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Administrer les provinces de la République romaine

 | 
Nathalie Barrandon
, 
François Kirbihler

Seconde partie. Le cadre et les modalités des missions administratives des gouverneurs

The Republican ‘War Economy’ Strikes Back : a ‘minimalist’ approach

Toni Ñaco del Hoyo

Texte intégral

A ‘minimalist’ introduction: question of method

  • 2 «According to Cicero, Spain and most of Africa (plerique Poenorum) paid a fixed sum in taxes (cert (...)
  • 3 ñAco del Hoyo T., Vectigal Incertum. Economía de guerra y fiscalidad republicana en el Occidente m (...)
  • 4 France J., «Le mise en place de l’impôt provincial sous le règne d’Auguste en Aquitaine et dans le (...)
  • 5 «Il n’est pas question ici de discuter la thèse du livre [Vectigal Incertum, op. cit.] qui est for (...)
  • 6 A remarkable example may be found in Cadiou F., Hibera in terra miles. Les armées romaines et la c (...)

1In recent years, a new analysis of Cicero’s Third Verrine book, De Frumento, written around 70 BC, has brought back an old discussion on the famous passage (2Verr. III, 6, 12). According to the most common opinion – albeit not unanimous –, it gives a plain description, a kind of «road map», of Roman provincial taxation of the Late Republic2. More specifically, current criticism to this traditional view, which highlights the historical importance of «war economy» in the discussion3, has been challenged by Jérôme France, who has launched new stimulating arguments, which actually pose remarkable, but not definitive, question marks on the historical debate4. The discussion continues on a methodological background, as some of France’s remarks are directly related to a certain «Anglo-Saxon minimalist» approach he detects – and opposes – in recent works on Roman Republican taxation5. What follows intends to be a response to some of the criticisms already made by remodelling the view on direct Republican taxation, which to me is based on the absolute dominion of «war economy». To be more precise, except for some vectigalia from state monopolies and custom duties, the ad hoc levies, war booty, and fixed-term indemnities, constitute the dominant direct tax policy implemented by the Republic in the post-war scenarios all along the Mediterranean for most of the period. Therefore, in this paper I will try to strike back by taking up what Jérôme France may probably consider an Anglo-Saxon «minimalist» perspective. To me, it is only the historical evidence that gives arguments to the historian, and not any other modern preconception of, for instance, how an empire-to be, such as Republican Rome, might have managed its public finances and the administration of the provincial resources at the time of its expansion over the Mediterranean. To my thinking, it is important to stress that we should not always take for granted that either the senate in Rome or the military commanders in the provinces were to implement a regular system of tax collection over the provincials, only because that is how most of the Ancient-and of course modern-empires have probably treated their subjects in the past, whether recent or remote6.

Going back on the Ciceronian passage (Cicéron, 2 Verr., III, 6, 12), once again!

  • 7 Crawford M., «Introduction», Crawford M. (éd.), Sources for Ancient History, Cambridge, 1983, p. i (...)
  • 8 France J., «Deux questions sur la fiscalité provinciale d’après Cicéron Verr., 3, 12», Dubouloz J. (...)
  • 9 Ibid., p. 176-182.
  • 10 Ñaco del Hoyo T., Vectigal Incertum, op. cit., p. 241-248; Genovese M., «Condizioni delle civitate (...)

2This Ciceronian passage is a unique piece of evidence, and as such, is exposed to historical and philological over-interpretation, as has certainly been the case for at least the last century. All the literary sources known to us are accessible, and practically no more will be added, save for any hypothetical find from Egypt. Taking all this in mind, Michael Crawford has warned on the problems of over-interpreting Ancient literature, as the modern historian may be always tempted to do with relevant texts, particularly when the historical evidence on certain subjects is rather scarce7. In this respect, Jérôme France, aligns himself in his 2007 article with the traditional view, which dates back to Joachim Marquardt’s masterpiece (1888); he remarks that, at the beginning of the passage, Cicero’s mentioning of agrorum vectigalium ratio should not be related to land taxation, despite the fact that he was writing a book called De frumento, but to a Republican direct tax system described in more general terms. According to France, these agri vectigales ought to be understood from a different perspective, as provincial lands liable to payment obligations, which could take any form as long as they were under the political submission of the Republic8. Within this framework, Cicero differentiates between the collection of a tithe (decuma) from Sicily and Asia on one hand, and a vectigal certum stipendiarium collected from the rest of tax-payers on the other, particularly from the «Spaniards» and «some Africans», the most likely translation for Hispani et plerique Poeni9. If the agri vectigales were interpreted as revenues from lands or field products in the provinces, as I have suggested myself, and others before me, this text could provide evidence, by 70 BC, for the regular collection of land taxation, not only from Sicily or Asia, but also from Africa and Hispania as well10.

