URL originale : https://books.openedition.org/pur/195934

Papal graces as a royal tool of internal politics
The example of Casimir IV Jagiellon and pope Nicholas V
p. 101-114
Texte intégral
1Centralisation of the church during the middle ages established the papacy as a significant factor influencing numerous aspects of European life. The growing authority of the Holy See was often treated as a threat by secular powers and generated conflicts between popes and emperors or kings. However, in some situations papal graces could also be useful tools in the hands of rulers, to strengthen their position, especially in countries which suffered from weak royal power. Late medieval Poland was such a country without doubt. In this article, I discuss how papal graces could be used for the reinforcement of the king’s position through the example of the contacts between Casimir IV Jagiellon and pope Nicholas V.
2Since the beginning of the 15th century, Polish monarchy suffered lack of legitimacy which caused further difficulties in the government of the state. After the end of the royal branch of the native Piast dynasty (in 1370), the Polish crown was taken by the Hungarian Angevins. In spite of the fact that Louis of Anjou was the nephew of the deceased Polish king, he had to pay for the acceptance of his rights and the succession of his daughters with granting general gentry privileges of Buda (1355) and Košice (1374)1. Louis was followed on the Polish throne by his underage daughter Hedwig. The Polish nobles married her with Jogaila, the pagan Lithuanian duke who was baptised only on the occasion of becoming king of Poland, and became later known as Wladislaw II Jagiełło. Unfortunately, the young queen died soon giving birth to a stillborn daughter. This created an extremely rare situation where the person occupying the throne did not have any natural rights for ruling. As a consequence, Jagiełło’s position and the succession of his sons (born from his later wife) fully depended on the acceptance of the Polish nobility. Jagiełło – just like Louis of Anjou – tried to ensure support for his dynasty with granting general gentry privileges, which limited the royal power even more2. Furthermore, in the time of Jagiełło’s death, his older son, Wladislaw III (known in historiography as Wladislaw III of Varna) was just ten years old. For all his reign, he was fully controlled by oligarchs, led by the bishop of Cracow and later cardinal, Zbigniew Oleśnicki. This caused further deterioration of the position of the dynasty. The tragic death of Jagiełło’s older son in the battle of Varna offered a chance to change the internal situation in Poland3.
3Ascending the throne, Casimir IV Jagiellon, the younger son of Jagiełło did not want to follow his brother’s or father’s path of relinquishing power to the nobles. However, in order to change the balance of power, he had to deal with a strong oligarch party which had been governing the kingdom since more than a decade. The king’s task was even more difficult, as the royal treasury was empty, a considerable part of the royal domain was pledged into private hands4 and all the most important state offices (both secular and ecclesiastical) were occupied by the oligarchs and their supporters5. Consequently, the first years of Casimir Jagiellon’s reign were concentrated on the strengthening of the royal power, especially by improving the economic situation of the monarchy and by promoting his supporters to the most influential offices. In some of these tasks, papal graces could be exceptionally helpful.
4The very first challenge for the new king was to fill up the empty treasury. During the reign of his older brother, Wladislaw III, Poland became involved in the rivalry for the Hungarian crown. This ambition absorbed considerable amount of money without bringing the expected results6. The death of the older Jagiellon allowed Casimir IV to retreat from Hungarian politics, however, he was forced to face the economic consequences of his brother’s actions.
5The income of the Polish crown in the Jagiellonian time was low compared to the other countries in the region. The main source of it were royal monopolies (especially salt mines), customs, duties, tolls and rants from royal domains7. These fees enabled the king to finance the everyday needs of the monarchy, nevertheless, they were insufficient to undertake any endeavours resulting in greater expenses, like war, especially if it was waged outside the country. Theoretically, a way to increase the income of the state could be imposing fixed taxes, however, it was impossible to do so in Poland, as since 1374 kings had to obtain the consent of the state assembly to collect tax from the two largest groups of landowners, namely the clergy and the nobility8. Taxes were considered as extraordinary burdens by the society imposed only under special circumstances. To illustrate the problem, it might be enough to mention that in the first 46 years of the 15th century tax was collected from the clergy five times9 and from the nobility only twice10. The king could impose taxes freely only on the cities (the city tax called szos and the tax from alcohol excise)11, nevertheless, these incomes were insufficient to eliminate the difficulties of the royal treasury and to finance more active politics of the state. Therefore, kings started to use another economic instrument to finance their actions – pledges secured on royal domain.
6Pledging part of royal domain provided kings with instantly available funds, and short-term support of the pledgee, however, it simultaneously weakened the power of the crown by giving up part of the steady royal income, and it also created economic superiority of a small group of pledgees over the rest of the society (including the king himself). In theory, the king could at any time repay his debt and reclaim the lands, although the repurchase of pledges happened in practice very rarely12.
