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Globalization, Governance and Identity

 | 
Guy Lachapelle
, 
John Trent

2. National Identity and Integration/Disintegration

Czechoslovakia

Secession and Formation of a New Partnership1

Normand Perreault

Texte intégral

  • 1 Some of the specific dates and events quoted in this paper are taken from The Prague Post, 1992-19 (...)

1The purpose of this essay is to examine the role played by international factors in the process that led to the breakup of Czechoslovakia and to the formation of a new partnership between the Czech Republic and Slovakia, as independent states. Having done this, we will attempt to highlight some recurrent themes and mechanisms within this process, and to draw a number of lessons that can then be applied to other cases of secession.

The Causes of the Break-up of Czechoslovakia

2In order to understand the development of the new partnership between the Czech Republic and Slovakia, it is first necessary to understand the climate in which the break-up of Czechoslovakia took place. The initial impulse for this process of secession was given by the Slovak government led by prime minister Vladimir Meciar. Meciar’s government considered that the power held by the federal government over social programs and over the management of the economy had become a direct obstacle to its own ambition to maintain state control over the economy and to preserve the network of clientelism inherited from the communist era. As a result, the status quo whereby both the Slovak and the federal government shared control over government programs and over the management of the economy, had become increasingly intolerable to Meciar and to his government.

3Motivated by its own ambition, the Slovak government had been demanding more power and greater decentralization within the federation, as early as 1990. In return, the Czechs, represented by Vaclav Klaus, then federal minister of finance, and impelled by similar motives, rejected any call for decentralization and insisted instead on a more centralized union, or on a total dissolution of the federal link. The Czechs thus presented their Slovak counterparts with a simple ultimatum: the creation of a unitary state, or separation, pure and simple. The Slovaks felt betrayed by the sudden intransigeance of their Czech counterparts, and were compelled, as a result of their own unwillingness to accept the status quo, to opt for independence.

4The decision, by both sides, to put an end to the federation was thus the result of the play of divergent and irreconcilable interests. It is important to note that neither Klaus or Meciar had initially wanted separation and that this option did not specifically represent the interests of either party, nor some form of compromise between these interests. Instead, the break-up of the federation was a testimony to the irreconcilable nature of the opposition between the Klaus and Meciar governments, and expressed nothing more than their failure to agree to any form of positive compromise. The break up of Czechoslovakia can thus best be characterized as a non-solution to the opposition of these two governments, and as a way to avoid any genuine discussion or compromise. Both sides thus came out of this process with their interests profoundly frustrated and with a high degree of resentment toward each other.

5The bilateral agreement to put an end to the federation was therefore not the result of the play of common interests or even of complementary interests, nor was it the result of a partial compromise between divergent and irreconcilable interests. Instead, this agreement was a non-solution, a failure to come up with a positive compromise, that both sides were compelled to accept with resignation and almost grudgingly as the only possible way out of an intractable situation. This serves to explain in large part the difficulties, the frustration and the animosity that permeated the process which led to the break-up of Czechoslovakia and to the establishment of a new partnership between the two republics.

  • 2 In November 1992, less than two months before the date set for independence, Mecier had suggested (...)

6Thus, both sides merely exchanged a situation that was untenable to both of them for one that left both sides frustrated and unsatisfied.2 It is important to note that, if separation was a solution that pleased no one, the status quo had become even more unacceptable to both parties and had been vehemently decried by both of them. This situation was the result of the unique constitutional vacuum that accompanied the fall of communism. As early as 1990, both sides had agreed that the communist constitution of 1968 was inappropriate for a country that claimed to be essentially democratic and liberal, and aspired to join the new Europe and the Atlantic community. More importantly, the 1968 constitution implied a sharing of power and responsibilities which prevented both Klaus and Meciar from carrying out their own political projects unimpeded, and to which both were opposed. Consequently, both the Czech and the Slovak governments had long agreed to open discussions on the drafting of a new constitution, better adapted to the new reality and aspirations of the two republics, in the post-communist era.

7This gave rise to a unique situation where the status quo had become unacceptable to all parties and where no one was willing to take the defense of the current constitutional order. As a result, there was no status quo to fall back on, in case of a failure of the negotiations to develop a new constitution. If these negotiations were to fail, as they did, then the only option left to both parties would be the dissolution of the federation and the break-up of the country. As we have seen, this is precisely what happened. Having failed to reach a compromise agreement on the establishment of a new constitutional order, and being faced with a constitution that was decried by all parties as illegitimate, Klaus and Meciar were left with only one solution, the dissolution of the federation. This explains how separation, a solution that both sides feared and would have preferred to avoid, emerged as the only possible outcome. It also explains why the emergence of these two new countries took place in a climate of profound conflict and antagonism, as both sides felt that they were being forced, by the other, to accept a solution that was not theirs and that frustrated their basic interests.

