Abstracts
p. 307-312
Texte intégral
Territorial and military organization of the Portuguese colony of Angola in the 17th century. Mathieu Mogo Demaret
1At the end of the 16th century and in the beginning of the 17th century, in the context of the development of the transatlantic slave trade, Angola played a prominent role in the political plans of Portugal and the United-Provinces for the South Atlantic. One particularity of the region of Luanda and its hinterland lies in the fact that the European presence was not limited to the coastal area, and that there was a process of penetration of the African continent. Based on Portuguese and Dutch sources and cartographical material, we will study the geographical disposition of the European military implantations. The aim of this article is to improve our understanding of the spatial organization of the region of Luanda. We will focus on three aspects in order to explain the strategic decisions made by the colonial agents: First, the nature of the relations between Portuguese and African powers had an impact on the configuration of the region of Luanda. Due to the small number of their troops, the Portuguese were obliged to adapt their military technics to the reality of the ground and to renegotiate constantly their relations with African powers. Second, we will show that the lack of a systematic Portugal’s policy of conquest caused conflicts between the home country and the Portuguese settlers of Angola. This reality influenced the implantation of Portuguese strongholds and the defensive policy of the port of Luanda. Third, in the 17th century due to its strategic position, the region of Luanda became a battleground for Portugal and the United-Provinces. After a failed attempt to take the city in 1624, the Dutch occupied Luanda between 1641 and 1648. In this manner, they forced the Portuguese to flee in the hinterland. In this context, the Portuguese had to rethink their relationship with the African powers and their military organisation in that region.
Static and dynamic defense, the case of Santo Domingo in the second half of the 17th century. Philippe Hrodej
2The Tortuga and coast of Hispaniola settlement developed without any royal interference. The settlers and buccaneers value “le droit de la hache” but, even if they may be tempted from time to time trade with the Dutch or the English, the inhabitants of coast of Hispaniola declare that they are faithful to the King of France, in spite of the fact that they have inadequate means in hand to protect their plantations: they only have a few soldiers with pressgang and a few workmen at their disposal. They also have trouble in getting enough money from the Secretary of State to build fortifications. In order to solve the problem, the first governors decide to make use of the buccaneers’services. It is difficult to maintain strict control over them but they are extremely mobile and they easily divert the enemy’s attention. They spread rumor and they are fully integrated into the West Indies economic system. No plantation is able to protect its whole territory, choices have to be constantly made.
Maritime military policies in the defense and protection of the Dutch Atlantic colonies in the 17th century. Roberto Barazzutti
3In the 17th century, most of the defense and protection from the dutch colonies was made by the WIC and privateer. It’s only since the 2nd and 3rd anglo-dutch wars that it appear for the General States to protect this Atlantic colonies. Some fleet from the dutch was send and this would became now the principal maritime defence of this colonies.
Defend empires and colonies during the War of Spanish Succession. Guillaume Hanotin
4The American territories of the Catholic King have always seemed to stay somewhat on the sidelines of the War of the Spanish Succession. They are only mentioned to illustrate how trade rivalries shaped the conflict and its outcome, or to evoke some spectacular operations against Rio de Janeiro for instance. And yet, the correspondence between the Catholic King’s officers and Louis XIV’s ministers reveal how these territories were integrated into the war. The missions inspecting the fortifications, and their reports, expose the risk and the fear of an extension of the conflict in theses lands remote from the European scene. Therefore, organising the defence of Philip V’s American possessions became an absolute priority for the courts of Madrid and Versailles during the war.
The privateering war and the defense of Martinique during the War of Austrian Succession. Patrick Villiers
5Too often mistaken for piracy, West Indian privateering did exist from Louis XIV to Napoleon. Unfortnately too many archives have disappeared. It is not the case for privateering for the Succession war in Austria (1744-1748) neither for privateering in the West Indies. I managed to reckon the number of privateers and the amount of their prizes. So, it seems that West Indian privateering comes near in value to the two first privateering ports in France: Dunkirk and Bayonne. If the size of West Indian privateers and their outlay are similar to those of Dunkirk, this type of privateering is basically a question of survival for the island and its inhabitants.
The Canadian militia during the Seven Years’War. François-Xavier Jeanne
6The militia forms the main pillar of Canada’s defence. Thanks to the militiamens’raids the english settlements must rout their forces annihilating their numerical superiority. The guerilla warfare is proved effective and forms the only fully fledged impidement to the reinforcements of the british regular troopers which are increasing. The guerilla warfare depends mainly on the maintenance of the alliances with the Amerindians experts in guerilla warfare. However, the negotiations leaded notably by William Johnson neutralize the systems of french and indian alliances. The increasing pressure of the british troopers and of the anglo american settlers is added to these diplomatic successes. Then for lack of reinforcements and of material and logistic supports New France is condemned.
