1The term princeps appears, in various forms, over two hundred times in the Concordance of Discordant Canons or Decretum compiled by the twelfth-century Bolognese monk Gratian.1 The texts in which it is found differ widely in date and origin, and the precise sources are not always easy to establish. About fifty are in passages written by Gratian himself, both the dicta and titles, which frequently (but not always) repeat the words used in the text. About ten derive, directly or indirectly, from the Bible and six from Roman law. About a dozen date from the eighth or ninth centuries, and ten, including two by Gregory VII and five by Urban II, were, from Gratian’s point of view, recent. The great majority come from works of the church fathers, especially Jerome, Augustine, and Isidore of Seville, and of the early popes, including Gelasius and Gregory the Great, and from the decrees of the early councils. They therefore reflect in many respects the concept of the princeps in Late Antiquity, which Gratian summed up and passed on to the later Middle Ages.

2It would be impossible in the scope of a brief paper to study, or even list, all these texts, or to place each of them in its historical context. Many of them deal with special circumstances and disagree with others, hence the “discordant canons” in the title. As a rule the sources cited by Gratian are accepted here. Other papers presented at this conference may study some of the same sources from a different point of view and show how princeps and parallel terms were used in specific periods and regions and how they were related to other social categories, such as the principales and potentes who appear in sources from the fourth and fifth centuries2—a period when many of the texts in the Decretum were written. Here I shall be concerned only with texts used by Gratian, and in the form he used them, not with their accuracy or authenticity. If a text was attributed to a particular church father, pope, or council it carried for Gratian, and for most of his readers, the prestige and authority of its source, whether or not it was authentic. In spite of their differences, there is sufficient agreement between them to show how Gratian understood the term princeps.

3Before coming to the main part of my paper, however, I should remind you that the Decretum is a huge collection of miscellaneous decrees and rulings, called canons, of which the first part consists of a hundred and one Distinctions, many divided into parts, dealing with particular issues of church law and practice and containing a number of canons bearing on that issue. The second part contains thirty-six Causae or cases in which Gratian presented specific legal cases, which gave rise to a number of questions on which, as in the Distinctions, Gratian gathered the relevant canons, interspersed with his own comments.3 There is no single section on principes, and references to them tend to be found in texts dealing with particular issues. They are referred by here by the number of the Distinction and the part and canon within it for part I of the Decretum and by the number of the Case, question, and canon for part II. The precise references are of importance only to specialists, however, and the interesting point is how Gratian used and grouped texts referring to principes around different topics.

4One of the most important uses, which together account for over a tenth of his total uses of princeps, was to describe the apostles, especially saint Peter, and the pope. I shall not study these passages in detail, except to emphasize that in them, as in other references to princeps, the term is sometimes ambiguous. Peter was the princeps of the apostles and the first pope in a temporal sense and also princeps of the pastors and priests in a hierarchical sense.4 Jerome cited Peter’s description of Christ Himself as the prince of pastors.5 Pope Gelasius called himself princeps cunctis sacerdotibus totius mundi and asserted the superiority of the pope over all churches. Gregory the Great referred to “the authority of the blessed Peter, the princeps of the apostles, in whose place we preside over the Roman church” (where princeps may mean first or greatest), and pope Lucius said that in the beginning the Roman church “received the norm of the Christian faith from its authors the princes of the apostles of Christ,” which apparently refers to all the apostles.6

