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Globalization, Governance and Identity

 | 
Guy Lachapelle
, 
John Trent

2. National Identity and Integration/Disintegration

Change on the Korean Peninsula

Dalchoong Kim

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Northeast Asia: A Historical Review

1As the 20th century comes to a close, the period beginning from the 1890s until the early 1950s, and the East Asian equivalent of a “long peace” from the mid-1950s until the late 1990s, stand out in sharp contrast. East Asia’s foray into the modern international system after the mid-i9th century could not have been more untimely, ill-prepared, or, over the long term, more devastating. The onslaught of Western encroachment which accelerated after the outbreak of the Opium War coincided with rapid dynastic decay in all three of the principal Northeast Asian states: China, Japan, and Korea. With the exception of Meiji Japan, however, neither China nor Korea were able to fundamentally “re-engineer” prevailing norms, capabilities, and strategies. To be sure, Japan’s response to changing inter-regional dynamics was to adopt its own version of imperialism with debilitating consequences for Korea and China. In a short span of fifteen years, Japan terminated Chinese domination over Korea and for all practical purposes, denied Russia’s strategic entry into Northeast Asia until the end of the Second World War. Contestation of Japanese imperialism would remain dormant for nearly half a century since no other East Asian power had the capability of directly challenging Japanese hegemony.

  • 1 Hans Binnendijk, “U.S. Strategic Objectives in East Asia,” Strategic Forum, no. 68 (March 1996), p (...)

2In a turn of events no one could have foreseen, it was the United States—a Pacific, but not an Asian power—that restored regional stability and spurred regional prosperity in the postwar era. Perhaps the most significant strategic development after World War II was the emergence of the United States as a de facto East Asian power since no regional power had the capability of directly contesting us supremacy. Even with the end of the Cold War, the fundamental strategic objectives of the United States in East Asia have remained relatively unchanged. Since the end of the Korean conflict, fostering political stability, sustaining access to regional markets, ensuring freedom of navigation, and preventing the rise of a hegemon have been the hallmarks of us strategic engagement in the region.1

3What, then, are the major characteristics of East Asia’s strategy legacies over the past century? First and foremost, the collapse of traditional regimes in China, Japan, and Korea towards the end of the 19th century meant that state security could no longer be preserved without a modem economic base, matching power projection capabilities, and more rationalized national security strategies. Although Japan attempted to impose its own brand of “Asianized” security, its coercive policies ultimately failed. Second, the absence of a viable security structure, weak domestic political institutions, and severe economic dislocation, among other factors, contributed significantly to an underlying current of regional instability. Third, none of the Northeast Asian countries had the ability to forge a comprehensive strategic policy following the end of World War II. By default, as much as preplanning, the United States thus emerged as the principal equalizer. Finally, an enduring and just peace cannot be sustained in the region without genuine security cooperation among the key actors of Northeast Asia. Even with the unprecedented presence and role of the United States in the region since the end of the Second World War, unless and until the regional powers are able to come to terms with outstanding historical legacies, in addition to developing more transparent and non-threatening national security strategies, the “Asianization” of Asian security, in a positive sense, will not materialize.

4The web of alliances fostered and sustained by the United States in the aftermath of the Korean War, over time, became synonymous with regional stability. While these alliances, and chief among them, the us-Japan and the rok-us alliances, continue to serve as the bedrock of Northeast Asian security, changes have also been underway. While an alternative security structure is unlikely to develop any time in the near future, what appears to be taking shape in Northeast Asia is a gradual process of strategic awakening. Compared to the first half of this century, almost all of the regional powers have acquired significant economic, military, and technological capabilities.

5Indeed, despite the on-going East Asian economic crisis, the single most important development during the Cold War era was the explosive economic growth of the region. To be sure, how the actors in the region manage their respective political transitions and their ability to respond to an array of potential crises, while at the same time harmonizing nationalistic impulses with realistic appraisals of the national interest, will influence the pace and depth of East Asia’s rise from strategic hibernation. Nonetheless, the process has already begun to unfold and Northeast Asia’s stability and prosperity will become increasingly dependent upon the strength of intra-regional cooperation.

Regional Strategic Developments

  • 2 See Kukbang Baekso 1998 (Defense White Paper 1998), (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, October (...)

6The Northeast Asian strategic environment will be driven, in large part, by three key factors: the rise of more militarily capable powers in Asia and structural changes following the end of the Cold War (including major power realignments), selective but significant transformations at the unit level (such as potential disruptions within North Korea), and resurgence of maritime theater strategies based on a more pervasive acquisition of air and naval power projection platforms and capabilities. Of the factors noted above, the resurgence of strategy and geopolitics in Northeast Asia has critical implications for Korean security and long-term defense planning dynamics. From a military perspective, South Korea’s defense planning in the post-Korean War era has been focused on deterring a North Korean blitzkrieg. Given the vital need to thwart an incoming North Korean assault with a heavy emphasis on concentrated heavy artillery, armored divisions, and operational maneuver groups (omgs), the rok’s basic military strategy and corresponding force structure has been dominated by the requirements ensuing from attrition warfare. So long as a credible military threat exists from the North, this fundamental strategic raison d’etre is unlikely to change.2 Nonetheless, in the post-North Korean era, the rok military has to take into consideration what type of a defense strategy it will employ in the absence of a focused military threat from the North.

