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    Plan

    Plan détaillé Texte intégral Two cases of hypermnesia What we can learn from metaphors The individual/collective divide Beyond human? Post-history or new temporalities? Notes de bas de page Auteurs

    The Digital Subject

    Ce livre est recensé par

    Précédent Suivant
    Table des matières

    Introduction

    Claire Larsonneur, Arnaud Regnauld et Pierre Cassou-Noguès

    p. 6-16

    Texte intégral Two cases of hypermnesia What we can learn from metaphors The individual/collective divide Beyond human? Post-history or new temporalities? Notes de bas de page Auteurs

    Texte intégral

    1 Two colossal research programmes have been launched recently: the Human Brain Project of the European Union (2013-2023) and the Brain Initiative of Barack Obama (2014-2026): the brain/mind compound appears set as the New Frontier for the twenty-first century and neuroscience seems bound to replace nuclear physics and biology as the key scientific field of our times.

    2This is quite in keeping with a reversal of our representations of the subject, increasingly identified with cerebral activity. For centuries the subject had been primarily defined by of his/her lineage, through the transmission of a name and means, or by the work he or she produced, as witnesses the notion of authorship. One could also refer to the ethical dimension of the subject, what Levinas calls the “face-to-face relation”. A pumping heart and the flow of breath were the bodily functions that signalled life, and they came to represent the subject metonymically and symbolically. But this changed after a spate of scientific research on coma during the first half of the twentieth century and the subsequent medical and legal shift in the criteria establishing death, no longer attested by the cessation of cardiac and respiratory activity but by the end of cerebral activity. This radical shift in paradigm (implemented in France by the 1968 administrative circular) may not be well known by the general public but increasingly bears upon our representations of the subject, both in the physical, the legal and the philosophical sense.

    3Over the same period of time, roughly from the second half of the twentieth century to now, computer science came to play a central role in our lives, first as a tool then as a conceptual template. For instance data processing or the architecture of networks are now embedded in almost all research. A new scientific field, neuroinformatics, has appeared. Digital technologies are now crucial to the smooth running of life in developed countries, shaping up economics, institutional life or even the social interaction of individuals. Symptom of this shift, a number of digital subjects/cyborgs have started to crop up in major film productions, such as Transcendence (Pfizer, 2014), Her (Spike Jonze, 2013) or Lucy (Besson, 2014).

    4If, following the works of Simondon and Kuhn, one thinks that technics play a crucial role in the making of a society and of the self, then we should investigate the manner in which our conception of the subject has evolved lately specifically in relation to brain science and digital technologies. This collection of essays chose to do so by confronting the perspectives of a variety of scientific fields: philosophy, literature, the arts and archival science. All our authors have tackled, from one angle or another, the four topics we deem to stand at the core of the “digital subject”: hypermnesia (Stiegler, O’Gorman, Bourassa), but also inscription and matters of writing (Liu, Stiegler, Le Cor, Smith, Vauday), temporality (Hayles, Méchoulan, Vanderhaeghe, Salanskis, Sebbah) and code (Liu, Salanskis, Sebbah, Smith, Vanderhaeghe).

    Two cases of hypermnesia

    5The history of emblematic cases of hypermnesia provides a fertile starting point for our investigation into the advent of a digital subject. Just a few years before the first computers appeared, just before a digital subject became possible, two remarkable literary works were published: H.G. Wells developed the theme of a World Brain1 in a series of conferences held between 1936 and 1937 and Jorge Borges created the character of Funes (in Funes o el memorioso2 1942). H.G. Wells coined the phrase “World Brain” in his crusade for the creation of a universal encyclopaedia, which would be comprised of reasoned summaries offering a synthesis of all human knowledge. A team of “knowledge civil servants” were to be in charge of the project, choosing the experts who would write the summaries, indexing articles and monitoring updates. For Wells, such an encyclopaedia would have filled the widening gap between cutting edge science and technology on the one hand and our imperfect education on the other, a gap which prevented us from implementing new findings and which contributed to spread the cultural clichés fostered by our ignorance. The encyclopaedia represented the steppingstone for “a sort of mental clearing house for the mind, a depot where knowledge and ideas are received, sorted, summarized, digested, clarified and compared.”