  • 11 Ñaco del Hoyo T., «Rearguard strategies of Roman Republican Warfare in the Far West», Ñaco del Hoy (...)
  • 12 The arrival of decem legati sent by the Senate in 133/132 BC, after Numantia’s fall (App. Iber. 99 (...)
  • 13 Richardson J.S., Hispaniae. Spain and the development of Roman Imperialism 218-82 BC, Cambridge, 1 (...)
  • 14 Cadiou F., op. cit., p. 601-608.

3However, this last point now looks to me even more objectable and fragile, because I am hard pressed to see how land taxes might have been organised regularly in active war scenarios, for instance in Republican Spain. There, as we all know, steady rearguard strategies, channelling men and supplies to the intermittent inner war fronts, were for a long time in need of «war economy» policies by the end of the Sertorian Wars, which roughly coincides chronologically with the Ciceronian passage11. Just after Numantia’s fall in 133 BC, and as long as warfare and garrisoning continued to be the main occupation of provincial governors in both Citerior and Ulterior, conditions for setting up regular incomes, such as general censuses of local populations and registers of all categories of lands, seem to be, not surprisingly, absent from our historical record12. But, when tempted to prove this by using a Livian passage regarding the regulations on vicesimae after the Spanish embassy to the senate in 171 BC13, and that is one entire century before Cicero’s writing of his speech against Verres, the data simply do not seem to match. The five per cent quota – which could also be interpreted, not as frumentum decumanum, but only as frumentum emptum or aestimatum- actually lines up with the decuma system and can hardly be called a vectigal certum stipendiarium, following the scheme drawn by Cicero in 2Verr. 3.6.12. Recently, F. Cadiou has insisted on the relation between such vicesimae, interpreted here as tax regulations on local land productions and their most likely destination as supplies for the armies in Spain and further afield from an early moment. Nevertheless, we must admit that this hypothesis, despite the modern logic behind it, is not completely supported by further historical evidence and definitely does not seem to match the Spanish vectigal certum reported by Cicero at all14.

  • 15 Bullo S., Provincia Africa. Le città e il territorio della caduta di Cartagine a Nerone, Roma, 200 (...)
  • 16 Picard G.-C., «Une survivance du droit public punique en Afrique romaine: les cités sufetales», At (...)
  • 17 Crawford M. (éd.), Roman Statutes, London, 1996, vol. I, p. 175-177; Carlsen J., «Public Land in t (...)

4Africa, on the other hand, is a slightly different matter, because there is some historical evidence to support that Rome was somehow involved in land taxation, almost from an early stage of Republican dominion. An example would be the failed Gracchan project of establishing a Roman colony in Carthage itself in 123 BC. According to the Ciceronian passage, along with probably all the Hispani, only «some Poeni » were to forcefully pay a vectigal certum stipendiarium. We know that after Carthage’s definite fall and physical destruction in 146 BC, a ten-man senatorial commission decided that its allies in the war against Rome were to suffer the same fate (App. Pun. 135)15. Consequently, their lands were confiscated and a decision was taken to collect a poll tax individually from them, perhaps by reusing the old Carthaginian structure of pagi, as it has been sometimes suggested16. Some lands were granted to Rome’s allies in the conflict, whereas the not enslaved, surviving population, known as stipendiarii in the African section of Lex Agraria of 111 BC, occupied the worst quality lands in the old Carthaginian territory, although not much is certain on how the collection of their land revenues was finally organised17.

  • 18 Ñaco del Hoyo T., Vectigal Incertum, op. cit., p. 110-114; Sacchi O., op. cit., p. 475-476.
  • 19 France J., «Deux questions sur la fiscalité provinciale», op. cit., p. 176 ff.

5It is true, however, that a rather puzzling stipendium shows up in line 77-78 of the inscription. In 2006, Osvaldo Sacchi connected stipendium, certainly an unicum in this epigraphical law, with a technical expression commonly employed by the written sources of the Republic: agris stipendioque multati, probably meaning a fine in the form of lands and of any other kind of wealth, such as cash, slaves, mining products, foodstuffs, etc. As a matter of fact, this interpretation easily connects with what the Ciceronian passage reports on the Hispani and Poeni, which were fined because of their defeat in war. Therefore, despite all modern attempts to historically relate the Ciceronian statement to a regular tax-system, either on the land or the general provincial resources, it is the aftermath of war and the position of those who were defeated in it, what seems to be lying behind Roman attitudes towards its new provincial lands and peoples18. On the other hand, J. France has tried to re-analyse the possible meaning of vectigal certum stipendiarium. For him, this was a direct tax, quoted in the passage as opposed to the tithe system already in existence in Sicily and Asia, and at least collected from «Hispani and most of Poeni », as Cicero puts it. But, if land taxation were taken out of the picture, following J. France’s suggestion, a vectigal certum stipendiarium could equally be understood as fixed income, regardless of its origins, perhaps booty or war indemnities, but not exactly regular taxation; its presence only in regions where warfare did not cease to exist completely remains very unlikely to be proven by that time19.

