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Idia kai dèmosia

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Véronique Dasen
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Marcel Piérart

Lege et consuetudine : Voluntary cult associations in the Greek law*

Yulia Ustinova

Texte intégral

  • *  I thank Dr. Elisheva German for her comments on the draft of this paper.

1Ancient Greek voluntary associations were groups deliberately founded by private persons for a common aim. They were joined by the members of their own free will. Whatever the focus of their activities, most of these groups had some cultic aspects. They differ from the subdivisions of the polis, to which a person belonged by force of his being a citizen.

2Voluntary associations for various purposes emerged early in the Greek history. By the beginning of the sixth century, they had already existed long enough to be treated by a lawgiver. However, voluntary associations did not receive much attention in the Greek legislation, their presence in the polis usually taken for granted.

  • 1  P. Vinogradoff, Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence, v. 2, Jurisprudence of the Greek City, Oxfor (...)

3No Pan-Hellenic law has ever existed, although the process of law-making in various Greek cities developed to a certain degree on similar lines and resulted in the fundamental unity of the Greek law. Legal status of voluntary associations differed from polis to polis.1 Since most evidence comes from Attica, the situation there may be reconstructed at least in general lines, whereas the state of affairs in other poleis remains little known.

4The purposes of the present paper are to examine the legal status of voluntary cult associations in the Greek world, and to consider formal interactions between these groups and the state. In conclusion, the applicability of the notions “private” and “public” to Greek voluntary associations will be discussed.

The notion of juristic person in the Greek law

  • 2  Radin (cit. n. 1), p. viii.
  • 3  Imperatoris Justiniani Institutionum Libri quattuor, Oxford, 1903, p. 194-195.

5The words κοινωνα and κοινν, translated into modern languages as ‘association’, ‘communion’, or ‘corporation,’ call forth complex modern notions, first and foremost, the concept of juristic or corporate person (personne morale, civile), current in Western law. Modern law clearly distinguishes between partnership, where persons involved remain individually liable, and corporations sensu stricto, where the liability of the organization as a whole differs from that of its members. From the practical point of view, several persons receive from the legally constituted authorities certain privileges of limited liability or extended property rights no one of them enjoys singly.2 As J.B. Moyle3 formulates it, “A universitas personarum (or corporation) is an aggregate of natural persons forming an ideal whole, regarded by the law as a ‘person’ distinct from its members for the time being, because its existence does not cease along with theirs, and invested with rights and subject to duties, other than those of the individuals, taken singly, of which it is composed ; so that legal relations can subsist between it and them and any number of them no less than between it and other persons generally. [In the ancient world,] such corporations may be exemplified by the state, ecclesiastical bodies and commercial corporations… ”

  • 4  Radin (cit. n. 1), p. viii.
  • 5  Jones (cit. n. 1), p. 162-163, citing R.J.T. Endenburg, Koinonia en Gemeenschap van Zaken bij de G (...)
  • 6  Radin (cit. n. 1, p. 138) maintains that neither general corporation law nor a state license for t (...)
  • 7  E. Ziebarth, Das griechische Vereinswesen, Leipzig, 1896 ; F. Poland, Geschichte des griechischen (...)

6It took much time before this understanding became commonly accepted in the modern Western world.4 The Greek law did not know this opposition.5 Its emergence started in a single area during the Hellenistic period, and was more or less6 complete only under Justinian. Nevertheless, many scholars7 are even not aware of the problem, and the existence of the concept of juristic or corporate person in the Greek law is postulated sine dubio et argumento.

  • 8   Harrison (cit. n. 7), v. 1, p. 242 ; Radin (cit. n. 1), p. 14 ; Jones (cit. n. 1), p. 162.
  • 9   Radin (cit. n. 1, p. 19, 24) interprets these words as expression of the spiritual or material c (...)

7The word usage current in Greek voluntary associations hints at the members’ perception of their unions. The word orgeon (ὀργεῶν pl. ὀργεῶνες) designating the most ancient, at least in Attica, type of associations, has no corporate noun for the organization as a whole. In the documents of the associations such words as ο θιασται, ρανιστα, names like Διονυσιαστα, occur more frequently than θασος, ρανος, κοινν.8 When expressions with σνοδος, κοινν were used, they always contained a genetivus pluralis : κοινν μυστν, ᾿Αθηναϊστν, whereas the emphasis was in on the concrete, rather than abstract noun.9 This word usage is instructive, since it illustrates the way the Greeks conceived their corporations, plainly as sums of individual members.

  • 10  Radin (cit. n. 1), p. 139.
  • 11  For the legal aspects of joint ownership see Kränzlein (cit. n. 7), p. 130-137 ; Harrison (cit. n. (...)
  • 12  On the property of Attic orgeons and its management see for instance W.S. Ferguson, “The Attic Org (...)
  • 13  M.F. Baslez, “Les associations dans la cité grecque et l’apprentissage du collectif,” Ktèma 23 (19 (...)

8Although the Greek law did not develop the abstract concept of juristic person, certain aspects of this concept existed.10 Greek associations could possess joint property,11 of which a part was devoted to particular purposes, usually those of the common cult.12 In business proceedings a group was normally represented by an elect magistrate, and he was considered personally responsible for the sums involved. It is even suggested that ownership of a “common space” defined the evolution of Greek associations starting from the fourth century.13

  • 14  Contra : Radin (cit. n. 1), p. 140. Baslez (cit. n. 13, p. 434) supposes “indivision” of property (...)
  • 15  Practice attested in Rome : Dig., XLVII, 22, 1. Cf. U. von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, Antigonos von K (...)
  • 16  Poland (cit. n. 7), p. 275.
  • 17  R. Taubenschlag, The Law of Greco-Roman Egypt in the Light of Papyri, Warsaw, 1955, p. 63.
  • 18  Cf. Arist., Ath. Pol., 52, 2 ; Rhodes (cit. n. 7), p. 586 ; Vinogradoff (cit. n. 1), p. 122.

9The property of a corporation seems to have basically equaled the sum of parts belonging to each member.14 This assumption cannot be confidently proved or disproved, since there are no documents attesting a Greek analogy of the procedure de communi dividendo,15 expulsion of a member, disintegration of a voluntary association, or its functioning as a debtor.16 In the unique Epicteta’s testament, discussed below, dissolution of the foundation is mentioned as a theoretical possibility, forbidden in all circumstances. However, documents from Hellenistic Egypt demonstrate that members of associations had prospective rights to their parts in the joint property, to become actual at the dissolution of the group.17 It is noteworthy that in Athens disagreements between members of voluntary organizations (δίκαι ἐρανικαί and δκαι κοινωνικαί), could be settled as conflicts between business partners.18

  • 19  For their analysis see H.B. Gottschalk, “Notes on the Wills of the Peripatetic Scholarchs,” Hermes (...)
  • 20  von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff (cit. n. 15), p. 263 ; Ziebarth (cit. n. 7), p. 69-74 ; Poland (cit. n. (...)

