Identity, Integration and the Rise of Identity Economy
The Quebec Case in Comparison with Scotland, Wales and Catalonia1
p. 211-231
Texte intégral
1Many nations are facing the dilemma posed by recognition versus nationhood2. As they want to valorise their national identity and develop their civic democracy, they remain in many cases nations without states3. This is the case in particular of four nations: Quebec, Scotland, Wales and Catalonia, nations attempting to affirm their respective identities. In these examples, the states (Canada, Britain, Spain) seem to be unable to adequately represent the divergent nationalities living within their borders. Some states, like Britain, have chosen the road of constitutional reform as a political choice to resolve internal conflict. Conversely the Canadian government has opted to take the road of confrontation to reaffirm its “national” identity at the expense of the other internal nations.
2Globalization has also had a important effect on identity. Many nationalist groups which were historically reticent toward the idea of a political and economic supra-state entity now embrace the scheme as one which may provide more opportunity. They now view the European Union (eu) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (nafta) as means to promote their national identity beyond the confines of the state structure, and thus enhance national recognition in the international arena. Moreover, it affords the opportunity for greater foreign investment coupled with free trade, resulting in less dependence on state governments. We have therefore witnessed the emergence in many nations of what we call identity economy, that is, nations or regions having their own cultural and political characteristics and being able to respond efficiently to international competition.4
3The eu and nafta have also transformed the European and North American political cultures. Consequently, the notion that citizens have a single identity seems to fade, while theories of multiple identity have taken the foreground of the discussion. The concept of identity is therefore analyzed more and more as dynamic and multifaceted. Therefore, the central question of this essay is: How have economic, technological, and sociopolitical changes transformed the basic attitudes, values, and skills of industrial societies such as Quebec, Scotland, Wales and Catalonia? As Ronald Inglehart argued, we think that “culture change is shaping both the economic growth rates of societies and the kind of economic development they are pursuing. It is reshaping the social basis of political conflict, the reason people support political parties, the kinds of parties they support, and the ways in which they try to attain their political goals.”5 These trends lead to the emergence of new forms of regionalism which are a response to the emergence of various regional trading agreements (nafta, eec, apec, etc.). As Adam Gwiazda suggests, this “new regionalism” has been pursued on a much larger scale than the old regionalism since the 1960s, and its most important characteristic is the search for new forms of economic, political and social partnerships between citizens and regions/nations6.
4As is implied by the title of this paper, the objective of the study is to facilitate a fuller understanding of the nature of public opinion toward the emerging European and North American political culture. The central idea is that despite the general popular support of Quebecers, Scots, Welsh and Catalans for European and North-American integration, they do not conceive this integration in terms of common needs and interests. They regard it more in terms of national gains (nationalism) and individual benefits (liberalism). This is the Européanité of the Scots, Welshs and Catalans and the Américanité of Quebecers, a form of liberalist/post-materialist civic culture coupled with a deep sense of national identity.
5The first part of this paper focuses on the identity measures of these four nations; subsequently, these percentages are cross-correlated in order to unearth some convergence/divergence elements. In the second part, we are formulating the hypothesis that the strong identity of these nations or their sense of belonging to a “national community”7 has led to the construction of their economic model or what we have defined as identity economy. Either in the case of the impact of nafta on Quebec or of the eec on Scotland, Wales or Catalonia, it is not a coincidence that these nations are often seeing the continentalization or Europeanization of their economy as a way to escape internal state pressure. Therefore, one of our hypotheses is that having a strong national identity is positively correlated to support for economic integration. This raises the issue of the relationship between nationalism and supranationalism.
6In the third part, we will focus more on the Quebec situation. We will present some of the data of longitudinal studies we carried out in 1997 and 1998 to provide a better understanding of the main determinants of the Americanness of Quebecers. Our central question is to what degree do Quebecers of all cultural and linguistic origins perceive themselves as North American, share North American values and adopt behaviour considered to be North American? We hypothesize that a significant shift has taken place in Quebec society since the signature of fta and nafta8.
