Rhodes during the Siege of 305-304 BC: Population, Territory and Strategy of Defense
p. 103-133
Texte intégral
1Note portant sur l'auteur1
2The siege of Rhodes in 305-304 BC was certainly the turning point in the city’s history. The efforts that were made on both sides, by the Rhodians defending their city and by Demetrios’attacking forces, remained engraved on people’s memories as one of the great military events of the ancient world. 2 It is no accident that Diodorus Siculus devoted many paragraphs (81-88 and 91-100) of book XX of his Historical Library to an account of this exceptionally memorable siege.3 It is not our purpose here to examine in detail the reasons that led the Rhodians to decide to resist Demetrios, the various episodes of the siege, or its conclusion and immediate consequences. Diodorus focuses on the military aspect of the siege of the capital town. He provides a breathless account, as if it were a duel between two equally valorous Homeric heroes. Of course, the courage of the defenders was certainly one of factors that led to the Rhodians’final success, although their situation had repeatedly looked hopeless and they had been on the verge of a catastrophe. But courage was able to prevail only on the basis of a carefully executed strategy that allowed the “weak”, if not to “defeat the strong”, at least to keep the latter from succeeding, which was already a victory.
3Was the defenders’strategy concentrated exclusively on the defense of the town of Rhodes ? That is the thesis that seems to follow from Diodorus’account, or at least to be the lesson that we are supposed to draw from it. Unlike the Knights Hospitallers during the sieges of 1480 and 1522, the Rhodians are thought not to have retained a position on the territory of the city. On the contrary, they are said to have brought the inhabitants of the territory into the town of Rhodes because this was a way of increasing the number of its defenders.4 An argument can be made for this thesis. However, there is enough evidence to suggest that the Rhodians followed a different strategy. First of all, even if it was clearly not his primary objective, Diodorus nonetheless provides in passing a series of useful bits of information regarding the logistics and social context of the Rhodian resistance. In addition, even if they are tenuous, a few epigraphic and archeological sources allow us to add a good deal to Diodorus’account and shed a different light on the Rhodian resistance. The main lines of the Rhodian strategy also emerge in a different way.
4Of course, the defense of their capital town was the central and absolute objective of the Rhodians’strategy. But this does not in any way mean that they neglected the rest – the population and the territory. On the contrary, their strategy succeeded in integrating logistical, institutional, and geographical constraints in a remarkable way. Thus the whole of the city-state of Rhodes, that is, not only the capital town but also the city-state’s territory, resisted the invasion. In fact, the Rhodians’final victory during the siege of 305-304 was won in the context of an overall strategy that mobilized the whole of the Rhodian population and territory. That is what allowed them to resist a much more powerful adversary. It is striking that in a similar strategic context and despite the chronological distance, solutions of the same type were adopted in various periods and for the various sieges to which the town of Rhodes was subjected later on, both in antiquity (by Mithridates in 88 BC, and by the Republicans in 43 BC) and in 1480 and 1522 (when the Ottomans besieged the Knights Hospitallers, who had established themselves there).
THE RHODIANS AND THE PREPARATION FOR THE SIEGE OF 305-304
The preparation for the siege
5Did the assault catch the defenders unprepared ? That is a capital point in sieges : although obviously the besieger must prepare his assault, it is even more important for the future besieged to take steps to accumulate war materiel and food supplies, to strengthen defensive walls, bring in mercenaries, and finally, when the enemy approaches, provide some kind of shelter for his population.5 In the case of Demetrios’siege, it was in the summer or fall of 306 that relations between Rhodes and the Antigonids grew tense.6 Diodorus’account may give the impression that the Rhodians were tardy in preparing themselves, because the sentence in which he explicitly mentions their preparations appears only when he is beginning his description of the siege itself.7 Scholars have concluded that the Rhodians continued to believe that they could arrive at an agreement with Demetrios, and that they therefore did not organize their defense until the very last moment.8
6The first point is entirely plausible, but the second is difficult to believe. Sensible leaders are quite capable of conducting negotiations to keep the peace while at the same time preparing for war in case it turns out to be inevitable. Everything suggests that in 306-305, the leaders of the city of Rhodes were able to reconcile these two objectives. Based on Zeno’s account, Diodorus’depiction of the situation was probably influenced by the propaganda produced by the Rhodians, who did not mention preparations that might have given Demetrios a pretext to attack them. Three bits of evidence suggest that far from allowing themselves to be taken by surprise, the Rhodians prepared for the siege as best they could.
7First, when in the spring of 306 Demetrios initially indicated his aggressive intentions by sending his fleet to intercept trading ships sailing between Rhodes and Egypt, the Rhodians immediately responded by deploying warships to protect their trading ships.9 In fact, their communications with Egypt were not broken, which certainly allowed them to continue to import the grain they might need. Second, the Rhodians may well have seen pursuing negotiations to keep the peace as a way of gaining time to prepare for war. That is a classic use of diplomatic means when there is a threat of war (before the siege of 1480, the Knights prolonged the negotiations in order to gain time and strengthen their defenses10). On the other hand, to prevent the Rhodians from completing their preparations Demetrios seems to have decided to bring the situation to a head by breaking off the negotiations with them.11 Third, it is noteworthy that even though it had received only minimal aid during the first part of the siege, the town was able to resist the assaults of Demetrios’forces during the summer, fall and winter of 305. It was only in the spring of 304 that the besieged town received the crucial aid in the form of supplies sent by Ptolemy and Cassander12. If it had been able to hold out so long, that is, at least nine months, it was because the Rhodians had been able to amass sufficient food supplies between the summer of 306 and the summer of 305, probably in July, when Demetrios’forces landed on the island.13
8A comparison with the later sieges can shed light on this point. During Mithridates’siege of 88 BC, as Appian explicitly mentions, the Rhodians also had time to prepare themselves, because Mithridates had to build a fleet and collect considerable armaments before launching his expedition against the city.14 On the other hand, Appian is also explicit regarding the lack of preparation for the siege by the Republicans in 43 BC.15 The Rhodians were then over confident. Their navy, which they considered invincible, was defeated at Myndos, where they lost five vessels, and then they lost two more in a naval battle near Rhodes.16 Because they had failed to retain control at sea, the city had to endure a siege. The Rhodians had not accumulated reserves of food supplies and did not have time to organize their defense. This absence of preparation may, if not justify, at least explain the haste with which some citizens betrayed their city, perhaps because it seemed to them to have no chance of resisting a vigorous assault or prolonged siege. So far as later sieges are concerned, in 1480 the Knights had accumulated two years’worth of food supplies, and in 1522 they had stored all the available food within their ramparts, allowing them to mount a long-term defense.17
The fortifications and the defenders
9The nature of the defensive preparations, which reveals not only the kind of defense chosen by the besieged but also the social organization that underlay it, is just as instructive. We know that the walls of the fourth-century fortifications were well within the Hellenistic walls, that is, the ones that stood up to the assaults of Mithridates and the Republicans.18 When confronting an enemy offensive, the first thing one does is repair fortifications and ready them for use in defending the main town. This also holds, of course, for the Rhodians in 306-305, since they undertook to repair their walls and reinforced them in the port area, where they must have been weak.19 Apparently they expected the assault to be made by land rather than by sea, but the size of the forces deployed by Demetrios required them to prepare themselves for all eventualities. According to Appian, in 88 the Rhodians were once again obliged to “reinforce the walls and the ports20”. In 305, they also busied themselves constructing or repairing projectile engines – oxybeloi, which shot arrows, and lithoboloi or petroboloi that threw heavy stones. In addition, craftsmen devoted all their energy to making weapons.21 More than nine hundreds stone balls apparently dedicated to “All the gods” (Pantes Theoi) in an archaeological context of the end of the fourth century BC should be connected to Demetrios’siege, which if necessary confirms the significance of artillery in the sieges of this period.22 Similarly, in 88 new military machines were set up23 and before the sieges of 1480 and 1522, efforts were made to strengthen the fortifications and to augment the artillery.24
10It was necessary as well to destroy everything outside the walls that might be used by the enemy. Appian tells us that when Mithridates approached in 88, the Rhodians destroyed the town of Rhodes’suburbs so that they would be of no use to the enemy.25 This attitude should be compared with that of the Grand Master d’Aubusson, who before the siege of 1480 asked everyone with houses or gardens outside the town of Rhodes itself to move inside the wall their doors, windows, pieces of iron, or roof beams, so that none of these materials could be used by the enemy.26 It is likely that similar steps were taken in 305-304.
11In addition to the material preparations, Diodorus describes the preparations relating to the men.27 The Rhodians did everything they could to increase the number of defenders : in addition to the 6,000 citizens old enough to bear arms, 1,000 volunteers among the foreign residents were enlisted. Able-bodied slaves were also called upon, bought from their masters, freed, and enlisted in the city’s forces. Unfortunately, we do not know the number of these, but it may have equaled or exceeded that of the foreign volunteers.