5The precise meaning of princeps in other texts also varied. It could mean first in time, founder, or principal, in a bad as well as a good sense, as in Augustine’s references to the prince of all vices and the prince of this world.7 It primarily meant a ruler or person in authority, either in the church or in both secular society and the church, since in some passages “prince” is the equivalent of high priest or bishop. It implied a primacy in administration, especially of justice, and in legislation rather than in military affairs. Princeps was not used in the Decretum for a military commander, though wars were authorized by princes. Princes might be generals, but generals were not normally princes. Among the first ten texts cited by Gratian was one on the ius militare which distinguished “the portion of the prince” from that of participants.8 Popes, emperors, and kings were principes, and many magnates of lower rank were also princes. Pope Symmachus spoke of the taking of church revenues “by the princes and the first men (primi) of regions” and of church property held “at the order and by the generosity of princes and certain powerful men (potentes).”9 Gregory VII called priests the fathers and masters of kings and princes, whose diadems he distinguished from the splendor of kings; the lateran council of 1139 granted kings and princes the permission to exercise justice; and Gratian himself spoke of emperors and princes.10 These three examples date from the eleventh and twelfth centuries, when it was apparently customary to distinguish emperors and kings from lower rank of princes.

6There was disagreement, however, over the use of the term princeps for clerics and the ranking of ecclesiastical princes. The third council of Carthage decreed that the bishop of a primatial see should not be called princeps sacerdotum or highest priest but only the bishop of the first see, whereas Isidore of Seville said that a patriarch was the patrum princeps, an archbishop the princeps episcoporum, and a bishop the princeps sacerdotum.11 Urban II called bishops the principes super omnem terram.12 Even the founders and heads of heretical sects were called principes, probably meaning founders in a temporal sense.13

7In addition to the miscellaneous references to principes in the Decretum, which I shall study later, there are six groups in various places, dealing respectively with the nature of law, ecclesiastical elections, ordinations and other church business, princes of the church, jurisdiction over the clergy, and the use of force, in all of which princes were involved, though they do not reflect a conscious decision on the part of Gratian to examine the concept of princeps. The first group, dealing with the nature of law, is in Distinctions 9 and 10 (parts 1 and 2), where the term principes occurs ten times. Distinction 9 is concerned with the superiority of natural to man-made law. It begins with two canons entitled respectively that “The laws of princes should not prevail over natural law” and that “Princes are bound and live by their own laws.” Canon 2 begins “It is just that a prince should obey his laws.” Not to do so would damage his authority.14

8Distinction 10 deals with the relation of ecclesiastical and secular laws. Part 1 is entitled “The constitutions of princes do not transcend but give way to ecclesiastical constitutions,” where prince is clearly used in a secular sense.15 Part 2 is similarly introduced by the statement that “The constitutions of princes should be put after ecclesiastical laws. They should be held worthy of all reverence, however, provided they do not oppose evangelical and canonical decrees16.” Two canons attributed to pope Gelasius I are entitled respectively “It is wrong to scorn the laws of princes and the rules of the fathers” and “The laws of the Roman princes should be preserved by everyone.” These titles derive from the texts, which show, respectively, a parallel between the laws of princes, rules of the fathers, and paternal admonitions, and “that the laws of the Roman princes” should be preserved.17

9The second group, in Distinction 63, parts 1-4, is concerned with ecclesiastical elections and includes twenty references to princes. Part 1 is entitled “Laymen should in no way be involved in an election” and begins with a decree of the eighth ecumenical council that “No lay prince or potens should be involved in the election or promotion of a patriarch, metropolitan, or any bishop” and forbidding “any secular prince, potens, or layman of another dignity” to oppose an ecclesiastical election. This is followed by a similar decree forbidding a lay prince or potens to interfere in the election or promotion of a patriarch, metropolitan, or bishop.18 Both these canons, however, left the way open for lay intervention if an election was disorderly or contentious. A canon derived from the second council of Nicaea declared in both the title and the text that an election of a bishop or priest made by princes was null,19 but this absolute prohibition was modified later in the Distinction. Canon 9 came from a decree of Gregory the Great expressing his satisfaction that “the consent and wish of the most serene prince” (in this case the emperor) agreed with the choice of the churchmen. It was entitled that “The wish of the prince is desirable in the ordination of a bishop.”20 Among the following canons are several referring to the participation of princes in ecclesiastical elections, including one from the twelfth council of Toledo entitled “The assent of the prince is desirable in the election of bishops.”21 Gratian in his conclusion said that these authorities showed that “laymen should not be excluded from the ordination of churches,” which may refer to the consecration of churches or to the ordination of churchmen.22 In the introduction to Part 3 Gratian referred to princes three times, saying that princes and emperors should be consulted in the elections of popes and bishops in order to exclude schismatics and heretics and that “These princes as most devout sons should consent to him whom they see elected as their father.”23 In Part 4 he included an account of how pope Adrian II was elected without consulting, as was customary, the legates of the prince, who was called the emperor in the title.24 In this Distinction, therefore, Gratian established a clear though limited role for the prince in the election of bishops, including the pope.