7This shift that we define as the Americanness or Américanité of Quebecers is at the crossroads between liberalism, nationalism and post-modernism. The first is based essentially on individual freedom and economic laisser-faire; the second recognizes the right of peoples and individuals to decide their future; and the third refers to the growth of communal or collective values9. Quebec society is therefore an interesting case study since it has developed a specific model between its liberalism (high support of free trade) and its nationalism (support for cultural distinctiveness). Quebecers are also pursuing new post-materialist values such as a deeper sense of social solidarity and greater concern for environmental issues. Quebec nationalism (like Scottish, Welsh and Catalan nationalisms) is partly the expression of Quebec’s role in the new economy.10
1 Self-Identification: Convergence and Divergence Between Quebec, Scotland, Wales and Catalonia
1.1 Self-identification: the Moreno-Arriba index
8In a contemporary political context, national identity cannot be reduced to a single denominator. More importantly, in an increasingly globalized society, identity is often multiform. No longer is there only one predominant carrier of national identity, but several. Language has certainly been a key carrier; nevertheless there exist many nations for which language plays a negligible role. National history has been, and will continue to be, the key factor of all nationalist movements. Having said this, one must acknowledge the myriad of other considerations involved in evaluating identity. These consist of ethnicity, economic performance, the potential for constitutional reform and certainly the effect of globalization. With regard to the latter, the potential of international representation and the reliance on foreign capital are of foremost importance.
9Until recently, public opinion polls aimed at ascertaining varying degrees of national identity have focused primarily on one group. Given the availability of recent opinion polls and surveys, comparative analysis can be undertaken more easily. In this section we are comparing the results of surveys which used the Moreno-Arriba’s index on multiple identities.11 Respondents from Quebec, Scotland, Wales and Catalonia were asked a series of questions geared toward determining their identities.
10The question in each nation generally consisted of asking if a respondent feels completely nationalist (only Quebecer, Scottish, Welsh or Catalan), predominantly nationalist followed by state-centric (more...than), equally nationalist and state-centric (as much... as...), predominantly state-centric followed by nationalist (more... than), and totally state-centric (Canadian, British or Spanish). Table 1 presents the comparative results on this question. Scottish respondents express a higher degree of national identity (33%) than Welsh, Quebecers or Catalans. If we add the first two answers on the scale, we observe again that Scots (66%) and Quebecers (46.9%) are more nationalist than Welsh (43%) and Catalans (27.5%).
11However, it is in the category of shared identity (as much...as...) that we can observe interesting trends. Catalans shared identity is at 43.6%, an increase of 7.3% since 1990 (36.3%)12 and the highest figure among the four nations. Welsh, Quebecer and Scottish numbers are relatively similar, one-third of the population being equally nationalist and state-centric. Finally, for the last two categories which revolved more around state-centric identity, Catalans have the highest number: 27.7%, followed by Quebecers at 12.3%, Welsh at 10% and Scottish at 3%. However, Catalans and Welsh are the ones who felt more only Spanish or British (12% each), in comparison with Quebecers at 6.8% and Scottish at 3%. If we compare the first two categories (national identity) versus the last two categories (state-centric identity) we can observe that Scottish respondents have a stronger national identity than state-centric identity (66/6), followed by Quebecers (46.9/19.1) and Welsh (43/22). Catalans are equally Catalan and Spanish (27.5/27.7).
Table 1. Self-identification in Quebec, Scotland, Wales and Catalonia
quebec | scotland | wales | catalonia | |
(1998)1 | (1997)2 | (1997)2 | (1995)3 | |
Only * | 16.8 | 33 | 17 | 10.3 |
More * than Canadian, British, or Spanish | 30.1 | 33 | 26 | 17.2 |
Equally/as much * and Canadian, British, or Spanish | 33.3 | 29 | 34 | 43.6 |
More Canadian, British, Spanish than * | 12.3 | 3 | 10 | 15.5 |
Only Canadian, British, Spanish, not * | 6.8 | 3 | 12 | 12.2 |
Total: |
* Quebecers, Scottish, Welsh, English, Catalan
Sources:
1. Survey conducted by the polling firm Léger et Léger, between June 19 and 26, 1998. The question asked was almost identical to the Moreno-Arriba study.
2. John Curtice, paper presented at the CREST conference in Cardiff in September 18, 1998. Respondents from Scotland, Wales, and England were asked whether they felt a. Scottish, Welsh, English not British, b. more S/W/E than British, c. equally S/W/E and British, d. more British than S/W/E or e. British, not S/W/E.