The Development of a New Partnership

8The establishment of a new partnership between the Czech Republic and Slovakia began with the first bilateral agreements to put an end to the federation. As we have seen, the decision to dissolve the federation was quickly seen by both parties to be both necessary and unavoidable. Thus, it is only because Klaus and Meciar themselves could not accept any compromise solution to their opposition that they came to the conclusion that secession was the only way out of a no-win situation where no one could obtain what they had originally wanted to achieve. As a result, both sides entered the negotiations to end the federation grudgingly and with a great deal of resentment toward each other.

  • 3 Despite the purely formal character of this recognition by the federal parliament, this recognitio (...)
  • 4 The Prague Post, December 30, 1992-January 5, 1993, p. 4.

9Furthermore, resistance to the process of separation was vocal, and came from all segments of society. The reservations expressed by members of the federal parliament were particularly notable and threatened the final stages of the process of secession. Thus, it was on June 9, 1992 that Vladimir Meciar, representing Slovakia, and Vaclav Klaus, representing the Prague government, first agreed to dissolve the federation. The negotiations that followed were carried out largely without the approval of the federal authorities and against their wishes. As a result, it was only on November 25, 1992, after two failed attempts and only one month before the date set for the official break-up of the country, that the federal parliament finally gave its assent to the separation3. A Czech negotiator would later declare that “relations between the two sides have greatly improved since the federal vote.”4 However, despite this relative “improvement,” the process of separation continued to take place, albeit to a lesser extent, in a climate of intense and passionate opposition.

10The 1968 constitution did not make any provision or offer any procedure for the separation of the two states that made up the federation. The process of separation was thus begun and carried out without a popular mandate, without a mandate from the federal authorities, and outside the realm of the constitution and of the rule of law. Finally, if the break up negotiated by Klaus and Meciar was finally enacted, it is first because both sides felt compelled to pursue what they saw as the only way out of an intractable situation marked by their irreconcilable opposition, but it is also because, faced with a done deal, and without appropriate legal parameters, no one in civil society could organize effective opposition against the full weight of governmental authority then at the disposal of Klaus and Meciar.

11To discourage any overt opposition, the terms of the break-up of the federation were negotiated by the Czech and Slovak National Councils, alone and behind closed doors. Early on, on July 17, 1992., the Slovak National Council declared its sovereignty, thereby establishing its authority in the upcoming negotiations with Klaus. From this point on, the process of negotiation would be both very rapid and surprisingly free of public controversy and of overt conflicts, despite the profound sources of opposition and animosity that permeated the relationship between the two sides.

12Thus, on July 23, Meciar and Klaus agreed on a general framework for negotiations and reaffirmed the importance of maintaining legitimacy and stability throughout this process. On October 29, Klaus and Meciar met again to sign the first 16 bilateral accords that established the terms of the future relationship between the two republics, after the break-up. All in all, it had taken representatives of both sides only two days of negotiations, October 25 and 26, to produce these accords. These agreements included accords on economic cooperation, on health care, on the establishment of a monetary union and of a customs union, the free transit of persons, passports and visas, citizenship, rights of residency and of work in either republic, education, protection of the environment, telecommunications, the use of information and of archives, borders, and the mutual recognition of official documents.

  • 5 The Prague Post, November 3-9, 1992, p. I
  • 6 Indeed, an agreement was reached, as planned, in 1997, to exchange two villages situated along the (...)

13It is important to note that on the day these accords were being signed, Meciar and Klaus met, together, with Britain’s prime minister, John Major, whose country then held the presidency of the European Community, in order to present the process through which they hoped to achieve their independence. During this meeting, both Klaus and Meciar praised the “very responsible and honest work on the part of the Czech and Slovak governments,” and declared that “nothing immediately will change” after January I, the scheduled date of the break-up.5 Furthermore, both sides explicitly agreed to subject every aspect of their separation and of their future relationship to specific bilateral accords. This meant that whatever was not subject to a bilateral agreement before the separation would have to be subject to negotiations after the separation, and that the status quo would be maintained in these matters, until both sides could arrive at specific bilateral accords. As a result, both sides agreed to avoid any unilateral action or decision, to continue the dialogue, and to avoid surprises. For the sake of stability and legitimacy, both sides also agreed on a five-year moratorium on territorial disputes and on the establishment of a final border. After this time, changes to the common border would be possible, but only of a common accord.6

14On November 9, 1992, Klaus and Meciar met again to sign another series of bilateral accords. These included agreements on the armed forces, on taxation, on transportation, and on the difficult issue of the division of federal assets. At the same time, the governments of both republics continued to support each other in the process leading to the establishment of a free-trade zone with Poland and Hungary, and reaffirmed their desire to see their two countries be treated by others as a single trading zone, after the break-up. The two republics also continued to support each others’ efforts to become members of the gatt and of the European Community. This form of mutual support was to continue even after each of them had achieved its independence, and would constitute one of the main aspects of their special relationship, after the separation and up to this day.