12At the end of the siege, the slaves who had performed well were given citizenship, which shows that the Rhodians were capable of keeping their word.28 In such circumstances, cities could resort to such measures.29 In 88, Mithridates’delay in attacking the city was used by the Rhodians to bring in aid from its allies in Telmessos and Lykia.30
13It is not clear who was mobilized for the defense of the town of Rhodes in 305-304. However, it is very likely that the defenders included not only the inhabitants of the town but also some of the men living in rural demes who had been recruited. The latter could obviously not take turns guarding the capital town, as was done by the rural demesmen on Kos during the First Cretan War. On Kos, those who were assigned to guard the capital town were designated by turns, kata gramma, that is, in alphabetical order.31 In the case of Demetrios’siege, the decision must have been made at the outset, once and for all, to mobilize a certain number of citizens (of course a majority of them) to defend the capital town, the others remaining in the fortresses and other fortified positions on the territory.32 Women and children had to be brought within the town walls for protection. Diodorus refers to non-combatants, mentioning the old men and women who watched the enemy forces approaching the town from Loryma at the beginning of the siege, and then the women and children grieving at the idea that the town might fall in the spring of 304.33
Social cohesion
14As Aeneas the Tactician emphasized, another important aspect of the defense of a city was social cohesion.34 Cities were, in fact, often conquered as a result of betrayal. In 88, during his Asiatic campaign, Mithridates promised to free slaves who killed or betrayed their masters, and to cancel the debts of those who were in debt.35 And it was to defeat him that Ephesus decreed a series of measures to benefit debtors, foreigners, and public slaves.36 Indeed, the king of Pontus found support in Rhodes itself, as defectors or deserters (automoloi) advised him to seize a position that was supposed to allow him to take control over Rhodes (though the operation ended in failure).37 It was clearly by treachery that Cassius seized Rhodes in 43, since his men were suddenly in the very center of the town before its defenders were able to react.38 In 1522 it was Andrea of Amaral’s treachery that betrayed the situation of Rhodes to Suleiman at a time when the exhausted besiegers were about to lift his siege.39
15It is evident that in 306-305 the Rhodians mobilized all their financial means, probably melting down the golden statues of Nike on the acropolis of Lindos and coining large amounts of silver money.40 But they also did everything they could to ensure their cohesion, and Diodorus explicitly alludes to the “concord” that prevailed among them.41 As for “useless” foreigners, those who would not or could not bear arms, they were simply sent away, which made it possible, as Diodorus notes, to limit the number of useless people who had to be fed, the risks of food shortages, and thus of treachery.42 So that combatants would have no hesitations in marching off to fight, the city promised to give those who died a tomb paid for by the state ; their families would thus not have to pay for the funeral, which was not a negligible consideration for the poorest among them, and, especially for foreigners and slaves who had no family in Rhodes, it provided assurance that funeral rites would be performed. The families of the fallen would also receive, and this was no less important, the mark of honor given to the families of heroes who had died for the fatherland. In addition, their parents (who would thus be elderly) and their children would be supported at state expense. When they arrived at the age of maturity, the daughters would receive a dowry, the sons a complete suit of armor, during a public ceremony held in the theater. Thus not only the subsistence but also the survival of the families would be assured, the daughters being able to find a husband, and the boys to carry out their duty as citizens of the hoplitic rank, no one thus being exposed to a decline in social status.43 Marriage for the daughters, war for the sons : here we are, of course, at the heart of an ideological system that was fundamental in ancient Greece. As for the steps taken to benefit families, there is no lack of parallels. The same was the case in Athens or Thasos, where a law from the middle of the fourth century also provides an excellent parallel to the steps taken in Rhodes : marks of honor for the dead and for their parents and children ; panoplies formally conferred on their sons upon arriving at majority ; dowries for their daughters at the age of fourteen.44 It has been noted that nothing was provided for widows45 : that is because widows were supposed to remarry promptly, as was usual in ancient Greece. Thus it was to be expected that no explicit provision would be made for them. We know of similar measures, particularly in Athens.46 It seems that these measures were successful, because Diodorus goes on to describe the people’s feeling of fraternity when faced with external threats, the rich providing money, craftsmen their technical ability to make weapons, each individual contributing to the defense in proportion to his means.47 During the siege itself, the city took care to reward generously mercenaries who proved loyal, such as the Milesian leader of a group of mercenaries sent by Ptolemy, Athenagoras, whom Demetrios had tried to bribe. Diodorus emphasizes that the city did the same with other foreigners and mercenaries.48 In this way, the city forestalled any risk of treachery ; whereas treachery did great damage during Cassius’siege, because it was obviously people who were opposed to the “demagogues”, according to Appian’s account, who handed over the city.49
16Another important question is what happened to the population during the siege. Foreigners have already been mentioned : Diodorus indicates that those who did not agree to help defend the city were forced to leave it, which was a way of limiting the dangers of shortages and treachery.50 Concerning the prisoners who might be taken on each side, the Rhodians and Demetrios agreed from the outset to exchange them, at the rate of 1,000 drachmas per free man and 500 drachmas per slave.51 The Berlin papyrus also shows Demetrios’anger when the Rhodians refused to apply this agreement to eleven siege-machine technicians who had been captured by a Rhodian naval division, whom they evidently wanted to make use of themselves : Demetrios told them that in that case he would no longer observe the agreement for Rhodians he captured.52 This shows that the agreement had been actually observed up to that point.
THE RHODIAN TERRITORY AND THE DEFENSE OF THE CAPITAL TOWN
The capital town and the territory : the two adversaries’strategies
17Like the attackers of later periods, Demetrios concentrated all his efforts on taking the town of Rhodes. His strategic choice is easily understood. If he took it, the heart of the political system would fall into his hands. It would also mean that the greater part of the Rhodian civic army would be annihilated, either by death in combat or by capture. In addition, it would mean that a considerable portion of the citizen population would fall into his hands and could be used for all kinds of extortion. And finally, the heart of the adversary’s system of defense, with the fortifications of the town and the port and the arsenals, would be henceforth at his disposal : in short, it would become impossible for the Rhodians to continue to resist.
18But it is clear that a city-state was not reducible to its capital town. The war waged by Demetrios could thus not concern the town of Rhodes alone. The capital town was only the nodal point of Demetrios’efforts to subjugate Rhodes. By definition, Demetrios’war also concerned the whole of the Rhodian territory, in order to use it as a base for attacking the capital town, but also to plunder and pillage it, and if possible to conquer it as a whole. For symmetrical reasons, the Rhodians’primary aim had to be to save their capital at all costs, but without neglecting the support that the territory could provide them.
Protecting the population
19When “the siege of Rhodes” is referred to, it is of course the siege of the town of Rhodes that is commonly meant. But it was in fact the city that was attacked, and although the town of Rhodes itself was the central core of the city-state, the war waged by Demetrios against the latter was more than a siege of the main town alone. Let us recall that during the siege of 305-304, as in 88 and in 43 for that matter, the Rhodian territory proper (territories divided into demes) included both the island of Rhodes, the territory called “integrated Peraea”, the islands of Syme, Karpathos, Saros, and Kasos, and Megiste, to which one must add, for the sieges of 88 and 43, the islands of Chalke, Telos, and Nisyros, the territories conventionally called “subject Peraea” and various possessions or spheres of influence in southern Caria.53 Before the sieges of 1480 and 1522, the Knights controlled the same series of islands (including
20Megiste-Kastellorizo) and also possessed a series of footholds in the islands and the Carian coastline, such as Halikarnassos (Castle of St. Peter) and Kos.54
21What happened in 305-304 to the mass of the Rhodian population, not only on the island of Rhodes, but also on the peripheral islands and in the Chersonese ? Under the circumstances of ancient war, the whole enemy population might be captured and sold into slavery : thus it was out of the question for the Rhodians not to protect the totality of their people.55 In any case, they could not consider sending men and goods to a nearby friendly city : not only the configuration of their territory, which was too dispersed and too large, but also the nature of the war against Demetrios made it impractical to resort this solution, which was, however, perfectly codified, goods and people to be taken back without having to pay taxes after the conflict for a period established in advance.56 The Rhodians were involved not in a local war between neighbors, but in a war against a “great power”. Thus this system was not relevant ; it is not clear what city could have been safe from Demetrios’fleet and army.
22Hence to protect the people of Rhodes the leaders had to “count on their own forces”. In 305, did the Rhodians adopt a strategy similar to the one used by Pericles during the Peloponnesian War, and bring all the citizens and metics within the town walls ?57 In fourth-century Athens, a strong reaction against the Periclean strategy had appeared, suggesting that the territory must not be abandoned to the enemy without a fight.58 Both Xenophon and Aeneas the Tactician had shown the necessity of implementing a thoroughgoing strategy for the defense of the territory based on a series of fortified positions that would be capable of hindering the invader’s movements.59 Some authors, such as Xenophon, advocated a very pragmatic attitude : withdrawing behind the town walls if necessary, but also holding fortified positions outside the town that would make it possible to defend sectors considered essential, such as the mining district south of Attica.60 After the defeat of Chaeronea, as they could not resist Philip in a battle fought in the open, the Athenians tried to bring women and children from the countryside behind the city walls, but this did not imply a total abandonment of their territory.61 An Attic decree inserted into the body of Demosthenes’speech On the Crown explains that no Athenian might remain in the countryside ; that everyone had to take refuge either in Athens or in Piraeus, except the troops assigned to guard a certain number of garrisons ; that all material goods had to be safeguarded either in Athens or in Piraeus if one lived less than 120 stadia (21 km) from Athens, or if one lived further away, in Eleusis, Phyle, Aphidna, Rhamnous, or Sounion.62 We see a very clear strategy of maintaining control over peripheral fortresses, while the population is withdrawn behind the walls of Athens and Piraeus.
23How did the Rhodians respond in circumstances of the same kind ? They had already experienced an invasion by the Persians. In the late 490s, confronted by the threat of Datis, the population of Lindos’territory took refuge in all the available “fortified positions”, though most of them fled to the town of Lindos itself, as the Lindian Chronicle explains.63 However, the town soon had to capitulate. Under the same circumstances and at the same period, even the fortified positions on the island of Kos were abandoned by the people, who took refuge in the mountains – which did not prevent them from being caught in the enemy’s nets.64 It is true that at that time the people of Kos may not have had a strong wall behind which to take refuge, which might explain why they preferred to flee to the mountains, though this ultimately did them no good.
24Before examining the situation in 305-304, it is probably worthwhile to seek a historical parallel in the medieval period. The Knights also had to protect the whole of the population, which was in danger of being massacred or deported. During the siege of 1480, the Grand Master ordered people living in the villages of the southern part of the island to repair to the strongly fortified positions of Lindos, Pharaklos, Monolithos, Neokastro (probably the fort of Kastello), and Kattavia. As for the inhabitants of the islands of Nisyros, Chalke, and Telos, they were brought to the town of Rhodes, but garrisons were left in the forts of these insular possessions in order to prevent the enemy from seizing them.65 At the end of the fourth century, Nisyros and Telos were not yet Rhodian possessions, but by the first century BC they were. For the rest, in 305 the Rhodians found themselves facing a strategic problem identical to the one the Knights faced more than a millennium later.
25What choice did they make ? A regional examination of the available sources allows us to answer this question.
Ialysos
26First of all, can we form an idea of the zones held by Demetrios ? Diodorus gives hardly any details on this point, except that Demetrios’camp was quite near the town of Rhodes, but outside the range of the city’s archers.66 He does not say whether the artificial port that he built was on the west side, in the sector of Trianda, like that built by the Ottoman general Misac Paleologus in 1480, or on the east side, in the sector of Kallithea, like that of Suleiman in 1522.67 The question is the extent of the zone that had fallen under his control. Close to Rhodes (about ten kilometers) lay the town of Ialysos.68 To be sure, the latter’s dynamism suffered from the proximity of the new capital town founded in 408-407. However, as is clearly shown by an inscription that probably dates from the first quarter of the third century, the town (polis) still existed, with its acropolis a little farther inland, which the inscription designates as Achaïa polis, the modern-day hill of Philerimo.69 Excavations have not discovered the remains of fortifications dating from the classical period in the lower town or on the acropolis (on the latter, only remains of fortifications from the Mycenaean or medieval periods have been found) ?70 But Strabo (14.2.12) gives this acropolis the name Ochyrōma, which indicates as clearly as possible that this acropolis was a “fortress”.