7If the Korean peninsula is unified, it will have a major impact on the regional security picture. Perhaps most significantly, it will mean a revival of East Asia’s maritime theater characteristics. Indeed, all of the regional powers have paid increasing attention to the importance of air and sea power independent of the situation on the Korean peninsula, but once the two Koreas are unified, there will be a relative increase in the importance attached to meeting operational requirements of a dominant maritime theater. Traditionally, continental powers such as Russia and China will continue to feel the need to maintain credible ground forces since they share the world’s longest border, although land-dominant defense strategies are unlikely to be pursued by either Russia or China over the long run. As noted below, China has key maritime theater interests including blue-water navy ambitions and more advanced airpower projection capabilities including cruise missiles. The United States has always recognized the importance of maritime theater operations and, to this end, continues to maintain the most advanced air and sea power capabilities, including air and sea lift capabilities. For its part, Japan’s Self Defense Forces continues to be restructured with a greater emphasis on air and naval power projection capabilities.

8The rise of militarily more capable powers in Northeast Asia thus stands out as one of the most significant development of the post-World War II era. To be sure, the onslaught of the East Asian economic crisis cannot be ignored in projecting the future of Northeast Asia since it could have fundamental long term repercussions, including less investments in the defense sector. But it is important to note that Northeast Asia has the potential to harbor the greatest concentration of economic wealth over the next two or three decades, with corresponding implications for more advanced power projection capabilities. In addition, despite on-going efforts to foster a culture of security cooperation in the region, such as the asean Regional Forum (arf), localized cbms such as the October 1994 us-North Korean Agreed Framework, and greater adherence to counterproliferation regimes such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (ctbt), the Chemical Weapons Convention (cwc), the Biological Weapons Convention (bwc), the Missile Technology Controls Regime (mtcr) and the Wassenar Agreement, the fact remains that in East Asia multilateral or even bilateral cbms haven’t prevented the regional actors from acquiring more sophisticated military systems. At the same time, the regional security picture is likely to be also influenced by the following factors.

  • 3 Kevin Sullivan and Mary Jordan, “Asian Nations Squabble Over Small Islands,” Washington Post, July (...)
  • 4 Growing security and economic integration in Western Europe throughout the post-World War II era h (...)

9First, Northeast Asia’s post-Cold War transition cannot be assessed without taking into account major power relationships, realignments, and relative power shifts. In no other region is the prospect for long-term regional stability and prosperity so dependent as Northeast Asia on the level, or lack thereof, of major power cooperation. It is also in Northeast Asia that a major power transition could take place, or, seen from the perspective of the current hegemon, the rise of a “peer competitor” could occur. Second, unlike Western or Central Europe, Northeast Asia is still marked by outstanding legacies from the Second World War. Technically, Russia and Japan and the two Koreas are still in a state of war. Almost all of the Northeast Asian states have territorial disputes with their neighbors.3 All have varying degrees of entrenched historical animosities and for the most part, closure on key historical legacies remains uncertain. Indeed, the relationships between the three main Northeast Asian states—China, Japan, and Korea—have yet to be fully “normalized” in contrast to the regularized pattern of interaction among Great Britain, France, and Germany.4

10Third, significant threats to stability exist in the region, stemming from a confluence of potential conflicts and indigenous disruptions.

11A spectrum of developments including abrupt regime transformations, acute regime or state atrophy (including variations of state implosion or collapse), spill-over from territorial disputes, escalation of transnational threats, and severe socio-economic dislocations could prove devastating for regional stability. Growing military capabilities of most of the Northeast Asian states, including modernized, offensive, longer range weapons platforms, poses a major challenge to military confidence-building measures and arms control. Adequately meeting the threat from wmd proliferation is bound to become more difficult with the accelerated proliferation of wmd technologies and more rapid absorption of asymmetrical weapons systems, as illustrated by North Korea’s recent missile test. And fourth, the region faces wide-ranging social, political, economic, and resource management challenges, many of them unprecedented. As the on-going East Asian economic crisis has illustrated, the region faces major structural economic and financial problems.

  • 5 See Desmond Ball, “Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the AsiaPacific Region,” Internati (...)
  • 6 Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar East Asia,” Internation (...)
  • 7 Figures cited from Hans A. Binnendijk and Patrick L. Clawson (eds.) 1997 Strategic Assessment (Was (...)