  • 7 The Prague Post, November 18-24, 1992, p. 5.

15On November 13, 1992, both sides signed accords on the division of common real estate assets. These would be divided on a strictly territorial basis. At the same time, they both agreed to divide their movable assets according to a 2:1 ratio which corresponds roughly to the proportions of their populations. These assets were then valued at 633.7 billion Kcs. On November 15, a specific agreement was signed on the division of state-owned radio and television stations and of news agencies. On November 18, Klaus and Meciar met, together, with a group of influential foreign bankers and investors. The explicit purpose of this meeting was to reassure foreign investors and to guarantee that the two new states would be “economically prosperous” and “politically stable.”7 On November 24, another series of accords was signed. These included agreements on the protection of investments, water management, agriculture, forests, military cooperation, the division of military assets, the transfer of property, double taxation, transports, communications, property rights, and finally a general treaty of cooperation between the two republics.

16On the political front, on November 13, the Czech National Council assumed, unilaterally, the powers of the federal government on the territory of the Czech Republic. This transfer of sovereignty was done without the agreement or support of the federal authorities and in contravention to the constitution. Shortly after, the Czech and Slovak National Councils declared that they would proceed with the separation, even if the federal parliament continued to withhold its approval. As a result, on November 25, the federal parliament finally approved a constitutional law that put an end to the federation, thereby recognizing de jure a situation that it could no longer control and that seemed to be de facto inevitable. On December 17, 1992, the federal parliament voted its own dissolution, thereby clearing the way for the creation of two independent states, on January 1, 1993.

17In early December 1992, both republics prepared documents that explained their decision to separate, detailed the sequence of events to be followed, and reaffirmed the sovereignty and legitimacy of the two new countries, as well as their right of succession. These documents were sent to foreign governments, foreign parliaments, influential individuals abroad, foreign organizations and international bodies, the Council of Europe, and the United Nations. These documents also expressed the wishes of both republics to obtain immediate international recognition and to gain immediate acceptance and membership within international bodies, as of January 1, 1993. In response, on December 8, a delegation of the Council of Europe warned both governments that their progress in the fields of democratization and of economic liberalization, and their ability to maintain stability would be carefully scrutinized, after their accession to independence, on January 1.

  • 8 The Prague Post, December 30, 1992-January 5, 1993, p. 5.

18On December 20, both governments officially applied for international recognition, for the Ist of January. On December 21, both governments signed, with Poland and Hungary, an agreement on the establishment of a free-trade zone between the four countries. On December 23, both parties added a final agreement to the long list of accords already signed, by signing an agreement on the division of the national oil pipelines. And finally, on December 30, Meciar and Klaus both reaffirmed publicly, once again, the fact that the process of separation had been carried out smoothly, quietly and successfully, without major difficulty, and while maintaining stability.8

19On January I 1993, both republics became fully independent. The same day, they were officially recognized by 68 countries, by the European Community, by the imf, the World Bank, the ebrd, and by the csce. On January I9, they were both simultaneously admitted to the United Nations, and in June 1993, they were both admitted to the Council of Europe.

The Need for Stability

20If the negotiations leading to the break-up of Czechoslovakia were carried out so rapidly, with apparent ease and in a surprising climate of consensus and stability, and if the parties were successful in retaining the confidence of foreign markets and in obtaining international recognition both rapidly and without difficulty, it is only because both sides made it a top priority to present the best image possible to the world community. This overriding preoccupation with maintaining a favorable image abroad led both parties to make important concessions and to set aside their conflicts and mutual animosity, in favour of a quick and apparently conflict-free settlement that focused on only one thing: the rapid and apparently consensual dissolution of the federation. The question we must then ask is why was it so important for both governments to uphold this image and to preserve the confidence of foreign markets and of their international partners?

