Hope and Disappointment. San Francisco Housing Reconstruction after the 1906 Earthquake and Fire
p. 57-68
Résumé
« Entre espoir et déception : la reconstruction de San Francisco après le tremblement de terre et l’incendie de 1906 »
San Francisco : ville portuaire prospère et capitale financière de la Californie et de l’Ouest américain en 1906. Les historiens de cette ville affirment depuis longtemps que le tremblement de terre et l’incendie qui s’ensuivit ne forment que des détails dans sa chronologie historique. Cette perspective aura ses racines éventuellement dans la période d’après catastrophe, où pour encourager l’investissement et une croissance économique rapide, la municipalité de San Francisco sous-estime systématiquement les taux de pertes pour minimiser la dévastation de la ville. Notre article démontre, au contraire, que l’échec de la reconstruction des logements pour les couches populaires permet de comprendre que ces catastrophes ont modifié significativement l’évolution de la ville.
Texte intégral
1San Francisco in 1906 was a prosperous port city and the financial center of California and much of the west. Historians of San Francisco have long asserted that the earthquake and fire of that year were merely blips on the timeline of the city’s history. This perspective may have its roots in the disaster’s immediate aftermath, when in an effort to encourage investment and rapid economic recovery, the San Francisco municipal government systematically underestimated death rates and other indicators of loss in order to minimize the devastation. (Fradkin, 189) Received scholarly wisdom has been that the disaster was a dramatic but relatively unimportant event that in no way changed the course of San Francisco’s economic, social, or political development. (Issel and Cherny, 155; Davies, 159) This paper, using post-disaster housing as a historical lens, demonstrates the fallacy of this view. The failed promise of post-disaster housing reveals an overlooked yet highly significant chapter in San Francisco history.
2In 1847, fewer than 500 people lived in Yerba Buena village, a Mexican outpost on the San Francisco peninsula. By 1900, the population of the newly named and proudly American city of San Francisco had exploded to 343000, with a relatively balanced gender ratio and a diverse ethnic mix largely of European origin with a significant Asian minority.
3Communication, transportation, and above all trade and commerce had been the key ingredients in transforming barren, wind-swept hills and sand dunes into a bustling metropolis. Although the nature of trade goods changed, the movement of commodities and people in and out of the city grew constantly and rapidly in the 19th century, shaping the San Francisco labor market and the city’s political power structure1.
4The earthquake struck the still slumbering city at 5: 12 the morning of Wednesday, April 18, 1906. Up to 4000 people were killed in the subsequent conflagration and thousands more injured. (Fradkin, 190 The disaster’s combined forces destroyed almost all of the infrastructure and physical plant at the base of San Francisco’s economy. Most commercial districts were levelled and the general upheaval created a tremendous setback to San Francisco manufacturers. The disaster also destroyed most of the city’s housing stock, especially in the densely inhabited older working class neighborhoods. The scale of the need experienced by all social classes and groups was astounding, making all the more impressive the speed with which the city rebuilt itself. Lost in the story of that rebuilding have been the efforts of poor San Franciscans to establish control over their lives as they fought for basic rights to housing and jobs.
5Following the 1906 disaster, progressive reformers saw a golden opportunity for experiment in the “great purification by fire” of San Francisco’s vice and prostitution districts as well as residential working class neighborhoods2. Ambitious social reforms were put into practice. Nature had indeed created a tabula rasa. Out of the ruins, reformers soought the rise of a new model city, one harmoniously designed to eliminate social tensions, and modernized to avoid public health problems. Above all, the new San Francisco would eliminate ancient vices by transforming a city of apartments, lodging houses, and hotels into a paradise of small homes. In living out the American dream, the proud laboring owners of modest, single-family homes would work hard and cultivate independence, self-reliance, and all the other democratic virtues and values touted by the middle class.
6Modern day muckraker Phillip Fradkin has called the housing solution in the immediate aftermath of the disaster “a short but successful experiment in self-sufficiency for the less affluent.” (Fradkin, xvii 215 The goal of recreating working class neighborhoods in post-1906 San Francisco ultimately fell victim to class and race-based prejudices fueled by commercial opportunism. But such results are not inevitable. San Francisco’s original recovery effort featured a vibrant and initially quite successful program to serve the housing needs of low income residents displaced by the earthquake. The story of the creation of a flourishing working-class housing development that allowed for dignity and self-reliance reveals the possibilities for real post-disaster recovery. It also highlights the power of the opposition to such developments.
