Version classiqueVersion mobile

Le pénal dans tous ses États

 | 
René Lévy
, 
Xavier Rousseaux

- I - Acculturation juridique et intégration nationale

Notabili, Gendarmes & the State: Preserving Order & the Origins of the Centralized State in the Italian Departements of the First Empire

Michael Broers

Texte intégral

I - FROM INTERNAL CONQUEST TO IMPERIAL INTEGRATION

  • 1 On Spain: M. ARTOLA-GALLEGO, Los Affrancesados, Madrid, 1953. H. JURETSCHKE, Los Affrancesados, Ma (...)

1The revolutionary wars of the 1790s destroyed what slender confidence most of the Italian propertied classes may have had in the ability of their rulers to protect them from the spectre of popular violence and common crime. In the convulsed circumstances of these years, few contemporaries bothered to draw the distinction between the two. These conditions often gave the prospect of French rule a deserved, if usually forced welcome from many who had fought them determinedly only months earlier. This attitude, of resignation prompted by fear and desperation, was not confined to the Italian states: similar sentiments were voiced by those at the healm of the crumbling Spanish state in the spring of 1808, and in Portugal, where Junot’s presence was welcomed initially by many within the Portuguese establishment as a bulwark against popular disorder1.

2In the Italian states, the moment between the collapse of the old order-whether it came in 1796 or 1809-was a crucial moment for the future evolution of French policy, for it was the point when traditional dynastic and political loyalties among the propertied classes came closest to disappearing under the strains of civil and military chaos. It is not without significance that the sections of the elites most likely to renounce their old allegiances in favour of collaboration were either those at the centre of the state, at national and provincial level - those men who had been left to preside over the disintegration of public order-or provincial notabili, the petty nobles and bourgeois of the borghi, who had only the state to protect them from popular disorder and, frequently, from vendettas within their own ranks. Out of this deep crisis of confidence, the French tried to build a social basis for their own regime, but it was a moment that had to be grasped.

  • 2 E.A. BRIGIDI, Giacobini e realisti, o Viva Maria: storia del 1799 in Toscana, Siena, 1882. S. LA S (...)
  • 3 G. TURI, Viva Maria: la reazione alle riforme Leopoldine, 1790-1799, Florence, 1969.
  • 4 On Aosta: M. RUGGIERO, La rivolta dei contadini piemontesi, Turin, 1974. On the southern uplands: (...)

3Whatever their political preferences, the Italian elites remained haunted by the spectre of the popular violence of the late 1790s. Well into the early twentieth century, the image of a rampant, barbarous plebe was still being evoked with urgency by liberal historians in the post-unification period2. To contemporary notabili, the mass revolts of 1796-1799 seemed to confirm the fears they had harboured throughout the preceeding decades. In the valleys of the Aretino, in southern Tuscany, the anti-French Viva Maria risings of the 1790s were another phase of the worsening relationship between mezzadri and their landlords, which had already flared into violence in the 1780s3. The vast jacqueries of the Val d’Aosta in 1799, 1800 and 1801, together with the ferocious anti-French risings of the southern uplands of Piedmont in the same period4 appeared to confirm the general prognosis of il ceto dirigente of the subalpine kingdom, that they had been governing a society on the brink of disintegration for decades before the French invasion. These are probably the most striking examples of this phenomenon, but similar attitudes can be discerned throughout the peninsula.

4The more astute, less ideologically charged French administrators of the Napoleonic period were quick to seize on law and order as an issue that could make support for the regime a reality in the Italian départements. As they came to understand that most of their initial collaborators had rallied to them in search of social control, higher-ranking French officials grasped that, if policing could be at once depoliticized to make it safe for all notabili to turn to the state, as well as effective - to prove the viability of French rule-then the social base of the regime could be extended. Seen in their terms, it was an attempt to repeat the process of the late 1790s, but it had to be done quickly. Hence the emphasis placed by Menou, first in Piedmont and then in Tuscany, by Lebrun in Liguria and De Gerando and Miollis in the Papal States, on the swift introduction of the complete, unadulterated Napoleonic police apparatus into the new départements. The need for a strong military presence in environments as hostile as these is obvious, simply as pure protection for the French and for the enforcement of conscription. This aspect need not be laboured. However, there is a very clear distinction between the use of regular troops for repressive duties and the establishment of a proper police force to protect local persons and property. The French saw it.