27There is no reason to doubt that the acropolis of Ialysos, which was very close to the capital town and a prominent observation point, was occupied by the assailants during the siege of 305-304, and also by all the later besiegers, from Mithridates to Suleiman the Magnificent. It is inconceivable that an enemy besieging Rhodes would leave behind him a position so threatening to his immediate rear, whereas on the contrary, holding this position provided him with an exceptional observation point and a rear base that allowed him to avoid being taken by surprise. Historical parallels are easy to find : in 1248-1250, the hill served as a base for the reconquest of Rhodes by John Cantacuzenus after the Genoese had temporarily taken the town by surprise.71 Similarly it was occupied by Suleiman’s staff during the great siege of 1522.72
28In addition, according to Diodorus, in 305 Demetrios “had the trees in the nearby countryside cut down and farm buildings demolished : with these materials he fortified his own camp, which he surrounded by a triple palisade formed of very closely-set, high posts, so that the damage done to the enemy served his own security”.73 The episode shows that Demetrios’control extended over a large part of the north end of the island. Therefore it is clear that the zone occupied by Demetrios corresponded at least to the territory of Ialysos, and not solely the area around the town of Rhodes. Moreover, the many “pirates” and other merchants attracted by the pillage of a rich territory that had, Diodorus adds, not been pillaged for a long time, would not have limited themselves to plundering a few farms in the immediate environs of the capital town.74 One detail casually mentioned by Diodorus when he is enumerating the forces mustered by Demetrios shows that the latter also wanted to have the means to conduct attacks throughout the Rhodian territory. His army included a cavalry unit, which was indispensable for controlling an extended territory.75
29But beyond its northern third, perhaps, were the other parts of the island occupied as well ? A detail of Diodorus’account, relating this time to the operations carried out by three elite Rhodian ships against the enemy’s lines of communication during the first phase of the siege, provides valuable information. Diodorus stresses that the Rhodians burned the enemy ships that they had driven onto the coast76 : doing this is conceivable only if you hold the coastline. This shows that not only a large portion of the southern coast of the island of Rhodes, but also of other Rhodian islands and probably also the Chersonese remained in the hands of the Rhodian forces.
Lindos
30Located about forty-five kilometers from the capital, on the east coast of the island, Lindos was probably the second largest town in the Rhodian state. The latter was organized by grouping together the three ancient cities of Ialysos, Lindos, and Kamiros. Like Kamiros, during the Hellenistic period Lindos remained a kind of regional capital. The territory of Lindos, with its twelve demes, was the most extensive on the island.77 Naturally, not only the acropolis but also the lower town were fortified.78 Here should be mentioned a point that has thus far remained unnoticed or unexploited : in the account of the third epiphany of the goddess, the Lindian Chronicle describes a scene that took place during Demetrios’siege.79 Kallikles was a priest of Athana Lindia whose term of office had expired but “who still lived in Lindos”.80 It is not too bold to suggest that this was simply because the population of Lindos’demes had been evacuated into fortified positions, in particular the town of Lindos, and was unable to return to its villages, – not, as C. Blinkenberg claimed, because after the expiration of his priesthood Kallikles “remained in Lindos only to settle his affairs”.81 According to the Lindian Chronicle, the goddess appeared to him in a dream and enjoined him to order one of the prytaneis, Anaxipolis, to write to King Ptolemy to ask for help. But Kallikles did nothing, and the goddess had to appear to him six nights in a row and take a threatening tone before he decided to go before the members of the council and communicate the goddess’command to Anaxipolis. The reason for Kallikles’strange reluctance to act is clear : to communicate the goddess’message to the members of the council and to the prytanis Anaxipolis, he had to take a serious personal risk, that of going to Rhodes. Implicitly, we have here a very clear picture of the situation of Rhodes invaded by Demetrios. Part of the population of the Lindian territory – what proportion it is impossible to decide which – had been brought within the town walls of Lindos. It is not certain, and not even very likely, that the town itself was besieged, because the text of the Chronicle mentions a siege of the polis, that is, Rhodes, but not a siege of Lindos. In any case, there were of course a few ships, and it was entirely possible to attempt to communicate by sea with the town of Rhodes, whose port was never completely blocked by the besiegers : the risk was obviously that of falling into the hands of Demetrios’forces while trying to pass through the naval blockade.
31The anecdote relating to Kallikles is thus of the greatest interest. It proves that the whole population of Rhodes had not been brought inside the walls of the main town. The cavalry unit of Demetrios’army and the pack of pillagers that accompanied it must have conducted extensive raids on the island. But these raids could not themselves ensure control over the whole territory, because several fortified positions, including Lindos, remained in the Rhodians’hands. Similarly, at the time of the Knights Lindos and the Hospitallers’other strongholds remained on the Christian side right up to the end of the siege of 1522. The forces based in Lindos helped the besieged town of Rhodes and the surrender of the Lindos occurred only after the capitulation of the capital town.82
Kamiros
32Located about thirty kilometers from the town of Rhodes, on the west coast of the island, Kamiros might have been a tempting objective for Demetrios’ forces. It would have been even more tempting if the town remained unfortified during the Hellenistic period, as now seems to be accepted on the basis of one of the Kamiran community’s Hellenistic decrees.83 To be sure, when the Lacedaemonians appeared before the town of Kamiros in the winter of 412-411, it was not fortified, and its inhabitants, finding any resistance impossible, were easily persuaded to abandon their allegiance to Athens and go over to the Peloponnesians.84 The absence of fortification in Kamiros had a series of parallels on the coast of Asia at this time.85 This was the result of Athenian policy. In theory, the cities of the empire had nothing to fear from an outside adversary because up to that point the Athenian fleet had been able to provide security in the Aegean. Above all, this method had the advantage of forestalling any idea of revolting against Athenian control.
33However, it should be clear that this situation lasted only as long as the Athenian empire. In the dangerous and uncertain world of the fourth century and the Hellenistic period, it would have been inconceivable for a town or even a village to remain unfortified. This holds true for all of Greece and western Asia Minor. The study carried out by I. C. Papachristodoulou on the territory of Ialysos reminds us of the existence of fortresses, for which it is difficult to establish a precise chronology between the Archaic and Hellenistic periods, but which shows that local defense was a matter of concern.86 This is the case for all the Rhodian territories, whether on islands or on the continent.87 So far as the town of Kamiros is concerned, a decree of the Kamiran community alludes to an earthquake that occurred several years earlier. The passage begins by recalling that “the walls had collapsed because of the earthquake that occurred under the priest Theuphanes”.88 The projects mentioned in the rest of the decree were intended to reconstruct what had apparently been totally destroyed by this earthquake, certainly that of 198 BC.89 This earthquake is mentioned by Justin in connection with the events of 198, when it struck Rhodes “and many other cities”.90 A decree from Panamara dating from the twenty-third year of the reign of Philip V, or 198 BC, mentions, in terms similar to those of the Kamiros decree, the earthquake’s destruction of the town’s ramparts.91 The decree thanks the king’s epistates for having overseen their reconstruction. Therefore one cannot conclude from the reconstruction work undertaken by the Kamiran community that the town of Kamiros had remained unfortified since the time of the Peloponnesian attack of 412-411. On the contrary, the decree from Kamiros proves that in 198 the town was fortified, since at that time its walls were destroyed by the powerful earthquake mentioned both by Justin and by the Panamara inscription.92 One should conclude that apart from the period of the Athenian empire, the Rhodian cities and secondary towns and villages on the island of Rhodes and in the Rhodian territories in general were in fact fortified. For the moment, we have no archeological evidence of the fortifications of Kamiros, because the Italian excavations, which were interrupted by the Second World War, uncovered only the central part of the town of Kamiros. But there is no doubt that during Demetrios’attack of 305-304, the town of Kamiros was in fact fortified, and thus that it was theoretically capable of resistance.
34It is clear that faced with the risk represented by Demetrios’expedition, the decision to defend or to abandon Kamiros could only be made by the Rhodian state itself. To abandon the town, unless its fortifications and houses were completely destroyed, would amount to making an unprecedented gift to the adversary, who could have established himself there to wage a long-term war in the event of a failure to take the town of Rhodes itself. Lindos was not evacuated and it resisted. What happened in Kamiros ? Although no literary text or lapidary inscription gives us a hint as to the Rhodians’decision, there is another source that might provide information about what happened in Kamiros in 305-304.
35In the nineteenth century, a large number of sling-bullets were found around Kamiros.93 Some of these sling-bullets ended up in Western European museums and in private collections. At that time, W. Vischer could already allude to a slingbullet coming from Kamiros.94 In the 1920s, the Rhodes museum had twentyeight of these sling-bullets ; except for one that had been bought on the local market and whose provenance was uncertain, all of these came from Kamiros. A. Maiuri published twenty-two of them (including one that was uninscribed but bore the image of a lightning bolt), G. Jacopi published three, the twenty-four inscribed bullets being included in the Tituli Camirenses.95 The three bullets published by Jacopi came from the Kamiros acropolis itself, and bore the names of Nikodamos and Pa [.] s […] – Pausanias, according to Jacopi, but Segre and Pugliese-Carratelli abstained from restoring the name. Some of the names found on the sling-bullets are well attested in the Rhodian civic onomastics, and the corresponding bullets could have been made in Rhodes : this is the case for the names Nikodamos and Sokrates, Pausanias also being a name well attested in Rhodes, but as already noticed the restitution is not certain. It is true that the fact that these names are attested in Rhodes does not suffice to prove that they were made in Rhodes, because they are also, to differing degrees, commonplace in Dorian onomastics and in the Greek world in general. On the other hand, as for the bullets bearing the names of Antidoros, Babyrtas, Euboulidas, and Thearos, which form a large contingent (the collection of the Rhodes museum included three examples with the name of Antidoros, nine with the name of Babyrtas, seven with the name of Thearos, and one with the name of Euboulidas), we are dealing with names external to the island. Babyrtas is a rare name, characteristic of eastern, central, and northern Greece.96 Euboulidas is a quite frequent name in a series of regions of western, central, northern Greece.97 Thearos is again a rare name, attested in Telos in the second century BC (but as previously mentioned the island was not Rhodian in 305-304) and sporadically in Crete and Cyrenaica, whose population came, as is well known, mainly from Thera but also from all the Dorian islands of the southern Aegean. There is also one Thearos in Arkadia (third century BC).98 The question that arises is to determine whether these bullets might have had a connection with a possible siege of Kamiros in 305-304.99
36G. Jacopi maintained that certain types of these bullets had been made in Rhodes. The text Sōkratēs epoēse on one of the bullets from the Kamiros acropolis has led to the suggestion that the names on the bullets were those of the men who made them.100 However that may be, manufacture in Rhodes may not be the only explanation for the exceptional concentration of sling-bullets. It has also been hypothesized that the names on the sling-bullets might be those of mercenary leaders.101 Excavations at Olynthus, a town besieged, taken, and destroyed by Philip of Macedon in 348, discovered about five hundred slingbullets, some of which can with certainty be connected with this siege, whether they were used by the besiegers or by the besieged. This is the case for fourteen bullets in the name of Philip, sixteen in the name of Hipponikos, one of the king’s general, and for five marked Chal-or Chalki-, and six marked Oly-used by the Olynthians.102 Thus it is perfectly reasonable to try to associate a series of sling-bullets found in a given place with a particular military event. The bullets found at Kamiros might thus have been used during battles that took place in the town’s immediate surroundings. Whether they were made in Rhodes and used by Rhodians (since the Rhodians were particularly experienced users of slings), by mercenaries hired by them, or by the besiegers, this concentration of bullets does not seem explainable by a simple process of “loss after manufacture” in a context of peace : in that case it would have to be claimed not only that all the bullets were locally made, which is not impossible but remains to be proved, but also and especially that the rate of loss after manufacture was exceptionally high.