7Pledges of royal estate were used in an increasing extent since the time of Wladislaw II Jagiełło. At the end of his life, he pledged lands to influential politicians to secure Polish succession of his sons13. His example was followed by his older son, Wladislaw III. During the ten years of his reign, he pledged lands worth at least 120 000 silver marchs14. According to the estimations, this sum equalled two-year total income of the monarchy, and it was six times more than the amount which the king could collect in form of taxes from all society15. Not surprisingly, the main beneficiaries of this policy were the magnates controlling the throne. To compete with them, Casimir IV had to find funds which would enable him to follow his own policy independently from the oligarch party. As raising taxes needed the consent of the royal council and the assemblies of nobility, and pledging royal domain impaired royal power, he turned to the Holy See for financial help.
8The new pope, Nicholas V was elected slightly before Casmir IV’s succession to the Polish throne (in March 1447). The beginning of his pontificate was troubled by the schism and by the antipope Felix V who had the support of the council of Basel. Even if the importance of the council was already decreasing, Nicholas V still had to strive for the obedience of monarchs. This situation gave the kings a considerably strong position in the negotiations with the papacy which the sovereigns mostly tried to use to systematically decrease papal influence on the church in their countries16. Casimir IV did not try to acquire such concessions. Even though Poland was part of the German nation at the council, the Polish king did not sign the concordat of Vienna17. Instead, he solicited from the pope one-time privileges : to have the right to collect the tenth part of the tithe from the clergy for six years, the Peter’s Pence for some time, and to ensure the extension of royal rights of presenting candidates for church benefices18. In Polish historiography, Casimir IV’s policy towards the Apostolic See is sometimes considered as a lost opportunity19, however, considering the internal situation of the monarchy, his demands were the exact answers for the current, most urgent royal needs.
9As we could see, an important part of the royal requests aimed to ensure financial help for the crown from the church. Evidently, the royal envoys could not admit that the requested resources are needed for the king’s internal policy, instead, they used the argument of the defence of the faith. Polish and Lithuanian lands in Ruthenia were neighbouring Tatars Hordes and suffered permanent threat of raids. The royal envoys argued that the money was needed to defend the kingdom and Christianity from them. The pope partly agreed to the king’s requests. He consented to the collection of the tithe from the Polish church which gave the state an estimated income of 10 000 florins20. This sum was approximately one-third of the revenues gained from the taxation of all society (gentry, city and liquor tax jointly) at the end of the century21.
10The tithe granted by the pope was without doubt collected22, but it is not sure how the money was spent. There is no information about Polish offensive actions against Tatars in this time, what is more, the Tatar raids in autumn 144723 and in 145024 found the country completely unprotected. Both times the invaders managed to loot a great part of the undefended Ruthenia. This indicates that Casimir IV spent the funds granted by the pope in a different way than he claimed. Most likely the money was used to deal with the most urgent need of the dynasty which was in this time to reinforce royal power.
11The above-mentioned example would not be the only occasion in the examined period when Polish diplomacy at the Holy See abused the rhetoric of the defence of the faith. Three years later, in 1450 the royal envoys used the same argument in the conflict between the pope and the king about the investiture of the bishopric of Włocławek (see the details below). They presented Casimir as a defender of the faith25 and to make a stronger impression, they solicited a special jubilee indulgence for the commanders of the royal army fighting with Tatars26. Although the noblemen listed by the envoys were indeed commanders of royal troops in that time, they did not fight the infidel Tatars, but the rebellious orthodox subjects of the king in Moldova27. This example shows that Polish diplomacy used the fact that the Holy See had a poor understanding of the situation in Eastern Europe to obtain benefits from the pope. In 1450, they did it for political concessions, in 1447 for financial ones.
12Considering the internal political situation of the Polish monarchy, the extra funds from the church meant a significant help. The money collected from the clergy with papal concession together with the special tax imposed by pretext of repurchase of royal pledges in 1447 gave the monarchy the basis to pursue bolder policy. Nevertheless, financial support was not the only way to use papal graces to strengthen the power of Casimir IV in the beginning of his reign. The second – similarly important – area was royal personal policy towards the church.
13Having influence on granting church benefices was a crucial matter in governing 15th-century Poland. On one hand, the lower and middle clergy remained the most important base for state administration28, and on the other hand, higher church offices (especially “old Polish” bishoprics29) were the most prestigious positions in the state. Bishops did not only participate in the royal council30, but the primate of Poland (namely the archbishop of Gniezno) and the bishop of the cathedral in the capital Cracow were also traditionally considered as leaders of the nobility in their lands (the primate in Great Poland, and the bishop of Cracow in Lesser Poland)31. Furthermore, the bishoprics had high prestige, but also very high income, amounting to thousands of florins per year32. The practical importance of the bishoprics is illustrated by the reign of Wladislaw III, when the most important political figure was bishop of Cracow, Zbigniew Oleśnicki. For all these reasons, the control over the investiture of bishops was of key importance in Polish politics.
