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L'affaire Dreyfus et l'opinion publique

 | 
Michel Denis
, 
Michel Lagrée
, 
Jean-Yves Veillard

Première partie. L'opinion en France

The Policy of Pardoning : Dreyfus and the World's Fair in 1900

Michael Burns

Texte intégral

  • 1 For Reinach’s text and Vidal-Naquet’s analysis, see P. Vidal-Naquet, Les juifs, la mémoire et le p (...)

1Two distinguished historians, separated by a century, have given us the most thorough accounts of the ten critical days between Alfred Dreyfus's conviction at Rennes and the presidential pardon that aimed to close the wounds of the Affair. While Joseph Reinach’s seven volume history remains the foundation text of the Dreyfus epoch, it is only a fraction of the vast archivai legacy left by that principal actor in the history he chronicled. Another Reinach text, composed à chaud between September 10 and 13, 1899, describes the internai Dreyfusard debates over the pardon. Less celebrated than Zola’s public manifesto of the previous year, Reinach's private memoir is no less passionate or revealing. And Pierre Vidal-Naquet has given it a title (“Vers la Grâce de Dreyfus”) and probed its contents. Examining the bitter personal and ideological battles that followed the Rennes verdict, Vidal-Naquet builds on Reinach's account to tell the story of a crusade in crisis, of one Dreyfusard camp fighting for the prisoner's life while another camp, willing to jeopardize that life, fights for an idea. And he tells the story of a govemment navigating the Scylla of the army's honor and the Charybdis of public opinion to reach a pardon that was “au plus haut degré politique1

  • 2 E. Zola, L’Affaire Dreyfus : La Vérité en marche, Paris, 1969, pp. 157-166.
  • 3 Reinach, “Vers la Grâce”, in Vidal-Naquet, Les juifs, la mémoire.

2Reinach and Vidal-Naquet focus largely on the domestic drama, on the intense negotiations involving Prime Minister René Waldeck-Rousseau, Minister of War Gaston Galliffet, Minister of Commerce Eugène Alexandre Millerand, the prisoner's principal spokesmen (Reinach and Mathieu Dreyfus), and, in the end, Président Emile Loubet. But simultaneously in the middle days of September external pressures influenced the government's actions. The stage of the Affair's “fourth act” (as Emile Zola called Rennes)2 was populated by more than one deus ex machina. Many factors led to the grâce and général amnesty that followed, and it would be reductionist to insist, as Hannah Arendt did a génération ago, that “French public opinion had been turned around” by international protest, and specifically by “fear of a projected boycott” of the 1900 Paris Exposition. Still, foreign reactions helped push the Affair toward its final phase, and Reinach alludes to those reactions in passing. Referring to “l’horreur du verdict de Rennes... devant l'Etranger”, he describes how “la presse du monde entier couvre la France d'injures et de sarcasmes,” and he quotes the question posed by Millerand (whose portfolio included the World's Fair) to his Dreyfusard friends : “Et l'Exposition ? Est-ce que l'Exposition n'est pas en danger ? Est-ce qu’il ne se forme pas un véritable complot de l'étranger pour ne pas venir à l'Exposition, pour mettre Paris, la France, en quarantaine ? “The question was “inattendu”, says Reinach, and 8 très juste3

  • 4 Archives Nationales (hereafter cited as AN) BB/19 103, French consul général reports, New York, Fe (...)

3The question had been building since that pivotai moment in 1898 when the case became an affaire. Prior to the Esterhazy and Zola trials, most foreigners, like the majority of the French population, accepted “la chose jugée” ; they assumed that the army had exposed a traitor and that Dreyfus had deserved his fate. But after January 1898, French ambassadors, chargés d'affaires and various other commentators based in London, Berlin, Rome, Amsterdam, Brussels and elsewhere informed their superiors of the broad belief in Dreyfus's innocence and of the growing wave of anti-French sentiment. In late February, the consul general in New York reported that “la presse entière et même les organes les plus modérés ont saisie occasion de la condamnation prononcée contre Zola pour attaquer le gouvernement et la France avec une extrême violence et une mauvaise foi insigne. ” Another officiai, in Holland, described camelots hawking translations of “J'Accuse” and shouting “L'Affaire Dreyfus, le plus grand scandale du siècle !” ; and he added that Dutch Protestants compared the France of the Affair to the days of “St. Barthélémy et des dragonnades.” One French army officer, summarizing the comments of a highly placed Russian officiai, reported that large numbers of educated Russians were “outrés contre la France.... La France est jugée, et très sévèrement jugée par tout l'étranger”. In Berne, a Swiss diplomat confirmed that “tout le monde [...] connaît la vérité. Les Français semblent être les seuls à ne pas la savoir”. And yet another report announced that “partout à l'étranger on se demande si le monde est fou en France4.”

