L’Europe de l’Italie dans les années de guerre froide
p. 13-25
Texte intégral
1In dealing with the topic of the present study I tried at first to give some answers to the set of questions professor Girault posed us. In this context I focused my attention on the post-war period, roughly speaking from 1945 to the second half of the 1950s1.
2As it is well known, this period was characterised by three relevant historical processes: (a) the emerging and the setting in of the cold war; (b) the early stages of the European integration process; (c) the beginning of decolonization.
3As for Italy was concerned, she was deeply involved in the fierce struggle between East and West, she became a staunch promoter of European unity and she was also a protagonist in the early stages of the decolonization process, as in the late 1940s Italy was compelled to give up any right to her former colonial empire, while maintaining a definite interest in what was going on in some areas of the African continent, as well as in the Middle East2
4These elements deeply influenced the developments of the internal political situation and the italian society, mainly as a direct consequence of the cold war, was split into fiercely opposing camps, which not only struggled for power, but nurtured and developed contrasting objectives and values.
5In the analysis of Italy’s attitude and understanding of the European identity it is impossible to disregard both the social context and the internal and international influences we have very briefly sketched out.
6The first and most outstanding consequence of the split loyalties and deep contrasts which emerged and took root in the italian society of the cold war years was the appearance of several – and sometimes contrasting – ideas of «Europe».
7In spite of that, it is likely that at a first, more superficial level, the majority of the italian people shared a vague image of Europe: the «Europe» of the traditional great powers: France, Britain, Germany, only to a minor extent Russia, rather than the Soviet Union. As these nations were well known elements to most Italians: they had always played a relevant role in shaping both Italy’s historical development and the peninsula’s place in foreign affairs; they had alternatively been Rome’s major allies or fiercest enemies in two World Wars and the World War II experience was very near to the life of every Italian during the late 1940s and the first half of the 1950s3. Last but not least4 the policies pursued by France, Britain and the Soviet Union, as well as the reality of the past alliance with Germany5, were destined to have relevant consequences, not only on Italy’s international role, but even if an indirect way on the every day life of most of the italian people.
8If we try to go deep in our analysis and we take into consideration the effects of the cold war we may perhaps single out three different «Europes», three different interpretations of the Old Continent, three different points of reference for different political/cultural/social groups in the italian society: (a) a catholic Europe; (b) a Western/lay Europe; (c) a workers’ Europe. Obviously in this sort of interpretative framework we cannot exclude some overlapping, as well as the negative consequences of any attempt at generalization.
9As for (a), what we called catholic Europe, that was the core of the Old Continent, the seat of its positive values, the heart of its culture ans best traditions, in the opinion of the Church, of the Christian Democracy and of the majority of their leading representatives6. This «Europe» was formed by Italy, France, Germany (as for Germany, perhaps it was easily, and conveniently, forgotten that it was partially a Protestant country, even if the partition caused by the cold war had as an indirect effect the strengthening of the Catholic part of the nation). In this context it would be possible to remember the ties, which were developed during the postwar period among the Catholic parties, the Christian Democracy in Italy, the CSU/CDU in West Germany, the MRP in France. This «Europe» could be enlarged to other countries: Belgium of course, but perhaps also Spain, Portugal, Austria, Poland and Hungary. If it was easy to advocate, but a bit more difficult to achieve, the return to Europe of «enslaved» Poland and Hungary, and Portugal and Austria, albeit for different reasons, could be regarded as minor elements, Spain seemed to pose some problems to Italian Catholics. In Spain’s case it was difficult to reconcile the struggle for democracy and for a free Europe against the Soviet Union and Communism with the Fascist heritage of the Franco’s regime; but for those who believed in the pre-eminence of the Catholic core of the Old Continent, Catholic values and ideals could have concurred in a not too distant future to the recovery of the whole Iberian peninsula. So the struggle against Communism appeared to become the struggle against the Orthodox part of Europe, which had broken its ties with Rome’s primacy and tradition. Obviously this Catholic «Europe» could not forget the Protestant part of the Old continent, mainly embodied by Britain and its minor Scandinavian partners; that was however regarded as an ally, obviously a powerful and useful ally, but, at any rate, an external one.