3. Luis Moreno and Ana Arriba, “Dual Identity in Autonomous Catalonia,” Scottish Affairs, 17 (1996), p-85.
12To further analyze the relationship between self-identification and political support, we have decided to distinguish each item from the Moreno-Arriba index and consider each one as a question.13 The idea of separating each item is simply a way to go beyond the exclusiveness of the categories suggested by the Moreno-Arriba index and to evaluate if citizens can also have some shared identities or loyalties. As we can observe in table 2, 56.7% indicate that they are more Quebecer than Canadian, and only 40.5% agree that they are more Canadian than Quebecer. But 72.3% of our respondents agree that they are equally Canadian and Quebecer. Finally, 97.6% of the respondents disagree with the statement that they are neither Canadian or Quebecer. These figures clearly indicate that respondents have some shared identity. It can be argued that they are equally Canadian and Quebecer, and in some situations more supportive of the Quebec identity. These figures indicate clearly that when we separate each items from the Moreno-Arriba index, the identity issue becomes more complex.
Table 2. Self-identification in Quebec (1998)

Question: Could you tell me if you completely agree, rather agree, rather disagree, or completely disagree with the following sentences?
Source: SONDAGEM, October 17 to 21, 1998.
1.2 Identity Convergence and Divergence
13To pursue this analysis, we cross-correlated these figures to unearth some convergence between these national/state-centric identities.14 Upon initial examination, surprisingly enough, Pearson’s r values are nearly identical for Quebec and Wales and the highest of all pairs. One explanation is probably that the two nations have several common characteristics which have not always been stressed, which is that language is for both a key carrier of identity. English has been widely spoken in these nations for generations and the fear of losing their respective languages has prompted more pro-active policies in Quebec and Wales.
14All Quebec governments in the last forty years, whatever the political party in power (Union Nationale, Liberal or Parti Québécois), have actively enforced the use of French in schools, government institutions and the private sector. The Welsh have also adopted a similar policy so as to preserve their language and promote cultural and national identity. Indeed, the Welsh have based much of their language policy on Quebec’s language law Bill 101 adopted in 1977 by the Quebec government. Furthermore, the issue of greater autonomy, whether it be devolution, sovereignty-partnership or independence, has gained support over the past decades. Finally, the two nations have experienced an economic growth in recent years which has certainly led to respective feelings of being economically more and more viable. These combined factors have certainly influenced the Quebecer and Welsh identities of these nations.
15The strong correlation between Wales and Catalonia is also interesting. In recent years Catalonia has been active in the European union, attempting to affirm itself both culturally and politically, whereas Wales has certainly not exhibited the same degree of international political activity. Nevertheless, the two nations both belong to the same supra-state entity and have a comparatively impressive growing economy, despite moderate reliance on foreign investment. However, both nations have actively sought to promote the use of their respective language to fortify their national identity. Also, Wales and Catalonia have exhibited relatively constructive relationships with Britain and Spain, which translates their strategy for greater autonomy.
16Not really surprising is the correlation between Quebec and Scotland. Quebec’s identity lies within the parameters of its North-American specificity, 82% of its population having French as a mother tongue while being a minority within Canada. In Scotland, language is not a major issue. But both nations were conquered by the English during approximately the same period, resulting in a common perception of political domination. Each nation also has a separate legal system within its own state; Quebec’s Napoleonic Code is clearly different from Canada’s common law, while the Scottish legal system is notably unique in the United Kingdom. But if Scotland was a state in its own right centuries ago, Quebec never achieved such a status, even if for many Quebecers, the merging of Lower and Upper Canada into a single state (1867) is interpreted as a pact between two nations. Today, the recognition of Quebec as a nation remains at the heart of the political discussion since the federal government refuses to acknowledge that Quebec is the homeland of Quebecers. Therefore, Quebec and Scotland are searching for new forms of institutional arrangements within or outside Canada or Britain. However, the lower correlation for Quebec/Scotland versus Quebec/Wales can perhaps be the result of the split between the hard and soft nationalists in both nations.
17Scottish and Welsh national identities are not as close as one might surmise. Given that both nations are part of the same state structure, not to mention of the eu, one might suspect a closer correlation. Despite these parallels, Scotland and Wales are largely divergent. For the Welsh, language is a key determinant of national identity whereas the Scots can only espouse a distinct accent. Hence, for the Scots, identity is largely based on formal/legal arrangements rather than linguistic ones. The Scots are not promoting the use of Gaelic to the degree that the Welsh are. Perhaps most striking is the relationship the two nations have with London. The Welsh are not nearly as embittered toward the English as their nationalist neighbours north of the border. These differences might account for the weak correlation between the two national identities.