7On the eve of the quake, the poorest workers lived in old, run-down boarding houses and apartments. Employment was scarce and poorly paid. Working families, especially those living in the south of Market Street neighborhood, often stretched their incomes by taking boarders into their already crowded homes. (Quam-Whickham, 8 The flimsy construction of these neighborhoods guaranteed their destruction by the quake and fire. With most housing burnt to the ground, rents immediately soared 350 %, and in 1910 were still 71 % higher than pre-fire rates. (Kazin, 125; cf map 1
8Measures to remake the city began even as the fires still burned. The U.S. Army organized San Franciscans into refugee camps and imposed martial law. Mayor Eugene Schmitz appointed a flurry of committees drawn largely from the city’s business elite. Former San Francisco mayor and leading urban reformer James Phelan incorporated his powerful finance committee as the San Francisco Relief and Red Cross Funds, known as the Relief Committee, in July of 1906. (Kahn, 137-8 President Theodore Roosevelt sent the influential Dr. Edward Devine to oversee the initial operations of the Red Cross, which coordinated the work of local charities, including the most prominent, the Associated Charities of San Francisco (ACSF), headed by Katherine Felton. (Boyer, 224; Felton) Pursuing their objective of fundamentally reforming San Francisco’s housing for the benefit of the working poor, the Relief Committee constructed 5,610 two and three-room wood frame cottages. Although Kevin Rozario suggests that the quality of the cottages was deliberately kept minimal by business leaders unwilling to “interfere with the private property market,” they were enthusiastically described by Devine as “attractive, sanitary, safe, and yet comparatively inexpensive dwellings which will have a beneficial effect not only in the immediate future but for the coming generation.” (Rozario, 973)
9The small green transportable “earthquake cottages,” as they came to be known, were placed in parks and on other public lands. The U.S. Army, under the leadership of General Adolphus Greely, established these refugee camps immediately following the disaster. Residents initially lived under “the most rigid [military] supervision.” (Greely, 129) After the withdrawal of the military on 30 June 1906, Felton and F. W. Dohrmann, vice-chairman of the Relief Committee, managed the camps, helped relocate the cottages onto lots throughout the city, and eased the refugees’ transition into non-supervised city life. (Bolton; Fradkin, 224)
10The ultimate goal of the cottage-lease system was single-family home ownership. The cottages were leased for one year at $2.00 a month, with the monies collected later refunded to the leasee. At the end of the year the cottager became a homeowner, although he or she still had to secure a private lot on which to move the cottage. After losing their homes and often their jobs in the 1906 disaster, many families found respite and recovery in their new houses as they worked successfully to reconstruct their lives4.
11Earthquake cottages relocated to residential districts of the city came to social workers’ attention nation-wide as bright spots in the years of the stubborn recession that began in 1907. In 1909, some observers recognized the beneficial influence of these single family homes: Out of the “unlikely heritage of the calamity... a miracle was wrought.” Hundreds of families “are to be found in many of the residence districts of the city... learning the art of home making.” (Simpson, 9-10) That same year, an observer commissioned by the Red Cross noted the durability of the earthquake cottages and reported approvingly on improvements made to the original structures: “It was very nice indeed how the little cottages seem to endure the rigors of the rain and hot sun of the Pacific Coast5....”
12As the most ardent supporter of cottage living, the ACSF regularly sent social workers to foster its experiment. They encouraged vegetable gardens and proudly reported families weathering hard times by living off their own produce. The modest size of the cottages was praised for encouraging healthy outdoor living. The ACSF concluded that even the most humble cottage was “infinitely better than the best tenement,” providing the beneficial “influence of a comfortable home upon men and women.” (Simpson, 14-17, 19)
13Although more than half the cottages had been moved out of camps by the spring of 1907, the Relief Committee came under constant attack by many middle-class San Franciscans. Complaints centered around two themes: the camps in city parks were depriving deserving citizens of much-needed open space, and the camps were creating a class of idlers and paupers6. San Francisco’s business elite led the critical chorus, seeking to exploit the tabula rasa left by the disaster by maximizing real estate investments on land made vacant, and potentially valuable, by the earthquake and fire. The working-class families living in earthquake cottages or other modestly built homes—so celebrated by social reformer—were viewed by business interests as obstacles to be overcome.