French and British strategic thinking in the Seven Years’War: two contrastive imperial projects at work in North America. Françoise Lejeune
7In this paper, we will analyse the colonial “strategies” of both Britain and France in North America, in the years which led to the beginning of the Seven Years’War. We will examine how each empire considered their involvement in the defence of their respective colonies. Did they both invest money and men or did they adopt some different plans which could include the colonies directly in their self-defence. The Seven Years’War seems to represent a turning point in both empires when it comes to encompassing their colonies in their total defence, though they both followed different paths. In this article, we will rely for our analysis on the reports written by the three military governors posted in New France by the British king and on various memoirs and correspondences written by French military leaders in Canada to the French Admiralty or War Office after 1750. This article will reveal crucial differences in the way both empires considered their overseas territories at this time. If Britain could truly rely on its colonies and colonists for defence and the conquest of Canada, France still struggled with concepts of commercial possessions and military province, as the idea of “colony” still seemed foreign to the King’s ministers.
France and the defense of Morocco and the Atlantic Mediterranean, 1936-1940. Michel Catala
8This article analyzes the importance of Morocco in the defense of the Atlantic Mediterranean between 1936 and 1940, a strategic space for the interests of France but also for those of the United Kingdom. In this context, this document aims to show the emergence of the Spanish threat to Morocco as the cornerstone of the defense of the Atlantic Mediterranean. Supporting the British, the French used a defensive device depending on the circumstances whose sole purpose was to maintain sovereignty over Morocco, which considered essential for the safety of the Metropolis. The French defeat in 1940 and the benevolent neutrality of Spain against Nazi Germany make the position of France in this context very precarious and short term.
The Algeria in the defense policy of the metropolis, 1940-1962. Christopher Griffin
9What were France’s strategic and military interests in Algeria between 1945 and 1962? This article is an analysis of Algeria’s role in the military security of metropolitan France during the final years of colonization. In May 1940, faced with the German breakthrough and the disintegration of the French Army, General de Gaulle proposed that the French government and army retreat to Algeria to continue the war. General Weygand was opposed to the idea of a strategic retreat, but this incident shows that Algeria was an essential strategic asset for France during the period. During the later phases of the war, Algeria provided a military base for the allies. In the years following the war, Algeria became a rear base for the defense of the French colonial empire, and also played an important role in the defense of Western Europe between 1945 and 1958. After 1958, Algeria was no longer a vital asset for the defense of metropolitan France, as it had been replaced in French military strategy by the nuclear deterrent.
French, English and Spanish military maps of the West Indies. An analysis instrument and a circulation vector of strategic knowledge. Caroline Seveno
10The history of the West Indian colonies led to the geopolitical instability of this space. Indeed, the three great powers of the early modern history sought to establish their hegemony on a two thousand-kilometer long territory from north to south. This complex situation generated a need to protect these islands from the very moment the first Europeans settled there. In this regard, the use of cartography became more and more important between the 16th and 18th centuries. Relying on a corpus of 4,515 maps of the West Indies produced by France, England and Spain this article analyzes the use of cartography with regard to protecting these islands. This analysis revolves around three major issues: the need to have a relevant topographic knowledge, to identify the enemies “strategies and to redistribute the political cards in the aftermath of the Seven Years” War and the need.
A hostage sued for espionage: Stobo trial in Montreal (1756). Stéphane Genêt
11The Virginian Captain Robert Stobo, become hostage after the surrender of fort Necessity (1754), takes advantage of his captivity at fort Duquesne to draw a plan he signed. He manages to transmit it to the General Braddock. After the British defeat of the Monongahela, this plan is found in the papers of the English General. The hostage held in Quebec is now considered as a spy and judged as such. Solemn trial opens in Montreal in November 1756 for the crime of high treason. The war council declares Stobo guilty and sentences him to be beheaded which is never applied. Before the trial, Versailles had actually sent the order of suspension for any penalty. The trial of Stobo therefore appears mostly as an internal propaganda operation to reassure the population of the colony, aware of regional tensions and the threat of English. The King wants locally to show firmness against a British officer convicted of spying while limiting by sthe suspension of the penalty, the diplomatic impact that the execution of a hostage could have in Europe. Stobo finally manages to escape. In July 1759 in Quebec, Montcalm is furious to find him with his assailants.
Africa of fighters Myths and realities through the Portuguese colonial exhibitions (1918-1940). Nadia Vargaftig
12This contribution analyzes the complex relationship, made of complicity and rivalry, between the Portuguese military institution and the dictator António de Oliveira Salazar during the interwar period. Studying the scenography and aesthetic of the colonial exhibitions, it underlines the part of construction and invention of the African experience in the representations which Portuguese army had of itself and its national fate, as well as the role of the black continent as an instrument of regulation between Salazar and the military. Those stagings so appear as the place of a symbolic compensation for the loss of influence of the army in the national political life.