5The Gendarmerie was heralded as a needed replacement for the sbirri, rather than as a refined weapon of military occupation. Above all, its role as a force devoted specifically to policing the countryside was stressed by the French, in an effort to portray the corps as not only better than any of its ancien regime predecessors, but different. At last, the many petitions of rural communities for state intervention, so numerous in the 1780s and 1790s, were to be answered. The French worked hard to keep their word: the administrative records of the period leave no doubt about their determination to establish the Gendarmerie as quickly as possible, or to disseminate its brigades throughout the countryside, in places where they were needed most. In this, the French felt the Gendarmerie could be unique, in that it was not there primarily to coax Italian society into the Napoleonic mould, but to meet Italian needs, as well as those of the state. It was not there to revolutionize, but to preserve and protect what it found. The large scale popular revolts had been repressed by military force by the early years of French rule, and they would continue to be dealt with in this way, in the rare cases where they occurred after 1801. In contrast, the Gendarmerie offered the propertied classes a means of curbing the continuing threat of individual, criminal offences against persons and property.

  • 5 On Piedmont: M. BROERS, The Restoration of Order… On Tuscany: J.P. FILIPINI, Difesa dell’Impero o (...)
  • 6 M. BROERS, Ibid. J.P. FILIPINI, Ibid. Research into Archives Nationales de Paris (A.N.P.) Serie F/ (...)
  • 7 For the Roman départements: A.N.P. F/7 8898 & 8899 (Police-Générale, dept. Rome). For the preannex (...)

6It is difficult to know with any certainty whether the notabili were really threatened with engulfment by social anarchy. In the context of the relationship between the French State and the Italian elites, it is tempting to say that it does not matter; their perceptions of the magnitude of the threat were very similar, and their responses were built on the shared assumption that such a threat existed. Working from this shared assumption - however inaccurate it may have been in fact-the French appear to have made considerable progress among the Italian elites, by using law and order as a means to achieve ralliement among them. Indicative of this is the evolution of the nature of the mesure de haute police in the Italian départements, in the course of Napoleonic rule. In the Piedmontese and Tuscan départements, it rapidly lost its political character once French rule became better established5. It was used less frequently for offences against the state by members of the political classes as time progressed; by 1804 in Piedmont and by 1810 in Tuscany, haute police had evolved into a tool of social control, directed and employed by the notabili, rather than a weapon used by the state against them, or - although it could still happen - as a weapon wielded by one faction of the local elite against another. Both the state and the potential elements of its social base were happy to see this extra-legal device used against common criminals. Its targets shifted from political subversives, whether Jacobin or reactionary, to a mixture of local bullies, persistent petty criminals and wayward sons of the petty aristocracy and bourgeoisie. There are two striking features about this social aspect of haute police: its wide geographic spread and the fact that these cases originated from private individuals or maires, not from the state or its officials6. If there is an example of a French institution winning the approval of the Italian elites, it is the social application of haute police. Those aspects of it which replicated the lettre de cachet had not withered among the propertied classes of Italy as they had in France7.

7More widespread was the use of haute police against known criminals who had often been the objects of denunciation by local communities since well before the French period. A systematic process evolved to deal with these social undesirables - be they dangerous or merely vexatious - which entailed their initial arrest under haute police, especially in cases which had failed to pass the courts in the past, followed by conscription into the Napoleonic armies and removal from their area. The Tuscan notabili, in particular, used these methods to lessen the threat they perceived themselves to be under from the mezzadri, whose hostility and alienation from their landlords had manifested itself in mass revolt and vendetta since the 1770s. In these cases, what mattered was not only the structure of the French system of repression, but that the Gendarmerie was capable of enforcing haute police more effectively than any police force of the ancien régime. When and where this was the case, the Napoleonic State found practical collaboration, as in Tuscany, where the partnership sought to “clean up” the countryside and fill the ranks of the Grande Armée, simultaneously.

  • 8 See A.N.P. F/7 8807, 8808, 8809 (Police-Générale, dept. Arno).