14Originally, the dukes and kings – as successors of the founders of the Polish church – had the right to choose bishops in Poland. The situation changed in the beginning of 13th century when Innocent III gave the right to choose bishops to the cathedral chapters. This decision caused a permanent tension between the chapters that tried to defend their rights, and the rulers who sought to influence canonical elections. In theory, this conflict should have ended in the 14th century when the Holy See reserved the investiture of all bishoprics33. However, Poland was on the periphery of Christianity and the papacy rarely had its own candidates for Polish bishoprics. Therefore, the popes confirmed the candidates proposed by local authorities in the majority of the cases. Depending on the circumstances, the pope could strengthen royal power by choosing the king’s candidate, or on the contrary, weaken it by promoting canonical elects or clerics related to the Curia.
15Although popes tried in general not to confront the kings in such matters, there are several examples of appointing the chapters’ elects or priests connected to the Curia against royal will in the 15th-century Poland. This mostly happened when the throne was occupied by weak rulers (like Wladislaw III) or the monarchy was in conflict with the papacy. The latter characterised also the rule of Casimir IV after the death of Nicholas V34. During the Thirteen Years’ war between Poland and the Teutonic Order in Prussia, the Holy See strongly supported the Order and did not hesitate to take measures to weaken the position of the Polish king. One of them was choosing bishops against royal will. It caused many conflicts between the king and the popes, especially during the pontificates of Callixtus III and Pius II.
16During the pontificate of Nicholas V, ten bishoprics vacated in the realm of Casimir IV (three of them in Poland, two in Lithuania and five in Ruthenia)35. In each case, the king choose a candidate for the bishoprics, or tried to influence the canonical election, in order to appoint royal councillors to the head of the dioceses. Three times (twice at the election of the archbishop of Gniezno and once the bishop of Przemyśl) the royal candidate was rejected by the chapter. However, these conflicts were pacified locally and most likely did not influence the relationship of the monarchy with the papacy. As there is no evidence of the activity of the chapters’ elects in the Roman Curia, it seems that the king managed to force his will on the chapters, and only royal candidates were presented at the Holy See. In most of the cases the pope did not confront the king and accepted his candidates without objections. The only exception was the vacancy of the bishopric of Włocławek in 1449. The pope decided to ignore the royal candidate and appointed Mikołaj Lasocki, a humanist and diplomat well-known in Italy and in the Roman Curia. The king did not accept the papal decision. The conflict caused by the disagreement lasted one year, and ended only with the death of the papal candidate. The king defended his position successfully and the pope had to withdraw and accept as successor of Lasocki, the royal candidate. This way Casimir IV managed to establish his councillors (e.g. his secretary Mikołaj of Błażejowice36 and his later chancellor Jan Gruszczyński37) in the most important ecclesiastical offices in Poland. It gave royal supporters strong voice in the episcopate and in the royal council.
17Although the benefices in cathedral and collegiate churches were less prominent than the bishoprics, they were also very important from the royal point of view. Ecclesiastical career provided considerable income and prestige without fragmentation of inherited lands, thus it was appealing for young members of the elite of the state. The possibility of presenting candidates for prelatures and canonries not only increased royal influence in the church, and enabled the king to reward his ecclesiastical councillors, but also could be used to extend the support of the king amongst the nobility. Furthermore, church benefices were the main source of income of clerics involved in the state administration (especially in the Royal Chancellery)38. Last but not least, controlling the majority in cathedral chapters could also reduce the chance of the election of bishops against royal will.
18The problem in Poland was the fact that kings had right to grant only a minor part of prelatures and canonries in the kingdom39 which severely limited their ecclesiastical policy. Therefore, rulers needed another legal basis to strengthen their influence on the personal composition of ecclesiastical institutions. Papal graces offered such possibility.
19The increase of royal rights for presenting candidates to ecclesiastical benefices was one of the political preconditions of Casimir IV of acknowledging obedience to Nicholas V40. Actually, royal envoys achieved to get a privilege which entitled the king to present candidates for ninety benefices41. The significance of this concession can be understood only if we consider the numbers of prebends in general in Poland and Lithuania.