18Quebecer and Catalan identities seem as close as those of the Scottish and Welsh. It should be said that Quebec/Catalonia relations are relatively recent: the Quebec government opened an office in March 1999. Mr. Pujol has referred several times to the Quebec model as an example to follow. Mr. Pujol and Mr. Bouchard both signed a declaration promoting the cultural identity of nations in an increasingly globalized economy.15 Secondly, in 1983 the Catalan government made both Catalan and Castilian the official languages of the nation, which has led recently to an increase in both national and shared identities. However, according to the 1978 Spanish Constitution, Catalonia is considered a “historic nationality,” a status that Quebec has never achieved under the Canadian constitution, which led to the failure of the Meech Lake Accord in 1990. These factors probably explain the strength of the relationship.
19Finally, the weakest correlation (0.30) is between Scotland and Catalonia. One common characteristic of these two nations is their support for the development of a “Europe of the regions.” If the Catalan are more concerned with preservation of culture and language and with achieving greater autonomy, the Scots are more concerned about the devolution process initiated by Westminster. Also, Catalan language policy has not been a very contentious issue.16 If the Scots have a strong national identity, the Catalans have a different sense of identity even if it can be argued that Catalonia existed before Spain. But the growing national identity of Catalans has first to be perceived as “being different from the Spanish peoples”; Catalan looks more like an emerging identity in comparison with Scottish identity.
1.3 Dual Identity and Voting Patterns: the Quebec Case
20Looking at the Quebec case, some interesting variations can be observed when we cross-tabulate our results with age, gender, education, family income, mother tongue and occupation. As we had previously observed, shared identity accounts for 33.3% of the total, while 46.9% of the respondents define themselves as only Quebecer and Quebecer first, in comparison to 19,1% who considered themselves only Canadian and Canadian first. However; mother tongue clearly discriminates between identities, with the francophone population belonging strongly to Quebec identity (55%). It is particularly relevant to observe that a greater proportion of the members of the other linguistic groups17 express a higher level of dual identity (45-4%) than Canadian identity (41.3%).
21Self-identification by the youngest group (18-24) is more in line with Quebecer identity (57.2%), followed by dual identity (26.2%) and Canadian identity (15,7%). The results are very similar in the next three age groups (25-34, 35-44, 45-54), being around 50%. However, we can observe for the last two age groups (55-64, 65 and over) that respondents express a lower degree of Quebec identity and the highest degree of Canadian identity. The results for the 55-65 group are particularly interesting since it is the only group which indicates their preference for a shared identity at 41.3%. For the age group of 65 and over, the Canadian identity comes first (37.1%), followed by the Quebec identity (34.9%) and shared identity (27.4%). Self-identification according to sex does not translate into significant differences.18
22When we look to education and family income we observe the same pattern. The higher the level of education or income level of the respondents, the stronger the Quebec identity and the weaker the Canadian identity. Dual identity increases slowly as education increases but remains relatively stable among income groups. Looking to occupation, we observe that homemakers (37.5%) and professionals (36.6%) have the highest scores for dual identity. But contrary to the Catalan experience, we do not observe that shared identity figures rise from higher to lower occupations.19 The percentages are relatively similar except for the unemployed, who have a stronger Quebec identity (73.1%) and the lowest shared identity (13%). Professionals show the second highest degree of Quebec identity (52.9%), followed closely by students (50.8%). In the case of retired people, the figures are very similar to the ones for the age group 65 and over, retired people being equally divided among Canadian identity (33.7%), Quebec identity (33.6%) and dual identity (32.2%).
23Voting patterns correspond closely to self-identification. Supporters of the Parti Québécois share the Quebec identity in the proportion of 79.3%, while dual and Canadian identity figures drop to 16.6% and 3.7% respectively (see Table 4). Dual identity reaches its highest ratios among Liberal voters; 47.1% express a shared-identity and 33.3% Canadian identity. Quebec identity is stronger among Action Démocratique supporters (56.9%) than liberal voters (19.3%). Consequently, party affiliation strongly shapes identities in the Quebec case.