The defence of the French Lesser Antilles in the time of the Compagnie des îles (1626-1648). Eric Roulet
13The colonization of the Lesser Antilles (St Kitts, Guadeloupe, Martinique) by the French was institutionalized in 1626 with the creation of the Compagnie des îles de l’Amérique. However the future remained uncertain. The rivalries with the English, the Spanish threat quickly lead the directors of the company, particularly concerned about the protection of the islands, to decide on an active defence policy. The acts of the company and the contracts signed with captains show the various aspects of this policy (forts were built, weapons and ammunition were sent), but they also reveal inadequacies in the face of the reality of the threats. However this policy was enough to protect the islands and keep them under the control of France.
Rochefort naval base and naval logistics in the defense of the colonies in the 18th century. Sébastien Martin
14In the 18th century, military competition between Europeans forced the French monarchy to organize dispatch of materials, supplies and men to its colonial possessions. To do this, a real logistics was established from the arsenal of Rochefort, which became the place of materialization of the French colonial policy in the Atlantic world in the 18th century. The methods used in this mission reveal an organization based on existing infrastructures and ships borrowed from the merchant naval world. The logistics scheme created by France is an original response to the challenge posed by the defense of the colonies, because it was centered on metropolitan France and it has never really used the possibilities offered by the French overseas territories.
Supply constraints during the American War of Independence: a case study in the Indian Ocean. Arnaud Orain
15Having stressed the limited capacities of the Mascarene Islands to prepare a naval operation at the end of the 1770s, this paper proposes a detailed study of the records of a convoy sailing from Lorient to the “île de France” (now Mauritius) in February 1780. Whether it is for foodstuffs or marine goods, their quantities or qualities, one must recognize, with the Mascarene officials, the failures of the metropolis in the supply of these islands. Thus, this case study intends to demonstrate the subordinate nature of the French campaigns in the Indian Ocean at the beginning of the American Independence War.
Goree Island, puzzles of French defense of the colonies in Senegambia, 1677-1817. Djiguatte Amédé Bassène
16Goree Island lies at the South-East of the Cape Verde peninsula, within the bay-shaped cove. It was a strategic spot for the defense and control of slave trade in the Senegambia between the 16th and 17th century. That was due both to its morphology and geographical situation. This asset of the island made it a source of hard disputes among western big trading powers of that time, namely Portugal, the Netherlands, France, and England. However, between 1677 and 1817, France and England showed increasing interest in the island. Actually, all through that period, France aimed at making Goree Island a defensive platform in its favor so as to conserve a striving trade of tropical products and especially slaves along the coast of the Senegambia. But in spite of that will, it was ousted from the island several times by England, which had the same ambitions. That failure of France can be justified, among other factors, by repetitive bankruptcy of the main charter companies responsible for the management of the island and the West African coast trading posts as well as the interference of the powers of the State authorities with those of the companies. Those difficulties had durably halted the administrative and military organization of the colonies, base of the protection of Goree and its dependences.
The gates of French colonial cities during the Ancien Régime: models, adaptations, functions and symbols (XVII and XVIII centuries). Agueda Iturbe-Kennedy
17In the past few years, French city gates of Ancient Régime have been the object of a rising number of studies. City gates were the most vulnerable parts of fortifications yet necessary for circulatory needs. Being pathways for local and foreign populations, they bore an emblematic role in Ancient Régime which has now been determined. Although civil and military architecture theorists offered strict models of city gates, colonial city gates designs are divergent. However, a detailed analysis of the diversity of forms reveals that colonial architects were driven by similar interests under the direction of the ministre de la Marine: to signify that the environing country belonged to the French crown by engraving the message in the minds of European and Native populations just as much as in the stone of their fortifications. The study of colonial city gates will thus allow us to trace their models, and to bring out their adaptation to local economic, material, climatic and ideological conditions.
The Archeology of a temporary fortification from the late 18th century in Guadeloupe: the redoubt d’Arbaud. Tristan Yvon
18In 2010, a wide ditch surrounding a platform about 1000 sq. yd was discovered in a wooded area in the south of Basse-Terre, in the island of Guadeloupe. It was hypothesized that these remains represent a fortification. Il was confirmed by research conducted in archives coupled with the realization of archaeological surveys in 2010 and 2012. Named redoubt d’Arbaud, this small temporary fortification was built at the end of the 18th century. It belongs to a defensive system compound of coastal batteries and other redoubts and entrenchments designed to prevent enemy landings. It was occupied at least until 1798, before being abandoned.
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