20In the countries ruled by Casimir IV (including Lithuania and Ruthenia), there were approximately 236 benefices in cathedrals and 294 in collegiate churches in the middle of 15th century. The king had patronage of approximately 140 of these. However, the royal rights were mainly concentrated in the newer, less significant and impoverished institutions in Lithuania and Ruthenia (in these the king could grant even 98 % of the prebends). The situation was completely different in the Polish church where chapters were older, stronger, richer and the benefices had higher esteem. Here, the king could decide only about 56 benefices which meant 12 % of all prebends (in the most important cathedral chapters this percentage was even smaller – around 9 %42). Therefore, the papal privilege of granting ninety benefices was used mostly in Western part of the monarchy where it tripled the number of benefices for which the king could present candidates. It enabled the king to monopolise for some time the decision on benefices in his entire realm and gave him the possibility to quickly promote his trusted priests. This fundamentally increased the potential of royal policy in the church and strengthened royal influence in the most significant church institutions.
21The privilege of presenting candidates to church benefices directly was not the only way to use papal graces to increase royal influence in the church. Since the 14th century, the Holy See built the system of reservations which allowed the popes to grant a considerable part of the most important church benefices in Europe43. Therefore, papal letters became very important tools in building ecclesiastical careers.
22Casimir IV and his environment without doubt understood the potential of private papal graces and did not hesitate to use them to promote royal councillors into church benefices. Therefore, almost every official royal legation managed private graces in the Roman Curia in the name of dynasty members in addition to main political questions.
23The expectatives on benefices which would vacate in future were the most advantageous for monarchs, as this type of grace could be used to claim every benefice, not only the ones which were reserved for the pope. The expectatives gave the king the possibility to establish his supporters freely in the chapters, without being accused of violating the liberty of the church. The successful application of expectatives depended on the date of the document. The expectatives dated to an earlier time had always priority. Furthermore, as a lot of expectatives were granted in the very beginning of the pontificate, the chances of successful implementation also increased by obtaining the document in the privileged form motu proprio.
24From the time of the pontificate of Nicholas V, fifty-three expectatives granted for Poles were preserved. Fifteen from them were issued as a result of supplications of the dynasty (king and queen mother) and a great part of the rest was managed when a royal delegation visited Rome. An intriguing question is the date of managing the cases. According to curial practice, the date of the document should have been the day when the pope or the competent authority signed the supplication44, however, evidence suggests that the mentioned expecatatives were antedated half year earlier than the pope’s consent, namely to 14 June 1447. Yet, royal envoys could not submit supplications in June, as they were sent to the papal court only in the beginning of July and arrived in Rome in October45. What is more, some priests (especially members of the delegation) were mentioned in the documents with curial offices which they received from the pope only at the end of their mission in December 144746. In addition, a great part of the expectatives were solicited in the name of queen Sophia in the form of a rotulus and were not signed with standard form “Fiat T. Datum…” but “sub data… Fiat T.”47. This means that the pope consented not only to the graces but also to the dating. The rotulus was copied in a quinternus of registers completed only in December 1447 which also supports the theory that this was the time when the cases were settled. Moreover, it contained a privilege which permitted the queen to present candidates for benefices and was limited in time to half a year. Because of the antedatation, this permission probably expired before it was dispatched from Curia, so next year the queen had to ask for changing the date of expiration of the grace from the date of the document to the date of its expedition48. It seems that not only rulers solicited antedatated expectatives. There are also private supplications preserved that asked the pope to grant a grace with the date 14 June 1447, but the pope agreed only with the date 15 June 144749. All the evidence point to the fact that expectatives managed by royal envoys had a dating almost half a year earlier than they were indeed granted. This also explains why the queen mother is mentioned as the supplicant instead of the king. Casimir IV was coroneted king of Poland only on 29 June 144750, thus he could not be referred to as king in the documents from the 14 of June.
25Most of the expectatives managed by the royal delegations concern the royal envoys themselves, their families, the councillors of the king and priests opposing who opposed the policy of Zbigniew Oleśnicki, and hence were natural allies of the royal court51. Expectatives could be considered as rewards for the people loyal to the king, but they could also be tools of gaining new supporters. It is noticeable that almost all graces managed by royal delegations were given in the form motu proprio and with the early date (14 June 1447) which increased the probability of successful application. Expectatives mostly were given for two benefices at once, so they enabled the king to settle his supporters in more than thirty benefices, which further increased the possibilities of the king to enforce his own ecclesiastical policy.
26Expectatives were not the only type of private papal graces which were granted as a result of royal supplication. Casimir IV is mentioned as supplicant in thirteen other cases as well. Three times the king solicited provisions52, twice new provisions53, twice graces connected to beneficial trials54, once he recommended one of his chaplains to receive privileges like the familiars of the pope55, and the rest of the supplications concerned dispensations for priests (from defect of age and violating the canon law)56. These graces influenced individual careers, but – in opposition to expectatives – they were insufficient to change the balance of power in the Polish church.