10The seventeen references to principes in Distinctions 96-7 constitute the third group, where Gratian dealt with the role of princes in ecclesiastical orders and affairs, over which, he said in the introduction, they had no authority.25 According to Gregory VII, as cited above, priests were the fathers and masters of kings and princes and the splendor of kings and diadems of princes were inferior to the honor and sublimity of bishops, to whom kings and princes submit and whose hands they kiss.26 Pope Gelasius said that Christian princes were accustomed to obey the decrees of the church and not to put their own power first, and pope Marcellus that “The responsibility of a good and religious prince is to restore worn-out and torn-down churches and to build new ones and to honor and protect the priests of God,” not to persecute them.27 Distinction 97 returned to the question of elections and showed, Gratian said, that no emperor or layman should decide the election of a bishop or other ecclesiastical affairs. It began with a letter to the emperor Honorius from pope Boniface calling the emperor “the most Christian prince” and the “Christian prince” and referring to the period “under those princes.”28

11Moving to Part II of the Decretum, the Cases, a fourth, smaller, group of references to principes, all from the works of Jerome, is found in Case 8, question 1, and concerns ecclesiastical princes. Canon 15 said that “Although the Lord instructs concerning establishing a prince [meaning a ‘bishop,’ which is given as a variant reading] and the Lord chooses, the synagogue is nonetheless summoned” and, it continues, the people should be present in ordaining a priest.29 Canon 16 concerns the rules of Moses for choosing “a prince of the people,” meaning a priest. After describing the ordination of a prince Jerome said that “The governance (gubernatio) of the people is granted to him who God selects, that is, to such a man as has […] the spirit of God in himself and the precepts of God in his sight.”30 In canon 17, however, in which there are four references to principes (including the title), Jerome said that:

“The prince of the people and judge of the church is not always given by the judgment of God but as our merits require. If our actions are evil and we perform evil deeds in the sight of God, princes are given to us according to our heart. For hear what the Lord says: ‘They have reigned, but not by me; they have been princes, and I know not.’”31

12This canon clearly shows, in the title as well as the text, that not all princes rule with the approval of God.

13A fifth, less concentrated, group of seven references to principes, dealing with the jurisdiction of secular princes over ecclesiastics, is in the first question of Case II, beginning with pope Gelasius’s assertion that according to the laws of the church, “which the ancient princes established by repeated confirmations,” only bishops should judge clerics.32 This was modified by the third council of Carthage, which requested the right to proceed against the rector of the province “in accordance with the statutes of the most glorious princes,” who apparently controlled the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and by Gregory the Great’s request that “the pseudo-bishop of Aquileia” and the bishop of Milan be taken for judgment “to the most clement prince,” which Gratian entitled “Those whom the church cannot correct should be corrected by princes.”33 Such jurisdiction must be exercised with restraint, however, and towards the end of the question Gratian included a canon from a letter of Gregory the Great, entitled, “Priests should be honored not judged by kings,” in which the pope cited the example of “prince Constantine of pious memory” and his predecessors who, though pagans, accorded the greatest honor to their priests.34

