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Le Tigre celtique en question

Catherine Maignant

Ireland in the European Union: the implications for Ireland of the Political Development of the Union

Margaret Mary Malone

Texte intégral

1Résumé: Écrit en 1999, cet article porte témoignage des inquiétudes de l’Irlande, que son succès économique a fait brutalement passer du statut de parent pauvre de l’Union européenne à celui de pays riche et développé. Agenda 2000 et ses éventuelles conséquences pour l’Irlande y sont analysés en détail en perspective économique et politique. Au-delà d’Agenda 2000, Margaret Mary Malone évoque les craintes irlandaises face à une éventuelle politique de défense commune qui risquerait de mettre à mal la neutralité irlandaise. Elle conclut toutefois sur la nécessité de poursuivre l’intégration.

2Abstract: This paper was written in 1999 and it bears witness to Ireland’s fears when it brutally evolved from being a “poor relation” of the European Union to being a prosperous developed country. It examines Agenda 2000 and assesses its possible economic and political implications for Ireland. Beyond Agenda 2000, Margaret Mary Malone analyses the possible effects of a future common defence policy, which might endanger Irish neutrality. She however concludes that European integration must be continued.

3On joining the Economic Community, Ireland became the first “poor relation” of the EC (albeit with the partial exception of southern Italy) as well as its first neutral state. In recent years, the Irish economy has gone from strength to strength with macroeconomic indicators showing a marked improvement in overall performance. The Irish economy has, indeed, come a long way in a relatively short period of time. Ireland is now one of the eleven member states participating in the Euro, launched as scheduled on January 1st, 1999.

4There are numerous factors to account for this remarkable improvement in economic performance. Commentators, in particular, point to:

  • sound fiscal policy pursued by successive Irish governments since the 1980s;
  • national agreements on wage restraint as a result of dialogue and agreement between the social partners; and
  • the increased competitiveness of Irish industry.

5In addition, EC membership has played no small part in modernising the Irish economy, as envisaged by Seán Lemass and Thomas K. Whitaker in the late 1950s and 1960s. EC membership has meant:

  • liberalising trade and thereby reducing dependence on the British market (in 1970, 66 % of Irish exports went to the UK market. In 1995, the figure was 25 %–the UK remains an important trading partner but not the only one–see table 1);
  • attracting direct foreign investment;
  • a bonanza for farmers through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); and
  • considerable budgetary transfer through what has become known since 1989 as the Structural Funds.
  • 1 1 IR£ = 1.26974 euros and 1 euro = 0.78756 IR£.
  • 2 Andrew Duff, John Pinder, Roy Pryce (ed.), Maastricht and beyond: Building the European Union, Lon (...)

6Ireland, as expected, did become a major net beneficiary of EC policies. Between 1973 and 1995 net EC transfers amounted to IR£1 18,45 billion, largely through the CAP and the Structural Funds. Indeed, in 1992 the Irish government reminded the electorate before the Treaty on European Union that for every £1 Ireland gave to the Community, she received £7 in return2 This argument had the desired effect–69 % of those who voted in the referendum, voted “Yes” (see table 2).

7The beneficial consequences of EC membership are not, however, measured solely in economic terms. EC membership also helped Ireland to mature politically as a nation state. It has enabled Ireland to take a seat at the negotiating table along with European countries as an equal partner, influencing EC policies that affected the country. Furthermore, by virtue of EU membership, Ireland enjoys a presence in international negotiations it would not otherwise have. A small, peripheral state, this has enhanced greatly its national sense of self-confidence.

8Also a consequence of EC membership, Anglo-Irish relations entered a new phase of constructive dialogue and consultation. The two sovereign states regularly meet on the fringes of EC meetings to discuss matters of mutual concern, including principally, the question of Northern Ireland. Such meetings have had a subtle positive impact on the peace process.

Table 1 – Ireland’s merchandise trade by area

Table 1 – Ireland’s merchandise trade by area

a. Excluding Austria, Finland, Sweden and the UK.

9Source: Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin.

Table 2 – Results of referenda in Ireland on EC membership and subsequent amendments, 1972-1998

Table 2 – Results of referenda in Ireland on EC membership and subsequent amendments, 1972-1998

Source: Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin.