10Testaments of Athenian philosophers (Diog. Laert., III, 41-43 ; V, 51-57, 62, 70 ; X, 16-17)19 attest a paradoxical situation. In terms of organization, philosophical schools were regarded by Greeks as voluntary associations, κοινωναι or σνοδοι, vague as these terms were (cf. Arist., Eth. Nic., 1160a 10-30). These associations were focused on cults, first and foremost of the Muses, and can therefore be called thiasoi.20 Harpocration (s.v. ργενες) even quotes Theophrastus’ will as evidence that assemblies of people heroizing dead persons were also called orgeons, which demonstrates that at least in the lexicographer’s opinion the term designating voluntary cult associations par excellence was applicable to a philosophical school.

  • 21  Baslez (cit. n. 13), p. 433.
  • 22  Cf. Baslez (cit. n. 13, p. 434) on the attitude of the (Athenian) state to associations as individ (...)
  • 23  For the property of a philosophical school, see Gottschalk (cit. n. 19), p. 328-335 ; Glucker (cit (...)
  • 24  T. Gomperz, “Platonische Aufsätze,” Sitzungsberichte der kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften (...)

11Although Athenian philosophical schools were associations, their heads regarded schools’ property, such as libraries, statues, etc., as their own, which could indeed be the case. Moreover, they left this property to private persons, rather than to schools as a whole. Yet scholarchs devised their gardens and other property “for collective usage.”21 There is a patent discrepancy between the situation de facto, that is, the will of a scholarch to promote the activities of the school, and the state of affairs de jure, namely, the lack of legal means to bequeath property to an association.22 In terms of the law, property of a school did not exist as such.23 For some scholars24 the lack of schools’ property proved that they were not considered associations. In fact, philosophical schools were voluntary associations, but in ancient Greek sense, which means that they were not regarded as juristic persons, hence could not inherit property.

  • 25  Jones (cit. n. 1), p. 155.

12Not only associations were considered as aggregates of their members. If the discussion is extended to include the city, at least in some cases it was regarded as an aggregate of its citizens. When the mines of Laureion started to yield significant income, it was suggested to divide it among the citizens, and only Themistocles succeeded to persuade the Athenians to use the silver for the sake of the state as a whole (Arist., Ath. Pol., 22, 7) : a clear example of “the collective, rather than the corporate conception” of the city’s property.25 However, nobody argues that since the notion of city’s income and property was underdeveloped, the city as a concept did not exist.

  • 26  Cf. Jones (cit. n. 1), p. 152-154.

13Lack of a clearly defined concept does not necessarily entail lack of apprehension of the difference between assembly and association. The idea of eternal (ες τν ἀε χρνον) honors to be paid to benefactors of some corporations could appear only if the belief that the associations continue to function for generations to come was taken for granted, that is, the association was conceived as a unity beyond a mere assembly of the living members.26 However, the testaments of philosophers never foresee future beyond the lifespan of the living generation ; further existence of their schools remains dim. It took several hundred years for the intuitive idea of long-term existence to develop into a legal concept.

  • 27  Kamps (cit. n. 7), p. 151, cf. Jones (cit. n. 1), p. 167-168.
  • 28  Vinogradoff (cit. n. 1), p. 123 ; Kamps (cit. n. 7), p. 161.
  • 29  All the dates un the paper are BC, unless indicated otherwise. For the analysis of the inscription (...)
  • 30  For foundations in the Greek law, see J. Modrzejewski, “À propos des fondations en droit grec,” Re (...)
  • 31  Kamps (cit. n. 7), p. 154.
  • 32  Radin (cit. n. 1), p. 58.

14The only exception is some Hellenistic cities of the Doric hexapolis.27 A family foundation on Thera cannot be described without recourse to the concept of juristic person.28 The statute of this association is determined in the famous Epicteta’s testament (IG XII 3, 330 = Mich. 1001 = SGDI 4706 = LSCG 135), which was recorded on the eve of the second century.29 This statute is much more developed than that of similar simultaneous family organizations, namely, the foundation of Diomedon, active on Cos about 300 (Syll.³ 1106 = SGDI 3634), and the foundation of Poseidonios of Halicarnassos, recorded in the late fourth-early third century (Syll.³ 1044 = Michel 854).30 Members of the Halicarnassian association are always referred to as οἱ τῶν ἱερῶν κοινωνοντες, and never as a κοινν.31 Posidonios determined that his foundation submitted its accounts to the people of Halicarnassos. This is a unique example of public scrutiny of trust-funds, and it is very close to the modern views on corporations.32 We never find anything resembling this practice elsewhere.

  • 33  This was the custom in Attica, as well : IG II², 1318 ; 1263 ; SEG 2, 10 (third cent.)
  • 34  Kamps (cit. n. 7), 164.
  • 35  Kamps (cit. n. 7), p. 160 ; Jones (cit. n. 1), p. 166.

15The foundation on Thera is consistently named κοινν τν συγγενν. The magistrates of the Theran foundation are responsible to the association,33 rather than to the people, and in case of misuse they had to refund the damage. The corporation inherited the landed property left to it as a body by Epicteta. It enjoyed certain freedom in the management of this property, and received a rent intended for the cult ceremonies.34 Epicteta’s testament envisages the order of assemblies and even explicitly prohibits disintegration of the foundation. This foundation is unique in many respects. Its complex financial operations and the outstanding mechanism of administration attest the emergence of the concept of juristic person.35

  • 36  Kamps (cit. n. 7), p. 159.
  • 37  Finley (cit. n. 1), p. 276.
  • 38  D. Magie, Roman Rule in Asia Minor, v. 1-2, Princeton, v. 2, p. 854-855.
  • 39  Radin (cit. n. 1), p. 63.
  • 40  Cf. Moyle (cit. n. 3), p. 193-195.

16However, it was no sooner that in the Imperial period that this concept spread to other Greek cities.36 Geographical limitation to the Doric hexapolis is especially significant as an illustration of the lack of unity of the Greek law.37 As late as in the second century AD a special decree was issued on Iasos, which authorized initiation of law suits by the local gerusia and the association of neoi. Hence, both organizations were not regarded as juristic persons, and these rights were partially granted to them by an exceptional decree.38 The concept of the juristic person developed gradually during the Roman period.39 Under Justinian, a clear definition of res communes as a corporation was achieved, and collegia legally acquired universitas personarum (Just., Inst. II, 1-6).40

Solonian legislation on corporations

17Another aspect of the legal status of voluntary cult associations was their direct interaction with the state. They had existed in Greek poleis for centuries before it became clear that they could cause some difficulties and that in order to prevent conflicts the status of such associations had to be defined.