Performing deditio and the Roman achievement of «world dominion»

  • 20 Santangelo F., Sulla, the elites and the empire. A study of Roman policies in Italy and the Greek (...)
  • 21 García Riaza E., Celtíberos y lusitanos frente a Roma: diplomacia y derecho de guerra, Vitoria, 20 (...)
  • 22 Ñaco del Hoyo T., «The late Republican West», op. cit., p. 221-222.
  • 23 Only to quote two extreme examples, whereas Roman denarii arrived in Sicily practically at the sam (...)
  • 24 Nicolet C., «Documents fiscaux et géographie dans la Rome ancienne», La mémoire perdue. À la reche (...)

6It would be hard to dispute that Republican direct taxation worked differently in provinces in which there was no remaining tax-systems to re-use. Whereas in the East, the Hellenistic experience had been largely copied and even improved, as revealed by the Sullan measures taken on the Greek towns that had supported Mithridates after the peace of 85 BC20, in second-century BC Spain, the fiscal relations between Roman military representatives in the field and each town or populus subjected to Republican rule were normally established on a one-to-one basis, inevitably leading to the traditional Roman institution of deditio21. As I said at the beginning of this paper, some of the conventional interpretations of the picture drawn by Cicero do not seem to fit well with the historical background of the financial management of the Middle and Late Republican conquests, in which regular income probably represented a minority of the whole state budget, the remainder coming from extraordinary resources deposited in the treasury as war spoils and fixed-term indemnities22. When the modern historian seeks for hard evidence on Republican finances and taxation, war expenses and war spoils appear in every province under Roman rule, leaving hardly any room for centralised regular taxation, and certainly no room for a centralised coin system to theoretically support it23. At the same time, the dynamics of war and conquest outside Italy made it extremely difficult for the Republic to hold even an approximate account of the number of hypothetical provincial taxpayers, nor a precise record of all categories of provincial lands, unless of course, it was inherited from a Hellenistic kingdom, such as perhaps the case of Syracuse in Sicily or Pergamum in Asia, because their financial records already provided the Roman authorities with eventual lists of local contributors24.

  • 25 Ñaco del Hoyo T., Vectigal Incertum, op. cit., p. 144-145; Rich, J.W., «Review of Richardson J.S.,(...)
  • 26 Certainly, Spain gives us some relevant study cases such as the misinterpretation of a deditio whi (...)

7Equally significant are the effects surrender treaties may have had on both parties involved, creating different psychological perspectives of dominion. The Roman commanders and the externae might have seen completely opposite projections of the same historical events25. More specifically, although the decision to collect from the dediticii was previously established, the person in charge of claiming compensations was different each time: the actual Roman authority in command, one of his representatives in the field, or perhaps a Roman officer or an Italian civilian in charge of the exploitation of a state monopoly. From the Republican perspective, contributions only represented a constant renewal of the original deditio, despite being performed by different individuals, and to me it can hardly be described as regular taxation. However, it is true that provincials might have seen the whole scene from a radically different view. Every time that auxiliary recruitments, indemnities, foraging or forced billeting were requested from provincial subjects, all of which occurred quite regularly in regions in which warfare was still active, they only regarded the individuals as Romans, representing a foreign power, and making demands by force. Therefore, whereas Rome only requested ad hoc levies on the basis of a one-to-one deditio, dediticii might have thought they had been subjected to regular taxation, perhaps just like other neighbouring provincials. If my approach is correct, it is definitely «war economy» that helps us to better understand this phenomenon, for in some provinces Republican direct taxation does not seem to be a historical reality proven by hard evidence, but only a modern theoretical conceptualisation based on what the dediticii would think, according to their submissive status26.

  • 27 Salinas de Frías M., El gobierno de las provincias hispanas durante la República Romana (218-27 a. (...)
  • 28 Hassall M., Crawford M., Reynolds J., «Rome and the Eastern provinces at the end of the Second Cen (...)