  • 3 Quoted by Mr Patrick Killery, former President of Ireland and former Minister for External Affairs (...)

10Ironically, by joining the EC, a novel experiment in pooling sovereignty between states, Ireland effectively enhanced its national independence in general and vis-à-vis Britain in particular. As Emil Noel once remarked, EC membership amounted to a “second declaration of Irish independence”.3

11Therefore, the economic and political consequences of EU membership account for the generally positive attitude to the EC in Ireland. Partly in response to this, Ireland has sought to contribute in a constructive and positive spirit to the running and future development of the EC. Of the three new member states to join the EC in 1973, Ireland was by far the most “communautaire”. Ireland has consistently supported EC initiatives: it showed commitment to EMU, for example, both in terms of meeting the convergence criteria and its political support for the project itself, despite the UK opt-out. Will this change as the Union develops into an enlarged entity?

The Political Development of the EU: Implications for Ireland

12The future political development of the EU will be marked by further “widening” on the one hand and “deepening” on the other, that is, further expansion of legal competences or policy development and institutional development. The implications for Ireland are great in both respects. One could argue that Ireland, like the other Cohesion states, will be affected to a far greater extent than the other member states as the EU enlarges on a scale hitherto unknown. We are being asked to make a greater sacrifice. Ireland is facing:

  • reduced Structural Funding–with the loss of Objective One status;
  • possible regionalisation in the future;
  • reduced agricultural expenditure with continuing CAP reform;
  • the expiration of the 10 % corporation tax for foreign firms in the year 2000; and
  • the probability of becoming a net contributor to the EU budget in 2007 (if not before).

13In short, Ireland is entering a new phase of its engagement with the process of European integration.

Agenda 2000

14Enlargement of the Union is a political imperative. The next phase of enlargement is due take place in 2003 according to Agenda 2000. Enlargement is, to a large extent, the catalyst for the Commission’s proposed reform of internal policies.

15Agenda 2000 seeks to accomplish a nigh-on impossible task: that is, to prepare the Union for enlargement without increasing the EU budget by very much. Member states are adamant about containing expenditure in the EU. Agenda 2000 does not envisage raising the own resources ceiling from its current level of 1.27 % of GNP. However, when member states speak of “stabilising expenditure levels” and “freezing expenditure”, what they mean, in reality, is cutbacks.

16Let’s look at the proposals of Agenda 2000 from an Irish perspective.

Common Agricultural Policy

  • 4 Commission of the EC, Agenda 2000, Luxembourg, Commission of the EC, 1997.

17When enlargement takes place agricultural land in the Union will increase by 50 % while the agricultural labour force will double4 There is, therefore, every incentive for CAP reform to be continued. There is also an external pressure in the form of the forthcoming World Trade Organisation (WTO) talks where agriculture will be high on the agenda. In general, the aim is that, ultimately, EU agricultural prices will be reduced to world market price levels. The expectation is that, in the future, the CAP will be more competitive, both within and outside the Union. It is also the aim that European agriculture should become more consumer-friendly and environmentally sensitive.

18Cereals, beef and milk will be the products most affected by Agenda 2000. Let’s look at each sector in turn and at the way in which Irish agriculture is likely to be affected.

  • Cereals: Agenda 2000 proposes a cut in intervention prices for cereals of 20 % in the year 2000.5 To ensure that farmers’ incomes are not hit too hard, this will be compensated for by an increase in direct payments which will offset 50 % of the price cut. There will be 0 % compulsory set-a-side. In Ireland this may mean a net loss of £30 million per annum6
  • Beef: It is proposed to cut intervention prices for beef by almost 30 % between the year 2000 and 2002 in three equal stages.7 Community intervention will be abolished in 2002 and replaced with Aid to Private Storage (APS). Compensation will offset 80 % of the price cut. In Ireland’s view, this price cut is excessive and will cost the country £140 million in net terms per annum.8 Irish organisations such as the Irish Co-operative Organisation Society (ICOS) argue that intervention must be retained.
  • Milk: In milk, there are fewer problems for the EU than in beef and cereals. The surplus is not expected to increase dramatically. Therefore, drastic price cuts or abolition of quotas are not necessary. Agenda 2000 proposes a gradual decrease in intervention prices by an average of 10 % in total by 2006. Compensation will offset 55 % of the price cut. Should quotas eventually be cut, it is estimated that it would result in a net loss of 2.2 p / litre.9
  • 10 Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland and the European Union, Factsheet 4/96, Dublin, Government (...)

