Soviet historians and the revolution of 1905
p. 475-496
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1It is remarkable that seventy-five years after the Russian Révolution of 1905 there still does not exist a scholarly, compréhensive narrative history of that event in any language. This lacuna in our historiography surely does not stem from a lack of interest by scholars or a shortage of source material. In the Soviet Union the Révolution has been memorialized at varions anniversaries with a massive outpouring of archivai documents, recollections by participants, and specialized monographs. Most of the attention has naturally centered on events within the Russian Empire, but there hâve also appeared numerous studies of the Revolution’s impact on Western European countries and other parts of the world. No subject seems to be too trivial. In 1975, for example, two scholars delivered a paper in Moscow on « The Influence of the Revolutionary Events in 1905 on Cuba. » Although the authors claim that the « advanced strata of the working class and intelligentsia [in Cuba]... felt deep sympathy for the struggle of the Russian proletariat, » they cite only one Cuban source, an article in the newspaper La Voz Obrera. More than half the scholarly paper, in fact, is devoted to Lenin’s views on political strategy in 1905 and Fidel Castro’s policies since 19591.
2In non-Communist countries historians hâve been more discriminating in their choice of subjects, but there, too, a great deal of work on varions aspects of 1905 has appeared during the last two décades. Indeed, the sheer quantity of material may have given pause to historians contemplating a synthetic account of the Revolution, all the more so since it was a major upheaval with only limited success in transforming Russian society. Moreover, the Revolution of 1905 was an event of extraordinary complexity. In most modem révolutions in the West, developments in the capital city, or at most in two or three urban centers, tended to be decisive in shaping the destiny of entire countries. In Russia in 1905 however, developments in Saint-Petersburg and Moscow, though very important, did not by themselves determine the fate of the Revolution. Serious disturbances erupted, occasionally simultaneously but often at different times, in varions cities, agrarian regions, and outlying areas of the Empire. Most of these were suppressed fairly easily, but in some localities new organs of local authority came into existence that for a time defïed the Tsarist govemment. A comprehensive history of 1905 must therefore include accounts of a sizable number of local revolutions, most of which possessed some unique features.
3Although Soviet historians have still not produced a great synthetic work, they hâve offered broad interprétations of the Révolution that serve as frameworks for even the most specialized studies. An examination of the entire corpus of Soviet writings on 1905 would be beyond the reach of one paper and perhaps even of one historian. But the principal interpretations that have dominated the historiography of the Révolution can be usefully explored. Such an enterprise reveals a great deal not only about the nature of Soviet historical scholarship but also about the substantive problems encountered by students of the Révolution.
4My central, though not exclusive, focus will be the year 1905. It is true that Soviet historians consider the events of 1906 and the first half of 1907 to be integral parts of the First Révolution, but they hâve not, by their own admission2, examined the last eighteen months with anywhere near the same thoroughness as the first twelve. This is reflected in general accounts of the Révolution. A recent work, for example, devoted 286 pages to 1905 and 77 to 1906 and 19073. No doubt, Soviet historians have neglected the second phase of the Revolution because they regard it as far less interesting. It was the « period of decline » when large sectors of the population succumbed to « constitutional illusion » in trusting the new parliament, the duma, to devise solutions to Russia’s economie and political problems. Certainly, the most provocative Soviet scholarship has dealt with the earlier period of the Revolution, which furthe1 justifies our concentrating on it.
5The major thèmes in Soviet interprétations of 1905 can ail be traced to Lenin, who conceived of the Revolution as a necessary phase in a predetermined course of Russian history. He referred to the Révolution as the « dress rehearsal » without which the « victory of the October Révolution in 1917 would have been impossible. » But Lenin went far beyond this very general characterization of 1905. He claimed that although it was a bourgeois-democratic revolution « in its social content, » in its methods of struggle it was proletarian because the strike was the chief weapon in the endeavors to overthrow the existing order. Hence, the working class constituted the « leading force, the vanguard » of the entire oppositional movement.
6Both by example and through agitation, Lenin asserted, the striking workers stirred up large numbers of peasants, confirming his view that the revolution in Russia would be effected by the prolétariat in alliance with the peasantry rather than with the middle class, whom he dismissed as weak and politically untrus-worthy. Although in a lecture on the Révolution delivered in 1915 Lenin held that both the general strike in October and the armed uprising in December « marked the highest point in the rising tide of the Russian revolution, » at other times he declared that the uprising alone merited that désignation. In his view, « one of the fondamental reasons » for the Revolution’s defeat was the peasantry’s inadéquate organization and insufflaient aggressiveness. Finally, Lenin attached world-wide significance to 1905 since it had aroused the revolutionary fervor of masses of people in Western Europe and « throughout the whole of Asia4. »
7Following Lenin’s broad outline of the development of the Revolution, Soviet historians have focused on several interrelated questions. What were the moving forces of the Révolution, the forces whose activities produced the tests of strength between the opposition and the government ? More specifïcally, what was the rôle of organized political movements in the major events of 1905 ? What was the signifïcance of the general strike in October and the Moscow uprising in December ? Why did the Révolution fail ? An exploration of how historians hâve handled these questions suggests that Soviet historiography on 1905 may be divided into four phases, corresponding to broader political and cultural trends in the country.
8The first phase, covering approximately the years from 1921 to 1930, may be designated as the period of pluralistic Marxism. To be sure, there already existed a group of so-called « party historians » who were specifïcally charged with writing works acceptable to the leadership of the Communist Party and who tended to focus on the history of the party. However, there also existed a group of « Marxist historians » whose interests and knowledge were broader than those of the party historians. The Marxist historians occupied most of the positions at institutions of higher learning, where the younger génération was trained in historical scholarship5. The critical point is that although both groups of historians were highly partisan in their writings, they tended to respect the canons of historical scholarship. Rarely did they deliberately falsify evidence or ignore significant developments that did not fît neatly into their interprétations. And in their publications on 1905 they exhibited a diversity of opinion on a number of topics.
9Early during the second phase, which lasted from about 1930 to 1955, the two groups of historians were merged into one cadre subservient to party directives. Rigid orthodoxy, grotesque distortion of facts, and vilification of ail opponents of Bolshevism were the hallmarks of this phase.
10The third era lasted only about two years, from 1955 to 1957, and coincided with the initial period of the anti-Stalin campaign. It was a time of intellectual ferment when historians vigorously challenged the distortions and exaggerations of the Stalinist era without repudiating the essentials of Lenin’sinterpretations of 1905.
11The fourth phase, beginning in 1957, has in some ways been the most complex. Historians revived the dogmatic interpretations of 1905 dominant in the 1930’s and 1940’s, but they generally have avoided blatant cruditie : and falsifications. They hâve also sought to buttress the officially-sanctioned interprétations with studies based on extensive research, and some of these works are reasonably sophisticated and informative. On one occasion there even appeared in print a challenge to one of the most hallowed interprétations, that the prolétariat exercised hegemony over the oppositional movement throughout the revolutionary period. The challenge quickly came under intense attack, but it is noteworthy that the attack consisted of more than polemics. Several historians undertook a far-reaching scholarly rebuttal to the challenge.
12During all four phases the historians’ conceptions of the Révolution were shaped to a remarkable degree by ideological and political concerns. But whereas in the 1920’s historians could publish studies that reflected their own ideological preconceptions, during the last five decades they could not publish any work unless it was approved by authorities under the govemment’s control. In sum, highly partisan history was replaced by throughly politicized history.
