Democracy and Ecological Rationality
New Trials for an Old Ceremony1
p. 39-65
Texte intégral
1Of all the political structures, institutions and procedures inherent to the governing systems of capitalist market societies, none is more crucial to their systemic integration—nor currently more threatened with dis-integration—than democracy itself. Students of contemporary democracy have consistently argued for a historically contingent and functionally interdependent understanding of the Western model. Authors as diverse as Robert Dahl (1966, 1971), C. B. Macpherson (1962, 1966, 1977), Giovanni Sartori (1987) and David Held (1987), have all pointed out the strong relationship between existing democratic institutions, values and procedures, and the functional needs of liberal-capitalist nation-states. The Western model has indeed been defined as one of “competitive democracy,” with numerous analogies between the institutions and values of the free market on the one hand, and competitive electoral and representational politics on the other. More recently, the Clinton administration has made “market democracy” a cornerstone of its policy for progressive change and global development.
2The present paper focuses on the dependency between the Western model of democracy and the integrated growth of nationalism, liberalism and free-market economies. This dependency is more than 200 years old, and we stand today confronted by its eminence in the form of dominant values and presuppositions as to how the business of governance is to be carried out. The “market democracies” of Western (and soon all “Northern”) country-states are steeped in political-cultural tradition and normative limits. The overall system has clearly served mankind well—at least in the material sense to which it has become so acutely attuned—and voices of critical dissent have become very few and far between. We live in an age of hegemonic values with respect to economics, such that it is hardly surprising that the critique of democracy-as-market-analogy (so prevalent within political science and sociology during the 1960s and 1970s) has largely faded away.
3I have no intention of trying to revive those debates—at least not in the terms they were originally conducted. My interest in the dependency between democracy and the liberalist free-market logic is a more practical one. Given the prospect that major collective interests and political actors, for a wide variety of reasons, want to change the current nature of the forces of production and consumption, what does this imply for the functionality of democratic institutions? More specifically, given the fact that representatives of more than 160 governments of the world, including all of the major “powers”, North, South, East and West, have declared “sustainable development” as an overriding goal for global development—what does this imply for a culturally bound and normatively channeled steering system? If democracy is judged to have served us well under conditions of rapid industrialization, unfettered market competition and (seemingly) limitless consumption, will it serve us equally well if these conditions are to be problematized, controlled and reversed?
4The immediate context for both posing and trying to answer such questions is a European research project entitled: “The Ecological State: Towards a New Generation of Environmental Policies and Institutions.”1 The major premise of the project is that the current state model will have to be changed to achieve sustainable development, and that this will produce a number of discontinuities and dysfunctions in current steering capabilities. As there is currently no consensus as to what an “ecological state” might consist of, it is a part of the project’s exploratory nature to open this question to research dialogue.2 Our analysis begins, therefore, with a brief description of the notion of an ecological state, and then goes on to explain the idea of “ecological rationality” as put forth by John Dryzek (1987). This then prepares the ground for a schematic “confrontation” between ecological rationality and the notion of sustainable development, on the one hand, and democratic values, institutions and procedures on the other.
An Ecological State?
5The notion of an “ecological state” designates a political unit which somehow builds upon or otherwise integrates an understanding of “ecology” into the constitution and governing principles of the unit. Assuming that by “state” we mean the type of unit which currently qualifies for membership in the United Nations, the notion implies a qualitative change among existing country-states in the direction of making them more in line with, or reflective of, ecological theory. To warrant the title of “ecological state,” current country-states would have to change the functional relationship between governing principles, procedures and institutions, so that these more adequately, and perhaps predominantly, reflect ecological relationships. Such a state could then be more aptly understood as an “ecological state”, rather than an “industrial state,” “developing state,” “post-industrial state,” “welfare state,” etc.
6At the current level of discourse, the notion of an ecological state must be considered a normative concept since there clearly does not yet exist any such unit. “Ecology” has long existed as a central idea within the natural sciences, and has more recently been pressed into service as a more systemic generalization of the idea of “environment,” but has not, I believe, been adopted by any specific state. Environmentalists have long advocated the introduction of more holistic ecological principles into politics and economics, but in practical terms the idea has mainly been implemented as piecemeal changes in production and consumption. There is an increasing tendency to say “ecological” where one previously said “environmental,” without, however any clear explanation of what the difference actually implies.
7The Norwegian Labour Party has, for example, forcefully stated that the overriding goal of the party is to achieve an “ecologically sustainable society.” And, as described by the current party leader (and ex-Prime Minister), Mr. Thorbjorn Jagland, the goal is to be pursued with the same energy and purpose as that previously employed by the labor movement in the pursuit of the welfare state. Such a declaration provides us, at least, with a more specific notion of what an ecological state might imply. Given the widespread acceptance (indeed, universal recognition at the Rio Summit) of the goal of “sustainable development,” we can, for the purpose of our argument, understand the pursuit of an “ecologically sustainable society” as economic, social and political change directed toward the ecological aspect of sustainable development.