19Agriculture remains an important sector of the Irish economy accounting for 9.4 % of GNP, 21 % of total exports and almost 15 % of civilian employment. We are three times more dependent on agriculture in terms of employment and wealth generation than any other member state.10 Therefore, the proposed changes will hit Irish agriculture hard.

20However, there is a general view among member states that Ireland did not take as much of a hit as other countries as a result of the 1992 reform and that it is high time she did.

Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund

21By the same token, Structural Funds will be reformed with a view to concentrating even further financial assistance on regions and groups in society where it is needed most.

  • 11 Agenda 2000. The Ecofin Council of November 23rd, 1998 decided, however, to freeze expenditure. Th (...)

22During the financial perspective, 1993-1999, Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund as a percentage of the EU budget increased from 31 % to 36 %, amounting to 200 billion ECUs in 1999. Agenda 2000 envisages the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund being capped at 36 % of the EU budget during the period 2000-2006, amounting to some 275 billion ECUs.11

23The Structural Funds will be concentrated on fewer objectives. The number of objectives will be reduced from seven to three, two of which are regional while the third is horizontal.

  • Objective 1: Regions which are lagging behind. Such regions are defined as having a per capita GDP of less than 75 %–this will be more strictly applied in the future. Current Objective One regions such as Ireland will be phased out gradually or, to use an American term, Ireland will “graduate” from Objective One status. This status will be aimed also at northern regions with low population density and the outermost regions, for example the highlands and islands of Scotland and, also, the Arctic regions of Sweden and Finland.
  • Objective 2: Economic and social restructuring. Targeted areas include those regions undergoing economic change (whether in industry or services), declining rural areas, crisis-hit areas dependent on the fishing industry and urban areas in difficulty. Attention will be focused on education and training and access to new technologies and promoting an active business culture.
  • Objective 3: Human resources. The aim is to adapt and modernise systems of education, training and employment in regions not covered in Objectives 1 and 2. It will promote activity in four areas to complement guidelines underlying the European Employment Strategy:
    • first, accompanying economic and social changes;
    • second, lifelong education and training systems;
    • third, active labour market policies to fight unemployment; and
    • fourth, combating social exclusion.

24The “F-word” in the European Union no longer refers exclusively to “federalism”. The new “F-word” is “flexibility”, especially in the labour force.

25In addition, the current 13 Community Initiatives are to be reduced to three, namely:

  • cross-border, trans-national and inter-regional co-operation to promote harmonious and balanced spatial planning (Interreg);
  • rural development (Leader);
  • human resources, paying special attention to equal opportunities.

26The percentage of Structural Funds allocated to Community Initiatives will be reduced from 9 % to 5 %.

27It is proposed that the Structural Funds over the period 2000 to 2006 should cover 35-40 % of the EU population as opposed to 51 % in the previous period.

28The Cohesion Fund, introduced by the Treaty on European Union, more commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty, will remain unaffected by Agenda 2000: it will continue to apply to member states whose per capita income is less than 90 % GNP (to be reviewed in 2003) and is to be used on Trans-European Networks (TENs) and environmental projects; it is also to help the Cohesion states comply with the convergence criteria for EMU and the Stability and Growth Pact.

29Ireland, with its new label of the “Celtic Tiger” is, to some extent, a victim of her own success. As things stand, Ireland no longer qualifies for Objective One status, strictly-speaking. It is possible that, through regionalisation, Ireland may retain Objective One status in some parts of the country in the financial perspective for the period 2000 to 2006. The current proposal which has been submitted suggests an east-west divide. However, in order to achieve this, real devolution of power would be required to convince Commissioner Wulf-Mathies. Such genuine devolution would bring Ireland, the most centralised country in the Union, into line with the trend towards regionalisation in Europe. This would be a positive development for the country.