10As for (b), what I called Western/lay «Europe», it was the point of reference for some minority groups and small political parties in the Italian society (the Republicans of the PRI, the Social Democrats, the Liberals, some sections of the upper and middle classes, some intellectuals)7. This «Europe» partially overlapped with the Catholic one. In this «Europe», there was an important role for France, of course for the nation of the Enlightenment, of the principles of 1789, of the Republican – and free-mason – tradition. There was also a role for Germany, or at least for the traditional bonds which had tied generations of Italian intellectuals to German culture (in some sections of the Italian society it was impossible to forget the role played by German philosophical thought during the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, as well as what Italy’s economic take-off and industrial progress owed to Germany’s influence in both the financial and technical fields). In this «lay» Europe there was Britain, with its traditions of liberal democracy, with the role the United Kingdom had played during the Second World War in the fight against Hitler, as well as with its Socialist, pacific social revolution worked out by the Labour Party8. Last but not least, there was the Benelux – not only Catholic Belgium – as a group of nations, which had been able to develop modem social policies and to offer most of their citizens high standards of living.
11As for (c), what I termed workers’ «Europe», it was the point of reference for the parties of the Left (perhaps more the Socialists than the Communists) and their rank and file. This «Europe» stressed, above all, class structures and appeared to have less concern for national patterns and characteristics. From a «theoretical» viewpoint this «Europe» had to be identified with the whole continent, with workers everywhere and had to be regarded as a part of the world workers’ movement. It would be easy to remember how in a Marxist-Leninist context, states were mainly negative aspects of the capitalist System. In spite of that, some nations appeared more relevant than others: Soviet Russia, the father-land of the victorious revolution, the countries where the worker’s movement had developed stronger roots and traditions or had developed closer ties with the Italian Socialist and Communist parties; so it was an obvious feature to stress the interest towards France, with its powerful Communist party, or, to a certain extent, towards Germany, whose worker’s movement tradition had been strong before the Nazi period, as well as the people’s democracies, which, in the eyes of the Italian Socialists and Communists, enjoyed the consequences of the process of sovietization9.
12In any of these three different ideas of «Europe» there was by far less attention towards two groups of nations: (a) the scandinavian countries and (b) the Balkan countries. As for the former, even if they were further points of reference for those Italians who believed in a Western/lay Europe, this group of nations was too far both geographically and psychologically from the peninsula; their realities were not well known and it was very difficult to find out Italians who had had the chance to visit theses nations or to have direct links with these societies, while, as a consequence of migration processes or of wartime events and vicissitudes, several Italians had had direct experiences of France, Germany, Russia, Britain, etc... As for the Balkan countries, it was a bit difficult to regard them as models of any interests, as they were considered too influenced alternatively by a mixture of Orthodox tradition and Communist «barbarianism», by economic, political and social backwardness, by their minor role in the developments of the workers’ movement tradition. In particular, we must not forget the attitude towards Yugoslavia – perhaps the most representative country of the Balkan area in the eyes of the Italian public opinion – as this nation after Tito’s split with Stalin in 1948 became the target of abuse and despise for both the left parties and the moderate and right wing political forces, albeit for different reasons: on one hand Tito’s heresy, on the other the political and diplomatic difficulties related to the Trieste question and to the former Italian territories of the Istrian peninsula and Dalmatia10.
13As an obvious consequence of what has been told, it is possible to stress once again how in the opinion of the Italian people there was not a single idea of Europe, the concept of «Europe» varied sharply and the elements which could identify the Old Continent were very vague.