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13Soviet historians began the systematic study of the Révolution of 1905 immediately after the end of the Civil War in 1921. One of their primary aims was to refute the so-called Menshevik interpretation of the upheaval, which had initially appeared in scholarly form in the four-volume work, ObStestvennoe dviienie v Rossii v načale XX-go veka (The Social Movement in Russia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century), published between 1909 and 1914. A collective enterprise written for the most part by Mensheviks who had been either participants or observera of developments in Russia, it is still the most exhaustive study of the Révolution.
14The authors’ analyses clearly reflected the view that had become dominant among Mensheviks, that under the économie and social conditions of 1905 Russia could not hâve move beyond the limits of a bourgeois révolution. While they emphasized the contributions of the working class to the undermining of the old order, they did not claim that the prolétariat had exercised hegemony over the oppositional movement throughout that year. Indeed, they devoted a great deal of space to the oppositional activities of other social strata, such as the upper bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, the peasantry, as well as various national groups. The underlying assumption of the Menshevik historians seems to hâve been that 1905 was an open-ended affair whose outcome was neither inevitable nor predictable They were interested less in glorifying the proletariat than in understanding what had happened, why the Revolution had gone awry. Characteristically, D. Kol’tsov posed the following question on the very first page of his study of the working class in the years from 1905 to 1907 : « Why was the proletariat in the end isolated and forced to repel the blows of reaction on its own...?6 » Only a detailed examination of developments in Russia, Kol’tsov suggested, could provide an answer to this difficult question.
15It was with the express purpose of replacing the Obščestvennoe dvtëenie... with an authoritative Bolshevik account of the Revolution that M.N. Pokrovskij, the dean of Soviet historians, in 1925 launched the publication of three volumes of monographs and documents on the upheval7. For Pokrovskij, the task acquired spécial urgency because a number of distinguished historians, most notably N.A. Rožkov, continued to subscribe to the Menshevik view of 1905. A highly prolific historian who by the mid-1920’s had abandoned Menshevism for Bolshevism, Roïkov never quite felt at home in the Soviet historical guild. His works were readily published and widely read, he regularly participated in scholarly conférences, but time and again he came under attack for tenaciously clinging to unorthodox interprétations8. Even in recent years he has been singled out by Soviet scholars as a prime example of an historian whose judgments were distorted by his Menshevik preconceptions9.
16Rožkov accorded « fïrst place » to the « laboring masses » in causing the Révolution of 1905, but he also credited several other groups with having made signiflcant contributions to bringing on the revolutionary crisis. For example, he amphasized that the liberals’ pressure for fondamental change in 1904 did much to embolden the forces opposed to the govemment. And in his account of developments between February and August 1905 he concentrated not on the activities of the working class but rather on those of the libérais. But what especially irked Soviet historians was RoZkov’s treatment of the general strike in October 1905 and the Moscow uprising in December. In a chapter entitled « Highest Upsurge of the Révolution » he argued that because the libérais supported the strike that event « undoubtedly was the highest point achieved by the Révolution – not in the sense that the forms of revolutionary struggle did not develop further, but in the sense that no later revolutionary efforts were crowned with success as they had been in the October Days. » The « complete isolation » of the govemment left it no choice but to make far-reaching concessions to the opposition10.
17The October Manifesto, which Rožkov considered to hâve been a « semi-victory » for the Revolution, satisfied the upper bourgeoisie, prompting it to join the « counter – revolutionary camp. » The ensuing split in the opposition to the autocracy was an important factor in enabling the govemment to prevail11. Significantly, Rožkov offered a rather prosaic account of the December insurrection in Moscow, an event glorified by virtually every Bolshevik historian12. Moreover, he asserted that « backward » éléments in the working class, the only ones to hâve attained « political consciousness, » played a dominant role in it. He found this entirely « understandable, » for those elements had « in truth nothing to lose except their chains13. » Rožkov did not explicitly condemn the uprising, but no reader could avoid the conclusion that he regarded it a mistake. The gains of October, he subtly suggested, might hâve been Consolidated had the alliance between middle class libérais and workers not been ruptured.
18Ail of these « Menshevik » views were rejected by the Soviet historians who came to dominate scholarship on 1905 in the 1920’s. Their point of departure in analyzing the first révolution was the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917. They looked upon 1905 as merely a precursor to 1917 and consequently they went to great lengths to justify and magnify the rôle of the Bolsheviks, who in 1905 were a relatively small group within the opposition. They contended that the Moscow uprising, the one incident in which the Bolsheviks did exercise leadership, was « objectiver necessary » and the culmination of the revolutionary process, even though it was crushed by the govemment, an outcome that greatly enhanced the Tsar’s ability to reassert his political preeminence. Pokrovskij made the point quite dogmatically. « If there had been no December uprising there would hâve been neither a February nor an October 1917. This was the first blow, which was entirely necessary14. » Pokrovskij’s thesis on the uprising was widely shared by Soviet historians15.
19Pokrovskij argued that the insurrection was psychologically of the utmost importance because it marked the first occasion when ordinary people took it upon themselves to shoot at the authorities, which had the effect of breaking the « magic spell » that surrounded the Tsar and his armed forces16. Moreover, he was convinced that « the masses wished to put up a stand against tsarism, but did not know how to do it. The Bolsheviks showed them how these things were done, showed them that it was possible to fight tsarism openly – and that was infinitely more important than any military success or military reverse in the first struggle. If even the Bolsheviks had been unable to show this, it would hâve meant that the Russian working-class had no revolutionary leadership. » The masses would have succumbed to a « Menshevik counter-revolutionary mood17. » In short, there are times when « a defeat after a struggle is more valuable than a victory without a struggle18. »
20The tendency of Soviet historians to look at 1905 through the prism of 1917 prevented them from examining the first revolution as an historical event in its own right, an event that opened up several possibilities for Russia’s development. It also prevented them from assigning full weight to non-Bolshevik groups who participated in the Révolution. Still, it would be misleading to dismiss their writings of the 1920’s as more apologies for the Bolsheviks or as hopelessly tendentious.
21Pokrovskij’s general work on Russia, for example, which contains a long account of 1905, deserves to be taken seriously as history. To be sure, Pokrovskij took great pains to demonstrate the hégémonie rôle of the working class, whose actions he invariably described as heroic, and he argued vigorously that there existed a « political union of the working-class and peasantry which expressed itself in the most varied ways19. » By the same token, he painted the Tsar, the government, the nobles, and the « bourgeois intelligentsia » in the darkest colors. These were ail orthodox Leninist positions.
22Yet, he devoted a considérable amount of space to the activities of the libérais, many of whom, he pointed out, had adopted a defeatist position on the war against Japan as early as the summer of 1904 and had concluded that a révolution was necessary. For the first three months of 1905 their agitation for fundamental political change was so intense – Pokrovskij calls this the « revoit of the cultural societies »– that the govemment could not take decisive measures to stop the unrest spreading throughout the Empire. Moreover, he acknowledged that the bourgeoisie « applauded the working-class when it was beginning to be revolutionary » and tumed against it only when the proletariat « attempted to carry the revolution to its completion20, » a general assessment widely sharedby Soviet historians in the 1920’s21.