14Once the initial housing emergency was resolved and some of the city’s parks restored to open space, San Francisco’s cultural elite joined the chorus of critics. Working-class homes set in centrally located neighborhoods were inconsistent with their “City Beautiful” movement. Leaders of this movement, including Phelan and sugar baron Adolph Spreckels, had always been reserved in their support of the cottage housing plan championed by reformers. While they tolerated the cottages that had been moved to outlying areas of San Francisco, they did not want them in neighborhoods close to the city center. San Francisco’s upper middle and wealthy classes united with the business elite and engaged in a series of aggressive efforts to raze entire working-class residential neighborhoods. While the reasons cited ranged from cultural and social concerns to economic priorities, the primary method was the proclamation of a series of public health emergencies requiring the destruction of working-class homes, including the reformers’ cherished earthquake cottages.
15Immediately following the 1906 disaster, risks to public health were very real. The lack of clean water supplies, the broken sewage system, and accumulating garbage and debris led to high rates of typhoid and smallpox. To avoid a panic that could harm relief efforts, health officials dealt with the problem of disease discreetly. Those disease outbreaks were controlled by late 1906. (Fradkin, 221-2; Craddock, 147-8) However, in the following year a new and even more frightening health threat appeared: In April 1907, a case of bubonic plague was reported to health officials. By June, fourteen persons had contracted the disease but city officials still did not declare a public health problem. (Lewis, 204 In spite of the Board of Health’s rising concern, business interests (who controlled the press) opposed any wide scale campaign against the disease because a panic would threaten the economic recovery of the city. (Fradkin, 223) In July, however, in the midst of the notorious San Francisco graft trials, physician and law professor Dr. Edward Taylor was appointed mayor. In his efforts to restore health to the municipal administration, Taylor took immediate and vigorous action to stamp out disease. (Issel and Cherny, 157)
16When fifty-five plague cases were reported in July, Taylor appealed for assistance to the USSurgeon General. Sixteen public health officers were dispatched to San Francisco to carry out what one observer called the “most intensive rat hunt in history.” (Lewis, 204-5) Over the next several months, over 150000 rats were examined and exterminated7.
17The city government’s measures to control the disease rationalized the massive destruction of working-class homes, especially and precisely in those neighborhoods with the most real estate potential. Some of its actions flew in the face of the known facts of the epidemic. The city’s “one size fits all” remedy of destroying working-class neighborhoods persisted, however, as the fear of plague generated a wave of panic directed primarily against neighborhoods in which refugee cottages were concentrated.
18The most aggressive measures to “clean up” the city began with those cottages still situated in parks. According to the Relief Committee, in April 1907, about 20 000 people were paying leases in order to live in cottages in the remaining refugee camps. Frederick Dorhmann, the Relief Committee’s camp organizer, pointed out that it would take “many months and much effort before the families that lost all they had in the fire [would] have [alternate] accommodations8.” Rudolph Spreckels, head of the Relief Committee’s Camps Department, and friend and business associate of James Phelan, led the push to close the camps. No sites for the relocation of the cottages were secured, investigated or even suggested by Spreckels or other members of the Camps Department. His lack of concern for the welfare of their residents is reflected in his declaration that he would have the cottages “all removed from the camps within the next two months if he [had] to have the buildings torn down over the heads of refugees9.” The Relief Corporation was quoted as saying, “Some [refugees] show signs of settled stubbornness, but for these there will be an especial fate meted out in time, for everybody must move.” On a single Sunday in August, fifty-seven cottages were removed from eleven camps, and over 700 cottages were moved in that month alone. The parks were rapidly cleared, not because they had been centers of disease, but to make them, as the Chronicle put it, “once more at the disposal of the public at large... to obtain a wholesome outing10.”