  • 41  Y. Ustinova, “Orgeones in Phratries : A Mechanism of Social Integration in Attica,” Kernos 6 (1996 (...)
  • 42  On this passage see most recently : Jones (cit. n. 7), p. 311-320.

18In Attica, the status of voluntary associations before Solon is obscure. Probably there was no legislation on this subject. Solon noticed this deficiency. Seleucos (first cent. AD) in his treatise on Solon’s constitution records that orgeons were mentioned in Solon’s axones (Suda, Phot., s.v. ὀργεῶνες; FGH 341, F 1).41 A law ascribed to Solon is cited in the Digest (XLVII, 22, 4) :42

  • 43  BS, in F ναται instead of μηνυτα.

᾿Εὰν δὲ δμος φράτορες ἱερῶν ὀργίων μηνυτα43 σσσιτοι ὁμταφοι θιασται π λεαν οχμενοι ες μποραν, τι ν τοτων διαθνται πρς ἀλλλοις κριον εἶναι, ὰν μὴ παγοργεσῃ δημσια γράμματα.

If a village or members of a phratry or performers of sacred ceremonies or messmates or members of a burial corporation or thiasotai or those who go away for plunder or for commerce arrive at an arrangement among themselves, it shall stand, unless it is forbidden by the state’s written laws.

  • 44  Several conjectures are put forward. G. Busolt (Griechische Geschichte, v. 1-3, Gotha, 1893-1904, (...)
  • 45  According to Andocides (I, 82-83), the new law books included Solon’s and Draco’s laws, and even p (...)
  • 46  The law is almost unanimously accepted as Solonian, since ἐπὶ λείαν οἰχόμενοι could hardly been in (...)
  • 47  Cf. Lambert (cit. n. 46), p. 251 ; Jones (cit. n. 7), p. 34.

19Irrespective of the reading of the corrupted words between φράτορες and σσσιτοι,44 the basic meaning of the text is clear. However, the historical value of this law depends on its date. The trouble is that not only the code of 594, but also that of 409-401 was attributed to Solon.45 The nature of each and every association mentioned in the law neither allows its confident attribution to the Solon’s legislation, nor prevents this attribution.46 Compiling the Institutions, Gaius was much less interested in the details of Solon’s code than Seleucos, who devoted to Solon’s laws a separate study. Notwithstanding these considerations, it is very probable that the law cited in the Digest was issued by Solon ;47 at least it is certain that Solon’s legislation treated the status of the orgeons. Included in the fifth-century codices, it seems to have been a re-enactment of the existing Solonian law.

  • 48  Radin (cit. n. 1), p. 51.
  • 49  For the Athenian political clubs see G.M. Calhoun Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation, in Bu (...)
  • 50  Jones (cit. n. 1), p. 161.

20The reason for the enactment of the law on corporations under Solon may only be conjectured.48 Athenians inclined towards tyranny may have wished to forbid voluntary associations. In fact, Periander did prohibit “communal messes, fraternities, education (μτε συσστια ᾶν, μτε ταιραν, μτε παιδεαν) and other things that… usually give rise to (high) way of thinking and mutual trust” (Arist., Pol., 1313a 38). Solon might oppose these undemocratic actions, and therefore could initiate legislation confirming the freedom of association. On the other hand, Cylon’s attempted coup was supported by his hetaireia (Hdt., V, 71), and similar aristocratic clubs49 may have aroused suspicions of the lawgiver who sought social compromise. Thus, it may be supposed that the city was confronted with some activities of associations, traditional or newly founded, which appeared as infringing upon the sovereign power of the polis, and that Solon therefore issued a law reminding that the decrees of the state ruled supreme over the preferences of other groups.50 The Solonian law established a tenable balance between the freedom of association and the right of the state to preserve its stability.

  • 51  The law obviously applied to citizens alone, Ferguson (cit. n. 12), p. 67.

21Thus, by the end of the fifth century at the very latest, a law existed in Athens, which allowed voluntary associations of citizens51 to manage their affairs freely on the single condition that they did not contradict the laws of the state.

  • 52  For these organizations see Poland (cit. n. 7) ; Ziebarth (cit. n. 7) ; Ferguson (cit. n. 12) ; id(...)
  • 53  I treat this passage in detail elsewhere : Ustinova (cit. n. 41), p. 235-239.
  • 54  Andrewes (cit. n. 46), p. 2.
  • 55  Thiasoi and orgeons as subdivisions of phratries, i.e. of the polis, are obviously the subject of (...)

22The state not only acknowledged the liberty of association, it even based a certain procedure of paramount importance for the community on the judgment of members of a particular type of voluntary cult organizations, the orgeons.52 Philochoros (FGH 328, F 35a ; Suda, Phot., s.v. ργενες) states that “orgeons and homogalaktes, who are called gennetai, necessarily belong to phratores” (τοὺς δὲ φράτορας πάναγκες δέχεσθαι κα τοὺς ργενας κα τοὺς ὁμογάλακτας, οὓς γενντας καλομεν).53 Philochoros’ text may be understood as follows : the phratry automatically includes anyone able to prove his membership in associations of orgeons or homogalaktes, in other words, since homogalaktes are practically indistinguishable from gennetai, to orgeons or gennetai. In other cases membership is to be treated according to the usual procedures.54 It is implied that the elite groups of orgeons and gennetai carry out the dokimasia even more meticulously than the phratries.55

  • 56  See Ustinova (cit. n. 41), p. 240 for the discussion and refs.
  • 57  Ferguson (cit. n. 12) ; Ustinova (cit. n. 41).

23Although this fragment was incorporated in book IV of Philochoros’ “History of Attica,” which deals with the period 464-395/4, it is considered a digression.56 In fact, Solon’s legislation, as mentioned above, dealt with the orgeons. This particular law would be then in perfect accordance with Solon’s program of establishing social peace and supporting the middle class, which gave rise to the orgeons.57 It is reasonable to consider the Philochoros’ fragment not as a new law, but as a reaffirmation of the existing situation, and to date it back to Solon’s legislation.

Voluntary cult associations and the state in Attica after Solon

  • 58  Radin (cit. n. 1), p. 34-35. For a different view see Ziebarth (cit. n. 7), p. 166-167.
  • 59  Radin (cit. n. 1), 55 ; Jones (cit. n. 7), p. 41-42.