14The sixth and largest group, which includes twenty-four references to principes, is in Case 23, questions 1-5, which are concerned with the use of force by both ecclesiastical and secular princes. In an excerpt from a sermon by St Augustine entitled “The precepts of patience should serve the virtue of the spirit not the display of the body,” principes are mentioned six times, mostly in citations from the Bible, including the prohibition in Exodus 22.28, to speak ill of the gods or to curse “the prince of thy people” and Paul’s rebuke to “the prince of the priests” in Acts 23.2.35 In another canon Augustine said that “the authority and council of undertaking war should be with the princes” and later, that those who allowed the princes, in the sense of priests, to kill Christ were not free from guilt.36 Question 4 included an order from the Byzantine general Belisarius summoning the pope “to the palace of the prince” for judgment and punishment, which was an injury to the church.37 Two canons from Augustine concern the help from kings sought by the church against its enemies and the punishment of evil men by the church. They both cited Psalm 2.2, “The kings of the earth stood up, and the princes met together,” and justified the use of force by kings to protect peace and order.38 A canon from a letter by pope Innocent is entitled “A dictator [whom Gratian apparently equated with princeps] is free from guilt when the authority of the law is exercised against the guilty.”39 And in a canon entitled “The peace of the church is assisted by the severity of princes,” Augustine drew a parallel between “our intercession,” that is of the clergy, and “your severity,” that is of the princes.40

15The long and important canon 20 (still in question 4 of Case 23) is entitled “Power extorts by the terror of discipline what priests cannot accomplish by teaching.” In it Isidore of Seville said that “The princes of the world sometimes hold the heights of power obtained within the church in order that they may strengthen ecclesiastical discipline by that power” and that “Those placed within the church who act against Faith and discipline should be destroyed by the rigor of princes.” He stressed the responsibility of princes to protect the church, saying that “Whether the peace and discipline of the church are increased or dissolved by faithful princes, He who entrusts His church to their power will exact an accounting from them.”41

16Gratian went on to emphasize that rulers should punish evil men and protect the church, if necessary by force. In the introduction to part 5 he said that “It is fitting to keep faith and reverence to these princes and powers; he who does not show it cannot find rewards with God,” and in the introduction to part 6, he said, even more strongly, that “Just as we are required to show faith and reverence to priests and powers, so the need to defend churches is incumbent on the administrators of secular dignities.”42 A canon from Cyprian is headed “The princes of the world should not spare the most evil men,” and Haimo of Auxerre said that “The kings and princes of this world condemn guilty men,” such as the killers of clerics, who should be punished by secular judges rather than by bishops or the rectors of churches.43 Pope Pelagius I wrote to two secular officials, the general Narses and the patrician John, that evil-doers should be taken “under due custody to the most pious prince” and, in another canon, that “the perpetrators of crimes should be taken to the most clement prince.”44 Gratian in his conclusion said that God punished sinners both through the knowing, that is Christians, and through the unknowing, that is non-Christians, among whom he counted “the princes of the Romans.”45 It was thus the duty of princes, whether or not they were Christian, to exercise justice.

17Before turning to the scattered references to principes in the Decretum, let me summarize the light thrown on Gratian’s concept of the princeps by these six groups, which taken together show that he took a broad view of the position of prince, aside from its possible military application. Here and elsewhere in the Decretum there are almost as many references to ecclesiastical as to secular princes. At times he appears to have distinguished princes from emperors, kings, potentes, potestates, primi, and “other dignitaries,” but elsewhere he equated the various categories and defined their powers in general as well as in specific terms. The laws made by secular princes, for instance, though inferior to natural and ecclesiastical laws, were binding. Although princes should in principle not interfere in ecclesiastical affairs, they had the right, and indeed the duty, to use force to defend the church and to enforce justice and in exceptional cases to exercise jurisdiction over the clergy and to participate in ecclesiastical elections. Ecclesiastical princes, on the other hand, were under no circumstances to use force or to participate in the administration of justice. Those who did, or who behaved in other ways contrary to the laws of the church, did not find favor in the eyes of God. The authority of princes, therefore, was defined in its nature and in its exercise. In his choice of canons and in his own dicta Gratian asserted a balance between the rights, obligations, and responsibilities of princes, both secular and ecclesiastical. While asserting the limits of princely power, however, and subjecting it to the church, he clearly regarded it as essential to the well-being of both the church and secular society.