37The first point to consider is chronology. So far as can be judged from the shape of the letters, the chronology of the bullets is perfectly compatible with a date at the end of the fourth century. For the bullet bearing the name of Nikodamos, G. Jacopi (in his commentary in Tit. Cam.) indicated that the letters dated from the fifth or the fourth century. But the fifth century can obviously be excluded : neither the kappa, with two long and open bars, nor the mu, fairly open but with shorter internal bars, are from this period. As a whole, the letters of the writing on the sling-bullets leads to propose a date at the beginning of the Hellenistic period, without further specification. On the other hand, supposing that the collection is chronologically homogeneous, it is remarkable that one finds both long vowels written/o/(Nikodavmo – and Qeavro –), and/ou/(Euvboulivdaı) : in this case, we would be precisely in the transition period at the end of the fourth century, that of the siege of Rhodes.103
38The second point concerns the number of major military events that occurred in Kamiros during the period between 400 and 88 BC that might have justified a massive use of sling-bullets. To be sure, many things must have happened at the beginning of the fourth century, with the Rhodian civil wars.104 But after the 380s, we no longer find anything notable. As Diodorus emphasizes, in 305-304 the territory had not been pillaged for a long time.105 Until Mithridates’brief attack in 88, which seems not to have involved the whole of the Rhodian territory and which is in any case too late for the chronology of the sling-bullets, there is nothing except Demetrios’siege : for the period under consideration, it was the sole military event that occurred on the island of Rhodes. In fact, Artemisia’s seizure of control over Rhodes, whatever real form it took, seems not to have involved fighting.106 The hypothesis that the slingbullets from Kamiros can be connected with a siege of the town of Kamiros carried out by the forces of Demetrios thus gains credibility.
39In addition, in the specific context of a possible siege of Kamiros, it seems logical to think that the Rhodians used one of their favorite weapons in defending their town. The reputation of Rhodian sling-men is well attested by Xenophon, who, though in the context of the expedition of the Ten Thousand and in contrast to the barbarian sling-men, emphasized the Rhodians’skill in using leaden sling-bullets, which had twice the range of the Persians’stone bullets.107
40The sling-bullets bearing names attested in Rhodian onomastics might have been made in Rhodes and used by the defenders, while the uninscribed bullets could have been used by either camp. But the majority of the bullets bore names foreign to the island of Rhodes. The hypothesis that they were made in Rhodes by metics or slaves does not seem very persuasive. It is true that names belonging to this social category frequently appear as the names of the makers on Rhodian amphoric stamps in alternation with the names of citizens.108 But there is no reason to connect names like Antidoros, Babyrtas, Euboulidas and Thearos with a “socially inferior category”. It would make more sense to propose a possible connection with the events of the siege of Rhodes. As previously said, the rare name Thearos was used in Knossos, among other places, in the second century BC. We know that personal names were handed down from generation to generation (that explains the onomastic connections between Cyrenaica and the cities of the southern Aegean), and the name could very well have been used in Knossos before the second century. Now, Knossos was allied with Rhodes, and sent 150 men to help defend it in the first phase of the siege.109 Thus the bullets bearing the name Thearos might have been used by Knossians defending Kamiros or by some Arkadian mercenaries in Demetrios’army. As for the (numerous) bullets with the names of Antidoros, Babyrtas, and Euboulidas, the last two of which are names from western Dorian Greece, given also their concentration on and outside the island of Rhodes J. Ma is certainly right to consider them rather as the names of group leaders in Demetrios’army.110
41Although Demetrios’forces thus seem not to have besieged Lindos during the siege of the town of Rhodes in 305-304, the hypothesis that they attacked Kamiros is highly plausible. This supposes that, like Lindos, Kamiros was not evacuated. Was the town taken ? At this point, that question cannot be answered with certainty, although the fact that a fall of the town is nowhere mentioned in our sources does not speak in favor of this hypothesis.
The other parts of the Rhodian territory
42So far as the islands are concerned, we know that the Rhodians sent a naval force, consisting of three fast ships under the command of Damophilos, to the sector of the island of Karpathos. There the Rhodians attacked several of Demetrios’ships, sank some of them and drove the others onto the coast, where they were burned and their crews taken prisoner.111 A priori, the account is not very explicit as to whether Demetrios’forces had seized Karpathos. However, once again the fact that when Demetrios’ships were driven onto the coast their crews were taken prisoner suggests that (at least) a large part of the island was still under Rhodian control. Demetrios’forces might have undertaken raids on this or that fortified position (whence their presence in the area), and even attained their objective in some cases. But the towns of the island of Karpathos (Potidaion, Arkaseia, Brykous) were well fortified, and moreover most of the island, which is mountainous and particularly difficult of access, offered refuges that were easy to defend.112 It is probable that for the most part the island remained untouched.
43About the Chersonese we know little, except that Loryma fell into Demetrios’hands in 305, and that he made it the base for his attack on Rhodes, as Diodorus explicitly notes.113 The port provided an ideal shelter, on the lee side of the peninsula. Conon had made it his base for attacking Peisandros before the battle of Knidos in 394.114 The forts at Loryma (in their configuration at the end of the fourth century) thus fell into the hands of Demetrios’forces.115 The same was true during Cassius’campaign in 42. After their naval victory at Myndos, Cassius’forces seized Loryma. As Appian explicitly observes, he intended to make it a base for an attack on Rhodes, and his goal seems not to have been to take control of the whole of the Chersonese for its own sake.116 The situations in 1480 and in 1522 were significantly different. Being in control of the continent, the Ottomans sent the majority of their forces by land. They concentrated them at Physkos-Marmaris, whose bay offered a splendid shelter for their ships. From Marmaris they had only a short distance to cover in order to operate the landing on Rhodes.117
44But whether in 305-304, 88, or 43, was the Peraea itself entirely evacuated ? And did the invader actually occupy all of the Chersonese ? To be sure, there is no explicit information on this subject, but one can imagine that, as in Rhodes and probably in Karpathos, in this region, which is also particularly mountainous and difficult of access, the population must have retreated to a few major, strongly defended sites, leaving garrisons here and there in forts that could play an essential strategic role. The Chersonese was in fact a territory that had a number of fortified sites that offered opportunities for a strategy of territorial defense.118 However it is most likely that this territory also suffered from raids of the enemy. Diodorus says that the naval expedition of the Rhodian Amyntas was led pros tēn Peraian tēs Asias, which may refer to the Asian continent in general, but could also allude to the Rhodian Peraea.119 In the latter case, the battles might have taken a form similar to those of the expedition at the time when the siege was beginning or to that of Damophilos’battle at Karpathos, with the enemy ships driven onto the coast and burned.120 In another part of his work, Diodorus mentions the sanctuary of Hemithea at Kastabos, in the northern part of the Chersonese. He stresses the prosperity of the sanctuary and notes that remarkably the Persians did not loot it, but also the lēstai, “the pirates who used to loot everything left only that sanctuary completely untouched although it was unfortified and could have been plundered without incurring danger”.121 The Rhodian state was always keen at maintaining security against the pirates. We know of an unsuccessful Cretan attack against Potidaion of Karpathos during the difficult times of the second Cretan war in the 150s (the Cretans also attacked Kos).122 The widespread Cilician piracy of the end of the second and beginning of the first century may also have struck Rhodian territories. But the best period for a large-scale operation was certainly that of the siege of 305-304, when these unidentified lēstai could hope plundering without meeting serious opposition from the Rhodian state. They could be the same as the peiratai who accompanied Demetrios’army, as stressed by Diodorus.123 The exceptional attitude of the pirates in a period of general looting of the Rhodian territory might have been kept in local memories.
45Thus in 305-304, if one considers the whole of their territory, it is clear that the Rhodians did not abandon their peripheral cities and fortresses. Clearly, they did not bring the whole of the population behind the walls of the capital town. First of all, increasing the size of the non-combatant population would have greatly augmented the difficulties of providing food and water for the besieged population. In addition, simply from the point of view of logistics, it was easy for the Athenians to evacuate the whole population of their territory behind the walls of their two cities. But evacuating the whole Rhodian population behind the capital town’s walls would have been difficult or even impracticable, in view of the position of the capital town at one end of a long island (c. 85 km from north to south) and the great dispersion of the territory, which also included the peripheral islands and a continental territory. Thus it is clear that only the population of the northern part of the island was brought behind the capital town’s walls, which did not prevent the mobilization of a large number of citizens of the territory’s demes for the defense of the capital town, the rest remaining assigned to local defense.
THE STRATEGY OF ACTIVE DEFENSE : AN ASSESSMENT
46Enduring a siege thus does not mean abandoning the whole countryside and limiting oneself to a passive strategy.124 The capital town, behind its walls, was certainly the main point of resistance and the heart of the defensive system, but it was also the nerve center of a resistance activity that potentially included the whole territory, even if a good part of it was occupied by the enemy.
The resistance in the territory
47It is clear that in 305-304 the Rhodians acted in the same way as the Knights would do in 1480, gathering the population in a few fortified and strongly defended points, while retaining small garrisons in a few strategic fortresses. Did Demetrios’troops have time to seize these fortresses ? Apart from Loryma, we cannot say, but only note that the town of Rhodes itself was Demetrios’chief objective. It was there that he landed the majority of his forces. For him, trying to occupy the whole of the Rhodian territory and risking a series of minor sieges would have amounted to a waste of time and energy, and to forgetting his main objective, which was to take Rhodes. If the town of Rhodes fell, the whole city-state fell with it : that was precisely what happened in 43. Similarly, in 1522, the fall of the town of Rhodes led to the evacuation of the Knights’whole forces in the region. On the other hand, taking this or that minor site would have given the assailants no decisive strategic advantage, while at the same time it would cost them time and considerable means. It should be emphasized that the site of the town of Rhodes, on the seacoast, on relatively flat ground, was very favorable for the use of siege engines, in which Demetrios’forces excelled. On the other hand, taking the upper town of Physkos, the forts of the Eteokarpathioi in the interior of the island of Karpathos, or even Lindos and its acropolis represented an investment that was smaller, to be sure, but involved great technical difficulty for an uncertain result and no great strategic advantage. However, if only to prevent the forces engaged in besieging the town of Rhodes from having to deal with attacks from the rear, Demetrios’forces were certainly led to undertake a siege of the town of Kamiros and naval operations in the Karpathos sector.