12The military implications of East Asia’s economic rise are varied, although three main questions require close attention. First, what are the chances of a major power transition? Specifically, if China does become the region’s most dominant economic as well as military power over the next two to three decades, how will the United States react? How will a powerful, if not dominating, China affect the security policies and military strategies of the United States, Japan, and Korea? Second, based on the on-going revolution in military affairs (rma) and the overall ability of the regional actors to acquire increasingly sophisticated weapons systems, what type of forces will the regional actors likely possess in the mid-to longer-term? In particular, what type of power projection capabilities or other “destabilizing” systems will the regional actors possess?5 Third, the potential sources of conflict in the region could be increasingly characterized by multipolar dynamics. Or as one observer has noted, “what is unfolding in East Asia is a race between the accelerating dynamics of multipolarity which could increase the chances of con flict, and the growth of mitigating factors that should tend to dampen them and to improve the prospects for a continuing peace. This race is in its early stages and it is still too soon to pick a winner.”6 For the foreseeable future, the United States is likely to remain as the most powerful actor in East Asia, since it is the only power that is able to project and sustain military power globally and regionally. There is little doubt that the United States perceives critical advantages in remaining fully engaged in East Asia. In the post-Cold War era, however, and despite the fact that the United States intends to remain fully engaged in the region, some have questioned whether the relative decline in us military capabilities signals a longer-term trend towards incremental disengagement from the region. From a purely quantitative point of view, it is true that us forces have been reduced by approximately one-third since the end of the Cold War, as illustrated by the fact that from 1986 until 1997 us military strength in quantitative terms has registered a downward trend: army manpower has shrunk from 781,000 whereas air force aircraft has decreased from 1,764 to 912 and navy ships have been cut from 538 to 339.7 (In many respects, this drawdown was a natural consequence of a shift in us military stage after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. For instance, the us Navy incorporated a strong offensive strategy to meet expanding Soviet naval capabilities after the 1970s, but this strategy has since been significantly transformed, with a growing focus on the littoral or coastal regions of the globe.)

Implications for Korea

13For more than fifty years, stability has been maintained in Northeast Asia by a confluence of factors, but one of the most important elements is the essential security role played by the United States. With the economic emergence of the region and the cumulative acquisition of diverse national capabilities, most of the regional actors are in the process of revamping their national security strategies. While China is still in the process of redefining and articulating a comprehensive strategy, it confronts a spectrum of domestic challenges that are unlikely to be easily resolved. But China is in the process of developing a more sophisticated national security strategy. At the same time, while Japan excelled in economic development and technological innovations, strategic thinking was largely confined to the boundaries set forth by the us-Japan security alliance. In the case of South Korea, its principal strategic concern has always been focused on meeting a range of political and military challenges from the North.

14As these and other East Asian countries ponder their respective national security strategies over the next two to three decades, the geopolitical, socioeconomic, and technological foundations on which they have to formulate their strategies will differ significantly from the earlier era. With the ending of the Cold War, strategies can no longer be characterized as global, regional, and local. The amalgamation of cooperation and conflict strategems will increasingly complicate, if not obfuscate, traditional state diplomacy. The need to respond to a security threat environment that is becoming increasingly multilayered and diverse will be accelerated in East Asia, although this is true of other regions as well. What is more important is the rate of compression as differing socioeconomic and technological pressures coincide with the construction of viable long-term security strategies. Among the Northeast Asian countries, China confronts the widest range of challenges stemming from accelerated generational change within the party and military hierarchies, outstanding economic reform issues, and foreign policy strategies in its immediate environment. Japan’s search for strategy going into the 21 st century is likely to be driven by conflicting domestic and external impulses, as it seeks to set new strategic objectives. In the case of Korea, the prospects for unification stand out as the major goepolitical and economic challenge.

15In the final analysis, there is, at present, no immediate cause for any fundamental revamping of existing bilateral security arrangements such as the us-Japan and rok-us alliances. Nonetheless, as the regional actors become more powerful in cumulative and relative terms, and as security issues become even more compressed, adopting strategies that are able to respond to the double demands of globalization and localization will become increasingly urgent in the years to follow. For Korea, domestic changes such as democratization, economic restructuring, a broadening security consensus, and the potential for significant transformations in North Korea mean that its overall foreign policy and national security strategies may have to be revamped significantly as it goes into the 2Ist century. Conceptualizing possible roadmaps and corresponding policies has thus emerged as a major task for Korea’s security planners.

Notes

1 Hans Binnendijk, “U.S. Strategic Objectives in East Asia,” Strategic Forum, no. 68 (March 1996), p. 1.

2 See Kukbang Baekso 1998 (Defense White Paper 1998), (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, October 1998).

3 Kevin Sullivan and Mary Jordan, “Asian Nations Squabble Over Small Islands,” Washington Post, July 31, 1996, p. 23.

4 Growing security and economic integration in Western Europe throughout the post-World War II era has been the key ingredient for fully normalized ties among Britain, France, and Germany despite the legacies of the Firstand Second World Wars. By contrast, the relationship between China, Japan, and the two Koreas remains to be fully normalized.

5 See Desmond Ball, “Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the AsiaPacific Region,” International Security, vol. 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993/94), p. 81.

6 Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar East Asia,” International Security, vol. 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993/94), p. 27-28.

7 Figures cited from Hans A. Binnendijk and Patrick L. Clawson (eds.) 1997 Strategic Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, NDU, 1997), p. 7.

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