18This picture is confirmed by the scattered references, which in spite of their diverse derivations and miscellaneous character can he brought together under several headings. The wide range of people who were called principes is confirmed by a frequently-cited canon of the sixth Roman council referring to “the princes and first men (primi) of the regions” and to “the command and grant of the princes and various powerful men (quorundam potentum)” and by Gregory VII’s prohibition for “any king or secular prince” or any bishop, abbot, or rector to receive the spoils from churches.46 Gratian cited Proverbs 14.28, “In the multitude of people is the dignity of the king; and in the small number of people the dishonor of the princes,” which suggests that a prince is a minor or unsuccessful king.47 Gregory the Great wrote that “There is one prince among bees […] one emperor, and one judge of a province.”48 Some canons show, however, that a multiplicity of princes was possible in the church as well as in secular society. Pope Sixtus II wrote to the bishops of Spain and “your princes,” apparently meaning their principal clergy, and pope Clement spoke of ranks of princes, without defining them, in a letter to his co-bishops saying that they should be obeyed by all priests and clerics, “all princes of both higher and lower orders,” and the rest of the people.49 These princes were probably also clerics.

19Two particular points emerge from the scattered references. First, the powers of the secular and ecclesiastical princes were parallel and complementary. “The princes of the churches,” Ambrose wrote, now live where the princes of the gentiles previously lived and, by implication, exercise some of the same authority.50 Their laws were also parallel and occasionally overlapped. A canon of pope Gelasius spoke of “either the laws of the princes, or the rules of the fathers, or recent admonitions,” and Gratian said that the laws of both the sacred canons and of secular princes forbade the bearing of false witness.51 In the exercise of justice, Gratian said, the church should intercede with princes rather than rashly defend evil men.52 There was no intrinsic conflict between the laws of the church and those of secular princes, even those who were not Christian. Second, in spite of this complementarity, the authority of the church was superior to that of secular princes, who should not interfere in ecclesiastical affairs without good reason and were forbidden to oppose church laws, hold ecclesiastical property, sit in judgment on bishops, or interfere in papal elections.53 Fidelity to God and His saints, according to Urban II, overrode the fidelity sworn to a Christian prince.54

20It is clear from these examples that the position and power of the principes in the Decretum varied greatly, but not without a certain consistency. Princes were concerned above all with legislation and the administration of justice. The most clement prince, according to pope Pelagius, meaning the emperor, established the laws. Many years later pope Urban II wrote that “We do not deny that the power of doing (faciendae) justice belongs to kings and princes after the archbishops and bishops have been consulted,” thus stressing the complementarity of the two powers.55 Secular princes even exercised some authority, when necessary, in ecclesiastical affairs, such as calling councils and the translation of relics.56 A further small clue to Gratian’s view of princeps is when the term is used in the title but not the text of a canon, and vice versa. A few examples have already been cited, to which can be added a canon by Augustine where the title refers to the laws of princes and the text refers to the laws of the emperor, and a decree of the council of Chalcedon where princeps in the text is rendered imperatores in the title.57 Principes is used in the title but not the text of some canons dealing with judicial authority, which brings out the judicial responsibilities of princes.58 Gratian’s statement that to question or even to think against the person (anima) of a prince or to contemplate his death was lèse majesty further emphasizes his view of the position of princes.59 Unlike John of Salisbury he never suggested the possibility of deposing, let alone killing, a prince. Princes for Gratian were part of the proper ordering of society and were protected by divine as well as human law.