21In 1992, the Czechoslovak economy had an urgent need of foreign capital, both in the form of loans needed to pay for deficits in the balance of payments, for social programs, for the restructuring of the economy, and for endemic shortfalls in state revenues, and in the form of foreign investments needed to reform and modernize the economy. Already in 1992, only two years after the fall of communism, the accumulated national debt totalled $3.35 billion us, which represented an important sum for an economy of merely $20 billion us that was struggling with a severe and deepening recession. For both republics, the situation had become critical, as state revenues were decreasing constantly and substantially and as the needs of the population for state intervention and for government assistance continued to grow.

22For both governments, the first priority was therefore to maintain a constant inflow of new foreign capital. This necessity to maintain a continued inflow of new capital can, in itself, explain the extraordinary importance which both parties then accorded to maintaining stability, to reassuring foreign markets and investors, and to maintaining a favorable image for the benefit of the international community. This constant preoccupation, as well as the need to develop new export markets, also translated into a desire and a necessity to be recognized as full members by the European Community, by nato and by any other prominent international organization, in the hope that this would lead to increased access to new markets and to increased credibility in the eyes of the financial markets.

23This is why, throughout the process leading to independence, the governments of both republics spared no effort to reassure foreign actors and to provide the best possible image of the process of secession. For both governments, the need to maintain the image of a process of secession that was at once successful, rapid, and problem-free, that guaranteed stability, and that vouched well for the future, became an absolute priority, often at the expense of their own particular interests and of the profound animosity that existed between them.

The Independence

24After both republics became independent, their governments initially believed that they could dispense with the image of stability and consensus that they had built and maintained so carefully during the period leading to their independence. This attitude was reinforced by the attitude taken by financial markets immediately after the separation. These markets had adopted a wait-and-see attitude and were prudently waiting to see how the two new states would use and manage their new sovereignty. Given these circumstances, the governments of both republics felt that they could put forward a number of policies that aimed essentially at strengthening their own control over their respective societies. However, the radical nature of some of these policies and the fact that they violated the rights of significant segments of the population could not escape the attention of foreign observers and could not avoid drawing their general condemnation.

25Among these policies, some of the most notable included the cancellation by the Meciar government of the application of the federal lustration law in Slovakia, the decision to disavow the first wave of coupon privatization and to cancel the implementation of the second wave, scheduled for 1993; and the directive given by the Meciar cabinet to the postal and customs services to begin inspecting all parcels coming from the Czech Republic. For its part, the Czech government decided to set up border posts on its border with Slovakia as early as January 2, 1993, and instructed customs officers to strictly inspect and control every transit of persons or goods coming from Slovakia. Of course, the Slovak government responded in kind almost immediately, thereby contributing to compounding the long delays on both sides of the border. The Czech government also used more stringent border controls, in order to stem the influx of Romany refugees coming from Slovakia who were seeking better economic opportunities in the Czech Republic. Finally, as early as January 8, in response to the extremely low level of foreign reserves of the Slovak National Bank, and to increasing pressures for the split of the common currency and for a devaluation of the Slovak currency, the Czech government had begun, in secret, to stamp the bank notes in its possession and to prepare its withdrawal from the monetary union with Slovakia.

26All of these actions were perceived very negatively by foreign observers, and quickly resulted in added costs for the two newly independent states. Thus, international organizations, and most particularly the Council of Europe, reacted very negatively and rapidly to the measures taken by both republics. At the same time, financial markets, represented by the imf, made it known that the protectionist measures taken by both governments, and the rising monetary instability, could have some very grave consequences on the influx of foreign capital and on trade in general. Indeed, the protectionist measures implemented by both governments and the efforts of the Slovak government to limit the liberalization of the Slovak economy had an immediate negative impact on the volume of trade, on foreign investments, and on state revenues, in both republics.

27As a result of these economic and political pressures, coming both from abroad and from home, both governments were quickly compelled to reverse their actions and to demonstrate a more conciliatory attitude. Thus, the Slovak government reversed its earlier decision and decided to honor the first wave of coupon privatization, and even promised to hold the second wave, albeit in a significantly modified form. Both governments also decided to relax their border controls and postal inspections. And, the Czech government made a renewed effort to support the common currency, while reaffirming its confidence in the monetary union and its vested interest in avoiding a split of the common currency and a devaluation of the Slovak crown.