  • 5 E. Feldmann, The Dreyfus Affair and the American Conscience, 1895-1906, Détroit, 1981, pp. 132- 33 (...)

4Foreign reactions were never uniform. Indifférence and ignorance could be found abroad, as in France, and so too could ferocious antidreyfusard sentiments. Segments of the Catholic population in the United States vilified Zola's fictional and political “pornography”, while in Canada many Québécois listened to the sermons of antisemitic curés and believed what they read in antidreyfusard newspapers like L'Action nationale. In addition, foreigners, again like many French citizens, often grafted the Affair's broad outlines to specific local concerns : Jews in London's East End and anarchists demonstrating in Hyde Park were clearly mobilized by more than Dreyfus's fate ; and British reactions in general, officiai and unofficial, were shaped by centuries of anti-French hostility (intensified by Fashoda). But after 1898 even the most cynical French observers based abroad could not deny the intensity of foreign reactions to the Affair5.

  • 6 AN BB 19/103, French ambassador, Rome, Feb. 26, 1898.
  • 7 AN BB 19/103, French ambassador, Berlin, July 10, 1898 ; report on Austria, Jan. 20, 1898 ; report (...)

5They could, however, simplify the causes, misread the significance, and take every occasion, as the French ambassador in Rome put it, “d'indiquer qu'il s'agit d'une affaire intérieure qui ne regarde que nous6”. The evidence suggests that many diplomats and police informants made little effort at sophisticated analysis. Instead, they prejudged international reactions and traced them to a single source ; it was, they reported, the work of the Jews. In the summer of 1898, the French ambassador in Berlin, with constant allusions to the Jewish-dominated press, noted how hard it was to counter the influence of “sémites” on the question of the Affair. Reports from Austria described the national press (“presque entièrement aux mains des juifs”) encouraging support of Dreyfus and attacks on the French army ; and another officiai defined Belgium as “l'un des théâtres d'opérations les plus actifs du syndicat israélite”. In London, French police agents were not alone in their obsession with the Jews ; according to the ambassador “la presse de ce pays qui obéit à des inspirations israélites très prononcées a fortement agi sur l'opinion dont elle a su flatter les préjugés favoris”. And also from the French embassy in London came rumors of vast Jewish funds behind the pro-Dreyfus movement and warnings about Jewish insidiousness. In one particularly byzantine account, an embassy officiai made a point of noting that the Parisian correspondant of the Daily Telegraph was married to the sister of the paper's owner, and that the owner (and one présumés the sister) was a Jew. That same official's dull mind and sharp bigotry prompted him to announce from his base in the heart of Anglican England that “tous les journaux qui ne sont pas dans les mains des juifs sont dans les mains des protestants”. Only the Freemasons slipped his net.7

  • 8 Archives de la préfecture de police, Paris (hereafter cited as APP) BA/1047, police reports, Sept. (...)
  • 9 Letter from A. Lundberg, Association des aveugles de la Suède, to Alfred Dreyfus in Dreyfus family (...)
  • 10 APP BA/1047, police reports from London, Sept. 1899 ; and AN F/7 12 465, telegrams, Sept. 12 and 2 (...)