48These were the elements of the situation in 305-304 that determined both Demetrios’offensive strategy and the Rhodian state’s defense of its territory and population. In comparison with the Periclean strategy, for the Rhodians one of the essential advantages of the defensive strategy they adopted was it avoided cramming a large population into a small space. The problem of providing food and water was thereby lessened. For the populations of the peripheral sites that continued to be held by the Rhodians, the control over the surrounding territory must have allowed them to continue to fill some of their needs under satisfactory conditions, except temporarily when the enemy made raids on the territory, like those Demetrios’forces launched on the island of Rhodes and probably in the Karpathos sector. Another advantage of having a smaller number of people within the walls of the capital town was that it limited the risks of epidemics like the one that had such tragic consequences in Athens during the first part of the Peloponnesian War, when the whole population of
49Attica had been concentrated behind the walls of the asty. A third advantage, this time a military one, was that in this way the whole territory was not abandoned to the enemy, whose rear could thus be constantly threatened where attacks were not expected.
Active defense on land
50It was by basing themselves on the network of forts that were resisting an enemy operating in the territory that cavalrymen were able to make raids that threw the invaders into turmoil and paralyzed their movements. This also made it difficult for them to bring in supplies, as a complement to the running war that could be conducted on the seas to attack the invaders’supply lines and prevent them from receiving reinforcements of men and materiel. To illustrate these principles, a good example can be found in the Syracusan resistance to the siege undertaken by the Athenians. In 415, after the Athenian expedition arrived in Rhegion, the Syracusans prepared themselves to resist the clash : “They sent guard troops here, emissaries there, everywhere among the Sicels, they supplied the territory’s forts with garrisons and in the town they reviewed weapons and horses to ensure that everything was in order”.125 In fact, the Syracusan cavalry constantly carried out offensive sorties that put pressure on the Athenians. Independently of the cavalry’s operations against the main body of the Athenian troops, it also repeatedly harassed the Athenians in the territory.126 On the other hand, the Athenians also attacked but failed to take a small Syracusan fort.127 Syracuse’s naval forces also harassed shipping along Athenian naval routes, seizing merchant vessels and a load of wood intended for naval construction.128
51All this, combined with the obstinate resistance of the town of Syracuse, led to the well known result : the besieging forces ended up being themselves besieged, and then fled, hoping to find their salvation in a desperate march in a hostile country, until they were finally destroyed. Moreover, even during the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians were also able to use their cavalry and certain territorial forts to hinder the enemy’s movements.129 In the fourth century, Aeneas the Tactician stressed the necessity of occupying a few points in the territory in order to impede the enemy.130
52Of course, the disproportion of forces meant that the Rhodians could not hope to destroy the besieging army. Cavalry raids from the town of Rhodes, which was under a tight blockade, were clearly out of the question. However, there is every reason to think that the situation of the “foragers” and pillagers who were following Demetrios’army was not comfortable in the back-country, because the Rhodians still held at least two important positions there, and probably a series of minor forts in the southern part of the island, from which they could launch raids against isolated groups, marauders, and even organized patrols.
The naval raids
53In addition, and above all, the Rhodians were always able to keep their maritime supply routes open, despite the size of Demetrios’fleet. In this respect, the failure of Demetrios’attempts to blockade the port of Rhodes had major consequences. The destruction of the enemy forces that had occupied the jetty at Rhodes was no doubt the turning point in the siege.131 As a result, thanks to their fleet the Rhodians were able to constantly harass the enemy’s communication routes, using in a way peculiar to them the strategy of harassment that allowed the besieged to keep the besiegers under continual pressure. Diodorus refers to three major naval expeditions launched by the Rhodians.
54In the first phase of the siege, three of the best Rhodian units were sent to attack Demetrios’lines of communication.132 Diodorus specifies that in this way the ships of the merchants supplying Demetrios’forces were attacked, as well as those of merchants who were attracted by the prospect of profits and who wanted to take advantage of the pillaging of the Rhodian territory. A considerable number of these ships were driven onto the coast and burned. The operation was doubly beneficial because the most notable of the prisoners were also resold to Demetrios, according to the agreement between the besiegers and the besieged, which provided for the mutual ransoming of prisoners. In the second phase of the siege, Damophilos’naval expeditions to Karpathos, those of Menedamos in Patara and along the Lykian coasts, and those of Amyntas in the islands all produced significant results.133 The first two made it possible to bring food supplies into the town, and the third to capture military engines and specialists being sent to the enemy. The Rhodians refused to abide by the agreement regarding the exchange of prisoners, to Demetrios’great indignation, which proves that for him this was a particularly painful blow.134 Finally, the fruitful expedition of the navarch Amyntas along the coasts of Asia allowed him to eliminate the pirates and bring a great quantity of wheat into the town.135
55In addition, the Rhodians were able once again to receive outside help, which proved to be of vital importance later on. They received a total of at least 2,150 men from their various allies : 150 Knossians and more than 500 mercenaries initially sent by Ptolemy ;136 1,500 additional mercenaries sent by Ptolemy later on.137 A succession of several food supply convoys arrived in the town, sent by Ptolemy, Cassander, Lysimachos, and once again Ptolemy.138 Similarly, as already observed, products seized by the Rhodians could be brought into the town. There were even symbolic victories, such as the Rhodians’capture of a ship bringing gifts from Queen Phila to her royal consort Demetrios – according to Diodorus, a royal ceremonial vestment, according to Plutarch personal letters, bedspreads, and mantles –, the two authors agreeing that everything was immediately sent to Ptolemy.139
56Thus now that their naval routes were open, allowing them to constantly harass the enemy, the Rhodians did not limit themselves to enduring the pressure of Demetrios’troops but, on the contrary, never ceased to hinder and oppose their initiatives. An analogous attitude can be observed during Mithridates’siege, and even more clearly, because the Rhodians did not hesitate to attack in force at sea, even if they had to break off the fighting in order to avoid being surrounded by their adversary because they were inferior in numbers.140 Thereafter they maintained their fleet ready to attack in order to seize all opportunities.141 The result was a series of significant naval engagements in the course of which in particular the naval commander Damagoras, at the head of a small fleet of six vessels, demonstrated his brilliant skills.142 Still better, the Rhodians attacked on the high seas Mithridates’supply fleet, which was bringing the king most of his land forces, captured some of his ships, and sank or burned others, taking 400 prisoners.143 Thus in 88 as well the Rhodians were able to keep their adversary in permanent insecurity.
57In their resistance to Demetrios, the defenders of the town of Rhodes had at first to count on the intelligence of the steps taken to defend it, and no less on their stubbornness, courage, and willingness to make sacrifices. Furthermore, during the most critical phases, they were also helped by luck when on several occasions the enemy seemed on the point of overwhelming them. But their victory was also due to the implementation of an overall strategy. This strategy was based first of all on a policy of “national union” that made it possible ensure the cohesion of the population. It was also based on the firm determination to allow the adversary to control as little territory as possible. The Rhodians were able to invent a strategy that was adapted to the particular configuration of their territory. In this respect, their situation was much more favorable than that of the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War. First of all, their main town was not located on the continent but on an island, and moreover it was a port city. To conquer the town of Rhodes, one could not count on a massive and potentially constantly renewed invasion of the territory by land. This factor certainly made an important contribution to Demetrios’decision to try to take the capital town by a direct assault. Naturally, the besieging forces were not of the same nature as those that a century earlier had waged the war in Attica, as Demetrios’troops were composed of professional soldiers and no longer (for the most part) of citizen contingents. The much greater cost of these professional soldiers therefore already meant that a quick decision had to be sought. Moreover, in relation to the fifth century, the use of siege engines made a direct assault possible, while earlier it could hardly have been considered. But in addition, attacking a territory like that of the Rhodians made the search for a rapid solution inevitable. The initial troops and all the reinforcements, including the precious cavalry for making raids on the territory, had to be brought in by sea, which considerably increased the cost of the operations. The same went for supplies, on the one hand because in itself the Rhodian territory was not a major grain producer, and on the other hand because when the attackers landed (probably in July 305), hardly any food sources remained available for them. As H. Delbrück put it, Demetrios was therefore obliged to adopt a Niederwerfungsstrategie, a strategy of annihilation144. An Ermattungsstrategie, a strategy of attrition, was out of the question, especially after the failure of the attempt to close the port of Rhodes by seizing the jetty that protected it.
58In a symmetrical way, the Rhodians were of course forced by the disproportion of forces to conduct a defensive strategy. But their defensive strategy was based on the determination to wear down the adversary as much as possible : it was a true Ermattungsstrategie. Demetrios’forces found themselves isolated in the middle of a hostile territory, their communication lines being constantly harassed. Despite the extensive raids conducted by the enemy, most of the Rhodian territory remained in the hands of the Rhodians. The latter found in it an ideal base for making raids on the invaders, whether by land or by sea, dealing them painful blows, disrupting their lines of communication, and even damaging their prestige and thus also their morale. This active strategy of defense bore fruit. At the decisive moments in the siege, the enemy lacked the additional strength that would have made all the difference.
59The hoped-for rapid victory having proved to be unattainable, the cost of the siege was becoming prohibitive for Demetrios. Without any serious prospect of victory in the short term because it was impossible to block the adversary’s maritime communications, there was nothing for him to do but negotiate, which he was able to do, moreover, on terms rather favorable to him, which allowed him at least to save face and to mask the reality of the defeat he had suffered145.
ABBREVIATIONS
60FGrHist Jacoby F., Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker, Berlin, Weidman, 1923.
61IG, XII. 1 Hiller von Gaertringen F., Inscriptiones insularum maris Aegaei praeter Delum. (1) : Inscriptiones Rhodi, Chalces, Carpathi cum Saro, Casi, Berlin, de Gruyter, 1895.
62ILindos Blinkenberg C., Lindos, Fouilles de l’Acropole (1902-1914), II. 1-2, Inscriptions, Berlin-Copenhagen, de Gruyter, 1941.
63IStratonikeia Şahin M. Ç., Die Inschriften von Stratonikeia, Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien, 21-22, Bonn, Habelt, 1981-90.