2 Identity and Continentalization: The Americanness of Quebecers
24A distinction has to be made between Americanization20 and Americanness. The first refers to the notion of resistance to or rejection of a process of acculturation by which the American culture influences European and North American culture.21 If the Scots, Welsh and Catalans often criticize the dominance of us culture in Europe, the Quebec situation is relatively peculiar since they are on the border of the most important economic and cultural power of the world. The Americanness of Quebecers encompasses both Latin America and Anglo-Saxon America, and denotes “the notion of openness and sphere of influence as indicators of Québec’s consensual sense of belonging to the continent.” In the case of the Europeanness of the Scots, Welsh and Catalans, the same analysis can probably be made: that they share a certain vision concerning the future of Europe. As Table 4 indicates, Quebecers are as supportive of North-American integration as many European countries are of Europe integration.
Table 3. Self-identification and voting patterns (1998)

Source: Léger et Léger, June 19 and 26, 1998.
25Analysis of Quebec’s ties with America, and more specifically with the United States, is not new. French Canadians, and later the Québécois, have long questioned the nature of their relationship with America and the United States. But until recently the debate has generally focused on minor aspects of this relationship. In light of more frequent references to America, particularly with the signing of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States (fta, 1988) and nafta (1992), a heightened awareness has emerged, and with it growing interest in shared historical, cultural, economic and political membership.
26Until now, the United States, by virtue of its power and influence, has dominated understanding of the meaning of “American”, monopolizing to a large extent its symbolic value. But the concept of Americanness is based on a narrower definition, namely that which is limited to the United States, and a broader definition in terms of an actual sense of belonging to the continent, resulting in a number of shared characteristics, attitudes and behaviours by the inhabitants of that continent. Defined as such, Americanness refers to a wide- ranging consciousness of a specificity linked to America, while Americanization by the United States expresses a perceived relationship of domination. To affirm the existence of Americanness is not to deny the existence of Americanization, which is now spreading to the four corners of the globe. We are, therefore, navigating between Americanization by the United States and Americanness, between the incorporation of influences strictly from the United States and the recognition of how Quebec identity is shaped by its belonging to a pluralistic America.
Table 4. Percentages of Quebecers favorable to NAFTA and European countries favorable to the EEC
Netherlands | 85 | Spain | 67 | Greece | 47 |
Luxembourg | 85 | Québec | 62 | England | 39 |
Italy | 79 | Germany | 62 | Danemark | 37 |
France | 70 | Portugal | 61 | ||
Belgium | 68 | Irlande | 57 |
Sources: Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift..., op. cit., p. 411; Max Kaase and Kenneth Newton, Beliefs in Government, London, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 116; gram, 1997.
2.1 Quebec National, Continental and Territorial Identities
27Research conducted over the last few years on the Americanness of Quebecers reveals three major areas of inquiry.22 The first refers to the reaction of the traditional elite to the growing dissemination of American mass culture which threatens specific regional and national cultures. The second concerns the interaction between Americaness and modernity, from the perspective of the North American dynamic. The third, which informed our inquiry and was apparent from the first findings of our survey, is that of the multifaceted identity of Quebecers, namely that which makes francophone Quebecers francophones of America. Francophone Quebecers’ identity is not based exclusively on an attachment to French roots, but on an equally strong attachment to being rooted in American soil. The question of identity enabled us to shed light on Quebecers’ sense of belonging as an essential element of the definition of Americanness.
28Our results indicate that 54% of Quebecers have a strong national identity, defining themselves as Quebecers, 23% as French-Canadians, 19% as Canadians, and 2% as English-Canadians. The growth of Quebec identity has become a sociological fact over the last forty years. The French-Canadian identity has been disappearing over the years. Since the 1995 Quebec referendum, it is important to note a certain stability in the number of people identifying themselves as Quebecers. In comparison with the European nations, the national sentiment of Quebecers is as strong as that of German or Irish people, and even stronger than the national identity of the French people.23 But beyond their national identity, 68% of Quebecers define themselves as having a North American (continental) identity.