14In the introductory remarks, it has been singled out the important role played in shaping Italy’s attitude towards the Old Continent by the European integration process. In this context we must draw a line between the opinions of cultural and political elites and the attitude of the man in the street. At any rate also the positions of the elites varied very much. As for the political and cultural groups which professed both democratic and anti-communist ideas, the point of reference in the process, which might lead to European unity was mainly France and later on the so-called Europe of the «Six». Other countries could not be forgotten: Britain, a sort of obvious link between the Old Continent and the United States, the Iberian peninsula and some central European countries which, in a distant future, could be saved, also owing to the development of Europeanist ideals, from Fascism and Communism. In other words, in this context Europe was identified with the Western half of the continent, plus some of its less backward or less distant appendices, such as: Spain and Portugal, Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the Scandinavian peninsula. The patterns shared by the countries wich could become, at once or in a future, part of the European integration process were: (a) the Christian tradition (Catholic and Protestant, but not the Orthodox one); (b) some political values (the ideals of liberal democracy) which were, or had been, common to the history of these nations; (c) the traditional links which had tied these countries to the old «concert of Europe», with the exception of Russia. As for Russia, with its traditional Orthodox and Slav satellites, it was regarded as anti-Europe, a sort of traditional threat to European civilization (i.e. Bizantium vs. the West)11.
15Also for the parties of the Left the Europe of the «Six» was an important concept, even if a negative one. The «Six» plus Britain were singled out by the leaders of the Communist Party and of the Socialist Party as the core of a Western, capitalist, anti-communist Europe, alternatively the alliance among Catholic reactionary forces (Vatican or «Black» Europe) or among capitalist monopolies and trusts. A Europe which had accepted to be subjugated to the interests and will of the most powerful capitalist nation, the United States, a Europe which was ready to lose both its identity and its soul in order to safeguard the privileges of some minority social groups12. In this context the forces of the Left were able to make a skilful use of nationalist stands and slogans by advocating the defence of Italy’s – and Europe’s – best popular and national traditions against the negative influence exerted by the unholy alliance among American capitalism, European monopolistic groups and Catholic universalism13.
16Even if the forces of the Right, both the neo-Fascists and the Monarchists, played a minor role in the political life of postwar Italy, it is impossible to forget their attitude. The Italian Right seemed ready, in particular during the late 1940s, to reject both the idea of a Western Europe closely tied to the United States and the concept of a workers’ Europe. Their approach to the image of the Old continent was, however, confused as the Right wavered between a complete rejection of Europe in favour of Italy’s particularities and the impossible restoration of a traditional European pre-eminence based on old values such as: nationalist ideals, the family, the faithfulness to the Catholic tradition. By the early 1950s, however, the cold war led most of the Italian Right to rally around the moderate forces and to accept some Western values as that was considered the only way to face the Communist threat14.
17These remarks lead us to wonder on what bases these different images of Europe were built up. Which was, for instance, the degree of knowledge the Italians had of the political life of other European countries? Once again we should have to draw a line between, on one hand, the political and cultural elites, and on the other, the man in the street. At any rate it is very likely that in both cases attention focused to the peninsula’s traditional partners: France, Britain, Germany, to a minor extent Russia, which was not regarded, however, as a real part of Europe’s core15. The French situation was perhaps the one the Italian knew best, also owing to the similitaries between the two nations (e.g. in both countries there were a strong Communist Party and a powerful Catholic force, etc.). Furthermore some leading political figures were popular, at least among the sections of the Italian people, who could read newspapers or listen to the radio: de Gaulle, Schuman, Bidault, Thorez, Blum. The role of political leaders must not be disregarded also when we deal with other European countries and we may assume that most Italians knew Adenauer, Churchill, Eden, to a lesser extent Attlee and Bevin, without taking into consideration the outstanding representatives of the two superpowers: Truman, Eisenhower, Stalin, Molotov.