8Another substantial matter arises in close connection with the general topic of this conference. If Republican magistrates in charge of the provincial government were involved in financial or tax policies, can we immediately add some «fiscal attributions», perhaps on behalf of the senate, to their functions as provincial governors? The answer, again, is very controversial, particularly if we expect a simple and straightforward response. Again, Spain is revealed as an exceptionally rich study case for the matter, as shown in a 1995 book, which explores the universe of provincial government in the region. Concerning the figure of the governor, Manuel Salinas de Frías quotes military, judiciary, and also fiscal functions as part of his responsibilities in office. In sum, he thinks that apart from imposing new contributions without the explicit consent of the senate, provincial governors in Spain basically checked the collection of a regular tax-system, established in his opinion as early as 206 BC27. However, to me, the Republican provincial governor dealt with financial matters only in relation with his primary military function, regardless of the orders from the senate. Since he held political and military power to organise Roman interests in his provincia, he intervened over financial matters at his own discretion, even though, according to the Roman constitution, they were not strictly under his sphere of competence as governor. For instance, there is evidence of his direct involvement in organising taxation in lines 5 to 30 of the fourth column of the Cnidos text of Lex de provinciis praetoriis of 100 BC. Nonetheless, the evidence from this text clearly shows that the real function attributed to the magistrate in charge of that province was not the collection of taxes itself, but to provide assistance–and that surely meant military assistance-to the publicans directly involved in such collection tasks in the province of Macedonia. Therefore, strictly speaking, the governor of Macedonia c. 100 BC did not have fiscal competences specifically attached to his office, but in practice, he took decisions in that direction. As far as the evidence is concerned, this was a common feature of most Republican provincial governors until a later date28.

  • 29 «[…] the empire was seen in terms of control exercised through power, the power of the Roman peopl (...)
  • 30 Ñaco del Hoyo T., Vectigal Incertum, op. cit., p. 25-77.
  • 31 Nicolet C., L’inventaire du monde. Géographie et politique aux origines de l’Empire romain, Paris, (...)
  • 32 Sastre Prats I., «Ager publicus y deditio», op. cit., p. 159-166; see also Barton C.A., «The Price (...)

9While I still think that «war economy» developed extensively whilst the Republican military machine spread Roman rule over the Mediterranean basin, I acknowledge that a sort of «imperial» ideology of global hegemony may have equally evolved in Rome itself on a long term basis, particularly thanks to its close encounters with the Hellenistic powers, roughly since the end of the third century BC and up to the Mithridatic Wars, the Ciceronian period, and the very end of the Republic. But, as I have already shown, there is no evidence whatsoever, during most of the Middle and Late Republic, of either the senate or the ruling class managing to implement conscientious policies of world dominion by setting up a regular and direct tax-system for the provinces. In this respect, John Richardson observes, within the last two centuries of the Republic, an evolution in what he calls «the language of empire», as expressed in technical terms such as imperium. To him, the Ciceronian language is a clear example of the real impact of a territorial sense of imperium romanum in a Roman world of dominion over provincials, fruit of a long evolution from the end of the third century BC29. When a similar «minimalist» analysis is conducted for technical financial vocabulary, such as tributum, stipendium, and vectigal, and their adjectival forms, the results clearly show that except for the description of some Hellenistic tax-systems, there is no further evidence to prove that any form of direct provincial taxation was described with such terminology for the Republic, beyond the boundaries drawn by deditio30. However, as Claude Nicolet has masterly shown, the development of a political geography in Rome, encompassing the idea of a «global empire», and indeed the «rational» administration of its subjects in the form of a centralised taxation, probably should be associated with the end of the Civil Wars and the birth of the new imperial regime31. What is beyond question is that a certain atmosphere of general peace was necessary in order to rationalise the contributions Rome expected to collect regularly from the tax-payers throughout the empire. In fact, such a peace was contemporary to a progressive withdrawal of the traditional one-to-one relation with provincials based on deditio, in favour of a collective treatment of provincials from the Principate onwards32.

In conclusion: ‘war economy’ and military logistics

  • 33 See, recently Carreras-Monfort C., «Transition of the military supply from the Late Republic to th (...)

10It is hard to believe that the treasury was not overwhelmed by the huge amount of profit deposited in the temple of Saturn, such as fixed-term indemnities, booty, and the first revenues from the exploitation of state monopolies in certain pacified territories. Moreover, to my thinking, there was never a «master plan» of expansion and conquest designed by the Republican ruling classes in order to exploit such provincial resources, actually a by-product of Roman success in war. On the other hand, it should be stressed that paying for military expenses was the first financial worry of the Republic, no doubt a first step in securing Roman political primacy over neighbours and powerful enemies. From the experience achieved by its armies, and more specifically by its commanders, during the conquest of Italy, Rome learnt that long-term campaigns needed perfectly organised logistics, as well as the necessary resources to pay and feed the legions, keep the alliance with the Italians and hire external auxiliaries. But of course, when war took place outside Italy, sending supplies, pay, and weapons to overseas armies became a rather difficult and very expensive task, for which occasional private suppliers were hired, although their activities did not probably spread over the provincial world at a large scale until the last quarter of the second century BC33.