29Concerning their territorial attachment, Quebecers chose their province first, at 40%, followed by Canada as a whole at 20%, their region at 16% and their municipality at 13%. These results are important because they shed light on the complex nature of Quebec identity, since beyond the Quebec region there is strong national feeling. In the Quebec case, national roots are combined with a sense of belonging to the continent. Finally, in term of the supranational identity of Quebecers, 11% of our respondents indicated that they belong territorially either to North America or the world as a whole, results very similar to the European ones.24
2.2 Identity Economy and Competitiveness: Quebec-U.S. Relations
30The comparative data on identities translates the emergence of what has be called the “new regionalism” or what we prefer to describe as “identity economy.” It is in this context that the notion of competitiveness and the role of the state in creating a competitive environment to face the challenges of globalization becomes a key issue. The “new regionalism” both in Europe and North America has led in recent years to new forms of economic partnerships between regions, nations and states, the ultimate goal being to improve the standard of living, reduce unemployment levels and increase productivity. The ability of one state or region to sell products or services to the rest of the world through technological advancement, a skilled workforce, low inflation, and sound policy environment (reasonable tax rates and economic regulations) are among the key factors helping regions to increase their competitive edge.25
31From this perspective, the Quebec situation is comparable to Scotland, Wales and Catalonia since Quebec identity is part of the governmental strategy for economic, technological and political adaptation. The new Quebec “identity economy” is a response to changes in the North American environment and the development of a knowledge-based economy. Therefore, changes in values and attitudes enabled us to measure behaviour that can be tied to these new forms of competitiveness and transborder practices. From this perspective, support for the welfare state appears to be an important characteristic of the Quebec model vis-à-vis the United States. Consequently, it is not surprising that a large majority of Quebecers (62%) consider the us market to be the most important, and beyond that, the global economy.
32Therefore, the attitude of Quebecers toward the United States (affection, disaffection) should have an impact on policies supporting regional integration. These policies are also more likely to receive public endorsement. This hypothesis states that peoples who share “mutual sympathies and loyalties” (Quebec vis-à-vis the Americas or Scotland, Wales and Catalonia vis-à-vis Europe) with other regions/peoples are more likely to act positively toward regional integration.26 Expressions of support for North American or European integration are likely to be affected by the differences in the meaning attached to this term, as well as the differences in the regional climates prevailing at different periods of time. Most evidence since 1988 points to strong Quebec support for North American integration in comparison to other Canadian provinces. However, mutual loyalties and sympathies can be developed between Quebec and the United States even if some Canadians outside Quebec have great distrust toward the United States.
33Three questions were asked concerning mutual sympathies. First, 56% of Quebecers consider themselves very or somewhat different from American citizens; 26% affirm that Quebecers are only slightly different and I8% think that there is no difference. Second, when we ask if they feel closer to English Canadians from the other provinces or to Americans, 48% feel closer to citizens from the other provinces while 33% feel closer to Americans. Finally, a majority of respondents (51%) feel that the influence of the United States on Quebec’s cultural development is beneficial.
2.3 Public Support for North American Integration
34The image of North American integration generally held by Quebec citizens is strongly linked with their perceptions of economic growth, larger trade and the modernization of industry, which are attributable to nafta. Moreover despite the obvious existence of a certain utilitarian sentiment in Quebecers’ expectations of economic prosperity, emotional attachment to the idea of North America is also relatively important. In a survey conducted in September 1995 among 300 leaders of small businesses in Quebec, 57% of respondents said that nafta had neither a favourable nor an unfavourable impact on their businesses; 32% argued that the impact was positive and only 9% said that it was negative. Furthermore, 30% evaluated that the membership of other South American countries would be beneficial to their enterprises; 12% said it would have a negative impact; 54% said it would have neither a positive nor a negative impact.27
35First of all, Quebecers’ evaluation of the degree to which Quebec has benefited from nafta is very strong. To the question of whether nafta had a positive or negative effect on Quebec’s economic development, 61.9% argue that the effect was positive. Furthermore, the expected economic effects and the willingness on the part of the Quebec public to act in much closer cooperation on economic issues with other countries (usa, Mexico, Chile, etc.) is certainly an important indicator of support for integration. In our survey, we asked Quebecers if the inclusion of South American countries would have a positive or negative effect on Quebec society; 56.7% of respondents affirm that nafta’s expansion would have a positive effect.
36Finally, from a cultural viewpoint, the public’s awareness of the dangers of North American integration is the most helpful evidence in reviewing the perceived effects of integration on nation-state or individual levels. When we ask Quebecers if they feel that Quebec’s cultural uniqueness is at risk with nafta, 62,6% disagree. Furthermore, 64% of Quebecers think that economic globalization is neither a threat to cultural diversity nor to their social programs (59-6%). These results were obtained before the debate on the Multilateral Investment Agreement and the exception regarding cultural products came up for discussion. This certainly translates the cultural confidence of Quebecers at the time of the survey.