8This aspect, however, is but one of the three elements of sustainable development—the other two being the elimination of poverty (global equity) and the preservation of natural resources for the basic welfare of future generations (intergenerational equity). It is, however, clearly the key aspect of the concept. Though the Brundtland report itself (Our Common Future, 1987) makes only passing reference to the notion of “ecosystem integrity” (and says little or nothing about “ecology”), it is clear that the report’s references to “physical sustainability” and the “limits of nature” reflect basic notions of ecological balance.
9One way to approach the normative idea of an ecological state, therefore, is to assume that such a state should, at a minimum, aim to realize the goals and values of sustainable development, recognizing at the outset that sustainable development incorporates ecological principles. Given the plausibility of this exercise, it can further be assumed that the Rio accords and the coordinated United Nations effort for following up and realizing these accords, provide a specific political arena for the pursuit of “ecologically sustainable development.” Trying to explain the idea of an ecological state thus becomes a sub-task of a larger (and more explicit) program for realizing global sustainable development within the context of the unced process (Lafferty, 1996; Lafferty and Langhelle, 1998; and Lafferty and Meadowcroft, 1996).
10As a partial contribution to this sub-task, the purpose of the present work is, first, to briefly outline a notion of “ecological rationality” (which serves to anchor the discussion in ecological principles), so that we can then highlight a number of potential conflicts between the goals and values of ecologically sustainable development and existing democratic norms. This allows us, finally, to speculate on possible institutional and procedural reforms which might alleviate the tensions in question. The exercise can be understood as an attempt to adapt “form to function,” where the “form” refers to steering instruments for sustainable development and the “function” to ecological rationality.
Ecological Rationality
11As developed by Dryzek (1987), the concept of “ecological rationality” is a mode of “functional rationality” which aims to capture the essence of the interrelationship between human activity and ecosystems. As such, the idea “embodies both a value (or values) and a mode (or modes) of behavior appropriate to the attainment of that value (or values)” (p. 25). There is, therefore, a clear aspect of “strategic rationality” related to the concept, in that ecological rationality indicates “guiding principles for societal self-direction” with respect to specific types of existing “ecological problems.”
12The point of departure for identifying ecological problems is the particular nature of “ecosystems.” These exhibit the following distinct characteristics: (1) Interpenetration: ecosystems are always embedded in other ecosystems. Though it is possible to identify borders of ecosystems for analytic reasons, it must always be remembered that there is considerable activity and exchange taking place at and across the borders. (2) Emergence: ecosystem properties can never be circumscribed by a knowledge of the components of the system alone. New properties and characteristics emerge from unpredictable interactions within the subsystem. (3) Homeostasis: ecosystems are self-regulating, constantly adapting to both external and internal forces. This does not imply, however, that there is an identifiable purpose related to self-regulation. Overall structural-functional adaptation takes place on a contingent, not teleological, basis.
13Human activity takes place within (and is dependent upon) these ecosystem characteristics. The relationship between human and natural systems gives rise to five types of “ecological problems”: (1) Complexity: ecosystems are, in their own right, extremely difficult to systematize and predict. This complexity is only made more intricate and unpredictable as a result of human societal activity. (2) Non-reducibility: it is not possible to provide compensatory solutions to ecosystem disruption by manipulating one or more subcomponents of the system. Partial instrumental interventions will invariably lead to unpredictable consequences. (3) Variability: regardless of how similar ecosystems may appear, they will always vary in significant ways across both space and time. Differences in sociocultural forms compound this variability. (4) Uncertainty: the total effect of all three ecosystem characteristics creates problems of severe unpredictability. Given the fact that intervention itself can contribute to uncertainty, it is often not even possible to delimit confidence intervals for probability estimates. (5) Collectiveness: the interaction between human and ecological systems affects large numbers of actors, giving rise to problems of “collective rationality.” What appears to be rational on an individual level is quite often irrational for either the social collectivity or ecosystem as a whole. (6) Spontaneity: ecosystems have a tendency to right their own imbalances—a feature which human intervention often obscures or actively undermines. A problem arises as to how to understand and harness this particular characteristic without turning it against the ecosystem itself.
14An additional feature of the notion of ecological rationality is its avowed anthropocentrism. Dryzek focuses his interest only on those aspects of ecosystems which “provide the basic requirements for human life” (p. 34). These include productive needs, protection (against harm) and waste assimilation. He stresses that this focus is not meant to under-estimate other aspects and functions of ecosystems (aesthetic or biocentric values), but he feels that the anthropocentric focus is necessary so as to be able to relate ecological rationality to other forms of functional rationality (whether economic, social, legal or political). He is in this respect more concerned with “what ecosystems can do for humans, rather than with what ecosystems can do for themselves” (p. 36). Obviously, this is also a central focus for the notion of an ecological state, where one presumes that it is the function of authority systems to restructure the “world-openness” of the human species.
15On this basis, Dryzek defines ecological rationality as “the capability of ecosystems consistently and effectively to provide the good of human life support,” with “consistently” understood to mean “long-term sustainability.” It is the ecological rationality of “social choice mechanisms,” as these interact with natural systems and, in practice, lead to different “ecological problems,” that is the subject of his analysis. For present purposes, we can say that the focus is on the types of problems which democratic social-choice mechanisms lead to/face when trying to achieve sustainable development as a program which builds upon and incorporates ecological rationality.