24There is no evidence of limitations of the freedom of association in Attica.58 Intervention of the state was required in certain cases involving either non-citizens, or a conflict with existing laws. When Cypriot merchants from Citium asked the Athenians to grant them the right of γκτησις for the erection of a temple of Aphrodite, they were bestowed this right (IG II², 337, year 333/2). The procedure was necessary because Citians were non-citizens who wished to possess landed property in Attica. In the case of a group of merchants applying for the right to erect a statue of their proxenos in a public place (IG II², 1012, late second century) the authorization was required because non-citizens wanted to use a space in a public building for their purposes.59

  • 60  Ziebarth (cit. n. 7) p. 167.
  • 61  Radin (cit. n. 1), p. 35.
  • 62  Vinogradoff (cit. n. 1), p. 126 ; Jones (cit. n. 7), p. 38.

25In the deme of Piraeus the demarch and the priestess of the Thesmophoria had to take care “that nobody sets animals free to graze, summons thiasoi (μηδ‌ὲ θιά[σους] συνάγει), approaches the altars, or performs purifications” on the land belonging to Demeter and Kore (IG II², 1177, mid-fourth century). Irrespective of interpretation of these thiasoi as stable organizations,60 or temporary gatherings,61 it is clear that the main purpose of these restrictions is to preserve the sanctity of the sanctuary belonging to the two goddesses. It is exactly a case of a written law of a deme, a subdivision of the state, limiting the liberty of a voluntary organization, as envisaged by the Solonian law.62

  • 63  R. Garland, Introducing New Gods, London, 1992.

26In a few trials of people who were accused of assembling thiasoi, their main charges were asebeia and dissemination of foreign cults. Thus, Phryne was accused, because she was impious, worshiped foreign deities, and “shamelessly summoned thiasoi of a strange god” (θιάσους ἀναιδς καινο θεοὶ συνάγει, Athen., XIII, 590d-e). In fact, one had to behave quite recklessly to be charged with asebeia. Normally, foreign cults were performed in Athens almost without hindrance.63

  • 64  As in the arbitration between two groups of orgeons in IG II², 1289 (mid-third century), cf. Jones(...)
  • 65  Finley (cit. n. 1), p. 93.

27These examples demonstrate that when problems arose, they were treated by the state on the basis of the existing laws.64 Voluntary associations did not differ in this respect from the subdivisions of the Athenian citizen community, such as demes, phratries, etc.65 Freedom of associations that did not violate the law was guaranteed.

  • 66  von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff (cit. n. 15), p. 270-271 ; Jones (cit. n. 1), p. 165 ; cf. Lynch (cit. (...)

28A new law issued in 306 BC changed the situation. This law is mentioned by Pollux and Diogenes Laertius.66 Pollux (IX, 42) records “an Attic law against philosophers, suggested by Sophocles of Sounion, (which) prohibits that sophists found schools (διατριβὴν κατασκευάσασθαι).” Diogenes (V, 38) records that “Sophocles son of Amphicleides proposed a law, that nobody heads a philosophical school (σχολς ἀφηγεσθαι) without the consent of the Council and the people on pain of death.” Due to this law, Theophrastos had to retire into exile. He returned only a year later, when Sophocles was accused under graphe paranomon, and his law was cancelled.

29As argued above, in terms of organization, philosophical schools were regarded by Greeks as voluntary associations, κοινωναι or σνοδοι. Sophocles’ law contradicted therefore Solon’s law on corporations, which could serve the legal reason for its abolition.

  • 67  F. Wehrli, “Demetrios von Phaleron,” RE Suppl. X (1968), col. 520.

30Sophocles’ law was intended against the Peripatetic school, which was supported by Demetrios of Phaleron, whose tyranny ended in 307.67 Behind Sophocles stood Xenocrates and the Academy (cf. Athen., XIII, 610e), rivaling the Peripatos in philosophy as well as in politics. However, they did not succeed to establish their monopoly in Athens, notwithstanding the precarious position of the Peripatetics after the flight of Demetrios from Attica.

Voluntary cult associations and the state in other Greek cities

  • 68  Radin (cit. n. 1), p. 34-35, 56, 60.
  • 69  All the cases Ziebarth (cit. n. 7, p. 169) cites as exceptions belong in fact to this category. So (...)

31Other poleis acted in a way similar to Athens.68 State authorization for actions of voluntary cult associations was usually required only in cases when the interests of the state were involved, as for instance when a voluntary association wished to erect a statue in a public place or to crown its member on behalf of the entire civic community (IG XII 2, 1033).69 Exceptions from this rule are rare, and they are provided mostly by corporations focused on ecstatic cults.

  • 70  For a discussion of the cult of the Corybants see Y. Ustinova, “Corybantism : the Nature and Role (...)
  • 71  Dignas (cit. n. 70, p. 40) emphasizes financial reasons for this intervention. Although this aspec (...)

32The extant text of a state decree of Erythrae (IErythr. 206 = LSAM 23, late fourth century BC) establishes the duties of a person who purchased the post of a priest or a priestess of the Corybants.70 There existed at least three such organizations in the city (IErythr. 201 = LSAM 25, l. 108 and 118, mid-third cent. BC). The cult in Corybantic associations all over Greece was based on seeking altered states of consciousness in the framework of intimate circles of initiates grouped around a spiritual leader. In Erythrae, the priest or priestess of the Corybants obtained the right to be present at the city orgia. Furthermore, they could offer sacrifices, perform other rites, and initiate into the mysteries. Thus, the state regulated at least some activities of the Corybantic associations. The existence of the city orgia provided a suitable ground for the state intervention in the affairs of voluntary associations. Events that caused the polis to interfere remain obscure.71

  • 72  Cf. B. Haussoullier, “Bacchantes milésiennes,” REG 32 (1919), p. 256-261 ; A. Henrichs, “Greek Mae (...)
  • 73  See M.-C. Villanueva-Puig, “Le cas du thiase dionysiaque,” Ktèma 23 (1998), p. 365-374 for an anal (...)
  • 74  Villanueva-Puig (cit. n. 73), p. 368.
  • 75  Ustinova (cit. n. 70), p. 519.

