market, i.e. exploitative abuses. Additionally, a “dominant position” is characterised by a market without any competition or any substantial competition, which is the target of such restrictions of competition as exclusionary abuses. Therefore, although Art. 102 of the TFEU can regulate exploitative abuses in a dominated market and thereby indirectly regulate such restrictions of competition as indirectly exclusionary abuses restricting the competition in other market,71 Art. 102 of the TFEU is unsuitable for the regulation of such restrictions of competition as indirectly exclusionary abuses restricting the competition in the dominated market and directly exclusionary abuses. However, the Commission72 and Mestmäcker73 have argued that indirectly exclusionary abuses restricting the competition in the dominated market and directly exclusionary abuses should be also regulated by Art. 102 of the TFEU. The CJEU even seems to accept such arguments in the Continental Can case. In addition, in the Continental Can case and Hoffmann–La Roche case, the CJEU seemed to demand that an accumulative connection exists between a “dominant position” and exclusionary abuses, showing that they cared that Art. 102 of the TFEU does not prohibit a “dominant position” itself. This inappropriately limits the coverage of Art. 102 of the TFEU on exclusionary abuses.
42Therefore, in relation to the regulation of exclusionary abuses in Art. 102 of the TFEU, we should not demand an accumulative connection. In addition, in order to comprehensively regulate exclusionary abuses in Art. 102 of the TFEU, we should interpret “dominant position” as containing all exclusionary power, regardless of whether it is characterised as an economic strength and present or potential exploitative power.74 The reason is that the regulation on exclusionary abuses lies in the prevention of restriction of competition, so exclusionary abuses causing the restriction of competition should be regulated regardless of whether or not the violator’s exclusionary power is characterised as an economic strength and present or potential exploitative power. The above interpretation is compatible with the purpose that Art. 102 of the TFEU limits undertakings to dominant undertakings and that it only prohibits the use of a “dominant position”. The reason is that the above interpretation limits the violator to undertakings that have the room to utilise power that is not sufficiently (actually or potentially) controlled by competition and enables the acceptance that a normative connection exists between a “dominant position” and exclusionary abuses.
43However, some exclusionary power is difficult to accept as a “dominant position”. For example, it is thought that this power enables undertakings to diffuse fake news about competitors and exclude them. Therefore, in order to comprehensively regulate exclusionary abuses in Art. 102 of the TFEU, the “dominant position” condition should be deleted and amended to a provision that prohibits undertakings’ conduct from restricting competition and deviating “from […] [methods] which condition normal competition”.75 If exploitative abuses should be regulated in Art. 102 of the TFEU, we should not delete the “dominant position” condition from Art. 102, but we should establish a new legal provision prohibiting exclusionary abuses without the “dominant position” condition.
Notes de bas de page
1 ※ This paper is based on the following article: H. Sugisaki, “The structure of prohibition of abuse of dominant position”, The Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and International Studies, 2020, pp. 1337 à 1403 (the language to be mainly used is Japanese).
Art. 102 of the TFEU takes over Art. 86 in the Treaty establishing European Economic Community (hereafter “EEC”) and Art. 86 (later Art. 82) in the Treaty establishing the European Community. The texts of these provisions are unchanging, except for one phrase (“common market” was changed to “internal market”), and this change does not bring change to the substantial contents of the above provisions (P.-C. Müller-Graff, Europäisches Unionsrecht, in: C. Vedder et W. Heintschel von Heinegg (dir.), Nomos, 2e éd., 2018, Art. 102 AEUV, no 1, p. 640). In this paper, all the above provisions are called “Art. 102 of the TFEU”.
2 Similar arguments: A.-S. Choné, Les abus de domination: Essai en droit des contrats et en droit de la concurrence, préf. B. Teyssié, Economica, 2010, nos 386 et 388, pp. 253 à 255; G. Mallen, L’ appréhension des pratiques restrictives par les autorités françaises et européennes de la concurrence: Analyse des pratiques contractuelles abusives entre professionnels à l’ épreuve du droit des pratiques anticoncurrentielles, préf. L. Arcelin-Lécuyer, L’Harmattan, 2014, nos 188 et 216, pp. 215 et 237 à 238.
3 The European Commission takes over the Commission, which integrated the Commission in the EEC, the High Authority in the European Coal and Steel Community (hereafter “ECSC”) and the Commission in the European Atomic Energy Community. The Commission in the EEC and then the Commission applied Art. 102 of the TFEU before the European Commission was established. In this paper, the Commission in the EEC and the Commission are called “Commission”.
4 C. Gavalda, G. Parleani et B. Lecourt, Droit des affaires de l’Union Européenne, 8e éd., LexisNexis, 2019, no 739, p. 460; A. FUCHS, Kommentar zum Deutschen und Europäischen Kartellrecht, in: T. KÖRBER, H. SCHWEITZER et D. ZIMMER (dir.), C. H. BECK, 6e éd., 2019, Art. 102 AEUV, no 132, p. 629; A. JONES, B. SUFRIN et N. DUNNE, EU competition law: Text, cases, and materials, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 7e éd., 2019, p. 279.