19Over the summer of 1907, the ACSF moved approximately 3000 cottages, installing them on private lots with the plumbing paid. This orderly dispersal of cottages turned into a panic when Spreckels, with strong backing from San Francisco’s business and social elite and the courts, ordered all camps closed by the end of the year. Many people were injured and cottages and belongings damaged in hurried moves. Teamsters raised their prices. The ACSF was unable to fund all the applications for aid. The war against the earthquake cottages, ostensibly waged out of concerns for public safety, appeared to be quickly degenerating into a race to clear the land, heedless of the human cost.
20Genuine concerns about public health provided an excellent rationalization for those who sought to destroy the cottages for development purposes. The largest number of plague cases were found in Lobos Square Park, also the camp in which the most cottages remained11. The Board of Public Works, acting on Board of Health instructions issued in September 1907, refused to issue the permits necessary for the transfer of the refugee cottages remaining in city parks to privately owned lots. The Relief Committee finally negotiated terms with the Health and Public Works Boards so that the relocation of the cottages could resume. The terms included new sanitation regulations requiring the installation of foundations, fire-resistant roofs, and plumbing facilities. These requirements slowed the rate of movement considerably12. Also beginning in September 1907, the Boards of Health and Public Works, without evidence that the cottages harbored disease, systematically burned those without plumbing that were located outside the parks and in neighborhoods in which a case of the disease had been reported. Once a cottage was slated for condemnation, only twenty-four to forty-eight hours notice was given to its occupants. In a cruel repetition of the 1906 disaster, homes were often burned with furniture and belongings still inside13.
21The following year a vastly expanded program of destruction resulted in the mass demolition of 2,190 working-class homes, including 1,512 identified as “refugee cottages14.” In October 1908, the Health Board, working with the U.S. Public Health Service, began systematically reviewing housing inspection reports, condemning and destroying housing deemed “substandard.” Significantly, in a parallel action, the Health Board in November 1908 declared bubonic plague eradicated from the entire San Francisco peninsula. Earthquake cottages and other refugee homes were nevertheless destroyed in quick order, followed by lodging houses, hotels, and apartment buildings15.
22Location, rather than condition, increasingly dictated a cottage’s fate. Housing condemnations rose to a climax in 1911, with a total of 1,056 residences condemned in that year alone, before tapering off and finally stabilizing in 1915. Most condemned homes were located in clearly defined clusters, the largest of which was the Harbor View district (the present-day Marina district), followed by the neighborhoods south of Market Street and on Telegraph Hill, with significant numbers in the Mission district, as well as outlying working-class areas to the west and south. The Health Board often reviewed houses en masse. For instance, in a single meeting held on 9 March 1911, it condemned as public health hazards 118 homes in the south of Market district, most of them refugee cottages (cf map 2)16.
23 The largest concentration of condemned residences by far was in the Harbor View district, located between Fort Mason and the Presidio. Between April and December 1911, wholesale condemnations emptied a strip of land two blocks wide by thirteen blocks long. Other condemnations occurred nearby, adding a six by two block long rectangle of land to the strip already razed. Between 1911 and 1912, four hundred and fifteen homes were condemned within this area, comprising about one sixth of the total number condemned in San Francisco from 1908 to 191517.
24Why was such intensive attention paid to the Harbor View district? Was it really driven by concerns for public health? Harbor View’s Lobos Square was the site of the largest camp with the poorest refugees, home at one time to a concentration of 1,496 earthquake cottages. It was the last camp to be closed18. Cottagers frequently moved their homes into the immediate neighborhood, onto readily available lots in large tracts of undeveloped land owned by some of San Francisco’s wealthiest families19. In modern terms, Harbor View, with its sunny, bayside location, and undeveloped lots was ripe for urban redevelopment. In early 1911 the U.S. Congress confirmed San Francisco as the host city for the 1915 Panama-Pacific International Exposition. (Rydell, 217 Only working-class renters and cottagers stood in the way of Harbor View becoming the fair site.