27The presence of royal delegations in the Roman Curia always increased the number of private supplications which were not directly connected to the king. Ecclesiastical envoys mostly asked about beneficial privileges for themselves, while secular ones preferred spiritual graces and indulgences for institutions of which they were patrons57. Since royal envoys were mostly close councillors of the king, the graces granted to them indirectly strengthened the king’s position by enhancing the prestige of the supplicants.
28As we can see, the example of the contacts between Casimir IV and Nicholas V clearly proves that Polish kings could gain great benefits from papal graces. The younger son of Jagiełło received not only financial support from the pope, but he also used papal privileges to strengthen his position inside the Polish church. The pope let the king to choose bishops in most cases, and granted him a generous grace which enabled the king to monopolise the decision over benefices in cathedral and collegiate churches for some time. The efficient usage of papal graces helped the king to exercise independent policy, oppose the oligarch party, and enabled the clerical supporters of the royal policy to take control of the church. This last aspect proved to be extremely important in the future, when Poland entered war with the Teutonic Order (1454). This conflict lasted thirteen years and was a great challenge for the monarchy. Although the Holy See openly supported the Teutonic Knights, Polish church stayed loyal to the Crown. In this situation, the support of the clergy was indispensable, not only because the Polish church did not oppose the king, but because it financed a considerable part of the expenses of waging war. This could not have happened without the generous graces granted to the king and his councillors by Nicholas V.
29The Thirteen Years’ War showed clearly how important a favourable relationship with the Holy See was in governing the state in the second half of 15th century. During this conflict, popes were hostile to Poland, which resulted in the fact that Poland could not count on any financial support from the Holy See, Polish and papal diplomacies clashed, and also the king had to wage “bella spiritualia” inside the country against the papal candidates for bishoprics. These “spiritual wars” could have been the justification for inner opposition to turn against the king, however, the wise royal policy in the first years of Casimir IV’s reign had drained the strength of such attempts.
30By understanding the Jagiellonians’ weak position in Poland, it becomes obvious why Polish kings did not seek to limit papal power in the Polish church. Casimir IV preferred to use papal graces for his own advantage. Expectatives, provisions for reserved benefices, and papal rights connected to beneficial trials mostly restricted not the royal, but the episcopal power. Thus, it was more profitable for the monarchy to take advantage of papal graces than limit them. The royal diplomacy mostly succeeded to obtain from the popes what was important for the king. The king could supplicate for graces to the pope for his supporters and then he could force bishops to accept his will without being accused of disrespecting the freedom of the church.
31Obviously, the king was not the only politician who understood the possibilities created by papal graces. The strongest political opponent of Casimir IV, Zbigniew Oleśnicki, bishop of Cracow and cardinal since 1449 had also a strong position in the papal curia. Oleśnicki first used his influence at the Holy See to confirm his cardinalate which was conferred to him by both the pope and the antipope at the time of the schism. Even if his action resulted in a conflict with the king and the primate of Poland (who was concerned to lose his priority in the Polish church), he managed to succeed, which earned him great prestige. Oleśnicki also obtained a document that excluded the benefices in his collation from the royal privilege of granting ninety benefices in Polish church. He also sent to Rome his protégés and some young clerics who successfully solicited papal graces to strengthen their position. Nonetheless, the king had higher chance for successfully apply papal graces than bishops, even if such influential one like cardinal Oleśnicki.
Notes de bas de page
1 About Polish succession after the death of Casimir the Great see Michaud Claude, « The kingdoms of central Europe in the fourteenth century », in Michael Jones (ed.), The New Cambridge Medieval History, vol. 6, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 752-754.
2 The marriage of Hedwig and Jagiełło resulted in the union between the Kingdom of Poland and the Great Duchy Lithuania which lasted until 1795. In the time of Casimir IV Jagiellon, although both countries were ruled by the same person, they were still separate states with different ruling system, habits and even independent external policy (e.g. Lithuania did not participate in the thirteen years’ war between Poland and the Teutonic Order). The countries also competed for the control of Ruthenia – a region divided between both states. This article concentrates on the influence of papal graces in the Kingdom of Poland. About the Polish-Lithuanian union and the gentry privileges see ibid., p. 754-755 ; Gieysztor Aleksander, « The kingdom of Poland and the grand duchy of Lithuania 1370-1506 », in Christopher Allmand, The New Cambridge Medieval History, vol. 7, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 730-735.
3 On the reign of Wladislaw III of Varna see ibid., p. 735-736.
4 Sucheni-Grabowska Anna, Odbudowa Domeny Królewskiej w Polsce 1504-1548, Warszawa, Muzeum Historii Polski, 2007, p. 46-48.