    6Borges develops quite a different line of thought with the character of Funes. After he fell from a horse in obscure circumstances, this Uruguayan peasant acquired infallible perception and memory. Unable to forget anything of his past or present experience, Funes finds himself in dire straits: he lives holed up in the dark, trying not to see anything he doesn’t already know inside out, unable to sleep or even maybe to think, suspects Borges. This is because thinking requires general ideas and therefore the omission of reality’s numerous particulars, a feat Funes can no longer perform.

    7Funes’ memory and that of the World Brain seem diametrically opposed. The former was borne out of an accident whereas the latter is a deliberate construction, but this is probably not seminal. One could imagine a new drug designed for that purpose which could give us an almost infallible memory like Funes’s for a given period of time: it could be put to a number of uses such as solving crimes or reliving happy memories of love. That form of memory and the World Brain would then both be artefacts but still differ one from another on a crucial plane. Funes’s memory is private and he is the only one who can access it (the narrator can only guess its full range) whereas the encyclopaedia’s memory is public by design so that anyone can tap into it. Funes’s memory is individual, the World Brain collective. Funes’s memory is enclosed within his mind when the World Brain is implemented in such external technical apparatuses as books or microfilms. Contrary to what happens in Borges’s novella, the internal quality of one’s memory does not mean it will necessarily remain private: neuroscience may one day be able to retrieve a person’s memories to cast them on a screen, a process through which at least part of a private memory will go public (we might be able to keep part of our cerebral activity closed to scientific investigation). Lastly Funes’s memory is all-encompassing and arbitrary: there is no identifiable and accountable agent in charge of choosing what is kept whereas the World Brain has been thought through by a group of individuals who select what must be kept and how.

    8Those two models of hypermnesia, which one could picture as the opposite end of a scale of memory, shed an interesting light on issues related to our contemporary digital technologies. Take for example online encyclopaedia: it is common for opponents to stigmatise them as a shift from an individual, private and internal form of memory to a collective, public and external, or extended, form of memory. I can check the publication date of Borges’s novella on Internet and therefore not bother to learn it, because I know I can go back to this information whenever I am connected. We are closer to the World Brain model than to Funes’s. We are turning hypermnesiac in the collective sense, and hypomnesiac in the individual sense. The advent of digital technologies may not have enacted such momentous revolution after all…

    9But the two types of memory under study, Fune’s and the World Brain, share a feature that digital technologies lack: they are human throughout. The World Brain, as defined by Wells, is “centralised”. The type of knowledge to be included, the way in which it will be featured, the updates, the indexation, all this will be decided by a team of encyclopaedists which means that the World Brain is not autonomous. It is not some mechanical device scrolling down an array of publications and selecting those that have been most cited. The World Brain is not collaborative either: it does not reflect the personal preferences of a set of users in an undefined group. Though a collective endeavour, the Wold Brain is based on the model established by deliberate memory: the memory of a learner who decides to retain a given scientific result, to keep in mind this poem rather than that press article, etc. And even though Funes’s memory belongs to an individual, it appears rather inhuman since storage is arbitrary and exhaustive, hardly the outcome of a human decision. Maybe choice or selection is the moot point of our contemporary digital memory. Technical obsolescence or accident (the change in format which prevents us from opening old files from the 1990s, automatized robot indexation or unmonitored collaborative work) seems to have invalidated the model of deliberate choice, the human intervention necessary to keep track of our memories.

    What we can learn from metaphors

    10Beyond history, one may also explore our representations of the interplay between technics and the subject through the various images and metaphors used by our authors. Here comes a surprise: far from reinstating the tropes of the industrial revolution, the metal, cogs and cranes, soot and sweat associated with machines, pride of place is given here to nature. The texts do of course echo the fears and general uneasiness humans experience when faced with change, what Liu calls the “human paranoia about the dissolution of sense”: and so we hear of war and crises, dementia and mania, atrophy and handicap (O’Gorman), fragmentation, explosion and vampires (Hayles) or even the labyrinth (Liu), with the promise of death looming in its centre.