23Far from claiming that all the major occurrences in 1905 were the resuit of careful planning and organization, Pokrovskij placed great emphasis on the element of spontaneity. He described the démonstrations on Bloody Sunday as a « colossal stream of the spontaneous movement of the masses. The current carried Gapon on inexorably. The movement of ninth of January had, strictly speaking, neither a leader nor leaders. It is precisely because its only agent was the mass of the people that we must regard January 9 as the beginning of the Russian Révolution22. » The massive strikes that swept the country for two months after Bloody Sunday can also not be attributed to any leaders or organization. Nor can the general strike in October 1905. « I am not exaggerating when I say that even a month before the event not one of the revolutionary organizations believed that we were on the eve of a tremendous new wave of the working-class movement which was to rise far higher than on January23. » In a footnote Pokrovskij insisted that in saying this he was not abandoning the Marxist doctrine of historical necessity. He did not mean to suggest that the general strike was an accidental occurrence, only that it lacked « organized leadership. The October strike grew with iron necessity out of the whole preceding working-class movement but it was not prepared or carried out according to plan24 . »
24Nor did Pokrovskij claim undisputed and unerring leadership for the Bolsheviks in 1905. True, they « were the only entirely revolutionary party, but they were not the only leaders of the insurgent masses (as they were to become in October, 1917)25. » At times they even blundered : the Petersburg Bolsheviks « made a great mistake when, in the beginning [they] held aloof from the Soviet, because the latter had been started by the Mensheviks. The mistake was soon corrected26. » The Bolsheviks also « tended to suffer from a propensity for revolutionary phrase-making in hardly less a degree than the Mensheviks. » Only after Lenin arrived in Russia early in November, 1905 did the Bolsheviks consistently follow Sound policies27, a judgment that is striking because it contradicts the Marxist notion that individuals do not shape the course of history.
25The chief failing of the Mensheviks was that they were not « entirely revolutionary » and lacked « sympathy for revolutionary methods. » Pokrovskij also accused them of having engaged in « disorganizing work, » by which he apparently meant that they had opposed the Bolshevik call to workers to préparé for an insurrection. But in his view they did not tum « anti-revolutionary » until the spring of 190628. Some of their actions even evoked praise from Pokrovskij. They were right in forming the Petersburg Soviet and they showed good judgment in responding negatively to the demands of workers right after Bloody Sundy for « armed action » against the govemment. « The Social Democrats, » Pokrovskij wrote, « did not necessarily have to be Mensheviks (though they happened to be Mensheviks) to tum down the proposai, which, in practice, could only have led to another massacre29. »
26Finally, Pokrovskij refrained from charging the leaders of the non-Bolshevik parties with responsibility for the failure of the Revolution On this issue he remained faithful to his main thesis, that the masses constituted the driving force behind the turbulent events. « The révolution of 1905, » he concluded, « was not entirely victorious because the insurgent masses were not entirely revolutionary. And this had its effect on the revolutionary leadership30. »
27In the 1920’s Pokrovskij’s analysis of 1905 was without doubt the most authoritative in the Soviet Union, in large part because of his official position as Deputy Commissar of Education but also because his views were widely accepted as a valid élucidation of Lenin’s pronouncements on the Révolution. But it was not uncommon for Bolshevik writers to set forth theses at variance with Pokrovskij’s conception. M.I. Vasil’ev-Južin, for example, contended that political miscalculation by Bolshevik leaders was a major factor in the defeat of the December uprising and therefore of the entire Révolution. Their mistake was that they made insufficient efforts to win the peasants over to the political struggle against the govemment. « I believe, » he wrote, « that we should have done in 1905 – and, perhaps, much earlier – what we did in 1917, that is, knock out of the weak petty bourgeois arms of the SR’s the banner of land and freedom without fearing that we would be reproached with sinking into Populism... We were Marxists, and if Vladimir Il’ië [Lenin], whom we followed, utilized this banner so effectively in 1917, then we could also have dared to utilize it in 1905 and even earlier31. »
28S. Černomordik, on the other hand, argued that politics had nothing to do with the failure of the December uprising. The cause of the defeat was « purely technical, » poor organization and an inadéquate supply of arms. Černomordik insisted that if the defeat could really be attributed to political miscalculation, it would mean that the time for an armed attack was not propitious, that the revolutionary tide in December was receding, that the entire undertaking was a mistake. His study of the insurrection persuaded him that such a conclusion was unwarranted. Had the insurgents been better prepared, they could hâve prevailed and could have succeeded in establishing a Soviet form of govemment32 . »
29It is also noteworthy that the scholarly journal Istorik-Marksist, founded specifically to promote Bolshevik historiography, published criticisms of some of the most sacred tenets of Soviet historians. In 1926 it printed a rather long, and in part quite amusing, attack by a certain Comrade Skabyš, on historians who claimed that the proletariat was in a far more militant mood in 1905 than had generally been assumed. Skabyš, a worker who had been a member of the Executive Committee of the 1905 Petersburg Soviet, was thinking in particular of P. Gorin, who had asserted that already in October 1905 the workers in Petersburg and other regions of the Empire were « psychologically ready for an armed uprising33. »
30According to SkabyS, it was a mistake to contend that in 1905 the working class constituted a disciplined social force committed to a radical social program. True, many workers were determined to bring about the overthrow of the oppressive autocracy and favored the establishment of a democratically elected constituent assembly, but beyond that they had no clear notion of what they wanted. Certainly, the mass of workers favored neither an armed uprising by the proletariat nor a seizure of power by the Soviets. To drive home his point about the workers’ lack of revolutionary zeal, Skabyš told the following story : « On January 9 a group of us were at the house of a worker who regarded himself a revolutionary, even an SR, I believe... His wife had baked some pancakes and said to us : ” First eat the pancakes and then go see the Tsar.” And having eaten the pancakes, we went to see the Tsar. » On a more serious note, he recalled that in October workers were prepared to stay out on strike for a short period of time regardless of whether or not they were going to be paid. But after three to four days they began to indicate that they would retum to work unless they were assured of pay for the days they missed. « It was extremely difficult for us to work on two fronts. It was extremely difficult, on the one hand, to frighten the govemment with révolution and, on the other, to persuade workers to hold out for a few more days. » Fortunately, the employers promised to pay the workers, and thus the strike was prolonged. « Now tell me, please, » Skabyš asked, « was this a genuinely revolutionary movement ? » He, for one, could not but be « extremely dubious » about the existence in October 1905 of « revolutionary spirit among the Petersburg prolétariat34. » It is true that Skabyš was not a professional historian, but the appearance of his comments in Istorik-Marksist cast doubt on the romantic version of working class conduct in 1905 that had had become the stock in trade of many Soviet scholars.
31This account of the divergent positions on 1905 that emerged in the 1920’s does not touch on all the issues over which historians differed. They also disagreed over such matters as the origins of the Soviets, the socio-economic status of the peasants who led the disorders in the countryside, and the extent to which the peasant movement was politically-inspired, to mention but three of the most interesting35 . The essential point is that Pokrovskij and his followers had set forth a broad interpretation of the Revolution consistent with Lenin’s pronouncements on 1905 to which, however, scholars were not obliged to subscribe in every detail. This State of affairs came to an end around 1930.
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32After Stalin’s ascendancy to sole political leadership Soviet historiography on 1905 underwent drastic changes. It increasingly came under the direct control of the Communist Party and declined dramatically in quality and quantity. In 1935, for example, there appeared several general works on the Révolution, but not a single scholarly monograph36. New éditions of memoirs were published from time to time, but only after they had been heavily edited to bring them into line with officially-sanctioned interpretations. Some of the memoir literature now considered heretical was entirely withdrawn from circulation.
33 Eventually, party-line historians produced a body of literature on 1905 that monotonously subscribed to one interpretation characterized by outright falsification and strident polemics. Historians who had been professionally active in the 1920’s occasionally managed to publish studies that were scholarly and free of invective, but none of them directly challenged the view of the Revolution that had become dominant37. E.D. Čermenskij’s Buržuazija i tsarizm v revoljucii 1905-1907 gg., the first edition of which was published in 1939, is often cited as an example of meritorious scholarship produced by a historian who matured in the 1930’s. It is true that Čermenskij did somehow manage to Write history that can be regarded as scholarly, but even he adopted a relentlessly censorious tone toward the « liberal bourgeoisie » and accused it of « perfidious conduct. » In the second édition, which appeared in 1970, he charged the liberal bourgeoisie with a « betrayal of the interests of revolutionary democracy38. »
34It would be pointless to undertake an extensive exploration of the new historiography, for it did little to illuminate the events of 1905. Still, a brief survey of the principal thèmes in that historiography seems appropriate, if only to make intelligible the ferment within the historical profession shortly after Stalin’s death in 1953.