33A parallel is provided by a detailed lex sacra from Miletus (LSAM 48, year 276/75).72 It establishes formal relations between the city and the Bacchic thiasoi, scattered all over the city and its suburbs. Although these thiasoi were headed by their own priests and priestesses, they were subordinated to the priest and the priestess of the polis, who in their turn were responsible for the organization of the city festival.73 Initiations (indicated by the word τελεν) and omophagia, that is, aspects of the Bacchic cult that were both private and incendiary, seem to have been mitigated by their submission to the public control.74 Competition between different thiasoi and their priests, as well as some disturbances during the festival of Dionysos, may have urged the city to issue the new sacred law.75

  • 76  The minute state control, imposed on the Dionysiac thiasoi in Egypt by Ptolemy IV, is an extreme e (...)
  • 77  Villanueva-Puig (cit. n. 73). It is also suggested (M.-C. Villanueva-Puig, “À propos des thyiades (...)

34Not neglecting the important difference between the Dionysian ecstasy and the Corybantic possession, we may suppose that the fierce character of the rites, common to both cults, and the existence of state cults of the same deities, may have been behind the introduction of the state control upon the mass ceremonies and their preparation.76 Athens, as well as other cities where Bacchic and Corybantic associations were active, yield no direct evidence of interference in their affairs, but it is reasonable to assume some form of participation of thiasoi in processions and other festivals organized by the state.77

Private and public spheres in the legislation on associations

  • 78  Jones (cit. n. 7), p. 319.
  • 79  Radin (cit. n. 1), p. 50.
  • 80  Radin (cit. n. 1), p. 51 ; Vinogradoff (cit. n. 1), p. 121.

35It is argued that the Solonian law cited in the Digest reflects the initial stage of development of the concept of voluntary association,78 because “the law-giver clearly lacks a general word for corporations, giving therefore a list of examples.”79 At least three types of associations are discernible : public or state corporations, voluntary associations of religious character, and associations of primarily secular and probably temporary nature, lacking even technical terms for their designation and therefore designated by descriptive phrases.80 However, when Aristotle writes on voluntary corporations (Eth. Nic., 1160a), he also does not contrast different categories of associations. Aristotle lists temporary associations, such as those of sailors or companions-in-arms, together with permanent organizations, and groups formed for the sake of social intercourse, for instance eranistai or thiasotai, together with parts of the political structure, as gennetai or demotai. Absence of categorization of associations seems therefore inherent to the Greek thought, and not limited to the early stages in its development.

  • 81  Cit. n. 12, p. 71.
  • 82  Vinogradoff (cit. n. 1), p. 119.
  • 83  Vinogradoff (cit. n. 1), p. 120.

36The same applies to the lack of contrast between private and public spheres. As Ferguson81 puts it, “from [the Solonian] laws it is clear that whether the associations of orgeons were public or private institutions, is a matter of definition… It seems clear that, while the state recognized the genus, it left to its citizens individually to plant and cultivate the species.” In the passage cited above Aristotle remarks that “all associations appear to be parts of the political association” (α δὲ κοινωναι πᾶσαι μοροις οκασι τς πολιτικς) and considers all the groupings mentioned in his list as ensuing from the common human tendency to form social ties.82 Since every human bond, from friendship to the state, serves the same aim, mutual benefit of people, Aristotle regards all associations as parts of the general political organization.83

  • 84  Dignas (cit. n. 70), p. 35.

37Modern categories of private and public are misleading when applied to activities of some associations in Asia Minor.84 In the cases of the Corybantic and the Bacchic cults discussed above, the polis regulated certain aspects of these cults, while other aspects remained free of state intervention. The resulting amalgamations cannot be attributed either to public or to private worship.

38In practical terms, the state could use the procedures of voluntary associations when it was convenient, as in the case of orgeons, or interfere in the affairs of cultic organizations when it deemed it necessary, as the examples of Bacchic and Corybantic thiasoi demonstrate. Greek legislation and practice lack clear discrimination between private and public corporations, exactly as they lack the notion of juristic person. Modern use of the term “private association” is therefore to a certain extent anachronistic, and the term “voluntary” reflects much better the contrast between two kinds of associations, the subdivisions of the state into which a citizen was born, and groups which a person could choose of his own accord.

  • 85  Radin (cit. n. 1), p. 35.
  • 86  For the Roman law on collegia, see recently W. Cotter, “The Collegia and Roman Law. State Restrict (...)

39Greek voluntary cult associations existed de facto, rather than de jure.85 The law almost ignored this phenomenon. Two reasons may be put forward. On the one hand, democratic freedom of association appeared so obvious that it did not need to be secured by law. Only a tyrant like Periander was deemed able to infringe upon this freedom. On the other hand, in the absence of the basic notion of juristic person, as well as clear-cut distinction between private and public spheres, the legislation on corporations remained underdeveloped until the Imperial period.86

Notes

*  I thank Dr. Elisheva German for her comments on the draft of this paper.

1  P. Vinogradoff, Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence, v. 2, Jurisprudence of the Greek City, Oxford, 1922, p. 3-7 ; L. Gernet, Droit et société dans la Grèce ancienne, Paris, 1955, p. 2-8 ; J.W. Jones, The Law and Legal Theory of the Greeks. An Introduction, Oxford, 1956, p. 16 ; specifically concerning the legislation on corporations : M. Radin, The Legislation of the Greeks and Romans on Corporations, New York, 1910, p. 35 ; M.I. Finley, Studies in Land and Credit in Ancient Athens, 500-200 BC, New Brunswick, 1951, p. 275, n. 5.

2  Radin (cit. n. 1), p. viii.

3  Imperatoris Justiniani Institutionum Libri quattuor, Oxford, 1903, p. 194-195.

4  Radin (cit. n. 1), p. viii.

5  Jones (cit. n. 1), p. 162-163, citing R.J.T. Endenburg, Koinonia en Gemeenschap van Zaken bij de Grieken in den klassieken Tijd. Diss. Utrecht, 1937 (non vidi).

6  Radin (cit. n. 1, p. 138) maintains that neither general corporation law nor a state license for the corporations, “which is the very essence of the existence of their modern counterparts,” have ever existed in the Roman world.

