Version classiqueVersion mobile

Les identités européennes au XXe siècle

 | 
Robert Frank

Europe, its Borders and the Others

Antonio Varsori et Marta Petricioli

Texte intégral

  • 1 See for example the results of a conference held in Florence in December 1998 on the topic “Unire (...)
  • 2 E. Galli della Loggia, La morte della patria, Rome-Bari, Laterza, 1998.
  • 3 M. G. Mueller, S. Woolf, F. Cerutti and G. Galasso, “L’Europa : identità e storia di uncontinente” (...)
  • 4 R. Girault, “Les trois sources de l’identité et de la conscience européennes au xxe siècle”, in R. (...)
  • 5 A. Varsori, “Les mers comme frontières de l’Europe et leur rôle dans la formation de l’identité eu (...)

1During the last few years, a growing number of historians, political scientists, sociologists, etc., have shown a deep interest in the issue of “identity”. Some of them have focused their attention on “regional” and “local” identities, an almost obvious consequence of a phenomenon which has characterize d Europe for the last two decades: the attempt by minority groups to assert themselves.1 In other cases, scholars’ interest focused on “national identity”, and in this context the Italian case is an interesting one for not only scholars, but also opinion-makers and politicians, who have argued at length about the fading of Italy’s national identity: for example, a well-known historian and opinionist, Ernesto Galli della Loggia, tried to single out the turning point which sealed the so-called “fatherland’s death”.2 As for European identity, the research project which was launched in the late 1980s has not been an isolated experiment, and only a few months ago, in a well-known Italian historical journal, leading European historians debated on the issue of L’Europa: identità e storia di un continente (“Europe: a continent’s identity and history”).3 In spite of that, especially when dealing with the “European identity” issue, it was and it is still difficult to find wide agreement on the main characteristcs of such an identity. René Girault, in the conclusions of the first results of there search, sometimes appeared to point out continuing problems and doubts, rather than clear-cut replies to the questions which were posed by most participants to the project Professor Girault coordinated, and most contributors appeared to share Girault’s doubts.4 Nevertheless, on the occasion of the final conference, held in Paris in 1993, the group which dealt with the role of the seas in shaping a European identity stated that when Europeans had been compelled to confront non-European peoples, habits, or cultures, they appeared to perceive themselves, albeit in a very vague way, as Europeans. In other words, as men and women who had something in common which was different from other identities, although other “identities”, felt by European peoples and nations (from the “Mediterranean” one to the “Atlantic” one, to the “Western” one) had been singled out.5 That was the starting point for the work of this group, which on the occasion of the second stage in the research, dealt not only with these as, but with the wider issue of Europe’s “frontiers”, as well as with the attitude that non-Europeans had developed from the inhabitants of the “Old World”.

2In January 1998 the group held its conference in Assisi. The conference’s structure and participants corresponded to several definite goals. First of all, it was decided that the research had to be based on contributions not only by scholars specialised in international history. So sociologists and political scientists, as well as historians interested in cultural phenomena, immigration etc., took part in the various sessions. Furthermore, four main questions had been singled out by the organisers:

  1. Did the Europeans who had settled outside Europe mainly perceive themselves as Europeans as a consequence of the contrast with non-European realities?
  2. Did non-European travellers to Europe regard the inhabitants of the “Old World” as a single entity sharing common values, customs and ideals?
  3. From political, cultural, and psychological viewpoints, which were Europe’s “frontiers”?
  4. Is the presence of a wave of non-European immigrants a factor which concurs with identifying the features of a European identity?
  • 6 See the paper by F. Karanasou, “The Greek Community in Egypt”.
  • 7 P. Pieraccini, “The Catholic Community in the Holy Land: Issues of Identity”.
  • 8 On the religious factor as a possible explanation of a European identity see the contribution by A (...)