2.4 Approaches or New Forms of Partnerships
37Political integration, on the other hand, is seen as a long-term goal. Furthermore, the public’s perception of more national gains rather than individual benefits may help to explain the reluctance of many people to accept some personal sacrifice in the cause of North American integration. Another important element is the significance of socio-political factors in Quebecers’ general satisfaction with integration. Therefore, the economic performance of nafta is not the only criterion for support.28
38The creation of North American institutions did not necessarily lead to a stronger public commitment of further integration. Nevertheless, the operation of supranational institutions (eg. North American Committee on the Environment, on Labour Relations, etc.) over a period of time could have some effect on the values of younger age groups. Also, popular support for North American integration proved to be correlated with the growth of a strong emotional component in the general support for greater cooperation. On the other hand, factors other than “legitimacy” of North American institutions could have accounted for the levels of support accorded to integration by Quebecers (e.g. increase in economic growth and standards of living as a result of economic integration). Thus, Quebecers might become less likely to express strong opposition to North American institutions. As for the legitimacy of newly created North American institutions, the public is disposed to accept it.
Table 5. Approaches to be followed in the next several years

Question: To be better prepared for North American integration over the next several years, which of the following approaches seems most appropriate for Quebec?
Source: gram, 1997.
39Therefore, we asked Quebecers which of the following approaches seems most appropriate for Quebec in the next several years: (1) to be part of a North American government in which Quebec would have a certain degree of power; (2) to forge links between Quebec and the United States; or (3) to maintain considerable autonomy from the United States. The results indicate again the willingness of Quebecers to strengthen their relations with the United States, 39.5% supporting greater links with the U.S. and 2.2.8% to be part of a North American government (see table 5).
40But the interesting element is to observe that 50.8% of Anglo-Quebecers favour to a larger degree than francophones the maintenance of considerable autonomy between Quebec and the United States. For 42.0% of francophones, forging links with the U.S. should be the first approach. When we compare the results by age group, we observe that the younger you are the more you support a North American government. But if the idea of increasing the links with the United States remains the favourite option for all age groups, we cannot dismiss the fact that in the 45-55 age group, the maintaining of a certain autonomy receives important support.
Conclusion
41Upon examining the correlations between the four nations in this study, it becomes apparent that, in the future, the key determinant of identity will be the effect of globalization, increased trade relations, due in part to the supra-state entities forged during the past decade. Nations wishing to assert their respective identities must seek to incorporate these factors into their particular agendas. Catalonia, Quebec, Wales and Scotland are reviewing their citizenship policies and their approach to the integration of new immigrants, emphasizing common culture, language and institutions instead of belaboring the past with delusions of common ethnic lineage.
42The results of the respective public opinion polls in each nation studied conclusively suggest that identity is founded on diverse considerations. The clear majority of all respondents felt both nationalist and supra-centric. Obviously, many felt more strongly one way or the other, but the relatively low numbers of respondents who felt only nationalist or state-centric indicates that multifaceted identity predominates. Furthermore, the results of the latest elections in each nation suggest that political autonomy rather than independence is the goal of many nationalists. Indeed, it would appear that the issue of recognition, either as a state or internal nation, is the dominant goal of all these nations. However, the idea of establishing new forms of political, economic and social partnerships, a formula by which nations can remain distinct while working in concert with state governments or supranational entities, is an idea that continues to growth.
43The Québécois identity appears to be well developed. It is strong enough to remain open to Americanness without being subjugated to us values. Furthermore, it has not forgotten its francophone dimension. Quebecers seem to be quite comfortable with their multiple roots, using them to create an original blend particular to the North American continent. It has often been said that Quebecers are precariously perched between two cultural traditions and realities, but they also seem to have both feet firmly planted on the ground. Quebec has developed an “identity economy” that will probably lead in the next few years to new economic and political partnerships. A new North American identity is indeed emerging and regions will certainly play a key role.
Notes de bas de page
1 The author wants to thank Stephan Ellington and Heather E. Richardson for their valuable comments.
2 Philip Schlesinger, “Wishful Thinking: Cultural Politics, Media, and Collective Identities in Europe,” Journal of Communication, 43 (2), 1993, 6-17.