8There are virtually no recorded cases of communities objecting to the presence of Gendarmerie brigades in the Italian départements; quite the reverse. Yet, there were severe doubts about their ability to defend their communities. Here, two general points can be made: confidence in the effectiveness of the Gendarmerie was related to the length of the French occupation and here, a regional and chronological pattern imposes itself. Broadly, there was more faith in the system and its institutions in the Piedmontese and Ligurian départements than in the Papal States; the Tuscan example is revealing because it shows rapidly growing confidence until 1812, followed by a rapidly diminishing faith in the system, as shortages of men led to amnesties and even treaties with bandits replacing a policy of determined repression8. Nevertheless, this loss of confidence should not be confused with hostility to this aspect of French rule. Support for a stronger police presence and a more aggressive approach to social control depended partly on economic gradations within the elites, and also on the traditional patterns of political power within certain regions.

  • 9 A.VALENTE, Gioacchino Murat e l’Italia meridionale, Turin, 1965, p. 107-155.
  • 10 For the great Roman families: A.N.P. F/7 8888, 8889, 8890 (Police-Générale, dept. Rome).
  • 11 Archivio di Stato di Cuneo (ASC) Epoca francese, Mazzo 154, S. Prefect, Alba to Prefect, dept. Stu (...)

9Those sections of the notabili most favourable to a strong police were the petty nobility and bourgeoisie of the small provincial towns: those groups most exposed to disorder and crime, but without the individual wealth or influence to protect their properties alone and, increasingly unable to do so from the collective resources available to local government alone. However, this was not universal or uniform. The most powerful landowners did not need the police protection offered by the French. Whereas provincial notabili needed gendarmes to support the work of gardes forestiers and gardes champêtres in protecting communal lands, as well as their private property, the baroni had always been able to retire behind their private armies in those parts of Italy where latifundi still existed. In parts of the Kingdom of Naples, especially Calabria, the success of the initial process of internal conquest was wholly dependent on convincing the feudal barons to withdraw their patronage from the bandits who formed their private armies. Although this appeared possible for a brief time, roughly between 1807 and 1809, thereafter the traditional pattern reasserted itself, and thus the foundations of Napoleonic policy were critically undermined9. In the imperial départements, the Roman baronage practiced a similar, if less aggressive bypassing of French rule10. Even in the Piedmontese départements, powerful families like the Barolos, whose estates were mainly allodial, were still able retreat behind their local influence and private field guards11. Families of this standing simply did not need this central aspect of the modem state. They were, and would remain, gli indifferenti.

  • 12 For the revolt: A.N.P. F/7 8926-27 (Police-Générale, dept. Taro).
  • 13 Based on the author’s evaluation of the evidence in A.N.P. F/7 8926 to 8933 (Police-Générale, dept (...)

10Beside the indifferent, there were also the sections of the provincial elites actively opposed to any effective police presence in their communities. The existence of such groups depended, primarily, on the political and social structures inherited from the ancien regime within certain regions. They, too, were of the small land-owning classes, and their opposition to policing must heavily qualify too ready an equation between acceptance of the Napoleonic State and the absence of seigneurial property. The crucial example is that provided by the Apennine valleys on the borders of Liguria, Tuscany and the duchies of Parma and Piacenza, the Piacentino, where the French never really found the co-operation they desired, although similar examples abound in Piedmont, Tuscany and Liguria in the early phases of internal conquest. The Piacentino contained some of the least governed communities in western Europe; here, the marked preference was not for a more effective State, but for no State at all. Indeed, under the ephemeral government of the Senate of Genoa and the Dukes of Parma-Piacenza, this preference expressed itself in the central place occupied by smuggling in the local economy; although this had also been true in many parts of southern Piedmont, in the northern Apennines, virtually no attempt had ever been made to stop it in the Piacentino. Thus, what the French encountered was a local elite of merchant-smugglers, rooted in their communities and more secure in their positions than the bandits of the Mezzogiomo or the Ligurian-Piedmontese border, because they were not dependent on noble patronage; if anything, they were the dispensers of local patronage. The French were able to crush their initial revolt of 1805-1806, thus completing the internal conquest of these valleys12, but thereafter, their rule did not really progress much beyond a military occupation. A close examination of the police sources reveals that, in the Piacentino, the majority of requests for the application of haute police, for whatever region, did not originate within the local communities, but came from the French, themselves13. Inherent in this is a wider cultural gulf.