3The settlement of European communities outside Europe was examined through two very different test cases: on the one hand, the European settlements in the Mediterranean/Middle Eastern areas, and on the other, the settlements which originated as a consequence of emigration towards the American continent and to Australia. As for the former case, it was obvious that the formation of European communities on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean was closely tied to Europe’s imperialistic expansion during the 19th century, and such a phenomenon experienced a dramatic decadence after the 1950s. In this context, for example, Floresca Karanasou examined the role of the Greek community in Egypt. From her analysis, a sharp divide in the community appeared between, on the one hand, its wealthy elements, and on the other, the ones who belonged to the working class and to the lower middle class. The latter tended to maintain closer ties with their Greek roots, and their attitude was often characterised by nationalistic feelings. The former, on the contrary, usually developed a cosmopolitan attitude which led them to mix with other European communities. In such a case, Europe an identity appeared as a sort of class consciousness, a situation which the Greek community shared with other Europeans, not only a series of economic and political privileges, but also a definite “way of life” including certain cultural customs.6 Those privileges and habits contrasted especially with the position of the Egyptian population, and marked the existence of a “European” consciousness. If such a vague “identity” did exist, it usually disappeared when nationalistic contrasts emerged. The role played by national rivalries was highlighted in the paper by Paolo Pierracini, which dealt with the Catholic community in Palestine during the late 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. The author stressed the fierce struggle which often opposed the various components of the Christian religious communities, especially in connection with the control of the most important holy places. Pieraccini pointed out not only the traditional rivalry between the Roman Catholic Church and the Greek Orthodox Church, but also between the Roman Catholic orders and the local Catholic communities. The religious factor was not the only reason for such contrasts, and on numerous occasions the religious orders’attitude was shaped by the attempt to enhance the influence of certain European power, such as, for example, France and Italy.7 The Christian factor, which is sometimes regarded as one of the most significant aspects of European identity, is not always a useful element whilst looking for the characteristics of a European identity. Religious differences and past political differences among Christians appeared to be perceived as characteristics more relevant than that of Europe being the core of the Christian world.8 Furthermore, national rivalry and imperial ambition played an important part in shaping the attitude of European Catholic milieux in Palestine, and national identity appeared to be a more powerful factor in the perceptions, beliefs and attitudes of several Europeans, despite their settlement in a non-European environment.

4So, if it is impossible to disregard the existence of a vague common European identity in the case of European communities in the Mediterranean/Middle East, such an identity appeared to be no more than the feeble reflection of the “white man’s burden”, closely tied to the 19th century imperialist experience. National loyalties appeared definitely stronger, and conflicts and lack of mutual confidence often influenced the attitudes of the various European communities.

  • 9 E. Vezzosi, Comment, on the section “European Emigration towards the American Continent”.
  • 10 See the paper presented to the conference by M. Mugnaini, “Les Italo-Américains au lendemain de Ve (...)
  • 11 See the contributions by F. Ottanelli, “Internationalism, Ethnic Consciousness and National Identi (...)
  • 12 A. Trento, “L’identità dell’emigrato italiano in Brasile attraverso la stampa etnica : ilcaso del (...)

5The case of the European immigrants to the American continent and to Australia posed different problems by far, for in this case the contrast with a non-European context was a minor factor to many immigrants: native American and native Australian communities had been almost completely destroyed during the early stages of Europe an expansion. So the point of reference was a new national reality which, however, was formed by other “whites” of European descent. In her comments on the paper of this section, Elisabetta Vezzosi pointed out that scholars who dealt with the emigration issue to the United States, as well as to other American nations, usually ignored the problem of a European identity while they deal with “ethnic identity”, a concept which contrasts with the one of “Americanization”.9 Furthermore, numerous scholars, especially when they examined the Italian-American community in the United States, tended to stress that the loyalty of Italian immigrants was more to their local roots, i.e. the cultural, psychological and religious ties with their village, rather than to the Italian nation, a factor which would obviously involve a more mature “national” consciousness.10 In fact, in the most recent studies which deal with the development of the hyphenated communities in the United States, it seems that “ethnic identity” may be reconciled with “Americanization”: “ethnic identity” changes according to circumstances, and the safeguard of certain “ethnic” characteristics did not contrast with the “assimilation” process, as the United States tended to become a multi-faceted society. Such an interpretation appeared to be shared by the contributor to the conference who took into consideration the Canadian case, although he referred to slightly different concepts.11 Latin America was not forgotten, and the case of the Italian community in Brazil seems to stress the eagerness on the part of the Italian immigrants to create and to safeguard a national identity rather than a European identity.12