18If we attempt at broadening our analysis from the perception of Europe’s political identity to a more general image Italy’s public opinion developed during these years of the major European nations, we would face some serious difficulties in sketching out a clear-cut picture, so we would limit ourselves to a few remarks of a general character. In our opinion it would be impossible to forget in this context the deep influence exerted by the experience of the Second World War. The image of countries, such as Germany, France, Britain, Russia, mirrored the attitudes and feelings of those Italians who had contacts with German, French, British, Russian soldiers and civilians during the war. In this context, Europe’s image has not been particulary enhanced by wartime experiences, in particular if the attitude towards British, French, Russian and German soldiers were compared to the feelings usually nurtured towards the average American GI16. Obviously we cannot disregard experiences of a different kind, for instance the one connected with the phenomenon of Italian emigration. As for this relevant aspect, the image of France was the one which got more profit. Even if the French authorities, between the 1940s and the 1950s rejected the perspective of a flow of italian immigrants flooding France and Italy’s emigration to her latin neighbour war less relevant than the ones which affected somme extra-European nations, France was still regarded by both the Rome authorities and the peninsula’s public oipinion as one of the best places for Italy’s emigration, because of the previous integration in the French society of large numbers of Italians immigrants, of the proximity of France to Italy, of the apparent similarities between the two countries17.
19Till now our attention has focused on the relations between Italy and Europe as the mirror through which Italians looked at the Old Continent, but a further element concurred in shaping Italy’s understanding of Europe: her relations with the «colonial» world. In this context we cannot forget two relevant elements: (a) Rome’s traditional Mediterranean «vocation»; (b) the bitter frustration felt by most Italians as a consequence of the Peace Treaty and the ensuing loss of the African colonial empire. Which were the main characteristics of Italy’s attitude towards the colonial experience that influenced the peninsula’s attitude towards the Old Continent? In the present paper I have to limit myself to a few remarks. Firstly I would remember the widespread conviction that Rome’s colonialism had been a different one if it was compared to the colonial traditions of other European countries, France and Britain in particular. Most Italians believed that Italy’s colonial policy had been a mild one, which had been able to avoid the worst consequences of this phenomenon: racism and economic exploitation. In this context the feelings and opinions of many Italians were still largely influenced by the ideals and propaganda of the Fascist period: a strange mixture of so-called «Roman tradition», populism, «proletarian nation» rethoric, and Italy’s civilising mission. At the same time many Italians perceived a danger which, in their opinion, was tied to both these feelings and to the sort of moral condemnation inherent in the Peace Treaty: Italy had lost her colonies as she had been unable to be considered by the major European nations a country worth administering colonial territories. So, in spite of the critical attitude towards other countries’ colonial experiences, the Italians did stress also in this context their European roots and traditions and, as a member of the European comity of nations – once again the main points of reference were France and Britain – Rome had to be recognize a role in Europe’s policy towards the colonial world. In other words Italy was a European power and owing tho this reason she needed some share in the Old Continent’s colonial burden18. Last but not least, we must not forget Italy’s conviction that the peninsula was a sort of bridge between Europe and the Mediterranean/Arab world. As a consequence of this widespread feeling Italy was a part of the Old Continent but, owing to her tradition, her geographic position, her history, she was in a better position to understand and to develop fruitful contacts with non-European peoples and cultures, in particular the world and countries of Northern Africa and the Middle East19.
20If the colonial world played some part in shaping Italy’s attitude towards Europe, it is impossible to forget another important element: America. In this context the American continent was often regarded as a sort of Europe outside Europe, also owing to the influence exerted by Italian communities, not only in the United States, but also in several Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, etc. As for the United States, Italy’s attitude was largely influenced by both the world war II experience and the cold war climate. So, while in the opinion of the moderate and anti-communist sections of the Italian society the US represented the achievement of the best European traditions and ideals, filtered through the American experience, in the opinion of Socialist and Communist rank and file the United States embodied the development of the worst aspects of Europe’s history20.