30However, the complete loss of Objective One status is ultimately inevitable: current predictions are that Ireland’s per capita GDP will go on increasing. In addition, with the inclusion of relatively poorer central and eastern European countries, the 75 % threshold in respect of per capita GDP will be lower in real terms.

31A problem peculiar to Ireland in this regard is the difference between GDP and GNP. In most countries, the difference is slight. This is not the case in Ireland, however, because of the large number of multinational firms in Ireland who repatriate their profits. In Ireland’s case, therefore, GNP rather than GDP is a more accurate measure of the country’s wealth. Such arguments are listened to with a sympathetic ear by the Commission.

32However, it must be said that Ireland to date has received more Objective One funding than any other member state, bar none. This may be attributed to three main factors:

  • First, the fact that Ireland has been a member of the EC since 1973 and, therefore, has been a recipient of Structural Funding longer than the other Cohesion states.
  • Second, Ireland has clearly negotiated very effectively over the years, engaging the sympathy of the other member states–the late 1990s saw the beginning of the end of this approach.
  • Third, Ireland has consistently demonstrated its capacity and willingness to match the funds from the Community and, thereby, to comply with the principle of additionality.

33In the late 1990s, Ireland is in the unenviable position of arguing that, while we are economically developed enough to justify membership of the European Monetary Union (EMU), at the same time, we continue to need a certain consideration in respect of Structural Funding. Ireland can argue with some justification that, while her economy is currently booming, the country is still in the process of “catching-up” vis-à-vis the other countries whose economies have been developed for a considerably longer period of time. In other words, the Irish economic boom is both recent and relative. Certainly its effects are not being felt uniformly throughout the country.

  • 12 Joseph Lee, Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and Society, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989.
  • 13 Quoted by Mr Patrick Hillery in Brussels on December 7th, 1998.

34That said, Ireland is a text-book example of the significant contribution Structural Funding can make to an economy in combination with sound government policies in other areas of economic management. Ireland has come of age as a member state of the European Union–we are no longer the “poor relation”. The fact is, Ireland will very likely become a net contributor to the Union in 2007. This is a development in which we should take pride and not lament. One undesirable side-effect of Structural Funding is the inherent danger of promoting a “culture of dependency”–or what Professor Lee calls the “sponger mentality”.12 That is not, after all, the reason we joined the EC–we joined to develop our economy and stem the flow of emigration. As Seán Lemass once observed, “Nobody owes us a living”.13

Institutional development

35Enlargement is also driving the issue of institutional reform in the Union. The institutional framework and decision-making process of the Union has not changed substantially since the 1950s when it was designed for six relatively homogeneous member states. The Treaty of Amsterdam did not go as far as we had hoped in terms of modernising the institutions in preparation for enlargement. This reflects the divergent views of member states regarding institutional development: it is a fundamental political issue as the development of the institutions reflects, by extension, the development of the EU itself as a political entity.

36In respect of the European Commission, it is Irish Government policy that each member state should continue to nominate a Commissioner.

  • 14 European Parliament, Summary of positions of the member states of the European Union with a view t (...)

37Ireland would oppose any proposal to remove that right.14 This is a view shared by small member states in general amid pressure from the larger member states for a reduction in the number of Commissioners. The larger countries argue that, to be efficient and effective, the College of Commissioners in an enlarged Union must be small and compact. Smaller member states, on the other hand, are opposed to losing the right to appoint a Commissioner. Some member states have advocated a middle way where each member state would continue to appoint a Commissioner, but that there would be different types of Commissioners: a senior Commissioner with voting rights and a junior one without voting rights.

38Ireland supports the increase in the legislative role of the European Parliament, with the “co-decision” procedure being extended to new areas as the Treaty of Amsterdam has done. In fact, Ireland would also like to see “co-decision” being extended to such issues as external economic relations (that is, Article 113).

  • 15 Ibid.

39In respect of the Council, Ireland supports the greater use of qualified majority voting in the Council, though it believes that the goal of unanimity could be counter-productive in certain areas which are highly sensitive for individual countries.15 In this regard, Ireland echoes the sentiments of most member states, each of whom have at least one area of policy where they would prefer to see the unanimity rule being maintained. Furthermore, though Ireland supports calls for increased efficiency in the Council, Irish governments do not necessarily wish to see the current weighting of votes being radically amended.