7  E. Ziebarth, Das griechische Vereinswesen, Leipzig, 1896 ; F. Poland, Geschichte des griechischen Vereinswesens, Leipzig, 1909 ; J.H. Lipsius, Das Attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren, v. 1-2, Leipzig, 1905-12 ; Gernet (cit. n. 1) ; J. de Romilly, La loi dans la pensée grecque, Paris, 1971 ; A. Kränzelein, Eigentum und Besitz im griechischen Recht, Berlin, 1963 ; D.M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens, London, 1978, and others. The first to pay attention to this difficulty were Radin (cit. n. 1, p. 138-139), L. Wenger (Das Recht der Griechen und Römer – Allgemeine Rechtsgeschichte. Heft 1. Leipzig, 1914, p. 208-211), and Vinogradoff (cit. n. 1, p. 123). Considerable progress was achieved by Endenburg (cit. n. 5, non vidi), whose dissertation is praised by Finley (cit. n. 1, note 5). W. Kamps (“Les origines de la fondation cultuelle dans la Grèce ancienne,” Archives d’histoire du droit oriental 1 [1937], p. 145-179) demonstrated not only that the concept of juristic person came into being in the Aegean in the third-second centuries, but also that this concept had not existed earlier. Finley adopted Kamps’ conclusions, and illustrated them with Attic examples (cit. n. 1, p. 99 sq.). Although these studies did not remain unnoticed (Jones, cit. n. 1, p. 158-163 ; J.P. Lynch, Aristotle’s School. A Study of a Greek Educational Institution, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, p. 113 ; A.R.W. Harrison, The Law of Athens, vs. 1-2, Oxford, 1968-70, v. 1, p. 242 ; v. 2, p. 22 ; P.J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristoteian Athenaion Politeia, Oxford, 1981, p. 586 ; S.C. Todd, The Shape of Athenian Law, Oxford, 1993, p. 297 ; N.F. Jones, The Associations of Classical Athens. New York/Oxford, 1999, p. 12), the importance of the lack of clear-cut legal characterization of voluntary associations seems to remain underestimated. Many authors appear to ignore the trouble altogether.

8   Harrison (cit. n. 7), v. 1, p. 242 ; Radin (cit. n. 1), p. 14 ; Jones (cit. n. 1), p. 162.

9   Radin (cit. n. 1, p. 19, 24) interprets these words as expression of the spiritual or material community (κοινν) of thiasotai or eranistai. In my opinion, this interpretation is somewhat artificial. Κοινν in the documents of the voluntary associations is simply ‘association,’ rather than ‘common property and cult, uniting the members.’

10  Radin (cit. n. 1), p. 139.

11  For the legal aspects of joint ownership see Kränzlein (cit. n. 7), p. 130-137 ; Harrison (cit. n. 7), v. 1, p. 242.

12  On the property of Attic orgeons and its management see for instance W.S. Ferguson, “The Attic Orgeones,” HThR 37.2 (1944), p. 61-140.

13  M.F. Baslez, “Les associations dans la cité grecque et l’apprentissage du collectif,” Ktèma 23 (1998), p. 431-439. I owe this reference to V. Pirenne-Delforge.

14  Contra : Radin (cit. n. 1), p. 140. Baslez (cit. n. 13, p. 434) supposes “indivision” of property belonging to associations.

15  Practice attested in Rome : Dig., XLVII, 22, 1. Cf. U. von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, Antigonos von Karystos, Berlin, 1881, p. 265-267.

16  Poland (cit. n. 7), p. 275.

17  R. Taubenschlag, The Law of Greco-Roman Egypt in the Light of Papyri, Warsaw, 1955, p. 63.

18  Cf. Arist., Ath. Pol., 52, 2 ; Rhodes (cit. n. 7), p. 586 ; Vinogradoff (cit. n. 1), p. 122.

19  For their analysis see H.B. Gottschalk, “Notes on the Wills of the Peripatetic Scholarchs,” Hermes 100 (1972), p. 314-342.

20  von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff (cit. n. 15), p. 263 ; Ziebarth (cit. n. 7), p. 69-74 ; Poland (cit. n. 7), p. 206 ; P. Boyancé, Le culte des Muses chez les philosophes grecs, Paris, 1936, p. 175 ; Jones (cit. n. 1), p. 162 ; H. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity, trans. G. Lamb, New York, 1956, p. 67, 360 ; R. Pfeiffer, History of Classical Scholarship, Oxford, 1968, p. 65 ; W.K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, v. 3. Cambridge, 1969, p. 374 ; G.E.R. Lloyd, “The Social Background of Early Greek Philosophy and Science,” in D. Daiches, A. Thorlby (eds.), Literature and Western Civilization, v. 1, London, 1972, p. 382 (reprinted in : W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, v. 3. Cambridge, 1969, p. 374) ; G.E.R. Lloyd, Methods and Problems in Greek Science, Cambridge, 1991, p. 121-140) ; with some reservations H. Cherniss, The Riddle of Early Academy, Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1945, p. 62. Lynch (cit. n. 7, p. 108-127) and J. Glucker (Antiochus and the Late Academy, Göttingen, 1978, p. 230) oppose this view ; Lynch’s position has recently been refuted by N.F. Jones (cit. n. 7, p. 39 ; 227-234). Lynch (o.c., p. 108-112) argues that (a) philosophical schools were not called thiasoi ; (b) they differed from unruly thiasoi mentioned by Demosthenes (XVIII, 259, cf. Strabo, X, 3, 18) ; (c) Aristotle (Et. Nic., 1160a) defines thiasoi and eranoi as focused on sacrifices and fellowship, rather than education. However, (a) voluntary associations were not necessarily called thiasoi, the variety of possibilities illustrated by the Solonian law (see below) ; (b) a thiasos could be a most respectable group (e.g. Is., 9, 30), such as a thiasos of Heracles (IG II², 2443) or a subdivision of phratry (see notes 44 and 54), rather than an ecstatic group ; (c) a philosophical school was considered as a “fellowship” (κοινωνα) of philosophers, and Aristotle is his brief remark did not have to specify every particular kind of fellowships. Lynch’s (o.c., p. 112-118) criticism of Wilamowitz’s (cit. n. 15, p. 263) approach also remains unconvincing : the fact that the Academy and the Peripatos maintained mouseia, Wilamowitz’ crucial argument, still retains its importance as a decisive proof of the existence of cultic activities of these schools. Finally, Lynch agrees that “the schools were private organizations” (o.c., p. 130), but emphasizes (o.c., p. 127) that philosophical schools were not “legally registered thiasotic groups.” Yet no official registers of voluntary associations have ever existed ! To attribute voluntary organizations maintaining a cult of the Muses to a separate category other than thiasoi, eranoi, etc. would contrast the tenor of the ancient sources, which oppose any attempt at categorization in strictly defined modern terms.

21  Baslez (cit. n. 13), p. 433.

22  Cf. Baslez (cit. n. 13, p. 434) on the attitude of the (Athenian) state to associations as individuals only, rather than juristic persons.

23  For the property of a philosophical school, see Gottschalk (cit. n. 19), p. 328-335 ; Glucker (cit. n. 20), p. 226-237.

24  T. Gomperz, “Platonische Aufsätze,” Sitzungsberichte der kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien. Phil.-hist. Klasse 141. 7 (1901), p. 1-11 ; Glucker (cit. n. 20), p. 230.