21In the conceptual framework on whose basis I tried to develop these interpretative remarks, it has been singled out the important role played by intellectual circles and elites in shaping Italy’s understanding of Europe. In this context it would be of some interest to add a few remarks. In particular I would stress that till the Second World War the traditional and most important points of reference for the Italian culture had been France and Germany. It is impossible to disregard the influential role played, for instance, by phenomena such as French «positivism» or German «Idealism» in shaping Italy’s philosophical, historiographical and scientific thought from the second half of the 19th century to the early decades of the 20th century21. The Second World War experience meant a partial break in the ties between Germany’s cultural tradition and the peninsula’s experience, even if some of the most outstanding Italian thinkers did not to give up entirely their past experience and bonds. The Second World War and the new world balance had some impact also on the cultural links between France and Italy: the French language was still popular and regarded as easy to learn, Paris was still considered as Europe’s cultural capital and, in particular in the 1950s, Paris was regarded as a lively centre, which was at the roots of innovating ideals and thought in both the literary and philosophical fields22. But the most innovating and relevant phenomenon in this context was the appearance of a deep interest in something which was outside Europe, the United States, in America’s technical and scientific primacy, in the American language, in its cinema, in its literature. Any aspect of American life and society was examined with careful attention by most Italian intellectuals, not only the ones who professed pro-Western ideals; on the contrary it would be possible to remember the role played by some left-wing writers, such as, for instance, Pavese and Vittorini in spreading some aspects of American culture. It would perhaps possible to state that, at least to a certain extent, some sections of the Italian society left aside Europe’s postwar reality and looked at the United States as the main point of reference, even if it would be useful to add that the process of Americanization did not influence only the peninsula, but the whole Western part of Europe23.
22As for the image of Europe in everyday’s life – one of the last aspects of our brief analysis – I would limit myself to a few remarks, not as a consequence of the minor relevance of this element but, on the contrary, as a consequence of the lack of sources. As for this aspect, during the second half of the 1940s and the first half of the 1950s, in our opinion, Italy was mainly influenced by two contrasting characteristics: on one hand a national, I would say a regional, one24; on the other an American one. So the man in the street had as his main points of reference regional traditions and bonds or, alternatively, the new myths and models originated in the United States. These feelings found expression in the attitude toward some popular movies and, if on one hand most Italians appreciated easy home-made movies, which stressed regional characters and features, on the other hand America’s cinema production transformed the peninsula into one of its most important European markets25.
23Even if this analysis had been a very sketchy one, it is perhaps of some interest to sum up the main points raised in the present pages in order to offer a few tentative interpretative remarks.
- First of ail, the majority of Italian people (both the moderate anticommunist sections and the part whose political allegiance went to the parties of the left, albeit for different reasons) thought of «Europe» mainly as Western Europe, in particular some traditional major powers: France, Britain and Germany.
- This «Europe» was the point of reference and model for some cultural and political elites (the ones that had confidence in a Western/lay Europe and, perhaps to a lesser extent, in a Catholic one), while larger sections of the Italian society were more interested and psychologically bound to their own regional realities or, alternatively, to the United States (a sort of vague «American dream») and to the Soviet Union, the latter considered as the champion of the workers’ movement.
- Italy felt herself an important part of Europe, as a consequence of her geographic position, her traditions, her history, her economic interests, etc., but in the opinion of many Italians, the peninsula was also a sort of border country of the Old Continent and so Italy had to show a keen interest in developing close contacts with other peoples and cultures of the Mediterranean basin, even if on many occasions this attitude appeared to be the reaction to frustrated ambitions and past experiences rather than an autonomous choice, which could offer fruitful results in a near future.
24Also on the basis of these assumptions it would be possible to state that the consciousness of a prevailing European identity, obviously a «Western European» one, strictly connected to the realities of some traditional partners (France, West Germany, the Benelux countries, Great Britain) mainly took roots in larger sectors of the Italian society from the late 1950s/ the early 1960s onwards. Such a process was chiefly the result of the following factors:
- the crisis of the American political and cultural model;
- Italy’s economic and social progress, which, to a certain extent, appeared to be closely tied to the Europeanist choice;
- a better knowledge and understanding of Western Europe, in particular if compared with other areas of the Old continent, caused by the spreading of affluence, by the increasing numbers of tourists and travellers (European tourists coming to Italy, Italian tourists going to some Western European countries), by the growth of cultural and economic exchanges;
- the appearance of new European cultural models and myths, which could successfully compete with the American and the Soviet ones and whose influence was felt not only by elite groupes (for instance the myth of the «swinging London» during the 1960s);
- last but not least, the strenghthening of the European integration process, not only from the economic and political points of view.
25Obviously we may wonder whether in the period I examined Italy was a part of Europe in the opinion of the British, the French, the Germans, etc, but this is a question whose answer I leave to my foreign – European – colleagues.