II - THE POLICE & THE PEOPLE MORES AND CULTURE

11There is powerful evidence to substantiate the acceptance of French policing and many of its objectives among wide sections of the elites of the Italian peninsula, but this success must be set in the wider context of the other policies pursued by the regime and elite responses to them. Indeed, as the attitudes of the baroni indifferenti and the merchant-smugglers of the Piacentino indicate, there were strong currents within Italian society which militated against the acceptance of the active, interventionist state, represented at its base by the Gendarmerie. Here, two points must be made which are distinct, but closely related. First, there were elements within the propertied classes-many at the apex of local and provincial life - which rejected this aspect of French policy, and this attitude widened to almost immeasurable proportions, in the case of the popular classes. Thus, even this most successful component of French policy had a very narrow appeal. Second, there is evidence to indicate that the relative success of policing policies among the elites was heavily qualified, and often negated, by responses to French policies in other areas.

  • 14 On Piedmont: M. BROERS, The Restoration of Order..., p. 213-221. See A.N.P. F/7 for information on (...)
  • 15 On the determination of Wirion to achieve this: A.S.C., Epoca francese, Mazzo 162, Dossier “Casern (...)
  • 16 For an example: A.S.C., Epoca Francese, Mazzo 227, Polizia, Commandant, dept. Stura to Prefect, de (...)

12Before widening the scope of investigation, there is a further point to be made regarding the Gendarmerie, itself. The Gendarmerie in the imperial départements of Italy was not only a foreign institution, in that it was wholly innovative in an Italian context; two-thirds of its ranks were composed of ex-French soldiers. In the Piedmontese and Ligurian départements, the normal six-man brigade contained four French gendarmes and two local men; elsewhere, the Italian “third” of the brigade could be made up of Piedmontese or Ligurians, to complete the exclusion of local men in Tuscany, the Duchies and the Papal States14. In a very real sense, the corps was within the community it was meant to serve, as the most widely disseminated institution of the French state, save the mairie, but it was manifestly not of that community. Culturally isolated by its origins, it was also physically segregated from its administrés in self-contained barracks, wherever possible. All this was the result of deliberate government policy, underlined by the determination with which both “ethnic” quotas and quartering in barracks was maintained, despite the financial and logistical difficulties they imposed on the state15. The corps was to be neither a burden on the community, nor a part of it. Requests by French gendarmes to marry local girls were invariably rejected with firmness and no small degree of reproach16. The goal of this policy was to create the conditions for the impartial enforcement of the law and to assure the loyalty of the corps to the state. By and large, the policy worked, but tensions between the Gendarmerie and the small communities it served were frequent and, often, violent. Relations with the popular classes were never cordial, given the major role played by the Gendarmerie in the enforcement of conscription, the collection of taxes and the usual range of duties that bring opprobrium on the police in many societies. However, even the narrow circle of patriot collaborators found themselves excluded from the social life of the barracks, and attempts to mix between the only two groups trully loyal to the government were usually futile. These divisions were exacerbated by the dualité du pouvoir inherent within the Napoleonic State, which bred rivalry among its different branches. Nevertheless, these essentially social and internal animosities only rarely distracted the Gendarmerie from its duty, and even the grossest misconduct on the part of its members produced local demands for the removal of individuals, but never of the brigade itself The essential service rendered to the propertied classes of the local community by the corps far outweighed its misconduct, the social gulf between them not withstanding.

  • 17 Instances of this type are legion, but they achieved particular virulence in the two Roman départe (...)

13However, the French police were also the arm of a state intent on changing the very fabric of Italian life, as it was perceived by the policy-makers at the apex of the state. The Gendarmerie carried out the closure of monasteries and convents prescribed by the Concordat, and arrested those clergy who refused the oath of loyalty imposed by the regime. In this, it was drawn away from its role as a servant of the propertied classes, and into that of a cultural oppressor, in a context where the sensibilites of the elites were as susceptible to offence as those of the popular classes. French ecclesiastical policies had very different connotations for the elites than that of conscription: the former struck at the heart of a culture founded on Baroque, Tridentine Catholicism, shared in common with the popular classes, something the French manifestly failed to appreciate until the damage had been done. The spectacle of the guardians of public security carrying out mass arrests of refractory clergy at their altars on Easter Sunday17 made a different impression from the battues générales carried out against the deserters whom they perceived as the spearhead of social anarchy. To the French, the enforcement of conscription and the Concordat were part of the same policy of welding Italian society to the ethos of secular civisme, a blend of militarism and Enlightened scepticism, at the heart of Napoleonic imperialism. The Gendarmerie was the agent of this cultural imperialism, as well as the protector of the community. As such, it drew reactions treading a line between respect based on utility, and odium, even as regards its clearest beneficiaries. It took part in too many detested aspects of the French occupation to escape unpopularity.

