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Sciences et décision

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Daniel Andler

Bibliographie

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Les sigles entre crochets à la suite de chaque référence renvoient par les initiales aux auteurs du ou des chapitres mentionnant la référence en question

[A] Andler / [B] Blitman / [CH] Cozic & Hill / [D] Drouet / [L] Liarte / [M] Mongin / [Mc] McAllister / [S] Shekeris / [V] Vorms / [W] Weirich

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