5 On the internal situation in the kingdom of Poland in the beginning of the reign of Casimir IV : Biskup Marian and Górski Karol, Kazimierz Jagiellończyk. Zbiór studiów o Polsce drugiej połowy XV wieku, Warszawa, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1987, p. 84-94.
6 About the difficulties of Wladislaw Jagiellon in Hungary : Olejnik Karol, Władysław III Jagiellończyk (1424-44), Kraków, Universitas, 2007, p. 77-135.
7 For a summary of the historical research on the economic foundations of the Jagiellonian Poland see Boroda Krzysztof and Guzowski Piotr, « From King’s Finance to Public Finance. Different Strategies of Fighting Financial Crisis in the Kingdom of Poland under Jagiellonian Rule (1386-1572) », in Giampiero Nigro (dir.), La crisi fnanziarie. Gestione, implicazioni sociali e conseguenze nell’età preindustriale, Firenze, Firenze University Press, 2016, p. 451-470.
8 Gieysztor Aleksander, « The kingdom of Poland », art. cit., p. 730.
9 Boroda Krzysztof, Guzowski Piotr, « From King’s Finance to Public Finance », art. cit., p. 467.
10 Ibid., p. 460.
11 Ibid., p. 461.
12 The kings reserved for themselves also the right to designate the people who could repay the debt and take control over the pledged lands. By this, pledges allowed the king to influence the composition of the state elite, however, it did not solve the problem of royal treasury. On the difficulties of recuperation of pledged lands : Sucheni-Grabowska Anna, Odbudowa Domeny Królewskiej, op. cit., p. 54-56.
13 Guzowski Piotr, « Klienci czy wierzyciele? Nie tylko o ekonomicznym wymiarze zastawu dóbr królewskich w pierwszej połowie XV wieku », in Ewa Dubas-Urwanowicz and Jerzy Urwanowicz (ed.), Patron i dwór. Magnateria Rzeczpospolitej w xvi-xviii wieku, Białystok, Wydawnictwo DiG, 2006, p. 70.
14 About the practice of pledging royal domain in the first half of the 15th century : Sucheni-Grabowska Anna, Odbudowa Domeny Królewskiej w Polsce 1504-1548, op. cit., p. 42-49. Explicite about pladges of Wladislaw III of Varna : Sepiał Marcin, « Zastaw na dobrach ziemskich i dochodach królewskich w okresie panowania Władysława Warneńczyka na Węgrzech (1440-1444) », Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prace Historyczne, no 125, 1998, p. 35-49.
15 For estimations for the second half of the 15th century see Boroda Krzysztof and Guzowski Piotr, « From King’s Finance to Public Finance », art. cit., p. 453.
16 Black Antony, « Popes and councils », in Christopher Allmand, The New Cambridge Medieval History, vol. 7, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 71 ; Scott Tom, « Germany and the Empire », in Christopher Allmand, The New Cambridge Medieval History, vol. 7, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 357.
17 Silnicki Tadeusz, Sobory powszechne a Polska, Warszawa, P.A.X., 1962, s. 117-118.
18 Dlugosius Joannes, Annales seu Cronicae incliti regni Poloniae. Liber Duodecimus, 1445-1461, Wyrozumski Jerzy et al. (ed.), Cracoviae, Polska Akademia Umiejętności, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2003, p. 48.
19 Grosse Ludwik, Stosunki Polski z soborem bazylejskim, Warszawa, Skład główny w księgarni Gebethnera i Wolffa, 1885, p. 165-166.
20 Dlugosius Joannes, Annales seu Cronicae incliti regni Poloniae. Liber Duodecimus, 1445-1461, op. cit., p. 64-65.
21 Boroda Krzysztof and Guzowski Piotr, « From King’s Finance to Public Finance », art. cit., p. 462.
22 An evidence for the collection of these funds is the bulla of the collector Jan Gruszczyński (AAV, Reg. Vat., vol. 403, fo 71 vo-72 ro ; Bullarium Poloniae litteras apostolicas aliaque monumenta Poloniae Vaticana continens, t. 6, ed. Irena Sułkowska-Kuraś, Stanisław Kuraś, Roma-Lublin, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski, Polski Instytut Kultury Chrześcijańskiej, nr 520) and also the appeals of the dukes of Mazovia made against the collection (AAV, Reg. Vat., vol. 409, fo 140 vo ; Bullarium Poloniae, op. cit., nr 266).
23 Dlugosius Joannes, Annales seu Cronicae incliti regni Poloniae. Liber Duodecimus, 1445-1461, op. cit., p. 71-72.
24 Ibid., p. 96.
25 Codex Epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti, t. III, Antoni Lewicki (ed.), Kraków, Skład Główny w Księgarni Spółki Wydawniczej Polskiej, 1894, nr 38.