3 Montserrat Guibernau, Nations without States-Political Communities in a Global Age, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999. Michael Keating, Nations Against States: the new politics of nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland, London, Macmillan Press, 1996. David McCrone, Understanding Scotland-The Sociology of Stateless Nation, London, Routledge, 1992.
4 Helgard Wienert, Regulation and Industrial Competitiveness: A Perspective for Regulatory Reform, oecd/gd, 1997 (133), 21.
5 Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990, 4. Ronald Inglehart, Neil Nevitte and Miguel Basanez, The North American Trajectory: Cultural, Economic and Political Ties among the United States, Canada, and Mexico, New York, Aldine De Gruyter, 1996. Guy Lachapelle (ed.), Quebec Under Free Trade: Making Public Policy in North America, Québec, Presses de l’université du Québec, 1995.
6 Adam Gwiazda, Globalization and Regionalization of the World Economy, Torun, Adam Marszalek, 1998.
7 Concerning this issue of “national community” see: David McCrone, “Autonomy and National Identity in Stateless Nations: Scotland, Catalonia and Quebec”, Scottish Affairs, 17 (autumn 1996), p. 42-48.
8 Stephen Blank, The Emerging Architecture of North America, North-South Center, University of Miami, 1993.
9 Yvan Lamonde, Ni avec eux ni sans eux. Le Québec et les États-Unis, Montréal, Nuit blanche, 1997. Yvan Lamonde, “L’Américanité du Québec,” Le Devoir économique, vol. 1, no. 2 (October 1985), 54-55.
10 Michael Keating, Les défis du nationalisme moderne: Québec, Catalogne, Écosse, Montréal, Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 1997, 104.
11 Luis Moreno and Ana Arriba, “Dual Identity in Autonomous Catalonia,” Scottish Affairs, 1996 (17), p. 78-97.
12 Luis Moreno and Ana Arriba, op. cit., p. 85.
13 This survey was conducted in October 1998.
14 The cross-correlation coefficients between nations (Pearson’s r) gave us the following results: Quebec-Wales, 0.95; Wales-Catalonia, 0.82; Quebec-Scotland, 0.78; Wales-Scotland, 0.74; Quebec-Catalonia, 0.73; and Scotland Catalonia, 0.30.
15 Christian Rioux, “Bouchard reçu en chef d’État,” Le Devoir, March 15, 1999
16 Michael Keating, Nations Against the State..., op. cit., p. 141.
17 The Quebec population is composed of 83% francophones, 11% anglophones and 5% allophones that is, citizens having neither French, or English as their mother tongue.
18 Moreno and Arriba observe the same thing in the Catalan case. See Moreno and Arriba, op. cit., p. 86.
19 Moreno and Arriba, op. cit., p. 9I.
20 Richard Jones, “Le spectre de l’américanisation”, in Claude Savary (ed.), Les rapports culturels entre le Québec et les États-Unis, Québec, Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, 1984, p. 145-166.
21 Robert T. Moran and Jeffrey Abbott, NAFTA: Managing the Cultural Differences. Houston. Gulf Publishing Company, 1994.
22 The research group of the Americanness (gram) carried out a survey among 2,204 respondents between June 12 and July 21, 1997. Guy Lachapelle and Louis Balthazar (eds.), “L’Américanité du Québec,” Politiques et Sociétés, 18: 1, 1999.
23 Guy Lachapelle, “L’américanité des Québécois ou l’émergence d’une identité supranationale,” in Michel Seymour (ed.), Nationalité, citoyenneté et solidarité, Montréal, Liber, 1999, 97-111.
24 Sophie Duchesne et André-Paul Frognier, “Is There a European Identity,” in Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott (eds.), Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance, Oxford University Press, 1995, 193-226.
25 This is the definition of competitiveness given by the Canadian Department of Finance.
26 Robert J. Shepherd, Public Opinion and European Integration. New York, Saxon House & Lexington Books, 1975, p. 63.
27 Groupe Everest, Rapport du sondage mensuel-Thème 2: les exportations et le libre-échange. Banque nationale, 1995.
28 François Rocher, “Continental Strategy: Quebec in North America,” in Alain G. Gagnon (ed), Quebec: State and Society, 2nd edition, Scarborough, Nelson Canada, 1993.
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