  • 34 Ñaco del Hoyo T., «Gadès et les précédents des attributions politiques des praefecti praesidii rép (...)

11Equally, garrisoning small detachments of troops, near or even inside the towns formerly subjected to Rome, within the rearguard of any open front in the provinces, allowed the passing armies to store supplies in secure bases. It should be noted that during winter legionaries and auxiliaries could be allocated in non-Roman towns, being billeted by local populations at their own expense. In time, the presence of Roman armies, even when they were demobilised, became a powerful occupation force, which drained a huge amount of resources from provincial towns, although of course, never on a regular basis. However, there is enough evidence in our sources of harsh complaints made by provincials against the interventionist policies conducted by Roman garrisons, commanded by their praefecti praesidii, which as a whole, created a certain atmosphere of external domination. Not surprisingly, Augustus made use of garrison commanders originally destined to individual towns in the Alps, praefecti civitatium, to take care of larger regions in the aftermath of the Civil Wars and just before the whole provincial administration was finally reformed according to his next «imperial» design34. «War economy» policies appear to have guaranteed the actual success of both the military machine and the state finances of the Republic, at least up to a certain point, in which the «Republican empire» was probably too big to be managed in such a disorganised and «irrational» way. In the end, the Republican state simply collapsed to be reborn into a new political and financial regime, less dependant on irregular income and more «rational» in draining resources from regular tax-payers.

Notes

2 «According to Cicero, Spain and most of Africa (plerique Poenorum) paid a fixed sum in taxes (certum stipendium) at the time of the Verrine speeches in the 70s BC (Sicily by contrast paid a tax in grain whose total varied with the harvest). It is usually assumed that because the amount was fixed, payment of direct taxes in Spain and Africa was in money and continued to be so under the Principate», Duncan-Jones R.P., «Taxation in money and taxation in kind», Structure & Scale in the Roman Economy, Cambridge, 1990, p. 187-198, esp. p. 188, and in very similar terms Lintott A.W., Imperium Romanum. Politics and Administration, London-New York, 1993, p. 74; Delorme C.-D., Isom S., Kamerschen D.R., «Rent seeking and taxation in the Ancient Roman Empire», Applied Economics, no 37, 2005, p. 705-711, esp. p. 706-707. The discussion, however, is much older, as shown by Marquardt J., De l’organisation financière chez les romains, t. X Manuel des Antiquités romaines, Paris, 1888, p. 229-237. Recent work on the Verrines: Prag J. (éd.), Sicilia nutrix plebis romanae. Rhetoric, law, & taxation in Cicero’s Verrines, London, ICS, 2007; Dubouloz J. et Pittia S. (éd.), La Sicile de Cicéron. Lectures des Verrines, Paris, 2007, and on Roman Sicily: Soraci C., «Sicilia Frumentaria. Contributi allo studio della Sicilia in epoca repubblicana», Quaderni Catanesi di Studi Antichi e Medievali, n.s. Anno II, Gennaio-Dicembre 2003, p. 289-401; Prag J., «Auxilia and Gymnasia: A Sicilian Model of Roman Imperialism», JRS, no 97, 2007, p. 68-100; ibid., «Republican Sicily at the start of the 21st Century: the rise of the optimists?», Pallas, no 79, 2009, p. 131-144, and esp. p. 132.

3 ñAco del Hoyo T., Vectigal Incertum. Economía de guerra y fiscalidad republicana en el Occidente mediterráneo: su impacto en el territorio (218-133 a. C.), B.A.R, Int. Ser. no 1158, Oxford, 2003, esp. p. 193 ff.; ibid., «The Late Republican West: imperial taxation in the making?», Hekster O., De Kleijn G., Slootjes D. (éd.), Crises and the Roman Empire. Proceedings of the Seventh Workshop of the International Network Impact of Empire (Nijmegen, June 20-24, 2006), Leiden-Boston, 2007, p. 219-231.