Beyond Agenda 2000 – A Future European Defence Policy and Irish Neutrality

40Beyond Agenda 2000, a possible evolution towards a European defence policy (EDP) has obvious implications for Irish neutrality. There is a strong desire on the part of some member states to see the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) evolve towards a European defence policy as an indispensable element of a veritable political entity.

41From an Irish viewpoint, the Treaty of Amsterdam is notable for three reasons:

  • First, it states that the CFSP shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy… which might lead to a common defence should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the member states the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.
  • Second, it absorbs the Petersberg Tasks of the Western European Union (WEU) into the competences of the Union, that is, humanitarian and rescue missions, peace-keeping and crisis management tasks including peace-making. This does not constitute, however, a merger between the two organisations.
  • Third, it reassures neutral states by stating that the EU does not prejudice “the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states”.16

42Such issues as defence and security go to the very core of national sovereignty. After Amsterdam, any European defence policy will require a treaty amendment to be proposed in the usual manner by way of an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). Such a constitutional amendment would then require the unanimous support of all member states and ratification in each member state either by means of a vote in the national parliament or a referendum as the political culture of the member states dictates.

  • 17 Ibid.

43Ireland takes the view that the principal objective of the CFSP should be to maintain peace, while any defence agreements concluded by the EU should be in the context of global European security and should not lead to any fresh division of Europe. A common defence policy of this type should be consistent with Ireland’s objectives in the field of disarmament and arms control. Any eventual participation by Ireland in this policy would be subject to a referendum in order to ensure that Ireland’s neutral status remains unchanged unless the Irish people itself decides otherwise.17

44The White Paper on Foreign Policy, published in 1996, outlines three main policy options for Ireland in terms of defence which are summarised below:

  • Full commitment: Ireland would join the WEU as a full member accepting a commitment to collective defence in addition to voluntary participation in crisis management operations. In the view of some member states, membership of WEU would imply membership of NATO.
  • Status quo: Ireland would maintain observer status at the WEU, at both ministerial and official levels. There would continue to be political consultation and no participation in military operational matters, such as planning, exercises or actual missions. This places limitations on the influence of Irish governments on matters affecting European security.
  • Crisis management: In addition to political consultations, Ireland would participate in selected crisis management operations under the aegis of the WEU, at the request of the European Union, on a voluntary basis.18 This option seems to be the preferred option of the Government as it would enable Ireland to lend its expertise to operations undertaken in conformity with the UN Charter, and to limit our involvement to that extent.
  • 19 Irish Times, March 12th, 1952.
  • 20 Séan Lemass’s statement to the Council of Ministers on Ireland’s application for membership of the (...)
  • 21 Patrick Keatinge, A Singular Stance: Irish Neutrality in the 1980s, Dublin, Institute of Public Ad (...)

45The declaration of neutrality in Ireland was originally an assertion of national sovereignty–it asserted the right of the young Irish state not to fight a British war. It is, therefore, neither ideological nor necessarily permanent in nature. It is not a part of the Irish constitution nor is it part of Irish law. When Ireland was invited to join NATO in 1949, the Government resolutely declined, though it agreed in principle with the idea of such a defence alliance. The issue which formed the basis of that decision was not neutrality but partition–it was the division of the country which was deemed to preclude Irish involvement in a defence alliance with Britain. As Seán MacBride, the Minister of External Relations, observed, “Were it not for partition, Ireland would be part of the Atlantic Pact”.19 The view of Seán Lemass was equally very clear. He once declared, “A Europe worth joining is a Europe worth defending”.20 Jack Lynch as Taoiseach in subsequent years echoed similar sentiments.21

46The challenge for Ireland now is to grapple with the vexed issue of military neutrality and unleash the public debate on whether this entrenched tenet of Irish foreign policy for sixty years should be abandoned or retained at all costs. Current public opinion in Ireland is divided right down the middle on it. In the past, benevolent neutrality has been a sufficient approach in the absence of real moves to develop a common defence policy–it has never been put to the test. However, the old notion that “we are neutral but we know which side we are on” is no longer tenable in the post-Cold War era. Ireland cannot continue to have it both ways. The time is fast approaching for Ireland (like the other neutral states) to take an unequivocal position.