Democratization as an Ongoing Task
16As mentioned earlier, there has gradually arisen a global political consensus (at the level of governmental commitment) as to the values and goals of “sustainable development.” “Physical sustainability” or “environmentally sustainable development” is a core concept of the unced program for change, and “ecological rationality” expresses the essence of the challenge whereby an equitable satisfaction of basic human needs must take place within the constraints of global, regional and local ecosystems. Existing states must, therefore, become more ecological in their basic constitutional structures and governing principles, and they must seek to promote ecological rationality by other modes of action and incentive. All this implies a conscious adaptation of existing democratic norms and procedures to the goals of sustainable development and ecological rationality.
17As an idea in history, democracy has been progressively applied to new types of units and different types of basic human activity (local democracy, national democracy, industrial democracy, economic democracy, ecolological democracy), the challenge being to develop procedures, institutions and techniques which contribute to sustainable development without violating democratic norms and values. Prior to the so-called “Age of Democratic Revolution” (Palmer, 1959), the democratic idea was primarily associated with three types of governance: the Athenian city-state, the Roman republic and the Italian and Swiss city-states. It was elements from these historical models which gradually filtered into the religious thinking of English and Dutch reformists, and then were made more explicit as governing systems in the colonies of North America. The development of the American Constitution itself, and the highly significant debates surrounding its instauration, mark the significant transition from diverse forms of local-community democracy, through representational democracy for the individual colonies, all the way to the notion of an American federal “republic.”
18Once established through force of arms in America, the idea of “democratization” took hold throughout Europe, leading ultimately (at the end of the Second World War) to a near universal acceptance of the idea as the only legitimate basis for governance. Over the past fifty years the idea has continued to be applied (and vigorously debated) along two dimensions: the distinguishing nature of “real” democracy at the country-state level, and the application of democratic principles to sub-state associations, whether voluntary organizations, industrial concerns or the economy itself (in the form of the democratization of capital).
19Throughout this long history, the substantive task has remained roughly the same: to apply the relatively small set of democratic/republican norms to associations which are either larger than those originally envisioned (the colonialist state of Virginia, the United States of America, France, Russia, the European Union) or of a different type than originally envisioned (i.e. any type of group not specifically devoted to the function of associational governance). Now the task has to do with a need for ecological democracy. How and with what implications can the conceptual demands of sustainable development and ecological rationality be adapted to existing democratic norms and procedures?
20Table 1 outlines a very rough initial attempt to come to grips with some of the key issues of this emerging discourse. The figure identifies six different value components of democracy (there may be more), and raises for each an aspect of ecological rationality or sustainable development which, at face value, appears to pose problems of adaptation. For the sake of the debate, the figure also outlines a number of possible reforms, i.e. changes which are presumed to offer more effective means of dealing with the values and goals of the unced program, without crucially compromising democratic principles. It should be noted here that, whereas previous attempts at adaptation have largely involved adjusting the norm to either new challenges of the same nature (political governance) on a different scale, or to types of activity with clearly defined group goals other than politics—the current task initially involves a reverse procedure. The goal is to confront existing democratic norms and practices with what are perceived to be necessary aspects of an alternative state creation.
Ecologizing the democratic state
1. Ecological community
21Though the focus of this paper is on the ecological state, the notion in question can be generalized to any given community. The idea of community is fortunate in this context since it has been used as a key concept in both “human ecology” (Hawley, 1950) and essentialist democratic thinking (Cohen, 1971). For Hawley, it is important to view human populations within given ecosystems as identifiable communities, and, for Cohen, community is one of two logical “presuppositions” for democracy (the other being “rationality”). Before we can reasonably discuss rules and procedures for governance, there must exist a specific association which has developed a minimum degree of self-identity as an association. Clearly, the quality of this identity (in terms of historical, cultural and psychological binding) will directly affect the nature of the community’s “democratic culture.”
22In Western democracies, the units by which communities have come to identify political membership and rights (citizenship) have developed under specific, and relatively similar, historical conditions. We live in villages, townships, municipalities, counties and states with borders which, in most cases, were defined under premodern conditions for premodern purposes. Yet our identities and political responsibilities remain attached to the established administrative units. When we cross a border from the one county to another or from the one state to another, we leave (in varying degrees) our duties as citizens behind.
23But problems related to environment and ecosystems know no such borders. We live within “ecological niches” of varying scope and holistic interpenetration. The notion of an ecological state presupposes that basic identities and responsibilities be shifted from time-worn and possibly dysfunctional administrative units. Not (in the first instance) as a replacement for current allegiances, but as a supplementary identity in the direction of an emerging “ecological citizenship.” Effective collective action for sustainable development requires a new consciousness with respect to the totality of local, regional and global ecosystems, a consciousness which focuses our identity as a species and our responsibility to nature, to coming generations and to the world’s poor.