4 France J., «Le mise en place de l’impôt provincial sous le règne d’Auguste en Aquitaine et dans le nord de l’Hispanie: un bilan», L’Aquitaine et l’Hispanie Septentrionale à l’époque julio-claudienne. Organisation et exploitation des espaces provinciaux. IVè Colloque Aquitania, Saintes, septembre 2003, Suppl. Aquitania, 2005, p. 65-93; ibid., «Deux questions sur la fiscalité provinciale d’après Cicéron Verr., 3, 12», in La Sicile de Cicéron, op. cit., 2007, p. 169-184.

5 «Il n’est pas question ici de discuter la thèse du livre [Vectigal Incertum, op. cit.] qui est fortement influencée par le minimalisme anglo-saxon», France J., «Tributum et stipendium. La politique fiscale de l’empereur romain», RHD, no 84, 2006, p. 1-17, esp. p. 10.

6 A remarkable example may be found in Cadiou F., Hibera in terra miles. Les armées romaines et la conquête de l’Hispanie sous la République (218-45 av J.-C.), Madrid, 2008, p. 498: «Doit-on ainsi dissocier la décision de créer les provinces de Citérieure et Ultérieure en cent quatre-vingt dix-sept de toute préoccupation fiscale de la part de Rome? […] Cela paraît peu probable, bien que le dossier demeure finalement obscur, faute de sources suffisantes. » In sum, despite the lack of evidence, which Cadiou explicitly acknowledges, he relates the settlement of a newly designed Roman tax-system to the creation of both Spanish provinces in 197 BC, but with no further evidence than his own logic as a historian on how an empire, no matter whether ancient or modern, ought to work. Moreover, from a «minimalist» perspective, such a step may be seen as too courageous.

7 Crawford M., «Introduction», Crawford M. (éd.), Sources for Ancient History, Cambridge, 1983, p. ix-x.

8 France J., «Deux questions sur la fiscalité provinciale d’après Cicéron Verr., 3, 12», Dubouloz J. et Pittia S. (dir.), La Sicile de Cicéron. Lectures des Verrines, Paris, 2007, p. 171-176.

9 Ibid., p. 176-182.

10 Ñaco del Hoyo T., Vectigal Incertum, op. cit., p. 241-248; Genovese M., «Condizioni delle civitates della Sicilia ed assetti amministrativo-contributivi delle altre province nella prospettazione ciceroniana delle Verrine», Iura, no 44, 1993, p. 171-243; Gebbia C., «Cicerone e l’utilitas provinciae Siciliae», Kokalos, no 45, 2004, p. 27-40; Sacchi O., Regime della terra e imposizione fondiaria nell’età dei Gracchi. Testo e commento storico-giuridico della legge agraria del 111 a. C., Napoli, 2006, p. 470-476.

11 Ñaco del Hoyo T., «Rearguard strategies of Roman Republican Warfare in the Far West», Ñaco del Hoyo T. & Arrayás-Morales I. (éd.), War and Territory in the Roman World. Guerra y territorio en el mundo romano, B.A.R. Int. Ser. no 1530, Oxford, 2006, p. 149-167; ibid., «Garrisons, military logistics and civil population in the Late Republic: Africa and Hispania», Carreras Monfort C. & Morais R. (éd.), Contributo para o estudo da economia e comércio na fachada atlântica, Barcelona, 2009, in press.

12 The arrival of decem legati sent by the Senate in 133/132 BC, after Numantia’s fall (App. Iber. 99), has sometimes been related to a hypothetical major provincial and tax reorganisation in Spain: Pina Polo F., «Las comisiones senatoriales para la reorganización de Hispania (Appian Iberiké 99-100)», DHA, no 23-2, 1997, p. 84-104; Barrandon N., «Le rôle des légations sénatoriales dans la gestion de la province d’Hispanie Citérieure entre 133 et 82 avant J.-C. », Domitia, no 8/9, mars 2007, p. 227-240. However, the lack of further evidence in the historical record and the continuation of military activity against Rome for the next decades do not seem to support such a view: Ñaco del Hoyo T., Vectigal Incertum, op. cit., p. 188-193.

13 Richardson J.S., Hispaniae. Spain and the development of Roman Imperialism 218-82 BC, Cambridge, 1986, p. 112-116.

14 Cadiou F., op. cit., p. 601-608.

15 Bullo S., Provincia Africa. Le città e il territorio della caduta di Cartagine a Nerone, Roma, 2002, p. 5-10 and p. 19-25; Crawley Quinn J., «The role of the 146 settlement in the provincialization of Africa», L’Africa Romana. Ai confini dell’impero: contatti, scambi, conflitti, Atti del XV Convegno di Studio, Tozeur, 2004, p. 1593-1602.