47Ireland will take a hard hit with enlargement. However, this should not blind us to the wider benefits of membership which gives us access to a formidable trading bloc and has afforded us a presence on the international economic and political stages.

48We may expect that Ireland will remain committed to the process of European integration because it remains in our national interests to do so. The rationale underlying the Whitaker Report is still relevant forty years on. European integration does not take place in a vacuum. It should be seen in the wider context of globalisation, that is, the integration of the world economy. This trend will intensify forces for increased competitiveness, not diminish them. Globalisation offers at least as many opportunities as risks to a small open economy such as Ireland.

49It is of paramount importance that Irish policy-makers be proactive and strategic in their approach. Like all member states, Ireland must strike a balance between support for further European integration and serving national interests – ideally, one should reinforce the other. Ireland’s support for the extension of Article 113 EEC to new trade-related issues such as services, foreign direct investment and intellectual property is an example of the sort of approach that is needed. Such issues are likely to dominate the agenda of the WTO in the future. The more co-ordinated the approach of the EU member states, the better.

50Finally, the economic challenge for Irish policy-makers is inter alia to continue to adapt and to provide for appropriate structural adjustment in the economy in order to expand productive capacity, improve competitiveness, develop a more flexible labour force, and reduce the size of the state sector. The political challenge is to continue to contribute to the running and future of the European Union in a constructive and positive spirit, especially given our changed economic circumstances.


1 1 IR£ = 1.26974 euros and 1 euro = 0.78756 IR£.

2 Andrew Duff, John Pinder, Roy Pryce (ed.), Maastricht and beyond: Building the European Union, London, Macmillan, 1994, p. 58.

3 Quoted by Mr Patrick Killery, former President of Ireland and former Minister for External Affairs, during an address to the Brussels branch of the Institute for European Affairs on December 7th, 1998 entitled: “Ireland and the European Union–25 years of membership”.

4 Commission of the EC, Agenda 2000, Luxembourg, Commission of the EC, 1997.

5 The Cereal intervention prices were cut by 15 % in two stages: 7.5 % in 2000 and 7.5 % in 2001. The final intervention price cut of 5 % (from the 20 % of Agenda 2000) was not implemented.

6 Michael Quigley, Director of ICOS, Brussels branch, in an address at the Irish Institute for European Affairs in Leuven in December 1998.

7 Intervention prices in the beef sector were eventually cut by 20 % in three stages.

8 Michael Quigley, 1998.

9 Ibid. The milk quota regime has eventually been extended until the year 2015.

10 Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland and the European Union, Factsheet 4/96, Dublin, Government of Ireland, 1996.

11 Agenda 2000. The Ecofin Council of November 23rd, 1998 decided, however, to freeze expenditure. This perhaps reflects, amongst other things, the influence of the new German government led by Gerhard Schröder.

12 Joseph Lee, Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and Society, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989.

13 Quoted by Mr Patrick Hillery in Brussels on December 7th, 1998.

14 European Parliament, Summary of positions of the member states of the European Union with a view to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, Luxembourg, European Parliament, 1995, p. 55.

15 Ibid.

16 Treaty of Amsterdam, article J-7, 1977.

17 Ibid.

18 Department of Foreign Affairs, White Paper on Foreign Policy, Challenges and Opportunities Abroad, Dublin, Government of Ireland, 1996, p. 144-145.

19 Irish Times, March 12th, 1952.

20 Séan Lemass’s statement to the Council of Ministers on Ireland’s application for membership of the European Economic Community, July 1961.

21 Patrick Keatinge, A Singular Stance: Irish Neutrality in the 1980s, Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1984, p. 28.

Table des illustrations

Titre Table 1 – Ireland’s merchandise trade by area
Légende a. Excluding Austria, Finland, Sweden and the UK.
Fichier image/jpeg, 144k
Titre Table 2 – Results of referenda in Ireland on EC membership and subsequent amendments, 1972-1998
Légende Source: Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin.
Fichier image/jpeg, 73k

© Presses universitaires de Caen, 2007

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