35The most striking, and certainly most pervasive, feature of the new historiography was a magnification and glorification of the Bolsheviks’ rôle in every significant occurrence in 1905 surpassing by far the exaggerations of the 1920’s. G.D. Kostomarov was one of the masters of this genre, and his book on the Moscow Soviet, first published in 1948, came to be considered « standard reading for young historians39. » If other historians were less dogmatic, inventive, and polemical than he, the vast majority of them nonetheless echoed his interprétations.
36For Kostomarov, the « most important event in the history of the revolutionary movement in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century » was the « strike of 30,000 Baku workers in December 1904, » who were « led by Comrade Stalin. » That work stoppage served as « the signal for the glorious strikes in January-February [1905] throughout Russia, » which « were prepared by the preceding activities of the party of Lenin-Stalin [and] by the preceding course of the revolutionary struggle of the Russian proletariat40 .) ;
37The liberal bourgeoisie made no contribution at ail to the disorders that swept across Russia. « Already from the first days of the Révolution » it « openly sought to make a deal with Tsarism. » The Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries were nothing but « servants of the liberal bourgeoisie » and at every turn « betrayed the revolutionary struggle41. » In fact, one of the major tasks of the Bolsheviks was « indefatigably » to expose the « Mensheviks and Trotskyites, who denied the leading rôle of the proletariat in the Revolution, looked upon the peasantry not as an ally of the prolétariat in the Revolution but as a revolutionary force, and did ail they could to subordinate the revolutionary struggle of the workers and peasants to the interests of the bourgeoisie42 . »
38Kostomarov even credited the Bolsheviks with having organized the general strike of October 1905, which Soviet historians had previously explained either as a spontaneous event or one in which the Railroad Union had played the leading rôle43. It is worth noting that this startling and improbable interpretation was widely repeated by Soviet historians in the Stalinist era. In 1954 L.K. Erman stated flatly that « the October strike was prepared and executed by the Russian prolétariat under the leadership of the Bolsheviks44. » Other historians hâve tended to be more circumspect than Erman : They wrote their accounts in such a fashion as to give the impression that the Bolsheviks were responsible for the outbreak of the general strike45.
39Kostomarov also claimed preeminence for the Bolsheviks in the movement to create soviets. The Moscow Bolsheviks, he asserted, distributed leaflets calling on workers to elect deputies to a soviet as early as August 1905. The masses responded enthusiastically and the first meeting of the Moscow Soviet took place on October 2, twelve days before the Petersburg Soviet, led by the Mensheviks, held its first meeting46. The truth is that the leaflets to which Kostomarov referred contained no appeal at all to workers to form a Soviet47.
40There is no need to dwell on Kostomarov’s highly romanticized version of the December uprising in Moscow. Suffice it to point out that he described it as a « necessary » action that received « warm support from the masses of Moscow workers48. » But what deserves attention is his explanation of the failure of the insurrection. He repeated the usual points, namely, that the insurgents lacked weapons and that they had no clearly worked out plan of attack. His primary stress, however, is on the « treachery » of the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, who « sowed dissension among the insurgents, spread the filthy slander that the insurgents”looted” shops, disturbed °public peace,” etc., » and urged workers to stop fighting before it was clear that the struggle was lost.
41Kostomarov’s most astonishing charge is that a day before the insurrection several important Bolshevik leaders in Moscow fell into a police trap set with the help of Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. The latter, Kostomarov asserted, « committed base treason and dealt the Revolution a blow in the back49. » The charge has never been proven and seems altogether preposterous. Kostomarov’s purpose, it would appear, was to buttress the claim that the December uprising was a reasonable undertaking that might well hâve succeeded had it not been for the perfidy of the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.
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42That the crude interprétations and distortions of the history of 1905 were not universally shared by Soviet scholars became évident in 1955, two years after Stalin’s death. It was the fiftieth anniversary of the upheaval and the authorities promoted a vast program of publications on 1905. Significantly, a number of scholarly and balanced studies now appeared, quite different in tone and content from the Works of the Stalinist era.
43 The lead, unsigned article in the January 1955 issue of Voprosy istorii, the major journal of the historical profession, set the tone for the change in direction. The article began with a denunciation of bourgeois and Menshevik interprétations of 1905 – the Mensheviks were only concemed to justify their « renegade tactics » – and insisted that only the party of the revolutionary prolétariat, the Bolshevik party, offers a « truly scientific assessment » of the Révolution, of « its objective preconditions, its character and moving forces, its results and lessons. » It then restated all of Lenin’s assessments, which are summarized in the first pages of this paper.
44Having paid obeisance to party-line historiography, the article proceeded to criticize a number of Bolshevik historians, which, of course, raises the question of how « scientific » Bolshevik history really is. It took issue with V.A. Galkin, LV. Verhin, V. Osipov, and E.P. Kireev for contending that already during the first days following Bloody Sunday the working class acted as a well-organized and politically-conscious force. These historians, according to the article, ignored two facts : that the massive strikes and démonstrations at that early stage of the Revolution were spontaneous occurrences and that Social Democrats still exerted very little influence over the proletariat. Indeedî a fundamental task for historians is to examine how the working class gradually gained political consciousness.
45The article went on to list a series of other issues that Soviet scholars have insufficiently studied, the most interesting one being the « periodization » of the Révolution. Historians had assumed that the timing of major events had been identical in the cities, countryside, and among the military during the last quarter of 1905. But, the article pointed out, the fact of the matter is that the waves of militancy among workers, peasants, soldiers, and sailors followed different « rhythms, » a major reason for the failure of the Revolution50.
46The importance of this last point cannot be overstated. Although the article did not question the doctrine of the hegemony of the prolétariat, it was in effect calling on historians to demonstrate precisely how the working class had exercised leadership. If it was as potent a force as was claimed, why had the working class not been able to effect simultaneous revolutionary action among the proletariat, peasantry, and the military ? No one reading the article could doubt that this was the question, a very difficult one, that historians were being asked to address.
47Throughout 1955 Voprosy istorii published articles whose content reflected the new tone set by the lead article in the January issue. The most extreme interprétations of the 1940’s and early 1950’s were either ignored or quietly replaced. Thus, L.F. Petrova quoted Lenin to the effect that no political party had « invented » the Soviets ; they had been « called into being » by the Revolution of 1905. Her own research of the origins of the Petersburg Soviet convinced her that the institution had indeed arisen « spontaneously in the course of the masses’ revolutionary struggle. » Petrova also conceded that the « Bolsheviks did not immediately understand the importance of the Soviet and its historical role. » She cited an unpublished manuscript of an article by Lenin, written in 1905 but discovered only in 1940, which demonstrated that not until November, several weeks after the formation of the Petersburg Soviet, did the Bolshevik leadership begin to appreciate the potential of that institution to develop into a revolutionary organ committed to the preparation of an armed uprising. Petrova also did not conceal the Mensheviks’ preeminence in the Petersburg Soviet, which « achieved great authority among the workers » in the capital. She even mentioned Trotsky, who, of course, played a very important rôle in that Soviet. But she did so only in the context of a general criticism of the Mensheviks for having insisted that the Soviet should be merely an « organ of revolutionary self-govemment » and that the general strike should be the main method of struggle against the autocracy. However, she accused the Mensheviks not of treachery but of opportunism, which was progress of sorts51.