24In this connection, there are several possibilities for developing and eventually institutionalizing such an identity. At a minimum, we require specific mechanisms for aiding the transition from administrative-geographical identity to a more eco-centered approach. This requires a broad-based pedagogical effort in the direction of better knowledge of local ecosystems. In the current context this implies an expanded understanding of “the environment” to embrace the key ideas of ecological rationality. Efforts in the area of “ecological cartography” and natural-resource accounting, with mapping of biodiversity, resource stocks and the consequences of local production and consumption activities, could provide a more relevant foundation for community goals and policy debate. Such efforts would also lay the foundation for a more effective application of concepts such as “ecological space” (Buitenkamp, 1993; Hille, 1995) and “ecological footprint” (Robbins, 1994; Rees, 1994), concepts which serve to focus the global ecological impacts of local and national consumption patterns.
25The major burden for action in this area lies with informational and media-related change. One could, however, also entertain the prospect of local “Ecosystem Councils” to coordinate initial efforts at trans-border identity and problem specification. Such councils (cooperative bodies of stakeholders) could also take on the task of coordinating and disseminating information on ecosystem conditions. Efforts in this direction could serve as an initial step in the direction of promoting local and regional work on the unced action plan, Agenda 21.
Table 1. Democracy and sustainable development. New needs and functions require supplemental procedures and bodies
democracy involves | sustainable development requires | possible reforms |
Community within historical-geographical units | Community within ecological units | - Ecological cartography |
Citizenship and direct representation of interests | Protecting the interests of future generations and (possibly) other species | - Normative future-protection research |
Freedom and equality before the law | Redistribution of loss, gain and risk | - Social-ecological law |
Equality and “common sense” | Science and expertise | - National scientific councils for sustainable development |
Pluralism and the majority principle | Holistic decisions | - A national plan for sustainable development/ Agenda 21 |
Debate, dialogue, compromise, reflection and learning | Prompt and effective action | - Local plans of action with specific binding targets for sustainable development |
2. Representation of virtual interests
26Representation is an essential aspect of democratic governance in large-scale units. The effectiveness of face-to-face democracy is clearly defined in terms of both time and space, and effectiveness is a vital condition for political stability and democratic legitimacy. Representation is but one of democracy’s many “instruments” (Cohen, 1971), a device which requires constant change in line with emerging social problems and shifting constellations of interest.
27While current democratic systems have developed apace with nation-building and the growth of the welfare-state, the demands of an ecological state require new forms of representation and the delegation of power. Within the electoral (parliamentary) system, we are accustomed to thinking in terms of “one man/woman-one vote,” and within the system for interest-group representation, we apply the notion of “corporate pluralism” (Rokkan, 1966). Both of these steering mechanisms reflect a liberalist bias, with the individual citizen recognized as sole legitimate actor, but with a grudging recognition of the need for functional representation (Bendix, 1964).
28What is important in the present context, however, is that both systems presuppose what Thompson (1970) has referred to as “the democratic objective,” i.e. that decision-making should reflect the aggregated preferences of specific individuals and interests passed upwards within the system. One of the most crucial differences between conservative and liberalist notions of this objective was the transition from so-called “virtual representation” to “direct representation.” The difference between the individual and the group in this connection is less important than the difference between a representational system where the purpose is to articulate and aggregate specific votes and interests as the basis for decisions, and a system where the purpose is to make decisions on behalf of designated individuals and groups.
29It is, however, this latter pre-liberal notion which is reflected in the concept of sustainable development. The preferences and wants of current citizens and pressure-groups must be adjusted to take into consideration the interests of three “virtual” groupings: future generations, the distant poor and (according to many) non-human species. The challenge is to develop representational devices whereby the interests of such groupings can be accorded weight in current decisions as to resource use and allocation. While ethical debate on these issues has taken place for quite some time (see the contributions by Wetlesen, Ariansen and Malnes in Lafferty and Langhelle, 1998), the discussion as to specific reforms has only recently begun. Four perspectives of interest are:
Normative Futures Research. — A greater emphasis on scientific (disciplined) attempts to project and accommodate the interests of future generations. Through the use of scenarios and simulations developed from the norms of sustainable development, researchers have, for example, developed the idea of “back-casting” future interests into current plans and decisions (Dale and Robinson, 1996). By attempting to identify future configuration of need fulfillment on the basis of normative goals and current trends of production and consumption, it should be possible to represent the interests of future generations in a more systematic and well-founded manner. Futures research has, in this respect, made considerable conceptual and methodological gains in recent years. (See, for example, the multivolume works by Bell, 1997 and Slaughter, 1996.)
National Councils for Sustainable Development. — Though national coordinating committees for the implementation of the Rio accords are a recommended part of the unced program, they have thus far been given only marginal status in most countries. What is obviously necessary is a national council with high visibility and greater policy influence. One way to strengthen the role of such bodies would be to expand participation to include previous government ministers and heads of political parties, and to stress the future-oriented and global responsibility of sustainable development. In Norway, for example, it was possible on one occasion to bring together four previous prime ministers (from four different political parties) to openly reflect on why they could not, as heads of government, realize more effective environmental policies. Given the extreme importance of moral political leadership in this area, there can be little doubt that a body of political elders—freed from the constraints of both party programs and bureaucratic inertia—would be able to exert a more long-term and holistic influence. There is an analogy in this respect to the councils of elders in North-American Indian tribes, whose sole responsibility was to plan for the Seventh Generation.