  • 18 Archives de la Guerre, Vincennes (AG), Serie X/f (Gendarmerie): X/f 150 and AG X/f 134, Registre d (...)

14This unavoidable source of unpopularity was compounded by the zeal with which the corps enforced the more aggressive aspects of the Concordat. Where detailed evidence is available on the individuals who composed the Gendarmerie, as it is for the Piedmontese départements, the backgrounds of its officers and non-commissioned officers reveal a corps marked by revolutionary republicanism18. The core of the “team” created by Menou to introduce the Gendarmerie to the newly annexed départements and to oversee its recruitment and initial operations - to spearhead the phase of internal conquest - had been forged in the Vendée, and brought many of its preconceptions with it. Later in the period, there is some evidence that losses within the brigades of the Italian départements were in part made up of veterans of the Spanish front, where the war against the partidas rekindled many “Jacobin” instincts in a new generation of recruits. With the exception of the Piedmontese départements, little is known in detail of individual gendarmes, but their actions mark them out as virulently anticlerical and, therefore, very contemptuous of the culture of those they policed and protected. In these circumstances, the corps acquired a sense of isolation and what may properly be termed “otherness”, far beyond that intended by the government.

15The enforcement of the Concordat embodied many profound cultural differences between the notabili and the French police, often bringing them to the fore in the dramatic set-pieces of public life, secular and religious: processions and te deum.

  • 19 See for example: N. and Y. CASTAN, Vivre ensemble: ordre et désordre en Languedoc, XVIIe et XVIIIe (...)

16Refusal to celebrate alien, unpopular public festivals and defiant attempts to celebrate saints’ days banned under the Concordat became the most blatant "flash points" of the gap dividing them. The cultural gulf could show itself in other, more routine ways, however. In some parts of the countryside, a thorough examination of the existing evidence indicates that the provincial notabili of the borghi had very different notions from the French of what might be termed “acceptable levels of violent behavior”. Such assertions are hard to quantify, but the French were often very clear in their shock and disapproval at the acceptance of the frequent use of violence in personal quarrels among the lawyers, clerics, nobles and bourgeois of the borghi. They were not surprised by any of this, although it is a reasonable assumption that their readiness to act on that disapproval often surprised the notabili, who were simply not used to being “policed” in this way. Violence linked with personal or family honour was not a concept unknown to the French police, far from it19. They simply refused to sanction it, and had sufficient force at their disposal to believe they did not have to tolerate it.

  • 20 See for example, the comments in A.N.P., Serie F/le (Pays réunis et annexés) F/le 87-88 (Parme et (...)
  • 21 The violence of the notabili of the southern provinces of Piedmont was notorious and well publiciz (...)

17The most marked examples of this in the imperial départements come from the Piacentino, where generations, indeed centuries, under the nominal rule of a weak state had produced a society where most young men, notabili as well as peasants, went about openly and proudly, bearing arms. The overwhelming impression given by the French police sources is of a society with great affinities to the Balkans in the same period20. These valleys, notable for their previous independence, were not alone in their penchant for elite violence, however. The notabili of provincial Piedmont were relnowned as given to duelling to settle private quarrels in the eighteenth century, a penchant which seems to have been exacerbated by their readiness to serve in the royal army, rather than curbed by military discipline21. Throughout the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Savoyard monarchy produced a mass of legislation outlawing duelling, as well as a flood of regulations to prohibit the carrying of arms. It was only under the French that legislation of this type had any real chance of becoming effective, however. Even with their relatively efficient police apparatus, French success in this area was limited. The Napoleonic State could not hope to confiscate the flow of arms in the Italian countryside or even the borghi, but it was better equipped to arrest those who flouted the law than the forces of the ancien regime. When the French intervened in this aspect of disorder, the notabili resented their presence, and that of the kind of State they represented.