25It is no coincidence that housing condemnations peaked in 1911 following San Francisco’s win in the contest to host the Exposition. Preparations for the Exposition began in 1904, but they intensified after the 1906 earthquake and fire. In sharp contrast to the small sums local businesses donated to relief and charity efforts, by the end of 1910, the Exposition Company had acquired more than $6 million in cash, plus $5 million to be raised from a city bond issue, and an additional $5 million pledged from a state subsidy. (Issel and Cherny, 167-8)
26This outpouring of support reflects the business community’s uniting with the city’s cultural elite, professional, and middle classes in support of the Exposition on the Harbor View site. When James “Sunny Jim” Rolph, business leader and the fair’s most enthusiastic booster, was elected mayor, this alliance was cemented. Rolph ran his administration, in his own words, as “a business corporation of which the citizens are the responsible shareholders.” (Issel and Cherny, 164-5; Hicke, 25) But these shareholders did not include poorer working-class San Franciscans.
27By June 1912, the Company had acquired most of the land it needed to stage the exposition20. The final element necessary was the removal of the many small houses and refugee cottages remaining on the Harbor View site. Although there had been no new plague outbreaks for more than three years, the Exposition Company Building and Grounds Committee gleefully reported that “The Board of Health... at the request of this Committee, is insisting upon the property owners in the Harbor View District removing the unsanitary refugee shacks that are on their property.” The demolition of buildings not promptly taken down by their owners was ordered by the Board—ostensibly for health reasons, but obviously to clear the fair site for development21.
28The extent of the combined pressure by city government and fair organizers to force property owners to evict refugee families is further illustrated by city and Exposition Company reaction to resistance to their plans. The owner of about 100 cottages located on two blocks near Lobos Square secured a temporary restraining order on January 30, 1912, prohibiting the Health Board from removing or destroying the structures. The Exposition Building and Grounds Committee, aided by San Francisco City Attorney Percy V. Long, joined forces with the Health Department to prevent the order from being made permanent. On July 11, 1912, Public Health Service housing inspector, Dr. T. G. Howe wrote to Fred L. Hansen, a builder working with the Exposition Company, ordering the removal or destruction of these and other cottages. In this letter, which was forwarded to the Exposition Director of Works, Howe acknowledged receipt of an Exposition map of the Harbor View district detailing the areas to be cleared. In a statement that had nothing to do with public health, Howe assured Hansen that with the backing of the Exposition, the Golden Gate Valley Improvement Association of Property Owners, and the San Francisco Attorney’s office, “every effort will be made in having the shacks removed22.” These exchanges provide unequivocal evidence that the city’s elite used public services to disappropriate poor working families of their homes in the interest of development. They also provide evidence to support Rozario’s argument that the “logic of creative destruction... helps to explain why so many well-positioned Americans at the turn of the last century expected conflagrations to produce material benefits, even if those benefits were not shared by all.” (Rozario, 98) The city’s business and political elites, seeking to ensure their own economic recovery and profit, dismantled working class neighborhoods on the pretext of public health protection.
29The vision of thousands of prefabricated single-family homes proudly dotting the neighborhoods of San Francisco failed to materialize when it was most needed, in the years immediately following the earthquake. The ultimate failure of the “short but successful experiment in self-sufficiency for the less affluent” noted by Fradkin should not be viewed by urban planners and disaster specialists as inevitable. (Fradkin, 215) The story of San Francisco’s earthquake cottages offers a blueprint for disaster for the poor, if corruption and the desire for profit overshadow the need for modest, affordable housing. It also suggests some possibilities for hope, if support and space for safe, affordable housing for low-income Americans become significant components in the recovery plans for disaster-struck areas.
30The struggle of poor and working class San Franciscans for decent homes after the 1906 disaster has largely been forgotten. San Francisco rose almost phoenix-like from its ashes. The land that had once been home to the earthquake cottages was expanded in 1912, when 1.3 million cubic yards of sand and mud, along with wreckage from 1906, were added to the adjoining bay shallows, forming the site for the elaborate world’s fair. Although the city hosted the 1915 Panama Pacific International Exposition ostensibly to celebrate the completion of the Panama Canal, it was also intended to show the world that the rebuilt San Francisco was bigger and better than ever. Ironically, the exposition’s highly ornate structures, including a 432-foot Tower of Jewels, turned out to be just as temporary as the working-class homes championed by housing reformers in the aftermath of the 1906 quake. Immediately following the exposition’s ten-month run, all but one of its buildings was torn down, making way for the new Marina District, an upscale residential neighborhood. The landfill that makes up much of the area proved its fragility when another earthquake, the Loma Prieta in 1989, once again turned profitable but unstable soils into a landscape of ruined houses. (Fradkin, 343-4) San Francisco’s determination to privilege wealthy homeowners over the working poor continues to rest on (literally) shaky ground.