    11But there the image of a blurred frontier, taken up by a number of authors, crops up. Sebbah and Vauday both refer to phantoms, thus suggesting a form of presence which would be connected to reality in a rather intangible, fleeting way: such representation of the subject inevitably blurs the simple divide between the virtual and the actual, between screen life and real life. The notion of an immaterial presence made up of multiple states is rather close to the thematics of porosity and haze developed by Le Cor and Vanderhaeghe, and their examination of perforations, gaps and latency. The mental template for a digital subject is not the model of distinct yet conjoined worlds, nor the compound, a mix of different parts sewn together à la Frankenstein: hybridity is here redefined through juxtaposition as an unstable intertwining of features, some common, some distinct. We used to think the subject formed when confronted to its portrait or to its double, standing in front of a mirror; now the sense of one’s own presence seems closer to the experience of the shadow on the wall, the silhouette on tracing paper being transferred to other media. Ego is both self and avatar, or self and Internet profile. Little wonder the associated scientific field would be alchemy (Vauday) or the precipitation of chemicals and the vaporisation of ethers (Vanderhaeghe).

    12One metaphor however crowns it all, coming up in most texts but mots consistently in Bourassa’s: water. It could be an echo of Zygmunt Bauman’s thesis on liquid modernity3 or the unconscious recall of such everyday phrases as a flow of information, a stream of consciousness, electrical current. Our relation to the digital is described through images of the ocean, of Lethe the river of forgetfulness, of froth (Sloterdijk), deluge and drowning, eddies and floods, churning and meandering, the rise of the swell and open sluices. Such focus on water can be related to the fear of being submerged by technology, suggests the power and the ubiquitous nature of the digital and opens up onto the concept of plasticity. One may think of the plasticity of the brain which is able to learn again and recompose itself, or of the plasticity of international finance which constantly devises new protocols to optimise the circulation of liquid assets: maybe our key paradigm for the production of meaning is no longer the structure or even the network but the plasticity of life. And mediation could be seen as a form of recomposition rather than a transfer or a translation.

    13Hayles takes up one more metaphor from the natural world: a hive, a termite mound, a swarm of insects. Such a trope has already had quite a long history in philosophy, at least since Mandeville, but it does force us to examine another aspect of the interplay between the subject and the digital, namely the direct impact of new technologies on the individual/collective divide.

    The individual/collective divide

    14This collection of essays on the digital subject is quite remarkable for the absence of most of the usual defining features of the subject: no mention of gender, of ethnic origins, of class, of professional status, of location. Going digital seems to entail an erasure what constitutes traditionally the presentation of the self, in the definition of Erving Goffman4, which is quite a paradox for a media whose economy is currently based on the exploitation of personal data and the compiling of detailed consumer profiles. Furthermore, one could argue that the eviction of humans from the dynamics of the economy constitutes a further foreclosure of the subject. Two growing trends, automatized transaction protocols (Hayles, Stiegler, Méchoulan) and the influence of statistics on decision making (Liu), could even question the very nature of market as we know it: as a place where demand and supply (to be rephrased as desire and production) can meet, and as a process that enables the maximisation of each agent’s utility (to be rephrased as each subject’s happiness). What kind of market would be mainly defined by the impersonal mechanisms of algorithmic interaction? What becomes of the subject in a world that is ruled by non-human economic agents? The semantic shift from society to socio-technical “environment” is quite telling (Hayles, Salanskis, O’Gorman).

    15Obviously this is still just a thought experiment driven to its limits, but it nevertheless remains that digital technologies are redefining our social interactions. The exponential growth of digital storage space for archival purposes opens up the field for collective memory, and the various prostheses at the core of our extended minds, such as social media or smartphones, foster new modes of extended social interaction (Bourassa). The way in which meaning is shared evolves (Salanskis), and collective forms of attention appear (Stiegler).

    16One of the emerging moot points of our digital times relates to the distinction between public and private matters, between what could or should remain intimate (or secret) and what is exposed publicly, to some or to all. Most essays underline the very political nature of this issue, which can hardly be reduced to technical specifications: how exactly do our digital tools condition the expression of the self? One could think of such constraints as interface pre-formatting or access protocols. To what kind of monitoring is our digital expression subjected? Who controls these apparatuses? It may worth noting that the terms under which such new practices are defined, namely the emphasis on contract and the imperative of transparency, coupled with surveillance techniques, are characteristic of anglophone cultures: the dominance of a specific culture over the rest of the world rests as much upon the technical and legal design of digital media as upon the contents they circulate. And so it appears digital technologies and digital cultures are engaged in a radical reshuffling of what it means for a human being to become a person through their relation to others, and deeply affect what Simondon and Stiegler call the process of transindividuation. Which is worth considering.

    Beyond human?