Notes de bas de page
1 For a general picture of the events related to postwar Italy, see for instance:
A. Gambino, Storia del dopoguerra. Dalla liberazione al posxere DC, Rome/Bari, Laterza, 1975; G. Mammarella, L’Italia dalla caduta del fascismo ad oggi, Bologna, il Mulino (ed.), 1978, pp. 101-342; N. Kogan, A political history of Postwar Italy, New York, Praeger, 1966/1981.
These studies obviously stressed the political issues and events. For a different approach which, on the contrary, stressed also cultural and psychological aspects, see: E. Di Nolfo, Le paure e le speranze degli italiani (1943-1953), Milan, Mondalori, 1986. Some useful references to cultural and economic elements can be found in some studies in: L’Italia e la politica di potenza in Europa (1945-1950), Milano, Marzorati, 1988, E. Di Nolfo, R.H. Rainero, B. Vigezzi (eds). (These volumes gather the Italian papers of the international project on «La perception de la puissance en Europe» developed during the 1980s by British, French, German and Italian historians). Even if the interest towards the relationship between Italy and the rest of the world, with the exception of the Communist movement and the United States, is scanty, it is important to remember the recent studies on postwar Italian society by Paul Ginsborg and Silvio Lanaro.
2 For Italy’s role in the international context in the postwar period, see for instance:
E. Di Nolfo, Sistema intemazionale e sistema politico italiano: interazione e compatibilita, in: L. Graziano and S. Tarrow (eds), La crisi italiana, Turin, Einaudi, 1979, pp. 79-112; P. Pastorelli, La politica estera italiana del dopoguerra, Bologna, il Mulino, 1987; see also Di Nolfo, Rainero, Vigezzi, L’Italia e la politica di potenza. As for an outline of the events see: P. Cacace, Venti anni di politica estera italiana (1943-1963), Rome, Bonacci, 1986.
3 This attitude, which privileged some European nations in Italian attention and concerns, is perhaps confirmed by some studies in E. Di Nolfo, R.H Rainero, B. Vigezzi (eds), L’Italia e la politica di potenza in Europa (1938-1940), Milan, Marzorati, 1986.
4 On the relations between Italy and France in the postwar period see, among others, J.B. Duroselle and E. Serra (eds), Italia e Francia 1939-1945, Milan: ISPI/Angeli, 1984; Italia e Francia 1946-1954, Milan, ISPI/Anglei, 1988. As for the relations between Britain ans Italy, see A. Varsori, «Great Britain and Italy 1945-1956: the partner-ship between a Great Power and a minor Power?» Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 3, July 1992, no.2, pp 188-228; as for the relations between Italy and the Soviet Union see R. Morozzo Delia Rocca, La politica estera italiana e l’Unione Sovietica (1944-1948), Rome, La Goliardica, 1985.
5 As for the relations between Germany and Italy, at least during the first stage of the Second World War, see R. De Felice, Mussolini l’alleato, Turin, Einaudi, 1990.
6 As for the Vatican position, see, among others, E. Di Nolfo, «La politica estera del Vaticano e l’Italia dal 1943 al 1948»; C. Meneguzzi Rostagni, «Il Vaticano e i rapporti est-œst nel secondo dopoguerra (1945-1949)»; P. Chenaux, «Le Vatican et l’Europe (1947-1957)», in Storia delle relazioni internazionali, vol. IV, 1988/1, pp. 3-84; A. Riccardi, Il «Partito romano» nel secondo dopoguerra (1945-1954), Brescia, Morcelliana, 1983; A. Riccardi, Il Vaticano e Mosca 1940-1990, Rome/Bari, Laterta, 1992. As for the Christian Democracy, see, for instance, S. Galante, Alla ricerca delia potenza perduta. La politica internazionale delia DC e del Pci negli anni Cinquanta, Manduria, Lacaita, 1990.