64Nouveau Choix Institut Fernand-Courby, Nouveau choix d’inscriptions grecques. Textes, traductions, commentaires, Paris, Les Belles lettres, 1971.
65NS Maiuri A., Nuova Silloge epigrafica di Rodi e Cos, Florence, Le Monnier, 1925.
66Olynthus, X Robinson D. M., Excavations at Olynthus, Part X. Metal and Minor Miscellaneous Finds, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1941.
67SEG Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum, Leyden-Boston, Sijthoff then Brill, 1923 and following.
68SGDI Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-Inschriften, von F. Bechtel, A. Bezzenberger [u. a.], herausgegeben von Dr. Hermann Collitz, 4 vol., Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1884-1915.
69Syll.3 Hiller von Gaertringen F., Sylloge inscriptionum Graecarum, 3rd ed., Leipzig, Hirzel, 1915-1924.
70Tit. Cam. Segre M. and Pugliese Carratelli G., “Tituli Camirenses”, Annuario della scuola archeologica di Atene, n. s. 11-13, 1949-5, p. 139-318.
Bibliographie
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Notes de bas de page
1 My thanks are due to S. Rendall for his help in the English version of this text and to J. Ma for lively electronic discussions.
2 Older literature in van Gelder H., Geschichte der alten Rhodier, The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1900, p. 104-106; more recent one by Berthold R. M., Rhodes in the Hellenistic Age, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1984, p. 66-80; Garlan Y., “Le siège de Rhodes”, L’histoire, 25, 1980, p. 48-57; Wiemer H.-U., Krieg, Handel und Piraterie. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des hellenistischen Rhodos, Berlin,
Akademie Verlag, 2002, 78-84, which offers a good synthetic account of the siege of Rhodes.
3 Plutarch, Life of Demetrius, 21-22, mentions the helepolis, recounts various anecdotes about Demetrios, and refers to the latter’s attitude with respect to the painter Protogenes during the siege of Rhodes. Several briefer remarks should also be noted here, for example, Vitruvius 10.16 (on the role of architects and engineers during the siege of Rhodes) and Pliny (7.5). Above all, a Berlin papyrus (P. Berol. 11632) reproduces an original remarkably well-informed about the siege, as is shown by the parallel with Diodorus, 20.93-94. It was edited with an important commentary by Hiller Von Gärtringen F., “Aus der Belagerung von Rhodos 304 v. Chr. Griechischer Papyrus der Kgl. Museen zu Berlin”, Sitzungsberichte der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 36, 1918-2, p. 752-762, and republished by Jacoby, FGrHist, 533 F 2 (with commentary IIIb Text, p. 451-452, Noten p. 266). The details provided by this papyrus show that its author’s source was not Diodorus, but that he had a source similar to Diodorus’ : the arrangement of the account is generally the same, only the details vary. For F. Jacoby, neither the author nor the source are necessarily the same ; in any case, according to Jacoby, rather than Zeno of Rhodes, it could be Hieronymus or Agatharchides. Nonetheless, it is difficult to believe that the primary source of the papyrus, like that of Diodorus, could be anything other than Rhodian because it offers so many details that always concern the affairs of the Rhodian camp, and because the point of view is always that of the besieged, not that of the besiegers. See also Wiemer H.-U., Rhodische Traditionen in der hellenistischen Historiographie, Frankfurt am Main, Marthe Clauss, 2001, p. 222-250.
4 Wiemer H.-U., Krieg, op. cit., p. 85, who nevertheless emphasizes the paradoxical nature of this thesis in relation to what we know about the existence of fortifications on the Rhodian territory during the Hellenistic period and the Knights’later strategy during the period of the Ottoman sieges.
5 For parallels, see the supplies accumulated by the Mytilenians in 427 in relation to their revolt against Athens and a possible siege of their city conducted by the Athenians (Thucydides 3.2.2-3).
6 Wiemer H.-U., Krieg, op. cit., p. 81-82 (and p. 81-83 for the chronology of the events of the years 306-305) and ID., Rhodische Traditioner, op. cit., p. 231-238, for the motivations of the Rhodians.
7 Diodore 20.82.3-4 : δ’ ἐκεῖνος ὁμήρους ἑκατòν ἤτει τοὺς ἐπιφανεστάτους καὶ τοῖς λιμέσι δέχεσθαι τòν στόλον προσέταττεν, ὑπολαβόντες ἐπιβουλεύειν αὐτόν τῇ πόλει, τὰ πρòς πόλεμον παρεσκευάζοντο.
8 Wiemer H.-U., Krieg, op. cit., p. 83.
9 .Diodorus 20.82.2.
10 Brockman E., The Two Sieges of Rhodes 1480-1522, London, John Murray, 1969, p. 62-63.
11 Diodorus 20.82.2-3.
12 Diodorus 20.96.1-3 (see Wiemer H.-U., Krieg, op. cit., p. 83).
13 Wiemer H.-U., Krieg, op. cit., p. 86, and more generally p. 85-87 and 91 on the chronology of the siege.
14 Appian, Mithridatic Wars, 4.24.
15 Appian, Civil Wars, 4.72-73, on the disorganization of the Rhodian forces and the absence of sufficient preparations.
16 Appian, Civil Wars, 4.71-72.
17 Brockman E., op. cit., p. 65 and 119.
18 Filimonos-Tsopotou M., H ελληνιστική οχύρωση της Ρόδου, Υπουργείο Πολιτισμού. Ταμείο Αρχαιολογικών Πόρων και Απαλλοτριώσεων, Δημοσιεύματα του Αρχαιολογικού Δελτίου 86, Athens, 2004, p. 34-45, with map p. 35 ; Pimouguet-Pédarros I., “Le système de défense rhodien face à Démétrios Poliorcète”, in Mazoyer M. and Casabonne O., Studia Anatolica et varia. Mélanges offerts au professeur René Lebrun, II, Paris - Louvain-la-Neuve, Kubaba - L’Harmattan, 2004, p. 212-239.
19 Diodorus 20.84.5 and 85.4.
20 Appian, Mithridatic Wars, 4.24.
21 Diodorus 20.84.4-5.
22 kantzia C., ““Ένα ασυνήθιστο πολεμικό ανάθημα στο ιερό της οδού Διαγοριδών στη Ρόδο”, Ρόδος 2400 χρόνια I. Η πόλη της Ρόδου από την ίδρυση της μέχρι την κατάληψη από τους Τούρκους (1523), Athens, Ταμείο Αρχαιολογικών Πόρων, p. 75-82, with Chaniotis A., War in the Hellenistic World. A Social and Cultural History, Malden, Ma-London, 2005, p. 146-147. For another group of stone balls found in the town of Rhodes that might be connected to the siege of Demetrios, see Laurenzi L., “Projettili dell’artiglieria antica scoperti a Rodi”, MemFERT, 2, 1938, p. 33-36, pl. XXVII-XXXI.
23 Appian, Mithridatic Wars, 4.24.
24 Brockman E., op. cit., p. 65 and 119.
25 Appian, Mithridatic Wars, 4.24.
26 Papachristodoulou C. I., Ιστορία της Ρόδου. Από τους προϊστορικούς χρόνους έως την ενσωμάτωση της Δωδεκανήσου (1948), Στέγη Γραμμάτων και Τεχνών Δωδεκανήσου, Athens, 1972, p. 295.
27 Diodorus 20.84.2-4.
28 Diodorus 20.100.1.
29 Garlan Y., Les esclaves en Grèce ancienne, Paris, F. Maspéro, 1982, p. 190, stresses however the exceptional character of this citizenship given to slaves. K. W. Welwei, Unfreie im antiken Kriegsdienst, II, Wiesbaden, Steiner, 1977, on Rhodes p. 50-51.
30 Appian, Mithridatic Wars, 4.24, to be completed with SEG, 45, no. 1825 (help of the Lykian koinon in the war against the Pontic king mentioned in a dedication from Patara, with comm. SEG, 55, 2005, no. 1503).
31 See Baker P., Cos et Calymna, 205-200 av. J.-C. : esprit civique et défense nationale, Québec, Éd. du Sphinx, 1992, decree for Theukles (Syll.3, 569), p. 35-47, text p. 35-36, no. 3, l. 21-22 and comm. p. 44.
32 On this point, see below.
33 Diodorus 20.83.2 and 98.8.
34 Aeneas the Tactictian books XI (as a whole ; the danger of conspiracies) and XIV (as a whole ; the necessity of concord).
35 Appian, Mithridatic Wars, 4.22.
36 Syll.3, 742.
37 Appian, Mithridatic Wars, 4.26.
38 Appian, Civil Wars, 4.73.
39 Andrea d’Amaral, Master of Castilla, had not been elected Grand Master. His mortal hatred for Villiers de l’Isle-Adam, the order’s last Grand Master, had led him to encourage the sultan to launch his expedition. When Suleiman, considering the enormous losses he had suffered, was ready to lift the siege, Amaral told him that the besieged were totally exhausted ; the sultan thus persisted and Rhodes had to surrender (Papachristodoulou C. I., op. cit., p. 310 and 318-319). E. Brockman (op. cit., p. 139-147) is skeptical about chancellor d’Amaral’s treachery, but acknowledges that his policy was actively opposed to that of the Grand Master and that its aim was the surrender of Rhodes, which ultimately amounts to acknowledging the facts.
40 . Golden Nikai : Bresson A., “Relire la Chronique de Lindos”, Topoi, 14, 2006, p. 527-551, part. p. 545-546 ; coinages corresponding to the period of the siege and its consequences : Ashton R., “The Coinage of Rhodes 408-c. 190 BC”, in Meadows A. and Shipton K., Money and its Uses in the Ancient Greek World, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 79-116, part. p. 93.
42 Diodorus 20.84.4 : ὁμονοοῦντος γὰρ τοῦ πλήθους.
43 Diodorus 20.84.3 for all these measures.
44 Pouilloux J., Recherches sur l’histoire et les cultes de Thasos, I, Paris, de Boccard, 1954, p. 371, no. 141 (Nouveau Choix, p. 105-109, no. 19).
45 Nouveau Choix, p. 109.
46 For Athens, see the references collected in Nouveau Choix, p. 109 : Thucydides 2.45-46 (last part of the funeral oration for those who died during the first year of the war, in which Pericles urges widows to observe the strictest modesty) ; Isocrates, On Peace, 82 ; Aeschines, Against Ctesiphon, 154 ; Plato, Menexenus, 248e sq. ; Aristotle, Politics, 1268a and Constitution of Athens, 24.3 and 58.1.