Representation by “proxy”. — The notion of representation and voting by “proxy” is today most common in corporate business, but there is no reason why such a mechanism could not be extended to the political sphere. The origin of the idea lies in the Roman office of “procurator,” an agent who was mandated to exercise power on behalf of a given body or authority. As a tool of democratic representation, proxy votes could be allocated to parliamentary agents for the virtual groups affected by non-sustainable development. Though the entire notion of responsibility to future generations is normatively complex (Partridge, 1981; Gower, 1992), specific proposals have been put forth (Dobson, 1996), and there is a clear analogy to the now-accepted institution of “ombudsman,” which was hardly less controversial at its inception...
Expanded ecological rights. — Finally, there is the possibility of bringing the affected interests more strongly to bear on decision-making by assigning them enhanced ecological rights in current constitutions. Though the concepts have been elaborated theoretically (Nash, 1989), there are as yet few attempts to specifically assign rights to either other species or future generations. The Norwegian constitution goes relatively far in this direction, however, with its amendment no (b) which stipulates that: “Everyone has a right to an environment which secures health, and to a state of nature where both productive capacity and biodiversity are preserved. Natural resources should be disposed of within a long-term, comprehensive perspective, whereby the rights herein are also preserved for coming generations” (our emphasis).
3. Reallocation of risk and responsibility
30Western democracy builds on principles of individual freedom and autonomy, values which have developed in close correspondence with property rights, judicial security and political sovereignty. The functional relationship between market liberalism and “competitive democracy” is a well-developed theme among political theoreticians (Schumpeter, 1976; Macpherson, 1962, 1967; Held, 1987). But while the discussion previously focused on whether or not the Western model could be transferred to non-Western settings, we are now confronted with the question of whether or not the functional dependencies of the model are suitable to the task of sustainable development. Is the “democracy” of the liberal-capitalist state adequate to the needs of the ecological state?
31The idea of “sustainable production and consumption” (as outlined in Agenda 21, Chapter 4, and subsequently elaborated within unced) rests on the assumption that it is the industrialized countries of the wealthy North which bear the greatest responsibility for environmental degradation.3 A similar assumption can also be said to apply within each country, where those who are most responsible for non-sustainable production and consumption must bear the greatest burdens of change and reallocation.
32All this involves relatively massive changes in both lifestyle and control over natural resources. As previously shown, sustainable development implies a marked change in the direction of greater equity on both a global and national scale. This means a clear reallocation of responsibility—of risks, gains and losses among the major “stakeholders” in society. The problem is similar to that which was anticipated for socialism. But with respect to the ecological state, change must take place within the normative scope of democratic governance, at the same time that it is contended that the need for change now stems from objective ecological constraints rather than “dialectical materialism.” The challenge is to create legitimacy for such change within a system where “democratic freedom” is integrally related to personal autonomy and corporate private property. The “deep structure” of liberalist democracy in high-consumption societies poses serious problems of adaptation for an ecological state committed to the goals of sustainable development.
33One important reform possibility here is a more rigid legal code with respect to non-sustainable production and consumption, together with a more active and “ecologically rational” judicial system. A “balance of power” between the legislative, executive and judicial functions is an integral part of the Western model. In many countries, however, (e.g. Scandinavia, Great Britain, Ireland), the powers of the judiciary with respect to modifying and shaping public policy are insufficiently developed. The danger of strengthening these powers procedurally to the detriment of parliamentary decision-making is clearly present. All judicial systems operate within relatively contingent “legal cultures,” and it should be a major task in the pursuit of sustainable development to explore the possibilities for cultural change in these areas. Lawyers and judges should be “gently prodded” into cultural reflection on the underlying and often uncoded values affecting their daily routines.
34Perhaps even more promising in the short term, however, are approaches to risk and burden allocation which build on principles of voluntary negotiations and agreements. In a recent collection of articles on “democracy and the environment,” there emerged widespread evidence of both enthusiasm for and innovative practice in these types of approaches. Lafferty and Meadowcroft (1996) refer to these efforts as “cooperative management regimes,” the major characteristics of which are: (1) a prior recognition that there exists a serious ecology-related problem, which (2) must be settled jointly, even though (3) any settlement involves a clear re-allocation of loss and gain. Given a minimum of favorable preconditions, and a systematic application of given procedures, it has become increasingly clear that problems conceived of in this way can be tackled successfully.4
35The key underlying process in these efforts is “social learning,” whereby key stakeholders, through a joint commitment to regulated dialogue, seek to alter ingrained perspectives on the balance between particular and general interests. One is reminded in this connection of the vital process identified by John Stuart Mill as an essential aspect of democratic development (see Thompson, 1976). There is, claims Mill, a built-in tension in all democratic systems whereby it is necessary to balance a need for timely and effective decisions with a need for citizen education and increased personal competence. It is the responsibility of democratic leaders to develop dynamic procedures which are both effective and educative at the same time. Cooperative management regimes would appear to be just such a system.
4. Democratized science
36Another tension which must be resolved is that between a basic democratic commitment to equality and “common sense,” and an obvious need for the ecological state to better integrate and apply science and expertise. Despite documented tendencies towards elitism and oligarchy in democratic systems, the mainstream normative approach has been to defend procedures for maintaining popular control over elitist rule. Thomas Paine’s Common Sense (1776) was not only one of the most influential pamphlets of the “age of democratic revolution,” it served to establish individual voter opinion as the foundation of democratic design.