48Knowledgeable readers of the 1955 issues of Voprosy istorii would have detected that important changes were taking place in Soviet historiography, but they would not have suspected that a véritable storm was brewing within the historical profession. In March 1956, shortly after the Twentieth Party Congress, which marked the high point of the de-Stalinization campaign, Voprosy istorii ran another editorial higth critical of Soviet scholarship. It agreed fully with the delegates to the Congress, who had « noted that the research on the history of the party and the history of Soviet society is one of the most backward areas of our ideological work. » For two décades historians, captivated by the « cuit of personality, » had vastly exaggerated the « significance [Stalin’s] practical and theoretical activities. » Every achievement of the Soviet Union had been explained as the « resuit of the spécial qualifies of one man – VJ. Stalin. »
49To buttress such far-fetched accounts of the past historians had distorted and falsifïed the truth. The works of distinguished scholars had been withdrawn from circulation. The search for new facts had stopped. « The overwhelming majority of dissertations were nothing other than compilations of quotations and isolated facts, and to a significant degree repeat each other. » Voprosy istorii called on scholars to remember that the task of the historian is « to explain, not to hush up historical facts52. »
50The éditorial referred specifically to flaws in Soviet scholarship on 1905. Instead of portraying « Menshevism as a tendency hostile to Marxism within the labor movement, » it had depicted the « Mensheviks as accomplices of Tsarist autocracy. » The truth is that in 1905 the « Bolsheviks were the most consistent but not the only force in the revolutionary democratic camp. » For a time they actually formed a bloc with the Mensheviks « for a more successful assault on Tsarist autocracy. » This had been ignored by Soviet historians, as had the question of the « unification » of the two movements, widely discussed late in 1905. « There are comrades who refuse to study the history of the unification committees of the RSDRP because Mensheviks belonged to these committees. But is it really possible to strike out the fact of the existence of such committees ?53 » The editorial served as a signal to historians eager to break out of the Stalinist strait jacket. Several articles with interpretations hitherto considered heretical appeared in Voprosy istorii on a variety of subjects. At a conference in Leningrad historians were publicly encouraged to write about the past more truthfully54.
51By far the sharpest attack on Stalinist historiography of 1905 was a review by Z.M. Bograd of the second édition of Kostomarov’s book on the Moscow Soviet, published in 1955. Bograd accused Kostomarov of having deviated radically from Lenin’s assessments of 1905. He had disregarded the precepts ofhistorical materialism, distorted the conditions under which the Revolution developed, engaged in « empty glorifications » of Bolshevik achievements, and placed factual data into a « false scheme that contradicts reality. »
52More specifically, Kostomarov was wrong, according to Bograd, in stating that the proletariat became the leader of the all-national revolutionary struggle only after the formation of the Soviets ; Lenin had pointed out that the working class had become the hegemon much earlier, during the strikes in January-February 1905. Kostomarov was wrong in claiming that the Moscow Soviet arose before the Petersburg Soviet. He was wrong in placing the Mensheviks, Trotskyites, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the Railroad Union in the same camp as Tsarism. He was also wrong in dubbing the Mensheviks as « traitors. » If this had been the case, would Lenin have favored ever a « temporary unification » with them, as he did late in 1905 and in 1906 ? Would Lenin have wanted to collaborate with « « traitors agents of the Okhrana, conscious allies of Tsarism ? » Finally, Kostomarov was wrong in giving the impression that the Bolsheviks had committed no mistakes in 1905. Lenin himself acknowledged that the party had not adequately prepared itself for the December uprising.
53Bograd ended his review with an examination of a list of Bolsheviks, prominent in the 1930’s and 1940’s, who Kostomarov claimed to hâve been leaders of Soviets in various regions of the Empire. For at least four of them no such claim could be substantiated. Stalin, for example, was supposed to have been a leader of a Soviet in Transcaucasia. But Baku was the only Transcaucasian city in which a Soviet was formed in 1905, and Stalin was not there at the time55 .
54It soon became evident thai soviet historians had misinterpreted the communist leadership’s call for improvement in the writing of history. As early as July 1956 Voprosy istorii began to be subjected to attacks in various party journals and newspapers for embarking « on a dangerous course56. » And in March 1957 Kommunist, the Party’s main organ on theoretical questions, published a long assault on the journal. After paying tribute to Voprosy istorii for having eliminated « serious defects connected with the vestiges of the cuit of personality, » Kommunist charged that it had also published studies that « contained serious errors of a theoretical and methodological character. »
55Five of the authors who had written on 1905 in the new vein (among them Petrova and Bograd) were singled out by Kommunist for « concealing the opportunist activities of the Mensheviks, [and] slurring over the principled differences between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks on vital questions of the Revolution, among them the question of the alliance between workers and peasants, and [the question of] the hegemony of the proletariat in the general democratie movement in the era of imperialism. » These authors did not understand that the Mensheviks had « objectively acted as agents of the bourgeoisie in the labor movement » and that any blocs or agreements with them that Lenin sanctioned were « as a rule, brief and of a formal nature » and did not betoken any softening of the « ideological-political struggle » against them57. At bottom, the obsessive insistence of Party spokesmen that historians magnify the differences between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks was rooted in political considérations. They feared that any blurring of the distinction between the two movements would lead people to conclude that in 1957, too, the différences between Communism and its opponents were not all that significant.
56This is precisely the point made by Voprosy istorii in its éditorial of March, 1957, capitulating to the Party. Eight of the eleven editors had been dismissed, and the new board agreed to toe the party line entirely. « Historical scholarship, » it declared, « is one of the most important participants in the ideological battle-front, » and scholars must take every précaution to avoid « toning down » the struggle against the « ideological opponents of Marxism-Leninism. » Ail the « revisionist » intemretations of 1905 that had appeared in 1955 and 1956 were repudiated. Those studies, the éditorial declared, had distorted the historical record by « idealizing » the Mensheviks, who were once again castigated as « anti-revolutionary [and] treacherous. » The editors even rehabilitated Kostomarov’s book, which, they said, contained some « defects, » but was « on the whole correct [and consistent with] the true Communist approach58. » It was an ominous statement that seemed to augur a retum to the orthodoxies in historical scholarship of the Stalinist era.
IV
57In actual fact, however, Soviet historiography on 1905 during the past twenty-four years has taken a rather different turn. True, there has been no on-going debate over fundamental questions of interpretation. Certain themes, echoing the Stalinist version of 1905, are taken up by just about every scholar writing on the Révolution. Thus, in 1975, seven prominent historians reviewed the research on 1905 of the preceding twenty years and concluded that aside from confirming the proletariat’s overall hegemony in the Révolution it had further demonstrated that during the October strike the « Bolsheviks successfully applied on a large scale throughout the country the tactic of the”left bloc” and achieved the fîrst important victory over Tsarism, » and that the Mensheviks had not played a « leading role » in the creation of the Soviets59 .)
58Nevertheless, it would be misleading to contend that the kind of uniformity, superfïciality, and stridency that characterized the 1930’s and 1940’s pervades ail of contemporary scholarship on 1905. For one thing, a few historians have produced fairly sophisticated studies to buttress the Party line on important aspects of the Revolution. The biases are still very pronounced, and some important developments are sirnply ignored, but the research is extensive, at times based on hitherto untapped sources and archives, and there is a tendency to avoid the most blatant falsifications. The cautious reader can glean some interesting and significant information from these works60.