III - POLICING, IMPERIALISM AND THE MODERN STATE

18There was a strong and effective degree of co-operation between a large section of the Italian elites and the French in the work of restoring law and order, particularly in a rural context. In many parts of the peninsula, this mutual interest in better policing produced remarkable results, most notably in the Piedmontese départements and, perhaps less enduringly, in Tuscany. Here, old patterns of disorder - organized banditry based on smuggling in southern Piedmont, peasant revolt in the Aretino - disappeared, with fundamental consequences for the future evolution of these regions. Elsewhere, as in the Piacentino, no appreciable level of co-operation was ever achieved, and older patterns persisted into the nineteenth century. The same holds true for the Papal States.

19One general lesson is clear from the widely differing degrees of success achieved by the French: nothing of real value was achieved in the restoration of law and order without the co-operation of the elites at the local level. The provincial notabili were the ultimate arbiters of this aspect of French rule; without their support, the new institutions meant nothing.

20The nature of this support, the conditions on which and in which it was given, hold the real key to its historical significance. Contemporaries had no illusions that it was founded on fear and necessity. Pushed to its logical conclusion, the picture is of an alien, isolated police protecting an elite which perceived itself as equally embattled and isolated within its own community. Where local elites were not isolated, and did not feel they were living in the shadow of social anarchy, they felt little or no need for the new style of protection offered by the Napoleonic State. It can be argued that, to build the social base of the state among the provincial notabili was to build upon sand, yet realistic alternatives are hard to imagine. The cost of accepting the French state was higher for the notabili than has often been realized. The Concordat is but the most prominent of several essentially cultural issues that these elites had to oppose, if they were not to lose what degree of social control they possessed. In these circumstances, the clergy - at every level - emerged into the Restoration period with their influence greatly enhanced, not only because of the example of the cultural and social solidarity they had set during the Napoleonic occupation, but through the proportionate decline in that of their secular counterparts, who had exploited the benefits of Napoleonic rule, its policing institutions included.

21Within the extreme picture painted here there are obviously many shades of grey. The notabili were not invariably or universally compromised by collaboration, nor were they uniquely or exclusively obsessed by the spectre of social anarchy. Nevertheless, this fear had become an atavistic response of the notabili in moments of crisis, and the century ahead would be replete with such moments. The epoca francese did not see them freed from their original, underlying sense of fear and isolation and, although it had shown them the kind of state that could better protect them from the supposed sources of their fears, they had also learned that to support it bore the risk of even deeper isolation, of a kind that compounded social and economic tensions with cultural estrangement. The epoca francese left a dangerous legacy in Italy. Indeed, the later generation which forged the unitary state found itself appealing to the same cadres in the same terms, for the same reasons. The results were equally precarious. In this, the experience of the epoca francese marks a clear beginning of a process: the evolution of the relationship between the Italian State and its administrés which continues to this day, perhaps with more, rather than less, intensity.

Notes

1 On Spain: M. ARTOLA-GALLEGO, Los Affrancesados, Madrid, 1953. H. JURETSCHKE, Los Affrancesados, Madrid, 1962. For an interesting new appraisal, A. MARTINEZ DE VELASCO, La formacion de la Junta Central, Pamplona, 1972. On Portugal: L.A. DE OLIVERIA RAMOS, Da Ilustrao ao Liberalismo, Porto, 1979. A. DO CARMO REIS, Invasoes Francesas: as revoltas do Porto contra Junot, Lisboa, 1992.

2 E.A. BRIGIDI, Giacobini e realisti, o Viva Maria: storia del 1799 in Toscana, Siena, 1882. S. LA SORSA, I moti rivoluzionari a Molfetta nei primi mesi del 1799, Trani, 1903. F. CARABELLESE, In terra di Bari dal 1799 al 1806, Trani, 1900. For a brief analysis of this historiography, M. BROERS, Revolution & Risorgimento: the Heritage of the French Revolution in Nineteenth Century Italy, in H.T. MASON and W. DOYLE, (eds.), The Impact of the French Revolution on European Consciousness, Glouscester, 1989, p. 81-90.

3 G. TURI, Viva Maria: la reazione alle riforme Leopoldine, 1790-1799, Florence, 1969.

4 On Aosta: M. RUGGIERO, La rivolta dei contadini piemontesi, Turin, 1974. On the southern uplands: M. BROERS, The Restoration of Order in Napoleonic Piedmont, 1796-1814, unpubl. Oxford D.Phil. thesis, 1986.