37Yet one of the most distinctive characteristics of the modern environmental movement is the use of natural scientists to promote and legitimize demands for change. Nearly all of the early environmental publicists had natural-science training, and openly used their disciplinary knowledge to document the imminent crisis. As maintained elsewhere (Lafferty, 1996), the program for sustainable development derives moral support from two separate directions: the school of “ethical realism” and the school of “ethical consensualism.” As consensual ethics, the program rests on the support provided in Rio by over 156 national governments; and as ethical realism the program builds on virtually thousands of research reports (particularly with respect to environmental health hazards, climate change and ozone depletion) which document the pressing need for effective change. The essence of ecological rationality itself is a variant of natural-law thinking, i.e. that “the good” lies in the direction of harmony and balance in nature.
38The challenge in this area is to find methods and institutions for striking a balance between the expert (and often arcane) knowledge necessary for sustainable-development guidance and the need for popular insight, understanding and control. Two possible techniques here are: (1) “national scientific councils for sustainable development,” with joint representation for scientists, technicians, important stakeholders and lay persons; and (2) a more widespread and consequential use of public hearings and different forms of “consensus conference.” The aim of both methods should be to bring forth the best and most recent knowledge for the area in question, and to present it in such a way that average citizens can both gain insight into the underlying causes of everyday problems and offer their own forms of indigenous knowledge in return. Numerous such social-learning experiments have already been conducted in the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark, and in both Norway and the Netherlands comprehensive reports on science, risk and decision-making have recently been published (nscgp, 1995; nent, 1996).
5. Holism and emergent properties
39One of democracy’s most important features is a tolerance for diversity. For theoreticians as diverse as John Dewey, Joseph Schumpeter and Robert Dahl, it is competition and interaction among different “parties” which is the very essence of the form. Democratic leaders are to compete for popular support, and power must be liable to rotation on a recurring basis. Effective governance is secured through majoritarian rule, with 50.1 percent of the vote as sufficient (in most cases) for action—but the system must also be “protected” by adequate checks and balances between the different governing functions. The result is, of course, cyclical and alternate periods of change, stagnation and policy reversal with bargaining, compromise and increasing “governmental overload” as functional adjuncts to the system. Development under modern democratic governance is both incremental and unpredictable, a reflection of the price of tolerance, pluralism and liberalist constitutionalism.
40As we have seen, however, sustainable development and ecological rationality require holistic decisions and effective, lasting change. That which serves a particular constellation of interests at a particular time can prove to be both damaging and irreversible for the system as a whole. Pluralism’s greatest strength can become the ecosystem’s greatest weakness—at least when pursued under conditions of a presumed limitless surplus. Partial interests and fragmented results are an inherent characteristic of the pluralist “game.” So-called “win-win” strategies can be realized, but they are the exception rather than the rule, and, in any case, seldom transcend an incremental and time-bound understanding of the interests at stake.
41A major line of reform in this area is a stronger emphasis on longterm planning. Even if it is hardly possible to develop models and scenarios which take into account the totality of ecosystem penetration and emergent properties, it is clearly possible to do much more than is currently being done in most welfare states. Considerable resources are, for example, devoted to long-term planning processes in the Nordic countries, and the values and goals of sustainable development are being increasingly phased in. There is also (in Norway, at least) a growing tendency for the parties in parliament to requisition their own expertise in connection with the long-term plan (debated in the Storting every four years), and to provide their own alternative scenarios and projections. The prospect for greater coordination of the national plan at the regional and local levels is also present, particularly as part of the growing interest in so-called Regional and Local Agenda-2I processes. All in all, it must be pointed out that the unced process itself has reintroduced the notion of democratic planning into the process of policy implementation in a way which could not have been imagined a mere decade ago. While the ideological trend on most fronts points clearly in the direction of market liberalism and deregulation, there is simultaneously a growing interest in, and commitment to, environmental and sustainable-development planning.
42Another important possibility for increasing holistic understanding is to direct attention to the quality of political debate within existing legislative assemblies at the national, regional and local level. There can be no doubt that the parliamentary discourse in Europe at any rate has become increasingly instrumental and increasingly programmatic. Though this can be viewed, from the point of view of democratic rationality, as a progressive development in relation to debates among more individualized representatives (as is often the case in the United Kingdom and particularly the United States), it can also be faulted with respect to a need for more genuine dialogue and more holistic understanding. If the essence of parliamentary debate bogs down in rigid arguments for and against programmatic positions, there is clearly little room for either “enlightened understanding” through genuine dialogue (Dahl, 1986: 191-225) or a better grasp of ecological rationality. It is difficult to see how an ecological state can adequately function without at least one legislative chamber devoted to the type of discussion ideals associated with the Greek and Roman public fora, updated through debates over the American Constitution, and more recently systematized into a general epistemology by Jürgen Habermas.