59It is also noteworthy that when a historian succeeded in questioning in print the hegemonic rôle of the proletariat in 1905 the resuit was a scholarly dispute remarkably free of invective. One reason for the measured response may be that the challenge to the well-established dogma was so original and clever that the guardians of the party line believed that only a substantive réfutation would prevent the spread of heresy.
60The cirumstances surrounding the origins of the controversy are extremely interesting and puzzling, and suggest the possibility that the questioning of the dogma found its way into print surreptitiously. In 1970 there appeared a collection of articles entitled The Russian Prolétariat : Cast of Mind, Struggle, Hegemony, based on papers delivered three years earlier at an Ail-Union Scientific Conference on the History of the Proletariat. Each one of the contributors followed the orthodox party line on all issues, but the introductory essay, which is otherwise also orthodox, contains eleven lines (out of a total of twenty pages) that came to trouble many historians. We do not know the name of the author of the eleven lines, for the essay is ascribed to the « éditorial board, » which consisted of five people. What is so fascinating is that the second essay, by M.S. Volin, one of the editors, deals in its entirety with the broad subject that the eleven lines deal with without, however, so much as mentioning them. It is inconceivable that Volin would not hâve realized that those eleven lines were heretical and that they raised a serious question about the basic thrust of his article, which is devoted to « Lenin’s Teachings on the Hegemony of the Prolétariat. » Could it be that his co-editor included the eleven offending lines in the text without his knowledge ? If a censor read them, as is most likely, he might not hâve understood their import because the phraseology is rather casual, clearly designed not to be provocative. The author did not say that he was raising doubts about a dogma attributed to Lenin with quotations from the works of Lenin himself.
61It is worth quoting the eleven lines in full : « Vladimir Il’ič [Lenin] accorded to the proletariat the rôle of hegemon in the liberation struggle in the broad historical scheme, [but] at the same time he noted that during isolated periods the working class can temporarily lose that rôle. This happens when the proletariat or its ally is captivated by illusions. Validimir Il’ič singled out two such moments in Russia’s history : the period of the First and Second Dumas [which would be from the spring of 1906 until June 1907] and the period immediately following the February 1917 Revolution. Having corne under petty bourgeois influence after the overthrow of the autocracy, the prolétariat was not immediately prepared for the rôle of leader of the new revolution61. » The author cited five different places in Lenin’s Polnoe sobranie sočinenij as his source. An examination of the references confirmée ! the accuracy of the author’s research62.
62That the revelation contained in the eleven lines shocked Soviet historians is not surprising. After all for some fifty years the doctrine of proletarian hegemony had been an article of faith for scholars, and the ultimate authority for its correctness had always been presumed to be Lenin, who, so it had been believed, had professed it without the slightest qualification63. Now the doctrine was challenged, not on the ground that historical research failed to sustain it but rather on the ground that the Master himself had not believed in quite the way it had been presumed.
63The reaction of Soviet historians took one of three forms : reassertion of the dogma, déniai of the accuracy of the quotations, and scholarly rebuttal. One group of four historians announced that the editor was « mistaken » and declared that the « Leninist doctrine of the hegemony of the working class retains its importance for the contemporary phase of the world revolutionary process. It was and remains the starting point, the guiding thread in the formulation of the strategy and tactics of the international Communist movement64. » Another group of three declared that « in actual fact » Lenin « nowhere asserted anything like that and, of course, could not have asserted it, for ever since the revolutionary party of a new type had become the leader of the Russian proletariat, the proletariat invariably acted as the hegemon of the laborers’ liberation movement65. »
64The most sophisticated response was made by a group of five historians who devoted twenty-one pages to a refutation of the editor’s statement The five admitted that on several occasions between 1906 and 1910 Lenin had indeed referred to the hegemony of the Kadets in the period of the First and Second Dumas, the second phase of the Révolution. They even added a quotation from Lenin missed by the editor of The Russian Prolétariat. La te in 1907 Lenin had stated that « the leadership of Social Democracy was replaced by the leadership of the Kadets, who dominated both Dumas. The period of the decline of the mass movement was the period of the greatest growth of the Kadet Party66. » But the five historians considered it a mistake to interpret Lenin’s statements to mean that the proletariat had in fact lost its leading rôle in the Revolution and in the liberation movement in general. The matter was « substantially more complicated67. »
65For during the very years that Lenin made the comments about the Kadets he also « repeatedly emphasized that in actuality the proletariat was at all times the leader of the Révolution68. » Lenin was not contradicting himself, according to the five historians, since there is an important différence between the hegemony of the proletariat and the hegemony of the Kadets. The former signifies the role of a progressive class acting as the vanguard of the national movement struggling against autocracy and the remnants of feudalism. The latter signifies only a « particular, temporary leadership » of the Kadets « in relation to petty bourgeois strata in the cities and comparatively small portions of peasants, who became active in the course of the électoral campaigns and during the First and Second Dumas69 . »
66The five historians claimed that there was abundant evidence to demonstrate that the proletariat, represented by the Bolsheviks, did indeed lead the national movement hostile to the govemment even in 1906 and 1907. For example, the Bolsheviks, more than anyone else, sought to dispel the « constitutional illusions » of the masses. Moreover, they succeeded in establishing close links between the workers and peasants, the consequence of which was a better organized and more purposeful peasant movement. They attempted to wean the Trudoviks from the Kadets to the working class. Finally, in the Second Duma the Bolsheviks were the most effective advocates of bills to give financial aid to the unemployed and to transfer land from the landords to peasants without compensation70. None of this suggests, the five historians conceded, that the proletarian hegemony of 1906 and 1907 was as « striking » as that of 1905. Conditions had changed and the working class faced greater difficulties in asserting its leadership during the second phase of the Revolution71. But there could be no doubt that the temporary « leadership of the Kadets, » about which Lenin had written, « did not mean a loss by the prolétariat of its leading rôle in the libération movement as a whole72 . »
67It should be noted that the lead author of this long and elaborate article was M.S. Volin, the same man who had published a piece on Lenin in the collection that had given rise to the controversy and who had remained silent on the editor’s heresy. This lends credence to the suspicion that he may not have known that the editor intended to raise the question of Lenin’s consistency on the dogma of proletarian hegemony in the introductory essay.
68The attempt by the five historians to explain away Lenin’s inconsistency is rather strained. That the Russian working class played an extremely important rôle in the Revolution of 1905 is undeniable, but it cannot be demonstrated that it led the forces galvanized into oppositional activity throughout the three years of the upheaval. Lenin was certainly correct in pointing out that in 1906 and 1907 the prolétariat was not the prééminent force in the struggle between the opposition and the govemment. And it is an oversimplification to contend that the prolétariat was preeminent in all the stmggles against the autocracy during the earlier phases of the Revolution. The unwillingness of Soviet historians to concede this dramatizes the fact that the doctrine of the hegemony of the prolétariat has become firmly entrenched as the overarching principle of their scholarship on 1905.
69It is equally significant that the doctrine has really corne to mean the hegemony of the Bolsheviks, not the proletarîat. Thus in the 1975 review of Soviet scholarship on 1905 cited earlier, seven historians stated that « the Bolshevik Party became the embodiment of the proletariat’s leading rôle in the people’s revolutionary struggle73. » Soviet historians hâve not always interpreted the doctrine in this way. In the 1920’s Pokrovskij and his school emphasized that in 1905 the working class had often acted spontaneously in defying the Tsarist régime. Pokrovskij did not attribute the procession on Bloody Sunday, the wave of strikes immediately following that event, or the general strike in October to Bolshevik planning. In short, he did not blur the distinction between the working class and the Bolshevik party. But since the 1930’s, with the exception of the two years from 1955 to 1957, Soviet historians hâve tended to use the two ternis interchange-ably.