47 Diodorus 20.84.4.
48 Diodorus 20.94.3-5 (also P. Berol., 11632, l. 12-48, for the Athenagoras episode).
49 Appian, Civil Wars, 4.66 and 73.
50 Diodorus 20.84.2.
51 Diodorus, 20.84.6. On this procedure, Bielman A., Retour à la liberté. Libération et sauvetage de prisonniers en Grèce ancienne. Recueil d’inscriptions honorant des sauveteurs et analyse critique (Études épigraphiques 1), Lausanne-Athens, Université de Lausanne-École Française d’Athènes, 1994, p. 300-301, with 260 and 284, n. 61.
52 P. Berol., 11632, l. 1-12. The conditions under which these technicians were captured are explained by Diodorus 20.93.5, but he gives no details regarding the following events and the Rhodian refusal to exchange them.
53 Here it suffices to refer to Fraser P. M., The Rhodian Peraea and Islands, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1954, p. 94-98 and 138-154.
54 Papachristodoulou C. I., op. cit., p. 279 (Halikarnassos) ; Brockman E., op. cit., p. 154.
55 On the absolute necessity of protecting the people and evacuating them in the context of wars in ancient Greece, see generally Hanson V. D., Warfare and Agriculture2, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1998, p. 103-121.
56 On such agreements, Müller H., “Φυγῆς ἕvεkεv”, Chiron, 5, 1975, p. 129-156.
57 On the Periclean strategy, Garlan Y., Recherches de poliorcétique grecque, BEFAR 243, Athens, École française d’Athènes, 1974, p. 44-65.
58 Garlan Y., op. cit., p. 66-86 ; Ober J., Fortress Attica, Leyde, Brill, 1985, p. 51-66.
59 Ober J., op. cit., p. 81-82, with detailed references.
60 Xenophon, Poroi, 4.43-44. See Gauthier P., Un commentaire historique des Poroi de Xénophon, Geneva-Paris, Droz, 1976, p. 178-182.
61 Lycurgus, Against Leokrates, 16, is explicit on this point.
62 Demosthenes 18.37-38. Hanson V. D., op. cit., p. 113, thinks that we cannot gauge the authenticity of this decree. But it suffices to note that its terms correspond exactly to Lycurgus’indications.
63 ILindos, 2D, l. 5-8, which mentions the ὀχυpώματα of the Lindian territory.
64 See Jouanna J., “Collaboration ou résistance au barbare : Artémise d’Halicarnasse et Cadmos chez Hérodote et Hippocrate”, Ktema, 9, 1984, p. 15-26, p. 18 on this point.
65 Papachristodoulou C. I., op. cit., p. 295.
66 Diodorus 20.83.3.
67 Diodorus 20.83.4. Wiemer H.-U., Krieg, op. cit., p. 84-85 ; Brockman E., op. cit., p. 65-66 and 125-126 on the period of the two Ottoman sieges. However, M. Filimonos-tsopotou (op. cit., p. 43-45) offers persuasive arguments showing that for logistical reasons, this port must have been on the east coast, at the site of the future “southern port” (see map p. 35).
68 On Ialysos, Papachristodoulou I. C., Oι αpχαίoί poδιαkoί δήμoι. I. H. Iαλvσία, Athens, Bιβλιoθήkη της εv Aεήvαις Apχαιoλoγιkής Eταιpείας, 1989, p. 83-95.
69 IG, XII. 1, 677 (SGDI, 4110 ; see Papachristodoulou I. C., Δήμoι, op. cit., p. 152), l. 15-18 on the difference between the lower town and its acropolis.
70 Papachristodoulou I. C., Δήμoι, op. cit., p. 83 (Mycenaean period) ; Papachristodoulou C. I., op. cit., p. 394 (medieval period).
71 Papachristodoulou C. I., op. cit., p. 260-261 and 394.
72 Papachristodoulou C. I., op. cit., p. 394.
73 Diodorus 20.83.4 : έδεvδpoτμησε δὲ kαὶ τὴv πὴv πλησίov χώpαv kαὶ kαθεῖλε τὰς ἐπαύλεις, ἐξὧv ὠχύpωσε τὴv στpατoπεδείαv πεpιλαβὼv τpιπλῷ χάpαkι kαὶ σταvpώμασι πukvoῖς kαὶ μεγάλoις, ὣστε τὴv τῶv πoλεμίωv βλάβηv γίvεσθαι τῶv ἰδίωv ἀσφάλειαv..
74 Diodorus 20.82.4-5. On the pirates, see also below and n. 120-122.
75 Diodorus 20.82.4 : σὺv ἱππεῦσι.
76 Diodorus 20.84.6 : πλoῖα ; oὐk ὀλίγα δὲ kαὶ πpὸς τὸv αἰγιαλὸv kατασπῶσαι σuvέkαuσαv. See also below and n. 110 and 119.
77 Bresson A., “Richesse et pouvoir à Lindos (époque hellénistique)”, in Dietz S. and Papachristodoulou I. C. (ed.), Archaeology in the Dodecanese, Copenhagen, National Museum of Denmark, 1988, p. 145-154.
78 On the fortifications of the lower town of Lindos, Papachristodoulou I. C., “Recent Investigations and Activities carried out by the Archaeological Service of the Dodecanese”, Archaeology in the Dodecanese, op. cit., p. 201-209, part. p. 208 (segment of the late Archaic - early Classical fortification wall).
79 ILindos, 2D, l. 94-119 ; Wiemer H., Krieg, op. cit., p. 85, n. 140, mentions the episode but ranks it among the imaginary accounts and does not make use of it.
80 C. Blinkenberg, ILindos, 2D, l. 97-98 : ἒτι / διατpίβω[v] ἐv Δίvδωι.
81 C. Blinkenberg, ILindos, I, p. 187.
82 Luttrell A. and Von Falkenhausen V., “Lindos and the Defence of Rhodes, 1306-1522”, in Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Neoellenici, 22-23, 1985/86, p. 317-332.
83 Kamiros “may have remained unfortified until the Hellenistic period”, with reference to Tit. Cam. 110, l. 19 sq. (Nielsen T. H. and Gabrielsen V., “Rhodes”, in Hansen M. H. and Nielsen T. H. (ed.), An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 1196-1210, part. p. 1201). Reference to this point of view in Hornblower S., A Commentary on Thucydides, III, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 881.
84 Thucydides 8.44.2, with commentary by S. Hornblower, ibid.
85 Thucydides 3.33.2 (Ionia in general), 8.31.3 (Klazomenai), 8.41.2 (Kos Meropis).
86 Ancient fortresses on the territory of Ialysos in Papachristodoulou I. C.,Δήμoι, op. cit.: Erimokastro, p. 120-124, with pl. 12-14 (hardly a dozen kilometers from Rhodes on the east coast of the island, the fort was nonetheless certainly evacuated in 305-304); small forts in the region of Archangelos, p. 133 and 135-137, with pl. 17).
87 For the other parts of Rhodian territory on the island, Inglieri R. U., Carta archeologica dell’isola di Rodi, Florence, LeMonnier, 1936 (FN: Foglio nord, FS: Foglio sud): Kamiran territory – FN no. 132 (cat. p. 47): Chitala, small fortress; FN no. 158 (cat. p. 51): S. Focà (Haghios Phokas, powerful fortress of pre-Hellenistic times but permanently occupied later, sector of Kymisala); FS no. 17 (cat. p. 56): Patoclia; Lindian territory – FS no. 59 (cat. p. 65): Stafilia; two other fortified sites of the southern Lindian chōra seems to have been mainly or only of Archaic times: FS no. 96 (cat. p. 70): Iemartà (coastal fortress, Archaic times) FS no. 98 (cat. p. 71-72): Vrulià (Vroulia, Archaic times only). For the other islands and the continental territory, see below p. 114-115.
88 Tit. Cam., 110, 19-26, l. 19-21: πεπτωkό/τωv τε τῶv τειχέωv διὰ γεvόμεvov σεισμὸv / ἐπ’ ἰεpέως θεuφάvεuς.
89 Habicht C., “Rhodian Amphora Stamps and Rhodian Eponyms”, Revue des Études Anciennes, 105, 2003, p. 541-578, part, p. 556-557.
90 Justin 30.4.1-3: In Asia quoque eadem die idem motus terrae Rhodum multasque alias civitates gravis ruinarum labe concussit, quasdam solidas absorbuit.
91 IStratonikeia, l. 16-18 : σuvσεισθέ[v]/τωv τῶv τειχέωv ὑπὸ τoῦ/σεισμoῦ.
92 H.-U. Wiemer (Krieg, op. cit., p. 85, n. 143) also rightly emphasizes the existence in Kamiros of epistatai of the peripolion, that is, of local magistrates in charge of the fortifications (but the testimonies are posterior to 198).
93 I am indebted to J. Ma, who is writing a study on these sling-bullets (“Autour des balles de fronde ‘ camiréennes’”, Chiron, 40, 2010, in press) for drawing my attention to the group of sling-bullets from Kamiros. We both independently reached the conclusion that the “Kamiran sling-bullets” could have been used only during operations against the town of Kamiros.
94 Vischer W., “Epigraphische und Archäologische Kleinigkeiten. I. Antike Schleudergeschosse”, Kleine Schriften, II, Leipzig, Hirzel, 1878, p. 259-284, p. 270, no. 59, uninscribed, similar to an example in the Musée de Saint-Germain that came from “the Kamiros plateau”.
95 Maiuri A., NS, p. 249-252 ; Jacopi G., “Esplorazione archeologica di Camiro II. La stipe votiva”, Clara Rhodos, 6-7.1, 1932-1933, p. 278-365, part. p. 361 (illustration) and p. 365 ; Tit. Cam., 192 l-s.
96 LGPN, IIIA : Aetolia, beginning of the third century, 1 occ. ; Messenia, third century, 1 occ. ; IIIB : Delphi, second century 2 occ. ; Thessaly, c. 300 BC, 1 occ. On the name Babyrtas, Masson, O., “Notes d’anthroponymie grecque : quelques noms sans étymologie”, Revue de Philologie, 105, 1979, p. 244-250, part. p. 248-250 ; see also a Thessalian Babyrtadas, apparently third century BC, LGPN, IIIB.
97 It will suffice here to give the statistics by volume : LGPN : I (Crete [Olous], Cyrenaica, without the occurrence of sling-bullets from Rhodes) 2 ; IIIA (western Greece) 15 ; IIIB (central Greece and Thessaly) 15 ; IV (Kallatis) 1.
98 LGPN, I : Knossos, second century, 1 occ. ; Cyrene, fourth century, 2 occ. ; Berenike, first century, 1 ; IIIA : Arkadia, third century, 1 (but with however many Thearidas, Thearis, Thearion in Western Greece).