5 On Piedmont: M. BROERS, The Restoration of Order… On Tuscany: J.P. FILIPINI, Difesa dell’Impero o difesa della società? Le misure di ‘haute police’ nella Toscana napoleonica, Rivista Italiana di Studi Napoleonici, 1980, xvii, p. 9-66, 11-14.

6 M. BROERS, Ibid. J.P. FILIPINI, Ibid. Research into Archives Nationales de Paris (A.N.P.) Serie F/7 (Police-Générale) for the other départements of Imperial Italy has led the author to similar conclusions for Liguria, Parma-Piacenza and the Papal States.

7 For the Roman départements: A.N.P. F/7 8898 & 8899 (Police-Générale, dept. Rome). For the preannexation period in Tuscany, the mass of petitions in Archivio di Stato di Firenze (ASF), Buon Governo, filze 461, 463, 464, 465, 469, 470 for the years 1808-1809. Soundings for 1785, 1793 and 1802 show them to be common under the Ancien Régime.

8 See A.N.P. F/7 8807, 8808, 8809 (Police-Générale, dept. Arno).

9 A.VALENTE, Gioacchino Murat e l’Italia meridionale, Turin, 1965, p. 107-155.

10 For the great Roman families: A.N.P. F/7 8888, 8889, 8890 (Police-Générale, dept. Rome).

11 Archivio di Stato di Cuneo (ASC) Epoca francese, Mazzo 154, S. Prefect, Alba to Prefect, dept. Stura., 18 January, 1814.

12 For the revolt: A.N.P. F/7 8926-27 (Police-Générale, dept. Taro).

13 Based on the author’s evaluation of the evidence in A.N.P. F/7 8926 to 8933 (Police-Générale, dept. Taro).

14 On Piedmont: M. BROERS, The Restoration of Order..., p. 213-221. See A.N.P. F/7 for information on the other départements.

15 On the determination of Wirion to achieve this: A.S.C., Epoca francese, Mazzo 162, Dossier “Casernement”, 1805-1814.

16 For an example: A.S.C., Epoca Francese, Mazzo 227, Polizia, Commandant, dept. Stura to Prefect, dept. Stura, 5 July, 1803.

17 Instances of this type are legion, but they achieved particular virulence in the two Roman départements from 1810 onwards, following the deportation of Pius VII and the struggle by the French to impose the oath of loyalty on the Roman clergy. Over 20,000 priests were arrested and deported in the course of 1810-1813. For a dramatic arrest in Civita Vecchia, on Easter Sunday, 1813: A.N.P. F/7 8906, (Police-Générale, dept. Rome), Special Police Commissaire, Civita Vecchia to Director-General of Police, Roman départements, 10 May, 1813.

18 Archives de la Guerre, Vincennes (AG), Serie X/f (Gendarmerie): X/f 150 and AG X/f 134, Registre des Officiers, dept, de la Sture, 1806 et du dépt. du Tanaro, 1805. Cited in M. BROERS, The Restoration of Order..., p. 215-217.

19 See for example: N. and Y. CASTAN, Vivre ensemble: ordre et désordre en Languedoc, XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, Paris, 1981.

20 See for example, the comments in A.N.P., Serie F/le (Pays réunis et annexés) F/le 87-88 (Parme et Plaisance), Administrative Prefect, Parma to Minister of the Interior, 5 April, 1806.

21 The violence of the notabili of the southern provinces of Piedmont was notorious and well publicized in the eighteenth century. Their reputation reached even an English readership through G. BARETTI, An Account of the Manners & Customs of Italy, 2 vols, London, 1769, ii, p. 121.

Auteur

Lecturer at the School of History, University of Leeds (United Kingdom). He is the author of Europe under Napoleon (London, Arnold, 1996) and Europe after Napoleon (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996). He also published: Revolution as Vendetta: Patriotism in Piedmont, 1794-1821, Historical Journal, 1990, 33, 384. He is currently researching counter revolution in Italy (1796-1814).

© Presses de l’Université Saint-Louis, 1997

Conditions d’utilisation : http://www.openedition.org/6540

Cette publication numérique est issue d’un traitement automatique par reconnaissance optique de caractères.
Rechercher dans OpenEdition Search

Vous allez être redirigé vers OpenEdition Search