  • 13 However, in his novels, Henry James pointed out the differences between the US and Europe, see D. (...)
  • 14 D. Fromkin, op. cit., p. 229-240.
  • 15 See for example the biographies outlined in W. Isaacson and T. Evan, The Wise Men. Six Friend and (...)
  • 16 See the work by D. Hollinger, Posthetnic America, New York, Basic Books, 1995, quoted in E. Vezzos (...)
  • 17 R. Bosworth, “Australia’s Europe? A Fading Identity”.

6Of course, we may wonder whether the analysis of the case of the Italian immigrants may be regarded as the best approach to the issue of European “identity” in the case of the American continent. Italian-American communities, especially the one in the United States, were largely formed in their early history by illiterate and poor immigrants, who stuck to their original roots in order to defend themselves. It is of some significance that “wasp” Americans hardly regarded the Italian immigrants – but such an attitude extended to other communities from Southern Europe – as Europeans. So our questions may apply to the dominant American community, and we may enquire into the behaviour and attitudes of the American “wasp”. In this context, we cannot disregard the ties between such sections of American society and Europe, especially between the late19th century and the Second World War. Henry James’ novels are the most obvious evidence of those contacts,13 but it would also be possible to recall the wave of American intellectuals who spent long years in Europe in the interwar periods,14 as well as the “European” cultural background which strongly influenced numerous US decision-makers who played relevant political roles during the first half of the 20th century.15 In spite of that, such a deep interest shown by “Anglo-Saxon” American élites towards Europe did not lead to the creation of a “European identity” of those élites. Thus, different personalities, from Henry James to Ernest Hemingway, from Dean Acheson to Foster Dulles, who were closely tied to the European continent, strongly perceived themselves as Americans, and perhaps as Americans who loved some aspects of their past Europe an heritage. On the other hand, as David H. Hollinger has recently stated, the United States is not simply a “container of cultures”, but rather a nation-state, whose cohesiveness is the outcome of a non-ethnic ideological tradition, rooted in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.16 However, such an interpretation, together with the attitudes and feelings which have been quoted, may be regarded as evidence that in the perceptions of non-Europeans, European identity has some definite characteristics which make it different from American identity, in spite of the fact that some Americans are of European descent. The assimilation and the “invention” of a new “identity” were also stressed in the paper by Richard Bosworth, who dealt with the Australian case. He also argued that in the case of a colony with obvious ties with the Motherland, European identity tended to fade in favour of an Australian one. On the other hand, Bosworth stressed that the point of reference was more a “national” identity – a British one, but also an Italian one, etc. – rather than a “European” one.17

  • 18 A. M. Medici, “Intellectuels tunisiens en Europe (fin xixe siècle)”, and P. Starkey, “Some Ninetee (...)
  • 19 D. Hopwood, “The Development of Arab Views of Europe”.
  • 20 J. Pemble, The Mediterranean Passion. Victorians and Edwardians in the South, New York/Oxford, Oxf (...)