6The mental torpor captured in these examples, the inability on the part of some officiais to grasp the complexity of foreign reactions, would also mark assessments of protests surrounding Rennes (“C'est un concert unanime contre la France”, wrote a French police agent based in London, led by a press which is “entre les mains des juifs”8). But the “Jewish question” could not explain ail the protests that came from every corner and every class within hours of the Rennes verdict. Le Siècle had it right ; “Dans le monde civilisé tout entier”, the paper announced, “va éclater une explosion de colère et de mépris”. Thousands of telegrams, letters, petitions, manifestos, newspaper éditorials and even poems from around the world confirmed the breadth and depth of support for Dreyfus and anger at the French army and government. Members of the Swedish Association of the Blind (who, like the prisoner, had lost the light and live “en chaînes”) sent words of consolation to Dreyfus and his family, while an American citizen in Cranbury, New Jersey sent a warning to the Paris “chief of police” that “it will be unsafe for Frenchmen to travel in this United States of America”. A more celebrated American, William James, felt “deeply saddened by the behavior of the French” during the Rennes debacle, and in a brief but devastating salvo gave thanks that he, at least, “lived in a Republic9”. Two newspapers in Brussels carried the Rennes story “encadré de noir”, and another obituary, from Austria, echoed Zola's words of September 12 (“notre Sedan moral est perdu”) ; “No army in the world can remain healthy and vigorous under these conditions”, a Vienna newspaper announced. “The French Army has suffered an interior Sedan, the repercussions of which will be more profound and lasting than those of September 1, 1870”. In London, Jews rallied to the prisoner, as did the Queen, in her own way, nearby. Informed by her Lord Chief Justice (who attended the Rennes trial) that the Dreyfus case “no longer concems a question of justice Queen Victoria, through her ambassador, announced her “profound sorrow upon hearing news” of the verdict, and called the reconviction a “defiance of good sense”. Less diplomatie than their monarch, sixty five Englishmen, along with five Germans, signed a telegram to Président Loubet, and to avoid misundertanding they wrote the message in French : “Monsieur, vous êtes chef”, they announced on September 12,” d'un sale peuple10”.

  • 11 Le Temps, Sept. 11, 1899 ; APP Ba 1047, police report, London, Sept. 15, 1899 ; AN F/7 12465, poli (...)

7Most important, actions accompanied words, and in the context of the presidential pardon, the timing was crucial. Peaking in numbers and intensity at the précisé moment that Dreyfusards pressed for an immediate grâce (the moment that Reinach composed his text à chaud), external protests reinforced the internai campaign. Through the week following September 9, while Dreyfusard leaders met in newspaper rooms and ministerial offices, and while Waldeck-Rousseau's government pondered the wisdom of Dreyfus's release, a wave of démonstrations took place in Rome, Milan, Budapest, Antwerp, Brussels, London, Chicago, New York and other cities and town. Crowds shouted slogans and carried banners praising the prisoner and vilifying the French army (“Long live Dreyfus ! Down with Mercier !” went shouts in Budapest and London). Mounted police confronted protestors who threatened French embassies and consulats across Europe ; and those French citizens abroad who dared to demonstrate against Dreyfus (“A bas les juifs !” shouted a group of French workers and merchants in London) clashed with larger crowds of local Dreyfus supporters. Demonstrators in Chicago burned the tricolor, and in Jersey, off the English coast, French visitors were insulted in public with the récurrent epithet “sales Français”. Two thousand people marched through the streets of Naples, fewer in Budapest, and many more in London, where estimâtes of the Hyde Park protest varied from 30 000 to 50 000.11

  • 12 On early foreign agitation for a pardon, see, for example, the report from Rome in Le Temps, Sept. (...)

8The idea of an immediate grâce was not confined to France. As early as September 10 in Rome and only a day or two later in London, public meetings called for the release of Dreyfus by way of a presidential pardon. And from the start of the démonstrations throughout much of Europe and America the trade off was clear ; if Dreyfus remained in prison, the international community would refuse participation in the Universal Exposition due to open in Paris the following spring. The threats came from private citizens and ad hoc organizations, not from individual governments, but private exhibitors and visitors were the life-blood of the grand World Fairs of the modem âge. And French officiais knew it well12.

  • 13 M. Corday, “La Genèse de l’Exposition Revue de Paris, July 15, 1899 ; E. Weber, France, Fin de Siè (...)

9With the massive project already seven years in the making, the political and financial stakes were high. As Prime Minister in 1892, Emile Loubet, along with other public officiais and private entrepreneurs, had broached the idea of an exposition that would be far grander than the enormously successful event of 1889. Commerce, éducation, and the cause of international understanding would share the list of high priorities, as they had always clone, with national rivalries. In fact, French organizers had rushed to announce their project in order to “steal a march” on the German emperor, who had been planning an exposition for Berlin. They succeeded, and by 1895 dozens of greater and lesser nations had formally accepted France's invitation. Officiais aimed to attract at least 60 million visitors to Paris (21 million more than 1889). And after more than a decade of parliamentary scandais, anarchist attacks, and working class agitation, they aimed to celebrate French prosperity in a peaceful setting13.