Map 1.
Source: Lewis, San Francisco, Mission to Metropolis, 190 (droits réservés).

Map 2.
Source: Housing data derived from Board of Health Meetings, SFMR, 1910-1915 (droits réservés).
Bibliographie
Works cited
Bolton Marie, “Unstable but Not Shiftless: Working Poor Families in San Francisco, 1906-1915”, Frontières, (January 1997).
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Craddock Susan, City of Plagues: Disease, Poverty, and Deviance in San Francisco, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2000, 312 p.
Davies Andreas, Reconstructing Home, Ph. D diss., Stanford University, May 2005.
Douglas Daniels, Pioneer Urbanites: A Social and Cultural History of Black San Francisco, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991, 248 p.
Dreyfus Philip J., Our Better Nature: Environment and the Making of San Francisco, Norman, Oklahoma University Press, 2008, 226 p.
Ethington Philip J., The Public City: The Political Construction of Urban Life in San Francisco, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, 480 p.
Felton Katherine, “Work of the Associated Charities in Connection with the Clearing of Camps and the Permanent Housing of Refugees,” Annual Reports of the Associated Charities, 1907.
Fradkin Philip, The Great Earthquake and Firestorms of 1906, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2005, 448 p.
Hicke Carole, “The 1911 Campaign of James Rolph, Jr., Mayor of All the People,” MA Thesis, San Francisco State University, 1978.
Issel William and Robert Cherny, San Francisco, 1865-1932: Politics, Power, and Urban Development, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1986, 295 p.
Kahn Judd, Imperial San Francisco: Politics and Planning in an American City, 1897-1906, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1979, 263 p.
Kazin Michael, Barons of Labor: The San Francisco Building Trades and Union Power in the Progressive Era, Urban, University of Illinois Press, 1987, 338 p.
Lewis Oscar, San Francisco: Mission to Metropolis, 2nd edition, San Diego, Howell-North Books, 1980, 274 p.
Meisner Rosen Christine, The Limits of Power: Great Fires and the Process of City Growth in America, MA, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986, 408 p.
Quam-Wickham Nancy, “‘The Right to Board and Lodge Where and with Whom We Please’: Dimensions of Boarding and Lodging in a Working-Class District, San Francisco, 1880-1900,” unpub. mss. in authors’ possession, May 1988.
Rozario Kevin, The Culture of Calamity: Disaster and the Making of Modern America, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2007, 324 p.
Russel Sage Foundation, San Francisco Relief Survey, NY: Survey Associates, Inc., 1913.
Rydell Robert W., All the World’s A Fair: Visions of Empire at American International Expositions, 1876-1916, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, 338 p.
Simpson Anna, The Story of the Associated Charities Since the Fire of 1906 (San Francisco call, 1909), Berkeley, Bancroft Library, University of California, 9-10.
Takaki Ronald, Strangers From a Distant Shore: A History of Asian Americans, Boston, Back Bay Books, 1998, 640 p.
Tygiel Jules, Workingmen in San Francisco, 1880-1901, New York, Garland Publishing Co., 1992, 444 p.
Vance James E., Geography and Urban Evolution in the San Francisco Bay Area, Berkeley, Institute of Government Studies, 1964, 89 p.
Yung Judy, San Francisco’s Chinatown, San Francisco, Arcadia, 2006, 128 p.
Archival sources
American Red Cross Papers.
Associated Charities of San Francisco.
Panama-Pacific International Exposition Papers.
San Francisco Labor Council Papers.
San Francisco Municipal Reports.