70The centrality of the doctrine of proletarian hegemony is évident in the interpretation Soviet historians offer of every major event of the Révolution. It serves to justify the derision they heap on the policies and conduct of non-Bolshevik parties, their claim that the Bolsheviks deserve crédit for every success of the opposition in undermining the old order, and their insistence that the Révolution must be seen as a préludé to the Bolsheviks’ even greater success in 1917. It is no exaggeration to say that Soviet historians view the history of the Révolution of 1905 as a vehicle for indoctrinating the public in the inevitability of Bolshevism’s triumph and the correctness of Bolshevik policies, in 1905 and ever since. The ultimate function of the doctrine of proletarian hegemony, then, is to serve a political purpose74.
71In 1980, the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Révolution, the subject appears to have received relatively little attention. A few specialized studies appeared in which new sources have been examined, but no historian questioned the overall interprétations handed down by scholars of the 1930’s and 1940’s. The historiography of 1905 continues to be not simply partisan but throughly politicized.
72For those of us interested in the Revolution of 1905 Soviet scholarship on that event is, nevertheless, very important. It contains vast amounts of information shedding light on various aspects of the upheaval. But the analyses and interprétations must be treated with great caution. Unfortunately, Soviet historians hâve not sufficently heeded Pokrovskij’s dictum, which, in fact, he himself too often ignored : that the scholar’s task is « neither to weep nor to laugh, but to understand. »
Notes de fin
1 Jose Kanton and Erazmo Dumpierre, « Vlijanie revoljucionnyh sobytij 1905 goda na Kuba », in Revoljucija 1905-1907 godov v Rossii i ee vsemirno-istoričeskoe značenie, M., 1976, pp. 311-320.
2 See A. Ja. Grunt, « Istorik pervoj russkoj revoljucii (Grigorij Mihailovič Derenkovskij, 1912-1978) », Istorija SSSR, n° 1 (1980), p. 134.
3 G.M. Derenkovskij, V.A. Emec, N.A. Ivanova, D.A. Kolesničenko, Ju. I. Korablev, LM. Puskareva, M.S. Simonova, S.V. Tjutjukin, and K.F. Sacillo, Revoljucija 1905-1907godov v Rossii, M., 1975.
4 Lenin’s comments on 1905 are scattered throughout his works. For a succinct statement by him see his « Lecture on the 1905 Révolution », in Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Lenin Anthology, New York, 1975, pp. 278-292. For his view of the Revolution as the « dress rehearsal », see ibid., pp. 555-556. In 1918 and 1920 he described the uprising as the « highest point in the development of the first workers’ révolution against Tsarism ». See his Sočinenija, 3rd ed., M., 1926-1937, XXIII, p. 451 and XXVI, p. 60.
5 On the two categories of historians see Edith Bloomfield, Soviet Historiography of 1905 as Reflected in Party Historiés of the 1920’s, Unpubl. Diss., University of Washington, 1966, pp. 1-4.
6 L. Martov, P.P. Maslov, and A.N. Potresov, eds., Obščestvennoe dvženie v Rossii v načale XX-go veka, SPb., 1909-1914, II, p. 185.
7 See Bloomfield, op. cit., pp. 31-32. The title of the work is M.N. Pokrovskij, ed., 1905 ; Istorija revoljucionnogo dvilenija v otdel’nyh olerkah, 4 vols., M. – L„ 1925-1927.
8 P.O. Gorin, « Cem že byli Sovety Rabočih Deputatov v 1905 g.? », Istorik-Marksist, n° 1 (1926), p. 210 ; P.O. Gorin, review of the twelfth volume of Rožkov’s Russkaja istorija v sravnitel’no-istoričeskom osveščtenii in ibid., n’ 2 (1927), pp. 271-275 ; P.O. Gorin, « M.N. Pokrovskij kak istorik pervoj russkoj revoljucii », ibid., n° 9 (1928), pp. 46-47 ; A. Sidorov, « Istoriceskie vzgljady N.A. Rozkova », ibid., n °13 (1929), pp. 184-220.
9 I.F. Ugarov and N.N. Jakovlev, « Pervaja russkaja revoljucija 1905-1907 gg. v sovetskoj istoriografii », in M.V. Nečkina et al., eds., Oierki istorii istoričeskoj nauki v SSSR, M„ 1966, IV, pp. 417-418.
10 N.A. Rožkov, Russkaja istorija v sravnitel’no-istorileskom osveščëenii, L. – M., 1926, XII, pp. 5-6,72.
11 Ibid., pp. 73,152.
12 A.V. Šestakov was one of the few Bolshevik historians who shared Rožkov’s assessement of the October strike and the insurrection in December. See his « Vseobščaja oktjabr’– skaja stačka 1905 goda » in Pokrovskij, op. cit., III, p. 349. In another work Sestakov depicted the general strike as the « full moon » of the Revolution and argued that by December 1905 the Revolution was already in retreat. See his Oktjabr’skaja stabka 1905 g., Kharkov, 1925, p. 183,quoted in Ugarov and Jakovlev, op. cit., p. 416.
13 Rozkov, op. cit., p. 96.
14 See Pokrovskij’s comments in Istorik-Marksist, n ° 1 (1926), p. 253.
15 See, for example, the statements by P.O. Gorin and S.I. Cernomordik in ibid., pp. 234, 236-241.
16 Ibid., p. 253.
17 M.N. Pokrovsky, Brief History of Russia, tr. D.S. Mirsky, London, 1933, vol. II, p. 214, hereafter cited as Brief History.
18 Istorik-Marksist, n ° 1 (1926), p. 252.
19 Pokrovsky, Brief History, II, pp. 223-224.
20 Ibid., pp. 102, 125-126, 240
21 For a more nuanced, but not basically different, statement on the role of the bourgeoisie see S.E. Sef, Burluazija v 1905 godu, M. – L., 1926.
22 Pokrovsky, Brief History, II, p. 117.
23 Ibid., pp. 155-156.
24 Ibid., p. 155.
25 Ibid., p. 239.
26 Ibid., p. 167.
27 Ibid., p. 168.
28 Ibid., pp. 195,239.
29 Ibid., p. 122.
30 Ibid.
31 See Vasil’ev-Južin’s comments in Istan‘k – Marksist, n ° 1 (1926), p. 244.
32 See Čemomordik’s comments in ibid., pp. 240-241.
33 Ibid., p. 203.
34 See Skabyš’s comments in ibid., pp. 215-217.
35 For brief discussions of these issues see Oskar Anweiler, Die Ratebewegung in Russland 1905-1921, Leiden, 1958, pp. 48-49 ; Ugarov and Jakovlev, op. cit., pp. 415, 424 ; S.M. Dubrovskij, « Krest’janstvo v revoljucii 1905 g. », Istorik-Marksist, n° 1 (1926), pp. 256-279.
36 Ugarov and Jakovlev, op. cit., p. 427.
37 Robert M. Slusser, TheMoscowSoviet of Workers’ Deputies of 1905 : Origin, Structure, and Policies, Unpubl. Diss., Columbia University, 1963, pp. 7-8.
38 See E.D. Čermenskij, Buriuazija i carizm v revoljucii 1905-1907 gg., M. – L., 1939, p. 75 and his Buržuazija i carizm v pervoj russkoj revoljucii, 2nd ed., M., 1970, p. 417.
39 Solomon M. Schwarz, The Russian Revolution of 1905 ; The Workers’ Movement and the Formation of Bolshevism and Menshevism, tr. Gertrude Vakar, Chicago, 1967, p. 350.