  • 14 AN BB/19 103, consul general, Hamburg, March 10, 1898.
  • 15 Mandell, Paris 1900, p. 89.

10The Dreyfus Affair and the World's Fair had intersected many months before Rennes. In March 1898, on the heels of the Zola trial, the French consul général in Hamburg sent the Minister of the Interior a summary of German newspaper reports on European reactions : “déjà en Hollande et en Suisse on parlait de refuser toute participation à l'exposition de 1900” and he announced that the same question 7 commençait à s'agiter dans les cercles industriels allemands.” Waving a new red rag at the Gallic bull, another German newspaper “conseillait [...] aux Allemands de s'abstenir de visiter dans deux ans la grande exposition française parce qu'ils ne seraient pas en sûrété dans un pays où tous les droits sont violés, où seule la populace antisémite et chauvine fait la loi, menaçant de jeter à la Seine quiconque ne partage pas ses passions14”. Such threats, isolated in 1898, multiplied in September 1899, along with the use of the word “boycottage”, which, historian Richard Mandell tells us, seems to have entered the French vocabulary during the Affair's late phase.15.

  • 16 Le Temps, Sept. 14, 1899.
  • 17 APP Ba 1047 and AN F/7 12465, police reports, Sept. 11-22, 1899. For an excellent account of inter (...)

11But whatever term was applied —. interdit, quarantaine, abstentionnisme, or boycottage— the warning mattered most. On September 14, Le Temps summarized the crisis and then trivialized the threat : “La France a une mauvaise presse”, the paper announced. “Aux quatre coins du monde, d'honnêtes vengeurs de la justice outragée s'occupent à chevalier les moyens de nous faire sentir leur réprobation. [Les] don Quichotte du porc salé se proposent de ne pas venir à l'Exposition16”. Other sources took the warnings seriously and reported, for example, that the British press predicted “the failure” of the Paris Exposition. According to one French police agent, “les financiers Viennois qui avaient formé le projet de fonder [...] un journal allemand pour l'Exposition, l'ont abandonné” Merchants in St. Louis and San Francisco called for a boycott, while citizens groups throughout the United States appealed to Congress for an officiai withdrawl from the Exposition. And more immediately, in Paris, the director of Galeries Lamartine lamented that “commissionnaires étrangers ont reçu l'ordre de leurs masions de n'acheter pour le moment aucun article de modes en France”. In addition, nearly every public démonstration beyond French borders included calls for a World's Fair boycott.17.

  • 18 See Burns, Histoire d’une famille française, p. 267 ; and letter from Salomon Reinach to Carlos Bl (...)
  • 19 Le Temps, Sept. 13, 1899. Pierre Sorlin discusses Waldeck-Rousseau’s abrupt “volte-face” in the da (...)

12Given the conjuncture of internai events and external threats, WaldeckRousseau's government quickly realized that a pardon would serve many purposes : it would eliminate the very real possibility of the prisoner's death while in custody (suffering malarial fever, dysentary, malnutrition and constant nausea, he would deteriorate, physicians warned, “without hope of recovery18”) the pardon would also serve to liberate Dreyfus without exonerating him (and thereby pacify many factions in France) ; and it would salvage the 1900 Exposition by calming international protest. While the government continued to deliberate, increasing numbers of French observers agreed that the crisis was taking its toll on France “devant le monde”. ccording to Le Temps, “le pays ne le supporterait point [...] Quelle force pour nous, et quelle surprise pour nos rivaux qui nous croient voués aux mortels déchirements, si les étrangers retrouvaient, dans quelques mois, les Français dépourvus de prétextes à récrimination et de sujets de rancunes, souriants, apaisés, réconciliés ! 19”.

  • 20 Mandell suggests that just the promise of a pardon was the key : “Many foreign officiais, as soon (...)

13Borne between the Exposition he had helped conceive and the army he continued to fear, Emile Loubet hesitated. But with domestic pressures and foreign démonstrations continuing to exert pressure, he finally signed the pardon on September 19, 1899, three weeks short of the fifth anniversary of Captain Dreyfus's arrest20.