The Monetary Union

28However, despite these efforts, the future of the monetary union remained very uncertain. Thus, there was growing speculations about the future of the common currency and about its possible replacement by two distinct currencies among investors, lenders, foreign customers and exporters who were waiting to see the direction taken by the two new countries and who were increasingly worried about being paid in a currency whose value could not be guaranteed. This, along with the reckless actions taken by both governments immediately after their accession to independence, the weakness of Slovak exports, and the low levels of Slovak foreign currency reserves, all combined to create a situation that was equally untenable for both the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

29As a result, on February 7, concerned about preserving its more favorable foreign credit rating and no longer able to withstand the growing pressures, the Czech Republic suddenly pulled out of the monetary union and proceeded to stamp all bank notes in circulation on its territory. However, despite this dramatic turn of events and its potentially far-reaching consequences, the Czech withdrawal from the monetary union took place in an atmosphere of calm and relative stability. Almost immediately, the Slovak government reacted to the decision of the Czech government by announcing its intention to stamp all bank notes circulating on its territory and by imposing temporary restrictions on the free circulation and exchange of currencies. Again, this took place in a climate of relative calm and stability. In fact, in comparison with the period of intense speculation and uncertainty that had preceded it, the period immediately following the break down of the monetary union brought greater stability by putting a definite end to the speculations about the future of the monetary union.

  • 9 The Prague Post, July 14-10, 1993, p. I.
  • 10 The Prague Post, July 14-20, 1993, p. I.

30However, for reasons that remain difficult to ascertain, the Slovak government refused, at first, to follow the recommendations of international experts and devalue its new single currency by I0 to 30%. It was only on the tenth of July, two weeks after the imf had strongly recommended an important devaluation and had offered a loan of $90 million us to promote the stability of the Slovak economy, that the Slovak government finally agreed to devalue its currency by I0% in relation to the Czech crown.9 Again, external pressures played an important role in influencing the behavior of the Slovak government. A representative of the Slovak ministry of finance even went so far as to declare that this “devaluation was in compliance with an agreement with the imf made during the agency’s June visit to Bratislava.”10 In December 1993, the Slovak government accepted a further devaluation of 5%. Again, external pressures seem to have played a key role in this decision, as this devaluation coincided with a visit by representatives of the World Bank and with the promise of an $80 million us loan, allegedly aimed at insuring the stability of the Slovak economy.

The Customs Union

31A similar pattern can be observed in the case of the customs union. Here again, external pressures and economic imperatives finally prevailed and took precedence over the particular interests and arbitrary choices of both governments, and thus played a determinant role in insuring the continuation of the customs union. Thus, in 1992-93, all of the former members of the comecon were suffering from deep and prolonged recessions. All were seeing their exports and their revenues shrink while their imports seemed to be growing out of control. At the same time they were suffering from severe recessions and from a dramatic decline in their trade with other former comecon countries, these countries’ economies were becoming increasingly dependent upon trade with western countries.

32Thus, in the first half of 1993, trade between the Czech Republic and the former members of the comecon dropped by nearly 30%, while trade with the West rose by 20%. It shouldn’t come as a surprise, in this context, that during the same period trade between the Czech Republic and Slovakia had also fallen by 24%. In fact, during the first 9 months of 1992, well before the break-up and even before the negotiations leading to the break-up, Czech exports bound for Slovakia had dropped by 15%, while Slovak exports bound for the Czech Republic had declined by 22%. The two republics were thus involved in a general long-term process whereby trade with other eastern countries, and with each other, was being significantly reduced and replaced by trade with western countries. This was due essentially to the profound restructuring to which these economies were being subjected and to the break-down of the commercial links and production chains between former communist countries.

33Because of this general situation, and in part because of the speculation about the future of the common currency and about the value of an eventual single Slovak currency, trade between Slovakia and the Czech Republic declined by 24% in the first half of 1993. Both republics reacted in similar ways to this dramatic situation and to the resulting drop in revenues, by limiting access to their borders immediately after the break-up. As we have seen, these measures had a very negative and immediate impact on trade between the two countries and on the international reputation of the two new states. As a result of these effects, these measures were quickly, albeit discreetly, either abandoned or weakened in their application, so that, as soon as the value of the new Slovak currency was guaranteed to the satisfaction of all parties, trade was stabilized and could resume its more gradual long-term downward trend.

34A year later, on February 10, 1994, the Slovak government, again worried about the size of its trade deficit with the Czech Republic, tried to impose new quality-control measures on a large array of Czech agricultural and food products being imported into Slovakia. Officially, these controls were intended to protect the health of Slovak citizens. In reality, the purpose of these measures was to limit and deter the importation of Czech products. The Czech government responded immediately to these measures by imposing similar controls on Slovak goods and by questioning the validity of the standards put in place by the Slovak government.