16 Picard G.-C., «Une survivance du droit public punique en Afrique romaine: les cités sufetales», Atti del covegno internazionale sul tema: I diritti locali nelle province romane con particolare riguardo alle condizioni giuridiche del suolo (Roma, 26-28 ottobre 1971), Rome, 1974, p. 125-133, esp. p. 125-126, particularly in connection with two well-known inscriptions from 60 BC and 12 BC, concerning pagi stipendiarii (ILS 9482; CIL VIII 8366). See also ñAco del Hoyo T., Vectigal Incertum, op. cit., p. 107-109.

17 Crawford M. (éd.), Roman Statutes, London, 1996, vol. I, p. 175-177; Carlsen J., «Public Land in the Western Provinces of the Roman Empire», Aubert J.-J. (éd.), Tâches publiques et entreprise privée dans le monde romain, Neuchâtel, 2003, p. 179-192, esp. p. 184-186; see lately De Ligt L., «Provincial dediticii in the epigraphic Lex Agraria of 111 BC?», Classical Quarterly, no 58, 1, 2008, p. 356-362.

18 Ñaco del Hoyo T., Vectigal Incertum, op. cit., p. 110-114; Sacchi O., op. cit., p. 475-476.

19 France J., «Deux questions sur la fiscalité provinciale», op. cit., p. 176 ff.

20 Santangelo F., Sulla, the elites and the empire. A study of Roman policies in Italy and the Greek East, Leiden-Boston, 2007, p. 108-121; Ñaco T., Arrayás I., Antela B., Busquets S., «The Impact of the Roman Intervention in Greece and Asia Minor upon Civilians (88-63 BC)», Antela-Bernárdez B. et Ñaco del Hoyo T., (éd.), Transforming historical landscapes in the Ancient Empires, BAR Int. Ser. 1986, Oxford, 2009, p. 33-51.

21 García Riaza E., Celtíberos y lusitanos frente a Roma: diplomacia y derecho de guerra, Vitoria, 2002, p. 37 ff.; Sastre Prats I., «Ager publicus y deditio: reflexiones sobre los procesos de provincialización», Garrido-Hory M., Gonzales, A. (éd.), Histoire, espace et marges de l’Antiquité. Hommages à Monique Clavel-Lévêque, vol. 2, Paris, 2003, p. 157-192; Barrandon N., op. cit., p. 233-235; De Ligt L., op. cit., p. 358 ff.

22 Ñaco del Hoyo T., «The late Republican West», op. cit., p. 221-222.

23 Only to quote two extreme examples, whereas Roman denarii arrived in Sicily practically at the same time they were minted in Rome, there was no Roman silver coinage in Spain for at least one entire century, and probably the local issues were struck much later than generally admitted, never serving strictly fiscal functions, but used for the military pay of local auxiliaries, either integrated in the Roman armies or fighting others in Spanish soil. See Ripollès P.P., «Coinage and Identity in the Roman Provinces: Spain», Howgego Ch., Heuchert V., Burnett A. (éd.), Coinage and Identity in the Roman Provinces, Oxford, 2005, p. 79-93, esp. p. 81 ff.; López Sánchez F., «Los auxiliares de Roma en el valle del Ebro y su paga en denarios ibéricos (110-90 a. C.)», Athenaeum no 95, 1, 2007, p. 287-320; Hollander D.B., «Demand for money in Late Roman Republic», Harris W.V. (éd.), The monetary systems of the Greeks and Romans, Oxford, 2008, p. 112-136; Prag J., «Republican Sicily», op. cit., p. 136-137; López Sánchez F., «Moneda ibérica y gens mariana (107-90 a. C.)», Navarro M. (éd.), Des armes, des hommes et des dieux. L’armement dans la conquête romaine de la péninsule ibérique (Colloque Casa de Velázquez, 22-23 janvier 2009), Anejos de Gladius, CSIC, Madrid, 2010 (in press).

24 Nicolet C., «Documents fiscaux et géographie dans la Rome ancienne», La mémoire perdue. À la recherche des archives oubliées, publiques et privées, de la Rome antique, Paris, 1994, p. 149-172 (most of his evidence belongs to the first century BC); Mitchell S., «Geography, Politics, and Imperialism in the Asian Customs Law», Cottier M. et alii (éd.), The Customs Law of Asia, Oxford, 2008, p. 165-201.

25 Ñaco del Hoyo T., Vectigal Incertum, op. cit., p. 144-145; Rich, J.W., «Review of Richardson J.S., Hispaniae. Spain and the development of Roman Imperialism 218-82 BC, Cambridge, 1986», JRS, no 78, 1988, p. 212-214, esp. p. 213.