6. Decisive and effective action
43Finally, we come to what, for many, is the most crucial area of potential (and existing) conflict: the tension between democracy’s need for dialogue and learning, and the increasingly imminent demands of sustainable development. Democratic procedures are well known for working both slowly and ineffectively. Many theoreticians have, in fact, emphasized just this characteristic as one of democracy’s greatest advantages. Change does not take place too quickly, so that citizens have the opportunity to develop their competence and insight through reflective dialogue and compromise. It has also been maintained that, if a group has not yet reached an adequate level of consensus on a particular issue, it is perhaps better that the decision not be taken at all, so as not to strain the overall unity of the community.
44As already indicated, however, democracy must also make effective decisions. It must, as Jon Elster (1983) puts it, prove to be “serious” in tackling important problems, regardless of the size and nature of the minority affected. And, as we have also seen, there is perhaps no more crucial problem area for democracy to address just now than the presumed “ecological crisis.” As used in this context, the idea of “crisis” is borrowed from medicine, where it refers to the unstable state of a given illness, which makes it unpredictable whether the organism will restore health or degenerate towards death. Given that there do exist crisis symptoms within the sphere of ecological rationality, it becomes a crucial question as to whether or not democratic steering is adequate to tip the balance back towards health rather than further decline toward an ultimate breakdown in life-support systems. In this context, it is not surprising that serious questions are being raised as to the potential of existing democratic procedures to resolve the different crisis areas.
45Even though most of these critical queries stop short of recommending more authoritarian solutions, the tone of the critique is serious enough to place the issue at the core of any discussion of a future “ecological state.” Rather than risk throwing the democratic baby out with the ecological bath water, however, it would seem more prudent to first try to reach a more tolerable balance between them. Ecological clocks are clearly ticking in a number of areas—and there is no point in trying to muffle the sound with technological ear plugs—but neither should we give in to premature democratic panic. There are, I believe, a number of possible reforms (in addition to those already mentioned) which could increase the problem-solving effectiveness of an ecological state.
46Among these are: (1) a strengthening of the visibility and decisiveness of local and regional planning processes (as already achieved and documented for several of the Scandinavian countries [see Kleven, 1996]); (2) a stronger integration between planning and policy implementation (through, for example, the establishment of Local Agenda 21 programs which combine the mobilization of local citizens and stakeholders with regional and global networks of other Agenda-21 communities); and (3) a more focused and integrated use of problem-specific hearings and local referendums.
47Another model which has proved to be extremely successful in Norway is the establishment of an “Environmental Home Guard” (as documented in Lafferty, 1994). Founded in 1990-91, the Home Guard is one of Norway’s youngest environmental activities. Purposely referring to itself as a dugnad (ad-hoc cooperative effort) rather than an “organization,” the mission of the movement is to mobilize and educate average citizens and families in the everyday facts of ecological living. Those who become involved (as “participants,” not “members”) initiate their activity by signing off on a check-list daily tasks or commitments to improve their family lifestyle in a more ecologically friendly direction. There are no meetings or other types of collective responsibility, yet the members of the Guard become increasingly aware of other “participants” through the reverberating community effects of their own actions.
48Initially sponsored by 18 major environmental and solidarity organizations, and with financial backing from the Ministry of the Environment, the Guard has now grown to over 90,000 members and coordinators and is becoming increasingly active in promoting the goals of Local Agenda 21. To the extent that “misguided public opinion” (in the form of narrow materialist interests) undermines ecological rationality through democratic procedures, the transformative potential of the Home Guard offers an innovative alternative to more traditional forms of collective membership and mobilization.
Conclusions
49Though the normative work is still at an early and relatively rough stage, I believe that the juxtaposition of democratic norms and the requirements of sustainable development provides a fertile basis for further discussion and model building. Assuming that an ecological state will have to build on democratic principles and institutions (for instrumental as well as ethical reasons), the sum of reforms outlined would seem to point in a promising direction. In his own evaluation of “polyarchy” with respect to the criteria for ecological rationality, Dryzek finds the system, despite its obvious weaknesses, clearly superior to both markets and administered systems (1987: 110-131). This doesn’t prevent Dryzek, in a later work, from becoming more sceptical when it comes to reforming liberal-capitalist systems (in Lafferty and Meadowcroft, 1996). With reference to the United States and Canada, Dryzek seems to feel that, in the short term at any rate, strategies of “rejection” and “oppositional civil society” offer the best possibilities for reform—or at least postponement of “business as usual.”
50In conclusion, I would like to offer a somewhat more positive view. As recently pointed out in Lafferty and Meadowcroft (1996), there are, in fact, a number of reform practices which are already being implemented in European countries with a longer tradition of social-welfare cooperation and corporate-pluralist governance than those analyzed by Dryzek. We have identified the most promising of these reform perspectives as “cooperative management regimes,” “supranational governance,” and “long-term planning.” Each model holds promise of innovative and interconnecting steering mechanisms within and across the traditional functional sectors and levels of governance of industrial country-states. They involve values and commitments which transcend zero-sum thinking as well as narrower commercial, national and subgroup interests.