35However, once again, having reached a costly stalemate, and having seriously shaken the confidence of investors both at home and abroad, both countries were quickly forced to withdraw all of those trade restrictions less than a month after their initial implementation by the Slovak government. Again, the pressures exercised by trading partners and foreign investors weary of the consequences of a trade war, coupled with the high degree of integration of the two economies for whom bilateral trade still represented 20% of their gdp and a third of all their foreign exchanges, succeeded in thwarting all attempts, by either of them, to impose barriers to their bilateral trade.

The Debt

36Finally, external pressures and economic imperatives have also played an important role in the settlement of mutual debts and grievances between the two republics. Thus, in February 1993, the Czech government demanded payment of a sum of 24.7 billion crowns from the Slovak government, in compensation for investments and transfers of technology undertaken by the Czech Republic in favour of the Slovak Republic when both were still part of the federation. The Czech government also claimed compensation for the depreciation of Czech assets in Slovakia since the break-up.

37The Slovak government responded by demanding payment of a sum of $17 billion us, a sum equivalent to 80% of the gdp of the Czech Republic, in compensation for the gold reserves taken from Slovakia by the Czech Republic, during the Second World War. What followed was an escalation of words, conflicting claims and threats that betrayed the profound animosity that existed between the two parties. At the end of this escalation, the Czech government threatened to disavow the privatization coupons held by Slovak citizens, while the Slovak government threatened to cut off the supply of oil to the Czech Republic, via the oil pipeline that originated in Russia and crossed Slovakia, thereby depriving the Czech Republic of virtually all of its supplies of oil. The excessive nature of these demands and threats, and their potential impact on the stability of the region, quickly served to undermine the credibility of the governments of both republics and to awaken world opinion to the risks of this situation.

38By March 1993, the crisis had already reached dramatic proportions and was running out of the control of both governments who had themselves become trapped in an ever-increasing spiral of recrimination and verbal attacks. By that time, both sides were refusing any form of compromise and were continuing to raise the stakes and to add new claims and new demands. In fact, this crisis had come to symbolize all the frustration and animosity felt by both sides and by their respective populations as a result of the break-up of the federation. Worst still, both Meciar and Klaus, as well as the governments behind them, had turned this issue into a matter of personal honor and national pride.

39The crisis had thus taken very serious proportions. After each side had described the other’s position in the strongest and most vilifying terms, it became virtually impossible for either of them to accept anything less than complete victory and the total humiliation of the other party. It is in this context that, in March 1993, foreign investors, represented by the imf, the ebdr and the European Community, began to express their concerns with regard to this situation and began to put pressure on both governments to find a solution to this crisis.

40In late March, a delegation of the ebdr arrived in Slovakia, armed with a loan of 75 million ecu. In April, a delegation of foreign investors, led by representatives of the brokerage firm Solomon Brothers, visited the Czech Republic and publicly reaffirmed the paramount importance of stability between the two republics. Soon after, on April 23, Vladimir Meciar, caving into these pressures, proposed his 0-0 solution which called for the abrogation of all claims resulting from the break-up of the federation. The next day, Vaclav Klaus responded by proposing his “super-o” solution which went even further and proposed the abrogation of all claims, without restrictions of time or circumstances. In May, the Czech government finally accepted to honor the privatization coupons held by Slovak citizens, thereby putting a definite end to the crisis. This episode marks in fact the end of the period of transition from independence toward a new partnership, for both republics. This period lasted only slightly more than a year.

Recent Developments

41A number of features of the original partnership that was established at the time of the break-up have not survived the test of time. For example, the clearing mechanism, set up at the time of the break-up to facilitate the payment of mutual trading debts, could not withstand the massive expansion of the Slovak economy and of Slovak exports after 1993, as well as the continued relative strength of the Czech crown, and was consequently abandoned shortly after, in 1995. Similarly, the monetary union that was supposed to last 6 months, and was intended to provide both countries with the time necessary to progressively set up their own currencies, lasted only 5 weeks. Finally, the accords that were supposed to insure the free circulation of persons and of workers between the two republics were partly compromised by the growing problem of the refugees who were crossing the two republics to reach the West, and by the repression and discrimination suffered by the Romany minority, especially in the Czech Republic.