26 Certainly, Spain gives us some relevant study cases such as the misinterpretation of a deditio which lied behind the outbreak of the so-called «Third Celtiberian War» in 153 BC. As a matter of fact, when some clauses of the old surrendering treaty, originally signed by the Celtiberian town of Segeda and the governor of Citerior Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (pr. 179, cos. 177), were interpreted from opposite readings by both parties twenty-five years later, such misinterpretation led to an open war which ultimately made Rome advance in its dominion over Spain (Appian, Ib., 44; Diodorus, XXXI, 42; Polybius, XXXV, 1; Florus, I, 34, 3). See most recently: García Riaza E., «La expansión romana en Celtiberia», Burillo F. (éd.), Segeda y su contexto histórico entre Catón y Nobilior (195 al 153), Mara (Zaragoza), 2006, p. 81-94, esp. p. 90-94; Burillo F., «Una propuesta sobre los ‘ciudadanos’ de las ciudades estado celtibéricas de Segeda y Numancia a partir de la batalla de la Vulcanalia, año 153 a.C. », Uroz J., Noguera J.M., Coarelli F. (éd.), Iberia e Italia: modelos romanos de integración territorial, Murcia, 2008, p. 509-520.

27 Salinas de Frías M., El gobierno de las provincias hispanas durante la República Romana (218-27 a.C.), Salamanca, 1995, p. 56-63 and p. 144-149.

28 Hassall M., Crawford M., Reynolds J., «Rome and the Eastern provinces at the end of the Second Century BC. The so-called ‘piracy law’ and a new inscription from Cnidos», JRS, no 64, 1974, 195-220, esp. p. 213, p. 218-219; Crawford M. (éd.), Roman Statutes, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 264-265; Giovannini A., «Date et objectifs de la Lex de Provinciis Praetoriis (Roman Statutes, no 12)», Historia, no 57.1, 2008, p. 92-107, esp. p. 94-96 and p. 102 ff.; Richardson J.S., The Language of Empire. Rome and the Idea of Empire from the Third Century BC to the Second Century AD, Cambridge, 2008, p. 40, n. 84.

29 «[…] the empire was seen in terms of control exercised through power, the power of the Roman people and in particular of its generals, rather than of territorial annexation or territorial expansion», Richardson J.S., The Language of Empire, op. cit., p. 62, and p. 63-116.

30 Ñaco del Hoyo T., Vectigal Incertum, op. cit., p. 25-77.

31 Nicolet C., L’inventaire du monde. Géographie et politique aux origines de l’Empire romain, Paris, 1988, esp. p. 159-179; Stok F., «Caput mundi. Roma nella coscienza geografica dei Romani», Giordano F. (a cura di), L’idea di Roma nella cultura antica, Napoli, 2001, p. 277-296; De Nardis M., «Forma: aspetti della percezione dello spazio geografico-politico a Roma tra I sec. a. C. e I sec. d. C. », Storchi Marino A. (a cura di), Economia, amministrazione e fiscalità nel mondo romano, Bari, 2005, p. 133-162; Naerebout F. G., «Global Romans? Is Globalisation a concept that is going to help us understand the Roman Empire?», Talanta, no 38-39, 2006-2007, p. 149-170, esp. p. 154 ff.

32 Sastre Prats I., «Ager publicus y deditio», op. cit., p. 159-166; see also Barton C.A., «The Price of Peace in Ancient Rome», Raaflaub K.A. (éd.), War and Peace in the Ancient World, Oxford, 2007, p. 245-255.

33 See, recently Carreras-Monfort C., «Transition of the military supply from the Late Republic to the Augustan period: a case study of the NW of the Iberian Peninsula», War and Territory in the Roman World, op. cit., p. 169-178; Erdkamp P., «War and State Formation in the Roman Republic», Erdkamp P. (éd.), A Companion to the Roman Army, Oxford 2007, p. 96-113, esp. p. 101-104; Roth J.P., «War», Sabin Ph., Van Wees H., Whitby M. (éd.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare. I. Greece, the Hellenistic World and the rise of Rome, Cambridge, 2008, p. 368-398.

34 Ñaco del Hoyo T., «Gadès et les précédents des attributions politiques des praefecti praesidii républicains», DHA, no 35.1 2009, p. 95-113; ibid., «Le praefectus praesidii sous la République. Quelques cas d’étude», REA, no 111.1, 2009, p. 179-195.

Auteur

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona1 ICREA Research Professor, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. I must thank Nathalie Barrandon and François Kirbihler for having invited me to Nancy, and also Jérôme France and François Cadiou for their always positive reaction to my «minimalist» criticisms. Finally, I want to thank Fernando López-Sánchez for letting me read some of his work still unpublished.

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