7 There are by far less studies about the attitude of the «lay» parties towards the international situation during the postwar period; see, at any rate: E. Decleva, «Un difficile adattamento: la pubblicistica liberal-democratica italiana e la realta internazionale (1945-1949)», in Di Nolfo, Rainero, Vigezzi, L’Italia e lapoliticapotenza, pp. 371-390; as for the representatives of the former Action Party, see, for instance: A. Varsori, «Il quadro internazionale (1945-1956)», in L’azionismo nella storia d’Italia 1946-1953, Ancona, Il Lavoro Editoriale, 1988, pp. 59-82.
A significant example of «lay» leader was Count Carlo Sforza, Italy’s Foreign Minister from 1947 to 1951. About his role see, for instance: L. Zeno, Ritratto di Carlo Sforza, Florence, Le Monnier, 1976 and G. Giordano, Carlo Sforza: la politica 1922-1952, Milan, Angeli, 1991.
8 As for the attitude of the Italian Socialist and Social Democrat forces, see for instance: P. Sebastiani, Laburisti inglesi e socialisti italiani, Rome, Quaderni delia FIAP, 1983; A. Varsori, «Il Labour Party e la crisi del socialismo italiano», in I socialisti e l’Europa, Milan, Angeli, 1989, pp. 159-210.
9 As for the Italian Communist Party, see in particular S. Galante, «Il PCI e la genesi delia politica d’impotenza (1941-1949)», in Di Nolfo, Rainero, Vigezzi (eds), L’Italia e la politica di potenza, pp. 279-358; S. Galante, Alla ricerca; S. Galante, Il partito comunista italiano e l’integrazione europea. Il decennio del rifiuto: 1945-1957, Padua, Liviana, 1988; L. Lotti, «Il partito comunista italiano e la Francia negli anni cinquanta», in Duroselle, Serra (Eds), Italia e Francia, pp. 176-184. As for the Italian Socialist Party see: A. Canavero, «Nenni, i socialisti italiani e la politica estera» and D. Ardia, «Il rifiuto delia potenza: il partito Socialista Italiano e la politica di potenza in Europa (1943-1950)», in Di Nolfo, Rainero, Vigezzi (eds), L’Italia e la politica potenza, pp. 223-278. It is possible to add in this context E. Decleva, «Nenni, Saragat, i socialisti italiani e la SFIO (1945-1948)», in Duroselle, Serra (eds), Italia e Francia, pp. 117-149.
10 See S. Bianchini, «L’opinione publica e l’irnmagine dell’Europa danubiano-balcanica: dalla fine del conflitto alla guerra fredda», in Di Nolfo, Rainero, Vigezzi, L’Italia e la politica di potenza, pp. 447-472.
11 For a broad outline of Italy’s attitude towards European integration see S. Pistone, L’Italia e l’unita europea, Turin, Lœscher, 1982.
12 See in particular Galante, Il partito Comunista Italiano e l’integrazione europea.
13 In this context see the interesting remarks in L. Brunori, «I Partigiani delia Pace e la CED: il caso italiano (1950-1954)», in Storia delle relazioni internazionali, vol. VII, 1991/2, pp. 299-332.
14 See the remarks in R. Chiarini, ’«Sacro egoismo» e «missione civilizzatrice». La politica estera del MSI dalla fondazione alla meta degli anni cinquanta»’, Storia contemporanea, vol XXI, June 1990 no. 3, pp. 541-560; S. Finotti, «Difesa occidentale e Patto atlantico: la scelta internazionale del MSI (1948-1952)», Storia delle relazioni internazionali, vol IV, 1988/1, pp. 85-124
15 These aspects are by far less known. At any rate, as for the Soviet Union is concerned, see G. Petracchi, «Russofilia e russofobia: mito e antimito dell’URSS in Italia (1943-1948)», in Di Nolfo, Rainero, Vigezzi (eds), L’Italia e la politica potenza, pp. 655-676.