42However, despite these few setbacks, the two new countries have managed to maintain key elements of their new partnership, in those areas where their interests have continued to coincide. Thus, cooperation between the two countries has continued unimpeded in a wide range of important areas, and the vast majority of the accords signed in 1992 continue to be respected by both republics. For example, the customs union that was set up at the time of the break-up continues even today to benefit both countries. Similarly, the two governments have continued to work to insure relatively stable exchange rates for their two currencies, and had largely succeeded in doing so, until the severe Czech monetary crisis of 1997 forced a major re-adjustment of the value of the Czech crown. The division of debts and assets was effectively and definitively settled in 1993, and no longer constitutes an irritant in the relationship between the two countries. Finally, the list of significant successes must also include the exchange, in 1997, of two villages situated along the border between the two republics. This exchange took place of a common accord and was performed in complete agreement with the procedure set up in 1992 to review the territorial division and the borders established at the time of the break-up.

43Despite some setbacks, the partnership set up at the time of the break-up has thus remained largely intact in the 5 years since the break-up. The resilience of the partnership between the two independent republics can be explained by the fact that, despite the animosity that arose from the break-up of the federation, both republics have continued to act in ways that corresponded strictly to their respective national interests, particularly in matters related to the economy. In fact, if anything, their new independence has forced both republics to become more responsive to the needs of their own economies and to the demands of foreign customers and investors. The resilience of this new partnership is thus the result of a heightened preoccupation with pursuing matters of national interest, on the part of both republics, tempered by the necessity to take into account the requirements set by external actors, in the achievement of these goals.

44Thus, their independence has allowed both republics to define and to pursue their own interests with more freedom. Thanks to their independence, both republics have been able to implement their own distinct policies in a number of areas, and have had the opportunity to develop their own normative models of what they wanted their societies to become. Thus, as a result of choices made by the governments of both republics, democracy continues to spread and to gain strength in the Czech Republic, while in Slovakia it remains troubled and constantly threatened by the actions of the Meciar government. Similarly, Slovakia’s more flexible and less dogmatic approach to economic development has allowed this country to rebuild its economy and to surpass its neighbors in terms of growth and of economic development, while in the Czech Republic, the Klaus government’s tight monetary and budgetary policies, as well as its decision to prematurely leave the monetary union in early 1993, have resulted in a severe financial and economic crisis, four years later. In this context, the decision of the Slovak government to devalue the Slovak crown in relation to the Czech currency, albeit with great reluctance, in July 1993, has played a key role in the impressive growth of Slovak exports and in the re-birth of the Slovak economy, while also contributing to the current difficulties experienced by the Czech economy.

45Thus, for both republics, the break-up of the federation has represented an opportunity to choose their own paths, and to reap the consequences of their own choices and policies. However, the breakup also allowed the two governments to cooperate wherever their interests coincided. As a result, and despite some setbacks, the partnership that was established at the time of the break-up has remained in full force wherever both parties have found it to be in their own self-interest to do so. But, if independence has meant increased freedom of choice for both republics, it has also meant the obligation for these two countries to take into account the requirements of their external environment. In fact, the decision to separate meant that both republics came immediately under increased scrutiny by the international community, and had to deal with the more stringent standards of a world community fearful of the consequences of secession. For both republics, their increased freedom at home was thus immediately tempered by a corresponding set of restrictions that were established by foreign actors, and with which both republics have had to comply in order to retain international support for their actions.

Lessons From the Czechoslovak Experience

46A number of conclusions can be drawn from the efforts of the Czechs and Slovaks to put an end to their previous association and to develop a new partnership as independent states. First, the development of this new partnership followed a very specific pattern that corresponds to changes in the behavior of the two republics. Thus, in a first phase in the months leading to their break-up, the governments of both republics made a marked effort to establish and maintain a positive image of the process of secession, in large part for the benefit of foreign observers. However, in a second phase, once both republics had gained their independence, they felt confident that their newly acquired status released them from the need of having to actively uphold this positive image. Both governments then proceeded to implement policies that were motivated solely by their own particular interests, without regard to the perceptions of external actors. Not surprisingly, this resulted in a significant decline in the credibility and reputation of both republics, on the international scene. Consequently, in a third and final phase, having become conscious of the negative effects of their actions on world opinion and of the potential costs of such changes in attitude, and after having been subjected to mounting international pressures, both republics were compelled to return to a behavior that was more in line with the demands and expectations of their international partners.

47What stands out from these developments is the compelling role played by external pressures in the process of secession and in the development of the new partnership between the two republics. The process of secession was marked by a growing spiral of recriminations and animosity between the two states and their populations. It would therefore be illusory to view this process of separation, or any other such process, as being anything else but the result of the irreconcilable opposition of two parties who are bent on profoundly divergent paths. It would also be illusory to believe that any such process could take place without generating conflicts that test to their limit the goodwill of all those who are involved. However, what is most remarkable about the Czechoslovak experience is that, despite very intense opposition and a high degree of personal animosity, these were never allowed to obstruct the achievement of a peaceful and rapid settlement, capable of satisfying the very stringent requirements set up by the international community. Thus, both parties came to understand that it was essential, for economic as well as political reasons, to set aside their differences of opinion, their recriminations and their mutual animosity, at least in public, in order to achieve a rapid and credible settlement susceptible of receiving the endorsement of the international community. As a result, even today, despite their thinly veiled mutual animosity, the leaders of the two republics continue to support each other in their efforts to obtain further international recognition, continue to cooperate on issues where they share common interests, and continue to work on maintaining this positive image.