26 AAV, Reg. Suppl., vol. 444, fo 94 ro-94 vo ; Bullarium Poloniae, op. cit., nr 380.
27 Dlugosius Joannes, Annales seu Cronicae incliti regni Poloniae. Liber Duodecimus, 1445-1461, op. cit., p. 93-95.
28 Sułkowska-Kurasiowa Irena, Polska Kancelaria Królewska w latach 1447-1506, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków, Zakład Narodowy imienia Ossolińskich, Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1967, p. 42.
29 As far as the importance of the church is concerned, Casimir IV’s realm could be divided into three parts : Poland (belonging to the western Christianity since 966), Lithuania (converted in 1387-1388) and Ruthenia (in great majority Orthodox). The position of the church was very different in each of them. In Poland Church institutions were well-established, wealthy and influential, in Lithuania and Ruthenia the western Catholic Church was newly organised and had neither the resources, nor the power and prestige of Polish church.
30 The royal council was a body which had the most significant impact on current politics of the state in the 15th century. The composition of the council was not yet established legally in the beginning of the reign of Casimir IV. Theoretically, the king had freedom in inviting people to his council. In practice, he invited the most influential political figures occupying the most prestigious offices : bishops, voivodes, castellans of the most important royal castles. The composition of the council was legally confirmed at the time of the organisation of modern Polish parliament in the second half of the 15th century. Basically, these three groups of officers constituted the upper house of the parliament – the senate. The members of the high clergy had the first place in the senate. About the royal council : Kallas Marian, Historia ustroju w Polsce, Warszawa, PWN, 2005, p. 112-114. About the significance of the position of bishops : Wiesiołowski Jacek, « Episkopat Polski XV wieku jako grupa społeczna », in Społeczeństwo Polski Średniowiecznej. Zbiór studiów, t. 4, Stanisław Kuczyński (ed.), Warszawa, PWN, 1990, p. 240. The speeches of Polish diplomats at the Holy See also confirm the great importance of bishops in the government of the 15th-century Poland, e.g. : Codex Epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti, op. cit., nr 38.
31 The position of the primate and the bishop of Cracow as leaders of the nobility is well illustrated by the conflict between the nobility of Great and Lesser Poland about precedence of bishops after confirmation of Zbigniew Oleśnicki as cardinal in 1449 : Dlugosius Joannes, Annales seu Cronicae incliti regni Poloniae. Liber Duodecimus, 1445-1461, op. cit., p. 99-102.
32 About the income of Polish bishoprics : Kowalski Marek Daniel, Proventus Camerae Apostolicae debiti. Opłaty duchowieństwa polskiego na rzecz papiestwa w latach 1417-1485, Kraków, Historia Jagiellonica, 2010, p. 59-61.
33 The historical development of the rights of choosing bishops in Poland is described by Grzywacz Jerzy, Nominacja biskupów w Polsce przedrozbiorowej, Lublin, Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa Naukowego Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1960, p. 15-49.
34 Ibid., p. 43-52.
35 For details of provisions for bishoprics in this time see Zapała Adam, Kontakty Polaków i Litwinów ze Stolicą Apostolską za pontyfikatu papieża Mikołaja V (1447-1455), Warszawa, Instytut Historii PAN, 2021, p. 30-38.
36 AAV, Reg. Lat., vol. 480, fo 128 vo-130 ro ; Bullarium Poloniae, op. cit., nr 645.
37 AAV, Reg. Lat., vol. 465, fo 215 ro-215 ro ; Bullarium Poloniae, op. cit., nr 503, 505.
38 Sułkowska-Kurasiowa Irena, Polska Kancelaria Królewska w latach 1447-1506, op. cit., p. 49-50.
39 Szady Bogumił, Prawo patronatu w Rzeczypospolitej w czasach nowożytnych, Lublin, Wydawnictwo-Drukarnia LIBER, 2003, p. 42, 43, 60.
40 Dlugosius Joannes, Annales seu Cronicae incliti regni Poloniae. Liber Duodecimus, 1445-1461, op. cit., p. 48.
41 AAV, Reg. Vat., vol. 386, fo 23 ro-24 vo ; Bullarium Poloniae, op. cit., t. 6, nr 115. The queen mother received similar concession, but for four benefices : AAV, Reg. Suppl., vol. 421, fo 306 ro-306 vo ; Bullarium Poloniae, op. cit., t. 6, nr 27.
42 This meant 41 out of 265 prebends in collegiate chapters, and 15 out of 167 prebends in cathedral chapters. Szady Bogumił, Prawo patronatu w Rzeczypospolitej w czasach nowożytnych, op. cit., p. 42-44 and 60-61.