As for France, see, for instance, G. Rumi, «L’opinione democristiana e la Francia, Il Popolo (1948-1952)» in Duroselle, Serra (eds), Italia e Francia, pp. 228-249. More attention was given to the attitude of the French public opinion towards Italy. See, for instance in the same volume the essays by Pierre Milza and Ralph Schor. Furthermore see in J. B. Duroselle and E. Serra (eds), Il vincolo culturale tra Italia e Francia negli anni Trenta e Quaranta, Milan, ISPI/Angeli, 1986, the essays by P. Guillen, M. Vaisse, P. Milza and A. Le Fur.
16 In this context it is possible to remember how in the famous film «Paisà» by Roberto Rossellini, a neo-realist picture of Italy between 1943 and 1945, there appeared only US soldiers, usually in a favourable light, in spite of the fact that the Italian campaign saw the participation of units from several countries (Britain and the Common-wealth, France, Poland, Brazil) on the Allied side. The only episode in «Paisa» where it is possible to find non-American soldiers is the one located in Florence. On this occasion however Rossellini showed two «traditional», smart-looking British officers, who were discussing about Florence monuments and showed no concern whatsœver for the Italian partisans fighting against the Germans and the Fascists.
17 As for the emigration issue see, for instance, F. Romero, Emigrazione e integrazione europea 1945-1973, Rome, Edizioni Lavoro, 1991, in particular chapter second. As for the attitude towards France, it would be possible to remember the famous film «Il cammino delia speranza», whose plot is based on the failed attempt by some Italian workers to pass illegally the French border.
18 On Italy and the colonial issue see, among others, G. Rossi, L’Africa italiana verso l’indipendenza (1941-1949), Milan, Giuffrè, 1980); A. Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa orientale, vol IV, Rome/Bari, Laterza, 1984; A. Del Boca, Gli italiani in Libia, vol II, Rome/Bari, Laterza, 1988.
19 On this issue see, besides Rossi’s and Del Boca’s studies, B. Bagnato, Vincoli europei echi mediterranei. L’Italia e la crisi francese in Marocco e in Tuunisia, Florence, il ponte aile Grazie, 1991.
20 It is of some significance that, in particular during the 1970s, Italian historiography focused its attention on US-Italian relations rather than on the ties between Italy and other European countries. In this context it is possible to cite, among the many contributions, usually dealing with political-diplomatic aspects: J. E. Miller, The United States and Italy 1940-1950. The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization, Chapel Hill/London, the University of North Carolina Press, 1986; R. Quartararo, Italia e Stati Uniti. Gli anni difficili (1945-1952), Naples, ESI, 1986; E. Di Nolfo, «Italia e Stati Uniti: un’alleanza diseguale», in Storia delle relazioni internazionali, vol. VI, 1990/1, pp. 3-28. On the cultural and social aspects see some contributions in P. P. D’Attorre (ed.), Nemici per la pelle. Sogno americano e mito sovietico nell’Italia contemporanea, Milan, Angeli, 1991.
21 On Italian culture see the well-known essay by E. Garin, La cultura italiana tra ’800 e ’900, Bari, Laterza, 1963.
22 See some remarks in the volume Duroselle and Serra (eds), Il vincolo culturale, whose analysis, however, ends with the late 1940s.
23 In this context see, among others, G. Spini, G.G. Migone, M. Teodori (eds), Italia e America dalla Grande Guerra a oggi, Venice, Marsilio, 1976; Italia e Stati Uniti durante l’amministrazione Truman, Milan, Angeli, 1976; Le relazioni Italia-Stati Uniti dal 1943 al 1953: Storia-Economia-Cultura (Firenze, 8-10 maggio 1980), Florence, Scuola di Perfezionamento in Studi Politici Internazionali, 1983; D’Attorre (ed), Nemici per la pelle.
24 A significant portrait of these regional realities in G. Piovene, Viaggio in Italia, Milan, Mondadori, 1964.
25 On this issue see C. Wagstaff, Italian Cinema in a world Market (1947-1956), paper given to the conference «The Politics of Power. A conference on Italy during the Cold War Period» (Reading, 26-27 October 1990).
Auteur
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Antonio Varsori
Université de Florence
Le texte seul est utilisable sous licence Licence OpenEdition Books. Les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont « Tous droits réservés », sauf mention contraire.
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