7Perceptions of Europe by non-Europeans were at the centre of the analysis of the scholars who dealt with “Foreign travellers to Europe”. Those contributions examined the reactions by Arab intellectuals who had the opportunity to visit several European countries during the 19th century. Both Anna Maria Medici and Paul Starkey pointed out that Tunisian and Egyptian travellers were very much interested in the political, economic and social characteristics of the European continent.18 They usually had a positive opinion of the political institutions, as well as of the economic progress which appeared to characterise 19th century Europe. In the eyes of those Arab intellectuals, these aspects contrasted strongly with the backwardness of most Muslim societies, and to a certain extent the “Old World” was regarded as a model. A different view by far characterised the Arab intellectuals’ view of European society and of its “way of life”, which seemed to be tainted with corruption and was hardly a point of reference for the Arab nations. The feeling about the presence of different values and of different social relations, especially in connection with the role of women, was stressed in the paper by Derek Hopwood, who argued that such a feature had a deep impression on Arab views of Europe.19 All the contributors stressed that in the views of Arab travellers, Europe was perceived as a single entity and, although differences among the various nations were not ignored, in the opinion of Arab intellectuals, features such as economic progress, modern political institutions, or a different social role for women were definitely perceived as “European” characteristics. Such a factor would confirm the existence, at least in the 19th century, of a European “identity”. However we may wonder about the “consciousness” on the part of the Europeans of such an “identity”, and it is of some interest to stress that British travellers of the Victorian and Edwardian age who visited the Mediterranean tended to draw a clear-cut divide between the “European” world and the “Mediterranean” one. From their point of view, Greece and Italy were not too different from Egypt and Palestine, so in spite of the geographical reality, the Mediterranean area was by far a different political, economic and social entity from what was regarded as “Europe”.20

  • 21 See the papers by P. Papastratis, “The Balkans between Europe and Russia”, by G. M. Croce, “L’Orth (...)
  • 22 See for example the thoughtful analysis in I. B. Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe. A Study i (...)
  • 23 See the paper by G. Lami, “La Russie et l’Europe au xxe siècle”.

8Such considerations lead us to an important factor in our analysis: Europe’s “borders”. If the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean are important elements in trying to define Europe’s frontiers, as regards the continent’s eastern frontier, Russia’s position is of paramount relevance. Obviously it would be possible to look at this issue from two different perspectives: on the one hand, perceptions of the relationship between Russia and Europe by the Russians, and on the other, by non-Russians. Most contributions to the conference focused on the latter perspective, and all the papers pointed out that certain historical and cultural cleavages had to be stressed: the religious differences (i.e. the Roman Catholic tradition on the one hand, the Orthodox tradition on the other) and panslavism.21 So during the 19th and 20th centuries, not only Russia but also the Balkan area were perceived by most Europeans as something different from other parts of the continent. Russia, in particular, was often regarded as non-European, and the Balkans were a sort of border area where “western” – which would alternatively mean Catholic or Protestant, democratic or fascist – Europe would oppose Russia’s – but we may alternatively add reactionary, Tzarist, Orthodox or revolutionary, Bolshevik – expansionist ambitions. On the other hand, some Balkan peoples felt themselves torn between « western » Europe and Russia/the Soviet Union. So, at least on the basis of this test case, it would be possible to state that there was – and perhaps there is – no single European identity, but several identities. As for the Russian attitude towards Europe, this was a main source of debate, and the issue of European identity haunted Russians for centuries.22 On the one hand, some Russian intellectuals stressed their willingness, their eagerness for Russia to be regarded as a vital part of Europe, especially from a political and cultural point of view; and such a “westerniser” faction may be singled out in both the history of Russia and the USSR. However, there were other schools of thought in Russian history which developed a negative view of “western” influence, and tried to outline a different Russian identity in opposition to the main cultural and historical trends which characterised the European continent. Especially in the 19th century such tendencies appeared to be strong and they pointed out Russian “Orthodox”, “Slav” traditions, but did not disappear during the Soviet period, and in this context, Solzhenitsyn’s thought is clear evidence that this feature of Russian culture survived, in spite of the apparent strength of the Soviet régime. On the other hand, the Soviet Union often regarded Europe as the “hotbed” of capitalism and an obvious enemy, and it is well known that the “slavophile” tradition was often exploited by Soviet leaders. The “difference” that the Russians still feel when they deal with Europe has found significant expression very recently and seems to explain, at least to a certain extent, the willingness on the part of the Moscow government to appear as the standard bearer of Belgrade’s claims against the “western” plans concerning Kosovo. In the minds of numerous Russians, Europe is mainly the “west”, opposed to the “Slav” part of the continent,23 while in the opinion of some “western” intellectuals there is no single European identity, and the division created by history, especially as a consequence of both the schism between the Church of Rome and Constantinople and the influence played by the Ottoman empire, led to the existence of two different parts of the “Old World”, whose borders split the territories which were parts of the Hapsburg Empire from the ones which were under the sovereignty of both St. Petersberg and Constatinople.