48However, none of this would have been possible if the governments of the two republics had not been interested in achieving certain economic and political objectives at home, and had not needed external support in order to achieve these objectives. Both republics were thus forced to conform to the requirements set up by international actors, by the necessity to have access to foreign markets and to foreign capital, by the specific needs of their own economies in transition toward a more liberal form of capitalism, and by the personal ambition of their leaders. The actions of both governments were in fact guided by the interaction of these three sets of requirements, as the leaders of both republics needed international support in order to maintain economic and social stability at home, and retain the support of their respective populations. We can therefore infer from this that the more a country is integrated within the world economy and dependent upon the actions of foreign actors, the more its economy is developed according to the prevalent liberal capitalist model, and the more its leaders see benefits in this situation, the more this country and its constitutive states will be vulnerable to pressures and demands coming from external actors as well as from their own economy.

49In their efforts to satisfy the needs of their economies in transition and the demands of external actors, both the Czech Republic and Slovakia have had to emphasize, above all other considerations, the criteria of economic and political stability, of credibility, of openness to markets and to investors, and of integration within the international community. Thus, if on the one hand both governments have acted according to their own self-interest, and sometimes also according to their mutual interest, on the other hand, it is the interventions of foreign actors, as well as the structural conditions defined and established by these same foreign actors, that have framed the actions of these governments, have defined the rules of the game, have in part defined the goals pursued by each party, and have acted as an essential catalyst for their actions.

50Thus, we can conclude that economic imperatives at home and the pressures exercised by international actors have played a determinant role in the process that led to the break-up of Czechoslovakia and to the development of a new partnership between the two independent states that emerged from this break-up. The demands of foreign actors have forced the two republics and their leaders to accept standards that were not their own, and to modify their decisions and their actions in profound and lasting ways, in order to take into account the perceptions and preferences of external actors. Foreign markets, and specific international organizations such as the imf, the ebrd, the Council of Europe, the European Community, or the csce, have also played an essential role, as key intermediaries capable of expressing and enforcing the demands and standards of the international community.

51A priori, the rules applicable to secession or to the formation of partnerships remain open and are not subject to any form of effective sanction. Without the intervention of foreign actors, there would be few criteria, models or pre-established modus-operandi capable of guiding countries on their way to secession or to a new partnership, and capable of constraining the actions of authoritative and determined governments. In the case of Czechoslovakia, it is the external environment within which these events took place that has provided both parties with the rules, the standards and the modus operandi necessary to carry out a rapid, peaceful and successful process of secession. Similarly, it is this same external environment that has provided the incentives necessary to force the two parties to respect these rules and to come to a mutual agreement. Finally, the experience of the Czech Republic and of Slovakia shows that countries that choose to ignore the dictates of the international community and to act alone in an increasingly interdependent world can only do so at great cost.

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Notes

1 Some of the specific dates and events quoted in this paper are taken from The Prague Post, 1992-1995, from the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, 1994-1998, and from the Open Media Research Institute Daily Digest, 1994-1995.

2 In November 1992, less than two months before the date set for independence, Mecier had suggested to Klaus that the entire process of secession be cancelled, in order to look for another solution. While Meciar’s suggestion was rejected, this shows the profound dissatisfaction of the man who was commonly accused of being responsible for the break-up of the federation, with the process of secession and with its outcome.

3 Despite the purely formal character of this recognition by the federal parliament, this recognition was nevertheless important for the National Councils of both republics who were then very concerned with insuring their own future legitimacy and that of the process of secession as a whole.

4 The Prague Post, December 30, 1992-January 5, 1993, p. 4.

5 The Prague Post, November 3-9, 1992, p. I

6 Indeed, an agreement was reached, as planned, in 1997, to exchange two villages situated along the common border. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, 1997.

7 The Prague Post, November 18-24, 1992, p. 5.

8 The Prague Post, December 30, 1992-January 5, 1993, p. 5.

9 The Prague Post, July 14-10, 1993, p. I.

10 The Prague Post, July 14-20, 1993, p. I.

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