    17If digital technologies affect the subject’s relations to others, they also affect his or her internal life. The technoscientific fantasy of digital hypermnesia enabled by an ever more tightly prosthetized link between man and machine, be it through genetic manipulations meant to enhance the human brain or the transplantation of computer components into our bodies, partakes in a wish to obliterate oblivion as exemplified by the blank of our preverbal childhood. As remarked by Lyotard, we only access the constellation of hazy sensations that we call childhood through the narratives other adults share with us, testifying to what, and especially to who we used to be, weaving a narrative identity (Ricœur) around the core of our withdrawn ipseity, draping it in the folds of an infinite cloak. The memories upon which our subjectivity has elaborated itself originate in the intimacy of home while we are subjected to our parents’ authority, in other words, to the mancipium (the master’s hold over the slave) that makes us indebted. In fact, the intimate, not to be confused with the hidden or the private5 (Fœssel), points to a type of relationship which, while withdrawing from the public sphere, enables the elaboration of a primal relationship pertaining to the political.

    18With the advent of new technologies, attestation takes on multiple forms and narratives are enriched with images, sounds and other captures snapped on the spot, shared within the clouds which paradoxically privatise the intimate as they publicise it, exposing it to the gaze of others. Our current concern focuses on the memory of a non-emancipated subject whose attested narrative identity switches over into a different register, raising the question of an invisible, disincarnate or dehumanized (even though the negation still points both to the human and the flesh) and hypermnesiac authority, notably that of the various screening algorithms relentlessly shaping our digital identity, for the most part unbeknownst to us. If a machine overtaking the human brain’s capacities is a serious issue, so are technological developments: at best, they shift human condition toward a kind of posthuman and decentered subjectivity, redistributed along our connections to various digital data flows; and in the worst case scenario, posits an augmented transhuman entity, but in all likelihood desubjectivized by a technological environment that seems to run its own autonomous course now, beyond our cognitive grasp. In other words, is it still possible to emancipate ourselves as we have now regressed further into childhood, or indebtedness, battling a machinic and faceless manceps, brought down by a stupefying oblivion, paradoxically generated by the cognitive overload caused by a surplus of stored data? The hypermnesiac capacities of data storing and processing machines affirm the domination, or mainmise6 (Lyotard) of technological development over the human, thereby positing its end, or at least the beginnings of a posthistory.

    Post-history or new temporalities?

    19With new technologies, our relationship to temporality has been radically modified. If the broadcast of an event is erroneously said to occur « in real time », it nonetheless comes close to pure immediacy, that is to say a present without memory. That may be the drift of the exponential production of machine-processed data. Even though it is devoid of thought, it remains constitutive of the traces of our existence — real, or virtual —, whose elaboration has always already been virtually publicized by the privatization of intimacy (Fœssel). What’s more, such data no longer participates in the construction of a narrative of self, or of experience for that matter (referring to the notion of Erfahrung whose demise is mourned by Benjamin, and whose etymology points to the distance, or différance necessary for an event to emerge, and henceforth history), that one can reappropriate, but to the logical architecture of memory bank structured as data bases that have nothing to do with the complexity or workings of neural networks (assuming the seat of memory is solely located in the brain). What can we do with a structure that, contrary to human thought, will not tolerate redundancy and ambivalence? Is the term “memory” still adequate here, or should we talk about traces to account for the new modes of inscription of subjectivity? This new temporal regime paradoxically traps the user in a present devoid of memory that does not allow for a synoptic vision of all archived data (one should no doubt question the logic of gift and liability, value and indebtedness underpinned by this term). Contrary to thought whose “time shifts the cloud when one still believed to know it exactly”7 (Lyotard), the archiving of data on a computerized support is meant to endure and resist oblivion as the corrosive effects of time. This question requires further investigation into what ties digital obsolescence to human biological and subjective time, and once again, the elaboration of our (post) history through new technologies of inscription.

    20Our collective work on hypermnesia, inscription, temporality and code has enabled us to explore the various ways in which the digital subject is reinventing itself, through its relations to the self and to others, in its confrontation with history or with the machine. It has proven a thrilling adventure and opened up numerous exciting new avenues for research.