5 C. Prieto et D. Bosco, Droit européen de la concurrence: Ententes et abus de position dominante, Bruylant, 2013, no 1236, p. 907; A. Fuchs, op. cit.(n. 4), Art. 102 AEUV, no 134, pp. 629 à 630; A. Jones, B. Sufrin and N. Dunne, op. cit.(n. 4), p. 289.
6 C. Jung, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, in: M. Nettesheim (dir.), 67. Ergänzung-Lfg., C. H. Beck, 2015, Art. 102 AEUV, no 166, p. 71.
7 C. Jung, op. cit.(n. 6), Art. 102 AEUV, nos 184 et 199, pp. 78 et 85; J. BUSCHE, Kölner Kommentar zum Kartellrecht, in: W. Zöllner et U. Noack (dir.), Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2016, Art. 102 AEUV, nos 91 à 92, pp. 568 à 569.
8 A. Fuchs, op. cit.(n. 4), Art. 102 AEUV, no 143, p. 634; V. Emmerich et K. W. Lange, Kartellrecht, 15e éd., C. H. Beck, 2021, no 5, p. 97.
9 H. Schröter et U. Bartl, Europäisches Unionsrecht, in: H. von der Groeben, J. Schwarze et A. Hatje (dir.), 7e éd., Nomos, 2015, Art. 102 AEUV, no 209, p. 1290.
10 C. Prieto et D. Bosco, op. cit. (n. 5), no 1236, p. 907; A. Fuchs, op. cit.(n. 4), Art. 102 AEUV, no 134, p. 630; A. Jones, B. Sufrin et N. Dunne, op. cit.(n. 4), p. 289.
11 N. Koch, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, in: Grabitz et Hilf (dir.), 14. Ergänzung-Lfg., C. H. Beck, 1999, Art. 86, no 53, pp. 26 à 27; C. Jung, op. cit. (n. 6), Art. 102 AEUV, no 184, p. 78.
12 G. Mallen, op. cit.(n. 2), 2014, no 100, p. 122.
13 Ibid.
14 A. Fuchs, op. cit.(n. 4), Art. 102 AEUV, no 144, p. 634.
15 T. Wessely, Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht, in: W. Jaeger, J. Kokott, P. Pohlmann et D. Schroeder (dir.), O. Schmidt, 2005, Art. 82 EG-Vertrag (Anwendungsgrundsätze), no 47, p. 26.
16 H. Schröter et U. Bartl, op. cit. (n. 9), Art. 102 AEUV, no 64, p. 1213.
17 L. Focsaneanu, “L’Article 86 du Traité de Rome et la décision Continental Can Company de la Commission de la C. E. E. (décision Ⅳ/26811 du 9 décembre 1971) : Une interprétation contestable d’un texte mauvais”, La Semaine Juridique-Générale, 1972, Ⅰ, 2452.
18 A.-S. Choné, op. cit. (n. 2), no 379, p. 249.
19 A. Fuchs, op. cit. (n. 4), Art. 102 AEUV, no 77, p. 600; V. Emmerich et K. W. Lange, op. cit. (n. 8), no 14, p. 92; T. Wessely, op. cit. (n. 15), Art. 82 EG-Vertrag (Normadressaten), no 79, p. 38.
20 A. Fuchs, op. cit. (n. 4), Art. 102 AEUV, no 74, p. 598.
21 N. Petit, Droit européen de la concurrence, 3e éd., LGDJ, 2020, no 1051, p. 423; M. T. Stoll, Drittmarktbehinderungen im deutschen und europäischen Kartellrecht: Eine Betrachtung insbesondere der §§19, 20 GWB und der Art. 82, 86 EG unter dem Aspekt der Drittmarktproblematik, 2002, pp. 263, 266 à 267 et 270; T. Eilmansberger et F. Bien, Münchener Kommentar zum europäisches und deutsches Wettbewerbsrecht, in: F. J. Säcker, F. Bien, P. Meier-Beck et F. Montag (dir.), 3e éd., C. H. Beck, 2020, Art. 102 AEUV, no 272, pp. 1638 à 1639.
22 For example, M. T. Stoll, op. cit. (n. 21), p. 87.
23 A. Fuchs, op. cit. (n. 4), Art. 102 AEUV, no 136, p. 631. See, W. Möschel, Der Oligopolmissbrauch im Recht der Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen: Eine vergleichende Untersuchung zum Recht der USA, Großbritanniens, der EWG und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1974, pp. 204 à 207 et 220; J. Nothdurft, Kartellrecht Kommentar, in: H.-J. Bunte (dir.), Luchterhand, 13. Aufl., 2018, §19 GWB, no 211, p. 553; H. Schweitzer, J. Haucap, W. Kerber et R. Welker, Modernisierung der Missbrauchsaufsicht für marktmächtige Unternehmen, Nomos, 2018, pp. 135 à 136.