99 In publishing the sling-bullets in the Froehner collection, M.-C. Hellmann (“Collection Froehner : balles de fronde grecques”, Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique, 106, 1982, p. 75-87, part. p. 76-79, no. 1-14) has listed fourteen bullets that are of “Rhodian type” and whose Rhodian provenance is certain (bought in Rhodes) or very probable (bought in Alexandria, a city closely linked with Rhodes in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries through its Greek emigrant community). One of these bullets is uninscribed. As for the bullets bearing a proper name, we find a close correspondence with the sling-bullets from Kamiros : Antidoros, 1, Euboulidas 2, Nikodamos 1, Babyrtas 4, Thearos 1, with in addition one bullet bearing the name Ameinias, a name that is found throughout the Greek world but is particularly well attested among the Rhodian elite, and another with the name of Apollonidas, of which we can say the same for the whole of the Dorian world (for this name, however, see also below, n. 109). One bullet with the name Babyrtas had been published by W. Vischer, op. cit., p. 273, no. 65. The Canellopoulos collection also included a bullet with the name of Babyrtas (Empereur J.-Y., “Collection Paul Canellopoulos [XVII] : Petits objets inscrits”, Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique, 105, 1981, p. 537-568, part. p. 557-558, no. 8). Six bullets bearing his name were also found during the excavation of Miletos (Weiß P., “Schleuderbleie und Marktgewichte”, Archäologischer Anzeiger, 1997, p. 143-156, p. 146, no. 6, with p. 152).
100 On this hypothesis, see also below, n. 109.
101 Weiß P., art. cit., p. 152. P. Weiß correctly observes that Babyrtas (that is, his troops) must have fought at both Kamiros and Miletos. As for dating, however, his chronology remains vague : second half of the fourth century or third century.
102 See Olynthus, X, p. 418-420 ; Φιλίππov, ibid., p. 431-433, no. 2229-2241 ; Iππovίkov, p. 424-426, no. 2186-2201 (before the excavations in Olynthus, W. Vischer had already made the connection with Philip’s general operating in Euboea mentioned by Demosthenes, 3rd Philippic [9.58], Vischer, op. cit., p. 263, no. 10 ; another example in the Canellopoulos collection, Empereur J.-Y., art. cit., p. 560, no. 17) ; χαλ - ou Xαλkι (δέωv), p. 419 and 437, no. 2260-2264 ; Oλu (vθίωv), p. 430, no. 220-225.
103 On these questions of writing and chronology in Rhodian inscriptions from the end of the fourth and the beginning of the third century, Bresson, A., “Rhodes, Rome et les pirates tyrrhéniens”, in P. Brun (ed.), Scripta Anatolica. Hommages à Pierre Debord, Études 18, Bordeaux, Ausonius, 2007, p. 145-164.
104 Wiemer H.-U., Krieg, op. cit., p. 57-58.
105 Diodorus 20.82.5 : πoλλὰ γὰp ἒτη τῆς χώpας τῆς ‘Poδίωv ἀπopθήτov γεγεvημέvης.
106 Wiemer H.-U., Krieg, op. cit., p. 60-61.
107 Xenophon, Anabasis, 3.3.16-17.
108 Bresson A., “Monétaires rhodiens du IIe siècle a. C. : onomastique et société”, in Bresson A. and Descat R. (ed.), Les cités d’Asie Mineure occidentale au IIe siècle a. C., Études 8, Bordeaux, Ausonius 2001, p. 197-211. For slave onomastics in Rhodes, Bresson A., “Remarques préliminaires sur l’onomastique des esclaves dans la Rhodes antique”, in Moggi M. and Cordiano G. (ed.), Schiavi e dipendenti nell’ambito dell’“oikos” e della “familia”, Atti del XXII Colloquio GIREA Pontignano (Siena) 19-20 novembre 1995, Pisa, ETS, 1997, p. 117-126.
109 Diodorus 20.88.9.
110 See J. Ma’s study (art. cit.) and his conclusions. Concerning the bullet with Apollonidas’name in the Froehner collection (above, n. 98), M.-C. Hellmann has observed : “Plutôt qu’au général de Cassandre [Diodore 19.63.1-2], il faudrait peut-être songer, à cause du nominatif, à un artisan” (with the parallel of the bullet from Kamiros Swkravthı ejpovhse mentioned above). In fact, it is far from certain that Sokrates was a craftsman. The inscription could mean : “Sokrates had (this) made”. On Apollonidas, Cassander’s commander at Argos in 315 and a ruthless general, Piérart M., “Argos, Cléonai et le Koinon des Arcadiens”, Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique, 106, 1982, 119-138, part. p. 134-136. Diodorus does not mention Cassander’s troops being at Rhodes. This is what makes it less likely that leaders like Babyrtas and Euboulidas (whose names are also attested in Thessaly, a region under Cassander’s control) fought on the Rhodian side.
111 Diodorus 20.93.2. See above n. 75 and below n. 119 for the evidence that the ships had been driven onto the coast before being burned and their crews made prisoner. Conversely, while sailing down the Lykian coast, Menedamos took and burned in Patara a ship lying at anchor while its crew was ashore (Diodorus 20.93.2 : πλεὑσας τῆς Δukίας ἐπὶ τὰ ҐIάταpα kαὶ kαταλαβὼv ὁpμoῦσv vαῦv τoῦ πληpώματoς ἐπὶ γῆς ὄvτoς ἐvπὑpισε τὸ σkάφoς). Thus Menedamos did not tow the ship to the coast, because the latter was in the hands of the enemy forces.
112 On Karpathos, Hope Simpson R. and Lazenby J. F., “Notes from the Dodecanese”, Annual of the British School at Athens, 57, 1962, p. 154-175, part. p. 158-165.
113 Diodorus 20.82.4.
114 Diodorus 14.83.4.
115 For recent work on Loryma, Held W., “Platz, Heiligtum und politische Institutionen in Loryma und der Karischen Chersones”, in Hoepfner W. and Lehmann L. (ed.), Die griechische Agora, Symposion Berlin 2003, Mainz, Philipp von Zabern, 2006, p. 41-52, on the fortified town of Loryma, which was occupied starting in the sixth century BC. ; id., “Die Karer und die rhodische Peraia”, in Rumscheid F. (ed.), Die Karer und die Anderen, Kolloquium Berlin 2005, Bonn, Habelt, 2009, p. 121-134, who assumes that the Chersonese became Rhodians only c. 300 BC, a date that is however certainly too late.
116 Appian, Civil Wars, 4.72.
117 Papachristodoulou C. I., op. cit., p. 295 and 313-314.
118 Pimouguet-Pédarros I., “Les fortifications de la Pérée rhodienne”, Revue des Études anciennes, 96, 1994, p. 243-272 ; Ead., Archéologie de la défense. Histoire des fortifications antiques de la Carie (époques classique et hellénistique), Paris, 2000, p. 380-405.
119 Diodorus 20.97.5-6.
120 On Amyntas’expedition see below n. 132 and on the issue of burning the ships above n. 75 and 119.
121 Diodorus 5.63.1 : τoὑς τε λησττὺς τoὺς πάvια διαpπάςov ιας μόvov τoῦτo ἀφεῖvαι παvτελῶς ἂσuλov kαίπεp ὰτείχιστov ὑπάpχov kαὶ ὰkίvδuvov ἔχov τἠv ἀpπαγἠv. Indeed the sanctuary seems to have been unfortified : see Cook J. M. and Plommer W. H., The Sanctuary of Hemithea at Kastabos, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1966, p. 15-18 (who do not mention any trace of fortification). On the pirates, see also above n. 73.
122 Potidaion : H.-U. Wiemer, Krieg, op. cit., p. 343-344 ; Kos : Buraselis K., Kos between Hellenism and Rome : Studies on the Political, Institutional, and Social History of Kos from ca. the Middle Second Century B. C. until Late Antiquity, Philadelphia, American Philosophical Society, 2000, p. 11-13.
123 Diodorus 20.82.4 : kαὶ τoῖς σuμμαχoῦσι πειpαταῖς.
124 On the active strategy of defense in time of war in general (not specifically in the case of the siege of the capital city), Hanson, V. D., op. cit., p. 67-107, with the complementary comments of Y. Garlan in his review of Hanson’s work, Gnomon, 57, 1985, p. 474-475 on the first edition of 1983.
125 Thucydides 6.45 : kαὶ ἔς τε τoὺς Σιkελoὺς πεpιέπεμπov, ἔvθα μὲv φύλαkας, πpὸς δὲ τoὺς πpέσ βεις, kαὶ ὲς τὰ πεpιπόλια τὰ ὲv τῆ χώpα φpo upὰ ὲσεkόμιϛ ἐσεkόμιϛov, τά τε ὲv τῆ πόλει ὃπλωv ἐζετάσει kαὶ ἳππωv ἐσkπouv εὶ ἐvτελῆ ἐστὶ, kαὶ ταλλα ώϛ ἐπὶ ταχεῖ πoλέμω kαὶ ὃσov oὺ παpόvτι kαθίσταvτo.
126 Thucydides 6.52 ; 7.13.
127 Thucydides 6.94. On the Syracusans’strategy of territorial defense and its success, Ober J., The Athenian Revolution, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 78-79.
128 Thucydides 7.25.
129 Ober J., op. cit., p. 80-84.
130 Aeneas the Tactician 9.1.
131 Diodorus 20.88.7-9.
132 Diodorus 20.84.5-6.
133 Damophilos 20.93.2 ; Menedamos 20.93.3-4 (here the Dorian [Rhodian] form of the proper name is used, Diodorus giving the koine form) ; Amyntas 20.93.5.
134 P. Berol., 11632, l. 10-12.
135 Diodorus 20.97.5-6. On the episode, see also above and n. 118.
136 Diodorus 20.88.9. On the Knossians, see above, the analysis of the sling-bullets found in Kamiros.
137 Diodorus 20.98.1.
138 Diodorus 20.96.1-3 and 98.1, with Wiemer H.-U., Krieg, op. cit., p. 88 for the estimate of the quantities involved.
139 Diodorus 20.93.4 : ἐσθῆτα βασιλιkήv ; Plutarch, Life of Demetrius, 22.1 : γpάμματα kαὶ στpώματα kαὶ ίμάτια.
140 Appian, Mithridatic Wars, 4.24.
141 Appian, ibid.
142 Appian, Mithridatic Wars, 4.25.
143 Appian, Mithridatic Wars, 4.26.
144 For the contrast between Niederwerfungsstrategie and Ermattungsstrategie, Delbrück H., Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, Berlin, de Gruyter, IV, 2000 [IV, Berlin, 1920], p. 582-589.
145 On the peace terms, Diodorus 20.99.3, with Wiemer H.-U., Krieg, op. cit., p. 91-92.
Auteur
-
Alain Bresson
Department of Classics, The University of Chicago
Le texte seul est utilisable sous licence Licence OpenEdition Books. Les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont « Tous droits réservés », sauf mention contraire.
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