43 Popes could grant provisions on vacated reserved benefices and expectatives on benefices which would vacate in the future. Petitioners could also solicit confirmation of rights for already owned prebends by “new provisions” and dispensations that allowed to acquire benefices in situations where canon law would prohibit it, e.g. in case of defect of age, if the supplicant did not have the required ordination, or if he owned another benefice incompatible with the one he supplicated for. Furthermore, the papal tribunal (Sacra Romana Rota) was the court of appeal in beneficial trials. All this made papacy extremely important factor in granting church benefices.
44 Frenz Thomas, I documenti pontifici nel medioevo e nell’eta moderna, Citta del Vaticano, Scuola Vaticana di Paleografia, Diplomatica e Archivistica, 2008, p. 74.
45 Dlugosius Joannes, Annales seu Cronicae incliti regni Poloniae. Liber Duodecimus, 1445-1461, op. cit., p. 48.
46 E.g. Wyszota of Górka became notarius pape on 23.12.1447 (AAV, Reg. Vat., vol. 385, fo 155 vo-156 ro ; Bullarium Poloniae, op. cit., t. 6, nr 114), but he is mentioned with this title in an expectative from 14.06.1447 (AAV, Reg. Vat., vol. 404, fo 12 vo-14 ro ; Bullarium Poloniae, op. cit., t. 6, nr 35).
47 AAV, Reg. Suppl., vol. 421, fo 306 ro-306 vo ; Bullarium Poloniae, op. cit., t. 6, nr 27.
48 AAV, Reg. Vat., vol. 407, fo 147 ro ; Bullarium Poloniae, op. cit., t. 6, nr 177.
49 AAV, Reg. Suppl., vol. 423, fo 170 ro-170 vo ; Bullarium Poloniae, op. cit., t. 6, nr 28-29.
50 Dlugosius Joannes, Annales seu Cronicae incliti regni Poloniae. Liber Duodecimus, 1445-1461, op. cit., p. 46-47.
51 For the details of expectatives for Poles : Zapała Adam, Kontakty Polaków i Litwinów ze Stolicą Apostolską za pontyfikatu papieża Mikołaja V (1447-1455), op. cit., p. 98-105.
52 AAV, Reg. Vat., vol. 427, fo 111 vo-113 ro ; Bullarium Poloniae, op. cit., t. 6, nr 725 ; AAV, Reg. Suppl., vol. 436, fo 156 ro-156 vo ; Bullarium Poloniae, op. cit., t. 6, nr 281 ; AAV, Reg. Lat., vol. 487, fo 197 ro-199 ro ; AAV, Reg. Suppl., vol. 469, fo 39 vo-40 ro ; Bullarium Poloniae, op. cit., t. 6, nr 727, 784.
53 AAV, Reg. Lat., vol. 487, fo 210 ro-211 ro ; Bullarium Poloniae, op. cit., t. 6, nr 697 ; AAV, Reg. Suppl., vol. 455, fo 110 vo-111 vo ; Bullarium Poloniae, op. cit., t. 6, nr 575.
54 AAV, Reg. Suppl., vol. 469, fo 105 ro-106 ro ; Bullarium Poloniae, op. cit., t. 6, nr 736 ; AAV, Reg. Vat., vol. 403, fo 72 ro-72 vo ; Bullarium Poloniae, op. cit., t. 6, nr 518.
55 AAV, Reg. Vat., vol. 427, fo 147 ro-148 ro ; AAV, Reg. Suppl., vol. 469, fo 73 vo-74 ro ; Bullarium Poloniae, op. cit., t. 6, nr 738.
56 AAV, Reg. Vat., 386, fo 25 ro-25 vo ; AAV, Reg. Suppl., vol. 421, fo 265 ro-266 vo ; Bullarium Poloniae, op. cit., t. 6, nr 110 ; AAV, Reg. Vat., vol. 397, fo 379 bv-380 ro ; AAV, Reg. Suppl., vol. 453, fo 188 ro ; Bullarium Poloniae, op. cit., t. 6, nr 564, 567 ; AAV, Reg. Lat., vol. 486, fo 268 ro-268 vo ; AAV, Reg. Suppl., vol. 469, fo 122 vo-123 ro ; Bullarium Poloniae, op. cit., t. 6, nr 745, 751 ; AAV, Reg. Vat., 385, fo 154 ro-154 vo ; Bullarium Poloniae, op. cit., t. 6, nr 112 ; AAV, Reg. Suppl., 446, fo 174 ro-174 vo ; Bullarium Poloniae, op. cit., t. 6, nr 428.
57 For the private graces managed by royal envoys see Zapała Adam, Kontakty Polaków i Litwinów ze Stolicą Apostolską za pontyfikatu papieża Mikołaja V (1447-1455), op. cit., p. 263-269.
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