25  Jones (cit. n. 1), p. 155.

26  Cf. Jones (cit. n. 1), p. 152-154.

27  Kamps (cit. n. 7), p. 151, cf. Jones (cit. n. 1), p. 167-168.

28  Vinogradoff (cit. n. 1), p. 123 ; Kamps (cit. n. 7), p. 161.

29  All the dates un the paper are BC, unless indicated otherwise. For the analysis of the inscription see A. Wittenburg, Il testamento di Epicteta, Trieste, 1990.

30  For foundations in the Greek law, see J. Modrzejewski, “À propos des fondations en droit grec,” Revue historique de droit français et étranger 41 (1963), p. 82-92, with detailed criticism of A. Manzmann (“Die Rechtsform der griechischen Stiftung,” Revue internationale des droits de l’antiquité 4 [1957], p. 119-134). On the three foundations : A. Wittenburg, “Grandes familles et associations cultuelles à l’époque hellénistique,” Ktèma 23 (1998), p. 451-455.

31  Kamps (cit. n. 7), p. 154.

32  Radin (cit. n. 1), p. 58.

33  This was the custom in Attica, as well : IG II², 1318 ; 1263 ; SEG 2, 10 (third cent.)

34  Kamps (cit. n. 7), 164.

35  Kamps (cit. n. 7), p. 160 ; Jones (cit. n. 1), p. 166.

36  Kamps (cit. n. 7), p. 159.

37  Finley (cit. n. 1), p. 276.

38  D. Magie, Roman Rule in Asia Minor, v. 1-2, Princeton, v. 2, p. 854-855.

39  Radin (cit. n. 1), p. 63.

40  Cf. Moyle (cit. n. 3), p. 193-195.

41  Y. Ustinova, “Orgeones in Phratries : A Mechanism of Social Integration in Attica,” Kernos 6 (1996), p. 229.

42  On this passage see most recently : Jones (cit. n. 7), p. 311-320.

43  BS, in F ναται instead of μηνυτα.

44  Several conjectures are put forward. G. Busolt (Griechische Geschichte, v. 1-3, Gotha, 1893-1904, v. 2, p. 117) and von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff (cit. n. 15, p. 278) suggest ἢ ὀργεῶνες ἢ γεννῆται, Mommsen (T. Mommsen, P. Krueger, A. Watson, The Digest of Justinian, vols. 1-4. Philadelphia, 1985, v. 4, p. 793) proposes ἱερῶν ὀργίων θύται (cf. Lipsius, cit. n. 7, v. 2, p. 768). Ferguson (cit. n. 12, p. 64, n. 5) agrees with Mommsen, that three words are corrupted, otherwise he accepts the reading of Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, since in his opinion gennetai could not be omitted, and proposes ἢ ἡρώων ὀργεῶνες ἢ γεννῆται. However, these suggestions lead too far away from the manuscript, and are therefore rejected by several scholars (N.G.L. Hammond, “Land Tenure in Attica and Solonis Seisachtheia,” JHS 81 [1961], p. 80, n. 20). M. Guarducci (“Orgeoni e tiasoti,” RF NS 13 [1935], p. 333) suggests ἱερῶν ὀργίων (συ)ν(θ)ύται, which is closer to the manuscript. Hammond argues for ἱερῶν ὀργίων μηνυταί or μσται (l.c.). Jones (cit. n. 7, p. 34, 311) substitutes ὀργεῶνες for the transmitted ὀργίων, and ναυκραρα for ναται. Although generations of copyists could alter even more common words beyond recognition, ναται or ναυκραρα in the beginning of the text, immediately after φράτορες, look out of place, whereas μηνυτα seems quite appropriate : as Hammond observes, in Solon’s time the meaning of μηνυτα was close to ξηγεταί; ὀργεῶνες for the transmitted ὀργίων might be probable, but then the problem of ναται in the beginning of the list remains unsolved.

45  According to Andocides (I, 82-83), the new law books included Solon’s and Draco’s laws, and even preserved their archaic language, as quotations demonstrate (Lys., 10, 15-20 ; Dem., 23, 33).

46  The law is almost unanimously accepted as Solonian, since ἐπὶ λείαν οἰχόμενοι could hardly been inserted by later revisions (Ferguson, cit. n. 12, p. 66). However, these could be people involved in wartime piracy, rather than professional robbers. Thucydides (V, 115) records indeed the declaration of Lacedaemonians, immediately after the beginning of the war against Athenians, that everyone wishing to rob them (λῃζεσθαι) was free to do that. Although demos was supposedly introduced into the law only after Cleisthenes (von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, cit. n. 15, p. 279), even before his reforms villages of Attica could not lack any communal organization (Radin, cit. n. 1, p. 39 ; Ferguson, cit. n. 12, p. 66 ; Jones, cit. n. 7, p. 312). Syssitoi existed under Solon, as well as in the late fifth century (P.B. Manville, The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens, Princeton, 1990, p. 64). Associations of homotaphoi became common in the third-first centuries (Ziebarth, cit. n. 7, p. 191), but as early as in the fifth century adepts of a Bacchic cult has their own cemetery in Cumae (E. Schwyzer, Dialectorum Graecarum exempla epigraphica potiora, Leipzig, 1923, No. 792 ; A.D. Nock, “The Historical Importance of Cult Associations,” CR 38 [1924], p. 105 ; W. Burkert, Ancient Mystery Cults, Cambridge Mass./London, p. 22). Thiasotai must have belonged to voluntary cult associations, rather than thiasoi of phratries, which are attested for the early fifth-fourth century (IG II², 1237 ; 2345 ; Guarducci, cit. n. 44, p. 337-339 ; Ferguson, cit. n. 12, p. 133 ; A. Andrewes, “Philochoros on Phratries,” JHS 81 [1961], p. 6 ; Manville, o.c., p. 64 ; S.D. Lambert, The Phratries of Attica, Ann Arbor, 1993, p. 81-93). Thiasoi of phratries would be superfluous in the list that included phratores. Merchants’ organizations flourished in Athens by the fifth century, and are attested epigraphically (IG I², 127 ; 128 = IG I³, 133 ; 130a, cf. Ziebarth, cit. n. 7, p. 27-28 ; Lipsius, cit. n. 7, v. 2, p. 769).

47  Cf. Lambert (cit. n. 46), p. 251 ; Jones (cit. n. 7), p. 34.

48  Radin (cit. n. 1), p. 51.

49  For the Athenian political clubs see G.M. Calhoun Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation, in Bulletin of the University of Texas 262, Humanistic series 14 (1913).