51What may prove to be of particular importance regarding these possibilities for change is the prospect of integrating them into the unced program for global sustainable development. Dryzek maintains that ecological rationality presupposes a type of human intervention in nature which is balanced between the “hubris” of “ecological engineering” and the “sterility” of a passive, noninterventionist position (“nature knows best”) (1987: 45-46). A “good” ecological rationality accepts the need for controlled intervention, whereby human steering can, in fact, contribute to a more ordered, low-entropy human-ecosystem relationship. Borrowing from Odum (1983), Dryzek describes one ideal of ecological rationality as an “anthropogenic subclimax,” i.e. a “man-created and man-maintained stable ecological state different from the climax which would obtain in the absence of human intervention” (p. 45).
52Without going into a great deal of conceptual detail, I would make the case that the basic idea of sustainable development—as outlined in the Brundtland report—points toward a program for human-ecosystems relationships which, if taken seriously along the lines of the original report, constitutes a viable approximation of what Dryzek (and the other theorists he builds on) has in mind. There is an underlying set of values and priorities in Our Common Future which corresponds well with the conceptual content and normative emphasis of Dryzek’s position. Furthermore, the global political process, whereby the values of the report have been acknowledged by virtually all world governments, gives the program a form of political legitimacy which is unique on a world scale. The goals of the sustainable-development plan (however vague) are comprehensively expressed by the Rio Declaration and instrumentally outlined in Agenda 21. What remains is the task of customizing the program for each national and local setting; determining the priorities for change with greatest impact on non-sustainable practices; and working actively and effectively at the task of program implementation.5
53The development of an “ecological state,” both conceptually and pragmatically, needs not take place in a theoretical vacuum. The concepts of sustainable development and ecological rationality provide the necessary ideas for delineating the value contours of such a state, and the unced program provides a pragmatic road-map for moving the project along. The notion that we can achieve ecological rationality through either “benevolent” authoritarian ecological regimes or a new era of “green business” and global free-trade is clearly at odds with the Brundtland vision. Progressive development (in the form of just and stable need satisfaction on a global basis) can be fostered in an ecologically sustainable manner without sacrificing either nature or democracy.
54However, this will require new values, new habits of mind, new alliances and new institutions. None of this is easy, nor perhaps even probable. But it is possible. The response, for example, to the unced call for instituting action on “Local Agenda 21,” is nothing less than spectacular. In country after country, within and across the major regions of Europe, local communities and municipalities are turning to the Rio action plan with an enthusiasm and effectiveness which has caught most political parties and their leaders off guard. The documentation and analysis of these developments is still at an early stage, but by all indications we are witnessing a significant movement for change: a spontaneous effort to promote the values of an ecological state—from the bottom up.6 Those who still feel that the agreements made at Rio were both too little and too late, are in for a big surprise.
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Notes de bas de page
1 The project is funded by the European Commisssion under the “Programme on Environment and Climate” within DGXII: Science, Research and Development. The project is composed of approximately 12 “partners” from eight different countries, and is co-ordinated by Bruno Dente at the Instituto per Ricerca Sociale in Milan, Italy.
2 The project is organized as a so-called “concerted action”. The goal is to provide funds for meetings and improved networking so as to further develop and better apply ongoing research within this area of study. The project will be concluded with a book and an interactive “dialogue” conference between researchers and practitioners in December 1998.
3 The initial paragraph of Chapter 28 of Agenda 21 reads as follows: “Poverty and environmental degradation are closely interrelated. While poverty results in certain kinds of environmental stress, the major cause of the continued deterioration of the global environment is the unsustainable pattern of consumption and production, particularly in industrialized countries, which is a matter of grave concern, aggravating poverty and imbalances” (United Nations, 1993: 34).
4 This area of reform is receiving increasing attention, particularly with respect to the new demands implied by the Kyoto agreement on reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Signatories to the climate convention are now confronted with the problem of allocating reductions across national sectors and industrial branches. Confronted with the prospect of heavy across-the-board carbon-emission taxes, several branches are trying to maintain their national positions and international competitiveness by entering into different types of negotiated cooperative agreements. For an overview of the general nature of such agreements, see Meadowcroft, 1998.
5 Further elaboration of these ideas will be presented in a forthcoming special issue of the International Political Science Review (1998) entitled: “The Pursuit of Sustainable Development: Concepts, Policies and Arenas.”
6 See Voisey et al. (1996) for an initial analysis of literature and findings in Germany, the United Kingdom and Norway. There has also been established a European research network which is in the process of preparing comprehensive overviews of LA21 implementation in Norway, Sweden, Finland, Germany, the United Kingdom, Holland, Ireland, Austria, Italy, Denmark, Spain and France. The network was created recently by the European Commission (DGXII) as a “concerted action” on “Sustainable Communities in Europe.” An initial eight-nation study has been published in Lafferty and Eckerberg (1997). The project also has its own web-site, accessible at the web-site of the project co-ordinator, ProSus (http://www.prosus.nfr.no). The major source for monitoring developments on Local Agenda 2I is the International Council for Local Environment Initiatives (iclei), with homepage: http://www.iclei.org/iclei.htm.
Notes de fin
1 The current paper reports work being developed for an EU research project on “The Ecological State” (see notes 1 and 2 below). An earlier draft was presented to the iuperj/ipsa Roundtable on: “Division of Powers as a Problem in Contemporary Democracies,” Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, March 4-5, 1997. For further information contact: William M. Lafferty <bill@profus.nfr.no>.
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