  • 21 Burns, Histoire d’une famille française, p. 320.

14Dreyfus left Rennes the way he arrived, in the middle of the night and surrounded by guards. Hoping to avoid renewed démonstrations in France, Waldeck-Rousseau had asked Mathieu Dreyfus to send his brother out of the country, to some distant locale. But Mathieu refused ; that would appear cowardly, he insisted, and given the strong sympathies for his brother outside France, it might embarrass the republic in the eyes of the world (which the Dreyfus family had struggled for five years to avoid). Instead, the Captain would recuperate at the home of his eldest sister in Carpentras, and he would begin the work for his final exonération. Five security agents and a Dreyfus nephew acted as bodyguards on the train that left Rennes within hours of the pardon. And Mathieu, who managed the departure as meticulously as he had managed the Affair, carried a revolver21.

  • 22 Zola, L’Affaire Dreyfus, p. 233.
  • 23 Lalance’s letter of Sept. 27, 1899 appears in A. Dreyfus, Souvenirs et correspondance, publié par (...)

15Emile Zola had anticipated the fifth act of the Dreyfus Affair in a letter to Alfred Bruneau. “Entre nous” he wrote five days before the pardon, “j'ai la conviction que la lutte est finie. Ce sera la grâce, puis une amnistie louche et bâtarde, les honnêtes gens et les coquins dans le même sac [...]. Je ne doute pas non plus de la réhabilitation de l'innocent à laquelle nous continuerons à travailler ; mais dans combien de mois ou d'années ?22”. The amnesty came in December 1900 and the rehabilitation six years later ; but for ail except Dreyfus and his closest allies those were minor epilogues to the major events of September 1899. Shortly after Dreyfus's release, a fellow Alsatian, Auguste Lalance, advised the captain to be patient : “Il est de votre intérêt et surtout de l'intérêt supérieur de la France que l'agitation cesse autour de votre nom, qu'il y ait une trêve d'un an pendant laquelle on ferait le silence. Il faut laisser passer l'Exposition avant de pouvoir entamer utilement la campagne de réhabilitation.” Though Dreyfus had been forced to remain silent for over four years on Devil's Island, and though he longed to engage the battle to clear his family name, he had no choice but to wait ; he needed time to build his physical strength and légal argument, and while he publicly condemned the amnesty, he privately honored, as an obediant French officer, the “World's Fair truce23”.

  • 24 Weber, France, Fin de Siècle, p. 110.

16Much has been written about the Dreyfus Affair as a “dress rehearsal” for our times, about the legacies it left to modem antisemitic movements on the one hand, and to defenders of the parliamentary republic on the other. But in the context of démonstrations surrounding Rennes and the Universal Exposition, the Affair's global dimension suggests another dress rehearsal. Though previous World's Fairs had political agendas and served as “recovery rites” after national traumas (1878 following the seize mai crisis and 1889 in the wake of Boulanger's rapid rise and fall24) none had confronted the threat of an international boycott which linked the questions of commerce and human rights. On that score, events on the eve of the 1900 Exposition were more typical of the century to come than of the century just passed.

  • 25 R.A. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, Cambridge, England, 1986, pp. 129-30

17Political scientist R. A. Vincent has recently noted the “inescapable tension between human rights and foreign policy (...) It is not now enough for a state to be (...) recognized as sovereign. It must also act domestically in such a way as not to offend against the basic rights of individuals and groups within its territory25”. Vincent's comments, coming in the aftermath of the United Nations Déclaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki accords, describe a very différent world than that of the Dreyfus epoch, when great powers refrained from meddling in each other's domestic affairs, and when small nations, like small children, were expected to remain silent. But if sovereign states never called for an officiai boycott of the Paris Exposition (indeed, many foreign governments rejected the idea), thousands of private citizens and scores of organizations anticipated a central feature of international relations in the twentieth century when they made the connection between Dreyfus's civil liberties and the économies of the World's Fair. Insisting that France be punished for an offense against the basic rights of an individual, and noting the currency of prestige that France had invested in the 1900 Exposition, foreign protesters believed that commerical sanctions fit the crime.

  • 26 H. Harendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, New York, 1973, p. 91.
  • 27 The London Times, Sept. 11, 1899, quoted in E. Sanderson, Historié Parallels to l’Affaire Dreyfus, (...)