    Notes de bas de page

    1 H. G. Wells. 1938. World Brain. London: Methuen.

    2 J. L. Borges. 1962. Ficciones. Translated from Spanish by Emecé Editores. New York: Grove Press.

    3 Zygmunt Bauman. 2000. Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press.

    4 Erving Goffman. 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Anchor Books.

    5 Michaël Fœssel. 2008. La privation de l’intime – Mises en scène politiques des sentiments. Paris: Seuil.

    6 Jean-François Lyotard. 1990. “La mainmise.” Autres Temps. Les cahiers du christianisme social, 25, 16-26.

    7 Jean-François Lyotard. 1988. Peregrinations: Law, Form, Event. New York: Colombia University Press.

    Auteurs

    • Claire Larsonneur

      Senior Lecturer at University Paris 8, and a member of EA 1569 « Transferts critiques et dynamique des savoirs ». Her recent research focuses on digital humanities and digital tools, with a focus on contemporary British Literature and Translation Studies. She is Joint Head of « The Digital Subject 2012-2016 » project within Labex Arts-H2H. She has published La Recherche internet en lettres et langues (2008) and Filles de scène/Playhouse Creatures (2014, co-translated and annotated with Marie Nadia Karsky).

    • Arnaud Regnauld

      Professor of American Literature and Translation Studies at University Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis. He has published numerous articles on John Hawkes, Carter Scholz, Gary Lutz, Diane Williams, Matthew Derby, Jim Rosenberg, Shelley Jackson, Michael Joyce, Mark Amerika and Percival Everett. His recent research focuses on new forms of digital textuality and their translation. He is Joint Head of « The Digital Subject 2012-2016 » project within Labex Arts-H2H. He has co-directed with Florence Baillet, L’intime et le politique dans la littérature et les arts contemporains (2011).

    • Pierre Cassou-Noguès

      A Professor of Philosophy at University Paris 8. His recent work focuses on fiction in philosophy and around science. He is Joint Head of « The Digital Subject 2012-2016 » project within Labex Arts-H2H. He has published Lire le cerveau. Neuro/ science/fiction (2012); La mélodie du tic tac et autres bonnes raisons de perdre son temps (2013); Les rêves cybernétiques de Norbert Wiener (2014).

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    1 H. G. Wells. 1938. World Brain. London: Methuen.

    2 J. L. Borges. 1962. Ficciones. Translated from Spanish by Emecé Editores. New York: Grove Press.

    3 Zygmunt Bauman. 2000. Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press.

    4 Erving Goffman. 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Anchor Books.

    5 Michaël Fœssel. 2008. La privation de l’intime – Mises en scène politiques des sentiments. Paris: Seuil.

    6 Jean-François Lyotard. 1990. “La mainmise.” Autres Temps. Les cahiers du christianisme social, 25, 16-26.

    7 Jean-François Lyotard. 1988. Peregrinations: Law, Form, Event. New York: Colombia University Press.

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    Larsonneur, C., Regnauld, A., & Cassou-Noguès, P. (2017). Introduction. In L. Claire, R. Arnaud, C.-N. Pierre, & T. Sara (éds.), The Digital Subject (1‑). Presses universitaires de Paris Nanterre. https://doi.org/10.4000/books.pupo.30838
    Larsonneur, Claire, Arnaud Regnauld, et Pierre Cassou-Noguès. « Introduction ». In The Digital Subject, édité par Larsonneur Claire, Regnauld Arnaud, Cassou-Noguès Pierre, et Touiza. Sara. Nanterre: Presses universitaires de Paris Nanterre, 2017. https://doi.org/10.4000/books.pupo.30838.
    Larsonneur, Claire, et al. « Introduction ». The Digital Subject, édité par Larsonneur Claire et al., Presses universitaires de Paris Nanterre, 2017, https://doi.org/10.4000/books.pupo.30838.

    Référence numérique du livre

    Format

    Claire, L., Arnaud, R., Pierre, C.-N., & Sara, T. (éds.). (2017). The Digital Subject (1‑). Presses universitaires de Paris Nanterre. https://doi.org/10.4000/books.pupo.30803
    Claire, Larsonneur, Regnauld Arnaud, Cassou-Noguès Pierre, et Touiza. Sara, éd. The Digital Subject. Nanterre: Presses universitaires de Paris Nanterre, 2017. https://doi.org/10.4000/books.pupo.30803.
    Claire, Larsonneur, et al., éditeurs. The Digital Subject. Presses universitaires de Paris Nanterre, 2017, https://doi.org/10.4000/books.pupo.30803.
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