  • 24 See for example D. W. Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe. Western Europe, America and Postwar Reconstructi (...)
  • 25 F. Romero, “Americanization and National Identity: The Case of Postwar Italy”.
  • 26 M. E. Guasconi, “American and European Models in the Trade Union Movement during the Cold War: the (...)

9When Soviet intellectuals dealt with the concept of the “West”, they did not refer only to “western” Europe, but also to the United States. In fact, the relationship between Washington and Europe, especially after the Second World War, was one of the keys which, in the opinion of the scholars in charge of the research group, may offer an explanation for certain questions related to the problem of European identity. Some of the papers in this section were obviously related to the category which for a long time haunted most European historians studying relations between Washington and the “Old World”: “Americanization”. Numerous Europe an historians have argued that owing to the “Cold War” and to the international role the United States achieved after World War II, American values and ideals and the American “way of life” strongly influenced western Europe, and that this part of the continent has been “Americanized”. Some historians had tried to identify the western European nation whose society was more profoundly shaped by America’s influence.24 In this context, Italy was often regarded as one of the most “Americanized” among western European societies. Never the less, a more cautious view seems to surface. In his contribution, Federico Romero offered a reassessment of Italy’s reaction to the process of “Americanization”.25 The author argued that, although US influence was a powerful factor and American models had strong appeal, especially in popular culture, “Americanization” was slower and had a less pervasive nature than had been thought. It is of some relevance that Romero, as well as other Italian historians who share his historiographical interest, now seem to prefer the category of “modernization” to the one of “Americanization”, and they appear to think that American models and values were often adapted to national realities. Furthermore, it is stressed that in the Italian case, especially from the 1980s onwards, the concept of “modernization” was usually tied to western Europe, and countries such as Germany, France, and the Netherlands became interesting models to influential sectors of Italian society, while European integration was perceived as the instrument through which Italy would become a truly “European”, i.e. “modern”, nation. The presence of European “models” was singled out in the paper by Maria Eleonora Guasconi, who examined the policies pursued by the Italian anti-Communist trade unions during the late 1940s and the 1950s.26 She argued that the Catholic union CISL showed a keen interest in American unionism and industrial relations. In spite of that, the CISL tried to adapt such models to the Italian reality, and the Catholic union very soon became a staunch suppporter of European integration. As for the Social-Democrat and Republican UIL, it appeared to be more interested in the European unionist tradition, and had the British TUC as its point of reference.

  • 27 B. Heuser, “Alliance Bedevilled by History: Franks, Germanics and Anglo-Saxons in the Cold War”.
  • 28 In this context see the paper by M. Guderzo, “The Mediterranean, the US, and European Integration, (...)

10Italy was not the only European nation whose postwar history was shaped by the relationship with the United States, and in her paper Beatrice Heuser dealt with the defence policies pursued by Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany.27 Defence is the context where a “western” identity, sharing relevant values and interests with the United States, appeared to be stronger during the “Cold War” years. In spite of the common Soviet threat, the author forcefully argued that national identities still played a relevant role. Furthermore, rivalries and suspicions engendered by Europe’s past history often shaped the attitudes developed by both decision-makers and public opinions in France, Britain, and West Germany. In this context, Beatrice Heuser stressed some interesting factors: the Anglo-American “special relationship”, which also originated from both Britain’s feeling about its kinship with the United States and from the belief in its being “different” from the European continent, so advocating the existence of an “Anglo-Saxon” identity; the building up of the so-called Franco-German “couple”, which stressed the existence of a definite “European” identity sometimes opposed to the Anglo-Saxon one; and, last but not least, France’s “latinness”, which meant a keen interest in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, if we examine Washington’s attitude, the United States appeared to regard western Europe as a relevant entity, in spite of plans for an “Atlantic partnership”.28

  • 29 R. Leveau, “Les intellectuels franco-maghrébins”.
  • 30 O. Schmidt, “Les Marocains en Italie du Nord : entre local et transnational”.