18And they leveled their threats with such intensity because the offense against Dreyfus had been committed in a country that exemplified, for much of the world, the ideals of justice and tolerance. As Hannah Arendt noted, “the wrong done to a single Jewish officer in France was able to draw from the rest of the world a more vehement and united reaction than ail the persécutions of German Jews a génération later26. In the domain of human rights, France was held to higher standards than other nations, and when those standards seemed to collapse, as they did in the months between Zola’s first trial and Dreyfus's second court martial, the charges of hypocrisy followed. In September 1899, an English journalist described the “great country” of France, “which claims to march at the head of civilization... flagrantly [trampling) Justice, honor and truth under foot !” Even the American Henry Adams, who had no sympathy for Dreyfus, acknowledged that the Affair threatened the “moral collapse” of an enlightened nation, of France's capacity “to maintain a character of any sort in a world like Europe27

19Paris was not only “the capital of the nineteenth century” in the realm of World's Fairs and material culture (as Walter Benjamin described it). It was also the capital of cosmopolitanism at a time when that notion of freedom from provincialism and particularism commanded more respect than suspicion. And as the center of enlightenment and revolutionary traditions of equal justice, it was also the cradle of Jewish émancipation and the Rights of Man. That is why Theodor Herzl, upon witnessing Dreyfus's dégradation, reacted with such shock when Parisian crowds shouted “Mort aux juifs” ; and that is it why, after the Rennes debacle, high officiais and ordinary citizens from around the world attacked the French government with such ferocity. Echoing the Dreyfusards' domestic campaign, the international community called on France, not for the last time, to honor its own history, and to be worthy of itself.

Notes

1 For Reinach’s text and Vidal-Naquet’s analysis, see P. Vidal-Naquet, Les juifs, la mémoire et le présent II, Paris, 1991, pp. 129-158. See also, Vidal-Naquet’s préfacé to A. Dreyfus, Cinq années de ma vie, Paris, 1994, pp. 5-45. Other accounts of the September 1899 debate appear in M. Dreyfus, L’Affaire telle que je l’ai vécue, Paris, 1978, pp. 237-250, P.V. Stock, Mémorandum d’un éditeur. l’Affaire Dreyfus anecdotique, Paris, 1938, pp. 156-158 ;J.-D. Bredin, L’Affaire, Paris, 1983, pp. 395- 402 ; and M. Burns, Histoire d’une famille française : Les Dreyfus, Paris, 1994, pp. 312-20. See also, P. Sorlin, Waldeck-Rousseau, Paris, 1966, pp. 405-22.

2 E. Zola, L’Affaire Dreyfus : La Vérité en marche, Paris, 1969, pp. 157-166.

3 Reinach, “Vers la Grâce”, in Vidal-Naquet, Les juifs, la mémoire.

4 Archives Nationales (hereafter cited as AN) BB/19 103, French consul général reports, New York, Feb. 25, 1898, and Amsterdam, Feb. 7, 1898. AN BB/19 96, General Jamont letter, May 4, 1898 ; and Bibliothèque Nationale (hereafter cited as BN) NAF 17386, Albert Sandoz letter, Jan. 12, 1898. The Berne diplomat is quoted in J. Testts, La Trahison : Esterbazy et Schwartzkoppen, Paris, 1898, pp. 6-7.

5 E. Feldmann, The Dreyfus Affair and the American Conscience, 1895-1906, Détroit, 1981, pp. 132- 33 and passim ; and I. Abella, A Coat of Many Colors : Two Centuries of jewish Life in Canada. On the ways in which the Affair was either ignored or grafted to local issues in the French countryside, see M. Burns, Rural Society and French Politics : Boulangism and the Dreyfus Affair, 1886-1900, Princeton, 1984.

6 AN BB 19/103, French ambassador, Rome, Feb. 26, 1898.

7 AN BB 19/103, French ambassador, Berlin, July 10, 1898 ; report on Austria, Jan. 20, 1898 ; report from Belguim, Feb. 27, 1898 ; French ambassador, London, Feb. 26, 1898 ; and embassy report from London, Jan. 20, 1898.

8 Archives de la préfecture de police, Paris (hereafter cited as APP) BA/1047, police reports, Sept. 11-15, 1899.

9 Letter from A. Lundberg, Association des aveugles de la Suède, to Alfred Dreyfus in Dreyfus family private collection ; and APP BA/1047, Wilfred Graver to Paris police, Sept. 1899. William James is quoted in D. Lewis, W.E.B Du Buis, New York, 1993, p. 247.