24 See, W. Möschel, op. cit. (n. 23), pp. 204 à 207.
25 Memorandum der deutschen Delegation über die Ausschaltung wettbewerbsbeschränkender privater Praktiken, Paris 10 Februar 1954, Dokumente zum europäischen Recht Ⅲ, in: R. Schulze et T. Hoeren (dir.), Springer, 1999, Dok. 42, pp. 102 à 103.
26 H. Schweitzer, “The history, interpretation and underlying principles of Section 2 Sherman Act and Art. 82 EC”, in: C.-D. Ehlermann et M. Marquis (dir.), European Competition Law Annual 2007: A reformed approach to Article 82 EC, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008, p. 135.
27 Synoptische Darstellung über die Wettbewerbsregeln für die Unternehmen, Brüssel 9 Oktober 1956, op. cit. (n. 25), Dok. 59, p. 177.
28 See, P.-H. Burki, Le problème de l’abus des positions dominantes des grandes entreprises dans le Marché Commun, Herbert Lang et Cie SA Berne, 1968, p. 89.
29 C. Gavalda, G. Parleani et B. Lecourt, op. cit. (n. 4), no 710, p. 449 ; S. SCOTT GARNER, “Hoffmann-La Roche and dominant position in the EEC”, The Journal of International Law and Economics, 1980, p. 487.
30 J. J. A. ELLIS, “Enkele aantekeningen bij Artikel 86 van het EEG-Verdag”, Sociaal economische wetgeving, 1965, p. 328.
31 Aufzeichnung über die Wettbewerbsregeln im Vertrag über den gemeinsamen europäischen Markt, Brüssel 20 Oktober 1956, op. cit. (n. 25), Dok. 189.
32 Aufzeichnung über die Wettbewerbsregeln im Vertrag über den gemeinsamen europäischen Markt, Brüssel 20 Oktober 1956, op. cit. (n. 25), Dok. 60, p. 187.
33 Aufzeichnung über die Wettbewerbsregeln im Vertrag über den gemeinsamen europäischen Markt, Brüssel 20 Oktober 1956, op. cit. (n. 25), Dok. 60, p. 188.
34 The nearly view: P. Akman, The concept of abuse in EU competition law: Law and economic approaches, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012, p. 84. The cautious attitude: W. Wurmnest, Marktmacht und Verdrängungsmissbrauch: Eine rechtsvergleichende Neubestimmung des Verhältnisses von Recht und Ökonomik in der Missbrauchsaufsicht über marktbeherrschende Unternehmen, 2010, p. 75.
35 Etudes CEE Le problème de la concentration dans le Marché Commun ; série Concurrence no 3, Bruxelles, 1966 (hereafter “Mémorandum”).
36 Mémorandum, p. 22.
37 J. Temple LANG, “Monopolisation and the definition of ‘Abuse’ of a dominant position under Article 86 EEC Treaty”, Common Market Law Review, 1979, p. 345 ; L. Vogel, Droit européen des affaires, 2e éd., Dalloz, 2019, no 667, pp. 686 à 687.
38 Mémorandum, p. 25.
39 Ibid.
40 Mémorandum, p. 26.
41 M. Waelbroeck, Le droit de la communauté économique européenne: Commentaire du traité et des textes pris pour son application, 4 Concurrence, 1972, p. 60 ; H. Schröter et U. Bartl, op. cit. (n. 9), Art. 102 AEUV, no 70, p. 1215.
42 CJCE 14 fév. 1978, no C-27/76, United Brands Company et United Brands Continentaal BV c/Commission des Communautés européennes, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, (hereafter “United Brands”).
43 United Brands, pt. 249.
44 CJCE 11 déc 2008, no C-52/07 Kanal 5 Ltd et TV 4 AB c/ Föreningen Svenska Tonsättares Internationella Musikbyrå (STIM) upa. [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:703, pt. 27.
45 CJCE 21 fév. 1973, no C-6/72, Europemballage Corporation et Continental Can Company Inc c/ Commission des communautés européennes [1973] ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (hereafter “Continental Can”).
46 The contents of this provision were taken over by Protocol 27 of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
47 See, J. Temple Lang, op. cit.(n. 37), p. 351; P. Vogelenzang, “Abuse of a dominant position in Article 86: The problem of causality and some applications”, Common Market Law Review, 1976, p. 64.