11The last section of the Assisi conference focused on a very recent phenomenon, the migration towards Europe of non-European immigrants and their uneasy relations with European societies. In this context, this is of some relevance to the perception of Europe which was developed by those immigrants. The view is a mixed one, for some immigrants, such as the intellectuals from the Maghreb, whose position was examined by Rémy Leveau, appeared to regard France as their main point of reference and, in Leveau’s opinion, they usually felt scant interest or some vague suspicion towards European integration and towards the perspective of a single European entity.29 On the contrary, Ottavia Schmidt, on the basis of a sociological analysis of the attitude of Moroccan immigrants to Italy, stressed that this immigrant group, although it is aware of the differences which characterise the various European states, perceives Europe as a sort of single “space” and the “Old Continent” seems to possess a definite “identity”.30

12So foreigners, as in the case of 19th century Arab travellers, seemed to be convinced that a European identity existed – and exists – characterised by certain common features.

13It is not an easy task to sum up the results of a multi-faceted conference, and once again the research on the question of European identity appears to be a slippery ground on which scholars have to tread with great cautiousness. First of all it would be possible to state that relations and contrasts with non-European peoples, cultures, etc., did not always favour the surfacing of a European identity; in numerous cases “national” identities were of a paramount relevance. Furthermore, in some cases European identity tended to overlap with other powerful identities, such as the “western” one, the “Atlantic” one, etc. Another important feature is the existence of different European identities, and Europe’s “borders” change according to historical circumstances, cultural attitudes, and social phenomena. On the other hand, it is almost impossible to determine definite characteristics of a European identity, although non-Europeans tended to single out some aspects which change with the existence of different viewpoints: if 19th century Arab travellers pointed out “modernity”, 20th century Americans would point out “tradition”.

14Of course we did not take certain important questions into consideration: is the European Union relevant when we deal with the issue of European identity? Do non-European decision-makers and public opinions regard the European construction process and its structures as the expression of a true European identity? In this context it may be of some interest to stress that the Prodi government’s successful campaign to lead the Italian public opinion to accept a higher degree of taxation to be a founding member of the Euro was based on the catchword that “Italy must enter Europe”, so implying that, in spite of her tradition, of her history, of geography, etc., Italy was “outside” Europe. Europe and the European Union appeared to be positive models, and there appeared to bea true European identity which meant modernization, democracy, the existence of a reformed welfare state, etc.

  • 31 See certain contributions in L. Passerini (dir.), Identità culturale europea. Idee,sentimenti, rel (...)

15Besides all that, our research seems to lead to an important conclusion: there is a European identity which, however, on the basis of the relationship with non-European realities, may be defined as a multilevel identity. Such a “multi-level” identity does not exclude other “identities”, other “loyalties”, from local ones to national ones, from the “Western” one to the “Atlantic” one. On the other hand a dialectic approach to reality is perhaps one of the most important and characteristic features of Europe’s history.31

Notes

1 See for example the results of a conference held in Florence in December 1998 on the topic “Unire e dividere, unire o dividere”, under the aegis of the “Forum per i problemi della pace e della guerra”. On this occasion, attention focused on cases such as the former Yugoslavia, South Tyrol, the Catalunia, Northern Ireland, etc.

2 E. Galli della Loggia, La morte della patria, Rome-Bari, Laterza, 1998.

3 M. G. Mueller, S. Woolf, F. Cerutti and G. Galasso, “L’Europa : identità e storia di uncontinente”, Contemporanea, II, 1999, n° 1, p. 79-102.