40 G. Kostomarov, Moskovskij sovet rabolih deputatov v 1905 godu, M., 1948, p. 5.
41 Ibid., p. 8.
42 Ibid., p. 11.
43 Ibid., p. 13 ; see the discussion by Walter Sablinsky, « The All-Russian Railroad Union and the Beginning of the General Strike in October, 1905 », in Alexander and Jane Rabino-witsch and ladis K.D. Kristof, eds., Revolution and Politics in Russia : Essays in Memory of B.I. Nicolaevsky, Bloomington, 1972, p. 129.
44 L.K. Erman, « Učastie demokratičeskoj intelligencii vo vserossijskoj oktjabr’skoj političeskoj stačke », Istorileskie zapiski, 49 (1954), p. 363, quoted in Sablinsky, op. cit., p. 129.
45 For examples of claims to this effect see A. Pankratova, Pervaja russkaja revoljucija 1905-1907 gg., M., 1940, p. 102 and Derenkovskij et al. op. cit., pp. 143, 146, 156. See Sablinsky, op. cit., for an excellent analysis of this question. Sablinsky demonstrates conclusively that the All-Russian Union of Railroad Employees and Workers deserves crédit for initiating the strike.
46 Kostomarov, op. cit., pp. 18-20.
47 Schwarz, op. cit., pp. 35-352.
48 Kostomarov, op. cit., pp. 47, 50-51.
49 Ibid., pp. 47, 60-61, 69, 79, 81
50 « Za glubokoe izuôenie istorii pervoj russkoj revoljucii », Voprosy istorii, n ° 1 (1955), pp. 3-10.
51 L.F. Petrova, « Peterburgskij sovet raboôih deputatov v 1905 godu », Voprosy istorii, n° 11 (1955), pp. 25, 26, 31.
52 « XX s’ezd KPSS i zadadi issledovanija istorii parti ! », Voprosy istorii, n° 3 (1956), PP. 4-5.
53 Ibid., p. 7.
54 For details see Merle Fainsod, « Soviet Russian Historians or : the Lesson of Burdzhalov », Encounter (1962), pp. 2-3.
55 Z.M. Bograd, review of G. Kostomarov, Moskovskij Sovet v 1905 godu in Voprosy istorii, n ° 3 (1956), pp. 158-163.
56 See Fainsod, op. cit., pp. 3-4 for details.
57 « Strogo sobljudat’ leninskij princip partijnosti v istoričeskoj nauki », Kommunist, n° 4 (1957), pp. 17-29.
58 « Za leninskuju partijnost’ v istorièeskoj nauke », Voprosy istorii, n – 3 (1957), pp. 3, 6-7.
59 G.M. Derenkovskij, A.E. Ivanov, P.A. Ivanova, D.A. Kolesničenko, M.S. Simonova, S.V. Tjutjukin, and V.V. Selohaev, « Osnovnye itogi izučenija istorii pervoj russkoj revoljucii za poslednie dvadcat’ let », Istorija SSSR, n ° 5 (1975), pp. 43, 49, 50, 51, hereafter cited as « Osnovnye itogi ».
60 The following are examples of such studies : A.G. Rašin, Formirovanie rabočego klassa Rossü. Istoriko-èkonomičeskie očerki, M., 1958 ; S.N. Semanov, Peterburgskie rabočie nakanune pervoj Russkoj revoljucii, M. – L., 1966 ; U.A. Suster, Peterburgskie rabolfie v 1905- 1907 gg., L., 1976 ; A.V. Usakov, Revoljucionnoe dviženie demokratičeskoj intelligencii v Rossü, 1895-1904, M., 1976.
61 L.M. Ivanov, M.S. Volin, P. I. Vorobej, Ju. I. Kir’janov, and K.N. Tarnovskij, eds., Rossijskij prolétariat : oblik, bor’ba, gegemonija, M., 1970, p. 21. A similar point is made on p. 55, but in a much more muted form and only with respect to Lenin’s views on 1917. Historians also criticized this second statement, but that is outside the purview of this paper.
62 V.I. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sočnenij, 5th ed., M., 1958-65, XIV, pp. 107-108, 321, 403 -404 ; XVI, p. 35 ; XXXII, p. 432.
63 Actually, the doctrine was fïrst enunciated by Pavel Axelrod in the late 1890’s. He contended that in the sûuggle against Tsarism the proletariat would play a leading rôle, but he did not recommend that the working class direct or command other social classes opposed to the autocracy. After 1900 Lenin gave the doctrine a much sharper and narrower definition. He argued that Social Democrats must become the undisputed masters of all the forces interested in overthrowing the existing order and advocated that Marxists « utilize » for their own purposes the bourgeois opposition to it. For details see Abraham Ascher, Pavel Axelrod and the Development of Menshevism, Cambridge, Mass, 1972, pp. 111, 134-136,139. See also J.L.H. Keep, The Rise of Social Democracy in Russia, Oxford, 1963, pp. 24 and passim and Richard Pipes, « The Origins of Bolshevism : The Intellectual Evolution of Young Lenin », in Revolutionary Russia, ed. Richard Pipes, Cambridge, Mass., 1968, pp. 45-50.
64 LA. Aluf, M.S. Volin, A.F. Kostin, and S.L. Titarenko, eds., Problemy gegemonii proletariata v demokratičeskoj revoljucii (1905 – Fevr. 1917 gg.), M., 1975, pp. 7-8, 9.
65 P.A. Golub, V. Ja. Laveryčev, and P.N. Sobolev, « O knige ’Rossijskij prolétariat’ : oblik, bor’ba, gegemonija », Voprosy istorii KPSS, n ° 9,1972, pp. 125-126.
66 V.I. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sofinenij, XlV, pp. 120, quoted in M.S. Volin, G.M. Derenkovskij, D.A. Kolesničenko, S.V. Tjutjukin, and V.V. Selohaev, « O gegemonii proletariata v pervoj russkoj revoljucii », Istorija SSSR, n’ 4 (1973), p. 65, hereafter cited as « Ogegemonii ».
67 M.S. Volin et al., « O gegemonii », p. 47.
68 Ibid., pp. 47, 66-67. Italics are mine.
69 Ibid., p. 65.
70 Ibid., p. 55,56, 59,64.
71 Ibid., p. 65-66.
72 Ibid., p. 65.
73 Derenkovskij et al., « Osnovnye itogi », p. 47. See also the statement by the historian A.L. Naročnickij : « The central problem in the history of the first Russian Revolution is the problem of the hegemony of the proletariat. This embraces a whole complex of problems closely related to each other. In speaking of the working class as the leader of the oppressed masses, one must begin with the indisputable fact that the Bolshevik Party was the embodiment of the leading role of the proletaxiat. It was the only party that had a correct, scientifically grounded program of action ». A.L. Naroënickij, « Istoriografija revoljucii 1905-1907 gg. Osnovnye itogi i zadači izučenija », in V.P. Naumov, ed., Aktual’nye problemy sovetskoj istoriografü pervojrusskojrevoljucii, M., 1978, p. 17.
74 See, for example, N.N. Demoëkin, « Revoljucionnoe tvorčestvo krest’janskih mass v revoljucii 1905-1907 godov », Istorija SSSR, n ° 1 (1980), pp. 45-61 ; S.V. Tjutjukin and V.V. Selohaev, « Razoblaëenie Kadetov v bol’ševistskih listovkah 1906-1907 godov », ibid., pp. 74-88.
Auteur
-
Abraham Ascher
(City University, New York)
Le texte seul est utilisable sous licence Licence OpenEdition Books. Les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont « Tous droits réservés », sauf mention contraire.
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