Notes de bas de page
1 Tygiel, 17; Issel and Cherny, 12-13, 24, 55-56; Ethington, 425. See also Daniels, Yung and Takaki. For pre-20th century San Francisco, see for example Vance, Issel and Cherny, Ethington and Dreyfus.
2 Charities and the Commons 16 (June 2, 1906), 285.
3 See Edward Devine to James D. Phelan, “Recommendations submitted to the Finance Committee, July 10, 1906,” in San Francisco Relief Survey, 394-95.
4 ACSF Case Studies 1912, carton 2, San Francisco Labor Council Papers (SFLCP), Bancroft Library, UC Berkeley.
5 Joseph A. Steinmetz, Pennsylvania Branch Red Cross, to Mabel T. Boardman, National Red Cross, August 11, 1909; August 20, 1909, Red Cross Papers (RCP), National Archives, Washington, D.C.
6 Felton to Major General George W. Davis, National Red Cross, September 21, 1907, RCP.
7 “Contagious Diseases Reports,” and “Board of Health Reports,” San Francisco Municipal Reports (SFMR), 1905-1910.
8 Dohrmann to Boardman, National Red Cross, April 30, 1907, RCP.
9 Felton to Major Gen. Davis, National Red Cross, September 21, 1907, RCP.
10 San Francisco Chronicle, August 19, 1907; August 23, 1907.
11 “San Francisco Board of Health Meeting Minutes,” SFMR, 1907-08 to 1915-16; see also Fradkin, 222.
12 R. Briones to Dohrmann, September 23, 1906, RCP; Felton to Dohrmann, September 24, 1907, RCP; SF Board of Health Reports, SFMR, 1907-1908.
13 Letters and reports in Merchants’ Association of San Francisco, Civic League of San Francisco, and Citizens Health Committee, cartons 6 and 12, SFLCP; Rehabilitation Committee, “Report to American National Red Cross,” September 28, 1907, RCP.
14 Data compiled from San Francisco Board of Health Meeting Minutes, SFMR, 1907-08 to 1915-16. For the razing of much of the wooden infrastructure in San Francisco’s working-class neighborhoods, see also Craddock, 126, 153-55.
15 SF Board of Health Meetings reported in the SFMR, 1908, 1910-1915; “Memorandum on the Charity Needs of San Francisco,” October 22, 1910, RCP.
16 Data compiled from San Francisco Board of Health Meeting Minutes, SFMR, 1907-08 to 1915-16.
17 SF Board of Health Report, SFMR, 1911-1912.
18 Russell Sage Foundation, San Francisco Relief Survey, 85; San Francisco Relief Committee, Department Reports to Board of Directors, March 19, 1907, RCP.
19 Buildings and Grounds Committee to Directors of PPIE Co., March 15, 1912, Buildings and Grounds folder, PPIE Papers (PPIEP), Bancroft Library.
20 Buildings and Grounds Committee to Mastick and Partridge, June 10, 1912, Lease of Property folder, PPIEP.
21 Buildings and Grounds Committee, PPIE Co., to Directors of the PPIE Co., March 15, 1912, Buildings and Grounds folder; Director of Works, PPIE Co., to W. Chatfield, March 29, 1912, Removal of Houses, Harbor View Site folder, PPIEP. San Francisco’s experience defies the argument presented by Christine Meisner Rosen that poor people exercise a “passive” power in simply occupying space with their homes. See Rosen, 33.
22 Buildings and Grounds Committee, PPIE Co., to Directors of the PPIE Co., March 15, 1912, Buildings and Grounds folder; R.G. Brodrick, SF Health Officer, to Harris D.H. Connick, Director of Works, PPIE Co., September 27, 1912; Connick to Brodrick, October 1, 1912; Dr. T.G. Howe to Fred L. Hansen, July 11, 1912; Hansen to Connick, July 15, 1912; Connick to Hansen, July 17, 1912; Removal of Houses, Harbor View Site folder, PPIEP.
Auteurs
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Marie Bolton
Université Blaise Pascal, Clermont-Ferrand-II
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Nancy C. Unger
Santa Clara University, California
Le texte seul est utilisable sous licence Licence OpenEdition Books. Les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont « Tous droits réservés », sauf mention contraire.
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