48 R. Whish and D. Bailey, Competition law, 10e éd., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021, p. 211.
49 Continental Can, pt. 26.
50 Journal de droit international, 1974, obs. R. Saint-Esteben.
51 CJCE 13 fév. 1979, n° C-85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG c/Commission des Communautés européennes, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, (hereafter “Hoffmann-La Roche”).
52 Hoffmann–La Roche, pt. 91.
53 Hoffmann–La Roche, pt. 38.
54 T. Wessely, op. cit. (n. 15), Art. 82 EG-Vertrag (Normadressaten), no 25, p. 16.
55 United Brands, pt. 10.
56 Décision Ⅳ/30.698 [1985] JOCE L374/1 (hereafter “AKZO decision”), pt. 67 ; T. Eilmansberger, “Dominance – The lost child? How effects-based rules could and should change dominance analysis”, European Competition Journal, 2006 (2), p. 16.
57 See, United Brands, pt. 121; AKZO decision, pts. 68 à 70.
58 Hoffmann–La Roche, pt. 91.
59 Ibid.
60 Continental Can, pt. 27.
61 The nearly view: T. Eilmansberger et F. Bien, op. cit. (n. 21), Art. 102 AEUV, no 270, p. 1638. The cautious view: N. Koch, op. cit. (n. 11), nos 47 à 48, pp. 24 à 25.
62 See, K. Brinkmann, Marktmachtmissbrauch durch Verstoß gegen außerkartellrechtliche Rechtsvorschriften: Eine Untersuchung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Facebook-Verfahrens des Bundeskartellamtes, Nomos, 2018, pp. 168 à 169.
63 M. Kling et S. Thomas, Kartellrecht, 2e éd., Vahlen, 2015, no 90, p. 227.
64 In the Sanicorse case, where only French competition law ws applied, the Paris Court of Appeal seemed to think that behaviour causality must exist between a “dominant position” and exploitative abuses (CA Paris, pole 5, ch. 7, 14 nov. 2019, no 18/23992, pt. 92). In the Facebook case, where only German competition law was applied, the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal thought that behaviour causality must exist between a “dominant position” and exploitative abuses (OLG Düsseldorf, Beschluss vom 26.8.2019, Az. Ⅵ Kart 1/19 (Ⅴ), pt. 73).
65 The original expression is “Restwettbewerb”.
66 H. Weyer, “Zum Normzweck des Missbrauchsverbots nach § 19 GWB”, in: J. Kokott, P. Pohlmann et R. Polley (dir.), Europäisches, Deutsches und Internationales Kartellrecht, Festschrift für Dirk Schroeder, 2018, pp. 929 à 930.
67 CJCE 9 nov. 1983, no C-322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin c/ Commission des Communautés européennes [1983] ECLI:EU:C:1983:313, pt. 57.
68 The original expression is “Drittmarkt”.
69 CJCE 14 nov. 1996, no C-333/94 P, Tetra Pak International SA c/Commission des Communautés européennes, ECLI:EU:C:1996:436, pt. 27.
70 Speech by Mrs Margrethe Vestager at the College of Europe in Bruges on 2 March 2020 at http://hbfm.link/7680.pdf (consulté le 1er sept. 2021).
71 R. Joliet, “Der Begriff der missbräuchlichen Ausnutzung in Art. 86 EWG-Vertrag”, Europarecht, 1973, p. 119.
72 See, Memorandum view Ⅱ.
73 E.-J. Mestmäcker, “Die Beurteilung von Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen nach Artikel 86 des Vertrages über die europäische Wirtschaftgemeinschaft” in: E. von Gaemmerer, H.-J. Schlochauer et E. Steindorff (dir.), Probleme des europäischen Rechts, Festschrift für Walter Hallstein, Vittorio Klostermann, 1966, pp. 322 à 323.
74 In the 熊本魚 case (公取委勧告審決昭和35年2月9日審決集10巻17頁) and 神鉄タクシー case (大阪高判平成26年10月31日審決集61巻260頁), to which Japanese antitrust law was applied, undertakings disturbed their competitors’ business physically. Japanese antitrust law has provisions that regulate the conduct corresponding to exclusionary abuses, regardless of the violators’ position.
75 Hoffmann–La Roche, pt. 91.
Le texte seul est utilisable sous licence Licence OpenEdition Books. Les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont « Tous droits réservés », sauf mention contraire.
Qu’en est-il du code du commerce 200 ans après ?
États des lieux et projections
Corinne Saint-Alary-Houin (dir.)
2008
Qu'en est-il de la simplification du droit ?
Frédérique Rueda et Jacqueline Pousson-Petit (dir.)
2010
La réorientation européenne de la TVA à la suite du renoncement au régime définitif
Francis Querol (dir.)
2014
Regards critiques sur quelques (r)évolutions récentes du droit
Tome 1 : Bilans et Tome 2 : Réformes-Révolutions
Maryvonne Hecquard-Théron et Jacques Krynen (dir.)
2005