50  Jones (cit. n. 1), p. 161.

51  The law obviously applied to citizens alone, Ferguson (cit. n. 12), p. 67.

52  For these organizations see Poland (cit. n. 7) ; Ziebarth (cit. n. 7) ; Ferguson (cit. n. 12) ; id., “Orgeonica,” Hesperia, Suppl. 8 (1949), p. 144-162 ; Lambert (cit. n. 46), p. 74-77 ; Ustinova (cit. n. 41) ; and most recently Jones (cit. n. 7, 1999), p. 249-267.

53  I treat this passage in detail elsewhere : Ustinova (cit. n. 41), p. 235-239.

54  Andrewes (cit. n. 46), p. 2.

55  Thiasoi and orgeons as subdivisions of phratries, i.e. of the polis, are obviously the subject of Athenaeus’ remark (Deip. V, 185c-186a), referring perhaps to the fourth century (Andrewes, cit. n. 46, p. 10 ; Lambert, cit. n. 46, p. 86) : τῶν δὲ δείπνων προνοοῦντες οἱ νομοθέται τά τε φυλετικὰ [δεῖπνα] καὶ τὰ δημοτικὰ προσέταξαν, ἔτι δὲ τοῦς θιάσους καὶ τὰ φρατρικὰ καὶ πάλιν <τὰ> ὀργεωνικὰ λεγόμενα. (“The lawgivers, making provisions for the dinners we have today, established the phyle and deme dinners, and moreover the thiasoi and phratric dinners, and again those known as orgeonic.”) The sense may be, as Lambert (cit. n. 46, p. 87) argues, that “even for the cultic associations they provided for phratry dinners.” The historical background of this institution and the accuracy of quotation are unclear, although in fact nomothetai are attested in Athens in 400-399.

56  See Ustinova (cit. n. 41), p. 240 for the discussion and refs.

57  Ferguson (cit. n. 12) ; Ustinova (cit. n. 41).

58  Radin (cit. n. 1), p. 34-35. For a different view see Ziebarth (cit. n. 7), p. 166-167.

59  Radin (cit. n. 1), 55 ; Jones (cit. n. 7), p. 41-42.

60  Ziebarth (cit. n. 7) p. 167.

61  Radin (cit. n. 1), p. 35.

62  Vinogradoff (cit. n. 1), p. 126 ; Jones (cit. n. 7), p. 38.

63  R. Garland, Introducing New Gods, London, 1992.

64  As in the arbitration between two groups of orgeons in IG II², 1289 (mid-third century), cf. Jones (cit. n. 7), p. 39.

65  Finley (cit. n. 1), p. 93.

66  von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff (cit. n. 15), p. 270-271 ; Jones (cit. n. 1), p. 165 ; cf. Lynch (cit. n. 7), p. 117-118 ; 128-129.

67  F. Wehrli, “Demetrios von Phaleron,” RE Suppl. X (1968), col. 520.

68  Radin (cit. n. 1), p. 34-35, 56, 60.

69  All the cases Ziebarth (cit. n. 7, p. 169) cites as exceptions belong in fact to this category. Some of these examples, as for instance IG XII 2, 1033, left by a ktoina from Carpathus, belong to the twilight zone between private and public coprorations : ktoina was in all probability a subdivision of the polis, an archaic organization, similar to the Attic phratry (G. Busolt, H. Swoboda, Griechische Staatskunde, v. 1-2. Munich, 1920-26, v. 1, p. 250).

70  For a discussion of the cult of the Corybants see Y. Ustinova, “Corybantism : the Nature and Role of an Ecstatic Cult in the Greek Polis,” Horos 10-12 (1992-98), p. 503-520. The most up to date research is by E. Dignas (“Priestly Authority in the Cult of the Corybantes at Erythrae”, EA 34 [2002], p. 29-40), with the recently identified fragment of the inscription.

71  Dignas (cit. n. 70, p. 40) emphasizes financial reasons for this intervention. Although this aspect cannot be ignored, it is imprudent to disregard other aspects of the decree, which include regulations of the activities of the priests, that is, the way the demos could control their cultic role.

72  Cf. B. Haussoullier, “Bacchantes milésiennes,” REG 32 (1919), p. 256-261 ; A. Henrichs, “Greek Maenadism from Olympias to Messalina,” HSCPh 82 (1978), p. 120-160 ; A.-F. Jaccottet, “De la ménade à l’initiée, la femme dans la sphère dionysiaque,” in R. Frei-Stolba, A. Bielman, O. Bianchi (eds.), Les femmes antiques entre sphère privée et sphère publique, Bern, 2003, p. 127.

73  See M.-C. Villanueva-Puig, “Le cas du thiase dionysiaque,” Ktèma 23 (1998), p. 365-374 for an analysis of the notions of ‘public’ and ‘private’ in the organization of Dionysian thiasoi.

74  Villanueva-Puig (cit. n. 73), p. 368.

75  Ustinova (cit. n. 70), p. 519.

76  The minute state control, imposed on the Dionysiac thiasoi in Egypt by Ptolemy IV, is an extreme example of this tendency, and has some particular reasons : Nock (cit. n. 46), p. 105.

77  Villanueva-Puig (cit. n. 73). It is also suggested (M.-C. Villanueva-Puig, “À propos des thyiades de Delphes,” L’association dionysiaque dans les sociétés anciennes, Rome, 1986 (EFR, 89), p. 31-51 ; eadem, o.c. (n. 75), p. 367, 370 ; A.-F. Jaccottet, “L’impossible bacchant,” Pallas 48 [1998], p. 16) that Delphian and Athenian Thyiades (Paus., X, 4, 2 ; X, 6, 2 ; X, 32, 5 ; Plut., Mor., 242, 249, 293, 364, 953), who worshiped Dionysos in ecstatic rites, acted on behalf of their cities.

78  Jones (cit. n. 7), p. 319.

79  Radin (cit. n. 1), p. 50.

80  Radin (cit. n. 1), p. 51 ; Vinogradoff (cit. n. 1), p. 121.

81  Cit. n. 12, p. 71.

82  Vinogradoff (cit. n. 1), p. 119.

83  Vinogradoff (cit. n. 1), p. 120.

84  Dignas (cit. n. 70), p. 35.

85  Radin (cit. n. 1), p. 35.

86  For the Roman law on collegia, see recently W. Cotter, “The Collegia and Roman Law. State Restrictions on Voluntary Associations, 64 BCE-200 CE,” in J.S. Kloppenborg, S.G. Wilson (eds.), Voluntary Associations in the Graeco-Roman World, London/New York, 1996, p. 74-89.

Auteur

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Beer-Sheva, Israel
E-mail : yulia@bgumail.bgu.ac.il

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