4 R. Girault, “Les trois sources de l’identité et de la conscience européennes au xxe siècle”, in R. Girault (dir.), Identité et conscience européennes au xxe siècle, Paris, Hachette, 1994, p. 193-201.

5 A. Varsori, “Les mers comme frontières de l’Europe et leur rôle dans la formation de l’identité européenne”, in R. Girault (dir.), op. cit., p. 157-167.

6 See the paper by F. Karanasou, “The Greek Community in Egypt”.

7 P. Pieraccini, “The Catholic Community in the Holy Land: Issues of Identity”.

8 On the religious factor as a possible explanation of a European identity see the contribution by A. Canavero and J.-D. Durand.

9 E. Vezzosi, Comment, on the section “European Emigration towards the American Continent”.

10 See the paper presented to the conference by M. Mugnaini, “Les Italo-Américains au lendemain de Versailles”.

11 See the contributions by F. Ottanelli, “Internationalism, Ethnic Consciousness and National Identity: Italian Radicalism in the United States” and B. Ramirez, “Immigration, Multiculturalism and National Identity: the Canadian Case”.

12 A. Trento, “L’identità dell’emigrato italiano in Brasile attraverso la stampa etnica : ilcaso del ‘Fanfulla’, 1893-1940”.

13 However, in his novels, Henry James pointed out the differences between the US and Europe, see D. Fromkin, In the Time of the Americans, New York, Vintage Books, 1996, p. 17, 24, 27-28. Of course it is not our intention here to discuss the literary characteristics of James’ works.

14 D. Fromkin, op. cit., p. 229-240.

15 See for example the biographies outlined in W. Isaacson and T. Evan, The Wise Men. Six Friend and the World They Made, New York, Touchstone, 1986.

16 See the work by D. Hollinger, Posthetnic America, New York, Basic Books, 1995, quoted in E. Vezzosi’s contribution.

17 R. Bosworth, “Australia’s Europe? A Fading Identity”.

18 A. M. Medici, “Intellectuels tunisiens en Europe (fin xixe siècle)”, and P. Starkey, “Some Nineteenth-century Egyptian travellers to Europe”.

19 D. Hopwood, “The Development of Arab Views of Europe”.

20 J. Pemble, The Mediterranean Passion. Victorians and Edwardians in the South, New York/Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988.

21 See the papers by P. Papastratis, “The Balkans between Europe and Russia”, by G. M. Croce, “L’Orthodoxie en tant que frontière orientale de l’Europe”, and by A. Pitassio, “La perception de la Russie dans l’Europe balkanique”.

22 See for example the thoughtful analysis in I. B. Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe. A Study in Identity and International Relations, London/New York, Routledge, 1996.

23 See the paper by G. Lami, “La Russie et l’Europe au xxe siècle”.

24 See for example D. W. Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe. Western Europe, America and Postwar Reconstruction 1945-1955, London/New York, Longman, 1992.

25 F. Romero, “Americanization and National Identity: The Case of Postwar Italy”.

26 M. E. Guasconi, “American and European Models in the Trade Union Movement during the Cold War: the Italian Case”.

27 B. Heuser, “Alliance Bedevilled by History: Franks, Germanics and Anglo-Saxons in the Cold War”.

28 In this context see the paper by M. Guderzo, “The Mediterranean, the US, and European Integration, at the Beginnings of the Johnson Years”.

29 R. Leveau, “Les intellectuels franco-maghrébins”.

30 O. Schmidt, “Les Marocains en Italie du Nord : entre local et transnational”.

31 See certain contributions in L. Passerini (dir.), Identità culturale europea. Idee,sentimenti, relazioni, Florence, La Nuova Italia, 1998, especially the papers by G. Delanty and C. Millon-Delsol.

© Éditions de la Sorbonne, 2004

Conditions d’utilisation : http://www.openedition.org/6540

Rechercher dans OpenEdition Search

Vous allez être redirigé vers OpenEdition Search