10 APP BA/1047, police reports from London, Sept. 1899 ; and AN F/7 12 465, telegrams, Sept. 12 and 28, 1899. For Zola’s comment, see L’Aurore, Sept. 12, 1899. The Vienna newspaper is quoted in La Quinzaine littéraire, April 18, 1984. For Alfred Dreyfus’s comments on the British Lord Chief Justice at Rennes, see BN NAF 14308.

11 Le Temps, Sept. 11, 1899 ; APP Ba 1047, police report, London, Sept. 15, 1899 ; AN F/7 12465, police reports, England, Sept. 11-18, 1899 ; and Bredin, L’Affaire, p. 396. For more on British reactions, see M. Cornick, “La réception de l’Affaire en Grande-Bretagne”, in M. Drouin, L’Affaire de A à Z, Paris, 1994, pp. 575-80, and N. Wilson’s article in this volume.

12 On early foreign agitation for a pardon, see, for example, the report from Rome in Le Temps, Sept. 11, 1899. Nearly every démonstration cited in note 11 above made some référencé to the 1900 Paris Exposition. R. Mandell charts die history of World’s Fairs in Paris 1900 : The Great World’s Fair, Toronto, 1967.

13 M. Corday, “La Genèse de l’Exposition Revue de Paris, July 15, 1899 ; E. Weber, France, Fin de Siècle, Cambridge, Mass., 1986, pp. 242-43 ; and Mandell, Paris 1900, pp. 30-39.

14 AN BB/19 103, consul general, Hamburg, March 10, 1898.

15 Mandell, Paris 1900, p. 89.

16 Le Temps, Sept. 14, 1899.

17 APP Ba 1047 and AN F/7 12465, police reports, Sept. 11-22, 1899. For an excellent account of international reactions, see Mandell, Paris 1900, pp. 94-103. And for more on American responses, see W. Silverman’s contribution to this volume.

18 See Burns, Histoire d’une famille française, p. 267 ; and letter from Salomon Reinach to Carlos Blacker, Sept. [12 ?), 1899 (private collection).

19 Le Temps, Sept. 13, 1899. Pierre Sorlin discusses Waldeck-Rousseau’s abrupt “volte-face” in the days immediately following the Rennes verdict ; after rejecting the idea of a pardon, he suddenly agreed with Galliffet (Sorijn, Waldeck-Rousseau, p. 414). Again, there were many reasons for that shift, and foreign protests, which did not subside until after mid-September, must have been among them.

20 Mandell suggests that just the promise of a pardon was the key : “Many foreign officiais, as soon as they heard that a pardon was in the air, assured Millerand, French diplomatie officers, and the commissioner général of the exposition that they intended to participate in 1900” (Paris 1900, p. 100). Evidence from Chambers of Commerce in the United States and their équivalents in Europe confirm this (see, for example, the news summaries in Le Temps, Sept. 14-16, 1899).

21 Burns, Histoire d’une famille française, p. 320.

22 Zola, L’Affaire Dreyfus, p. 233.

23 Lalance’s letter of Sept. 27, 1899 appears in A. Dreyfus, Souvenirs et correspondance, publié par son fils, Paris, 1936, p. 257. On Dreyfus after Rennes, see Burns, Histoire d’une famille française, pp. 321ff. Near the end of die Affair, Dreyfus disagreed with Clemenceau on many points, including the Tiger’s remark about the Exposition : " C’est la République qui s’amuse de mourir " (quoted in Bredin, L’Affaire, p. 408).

24 Weber, France, Fin de Siècle, p. 110.

25 R.A. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, Cambridge, England, 1986, pp. 129-30

26 H. Harendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, New York, 1973, p. 91.

27 The London Times, Sept. 11, 1899, quoted in E. Sanderson, Historié Parallels to l’Affaire Dreyfus, London, 1900, p. xv. On Henry Adams, see J. C. Levenson, et al, eds., The Letters of Henry Adams, v. 5, Cambridge, Mass., 1988, pp. 14-15.

Auteur

Mount Holyoke College, Massachusetts

© Presses universitaires de Rennes, 1995

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