Perfide Albion ?
|Annexes
Texte intégral
1. Télégramme confidentiel n° 121 de Christopher Soames (Paris) au Foreign Office le 4 février 19691
- 1 NA/FCO/30/414.
11. I had a forty-five minute talk with the General de Gaulle today before my wife and I lunched with him.
2. The only subject which we discussed was Britain and Europe in the longer run. The General began by playing the old record about our pro-American stance but then showed that his purpose was to suggest that the British and French governments might have far-reaching bilateral talks covering economic, monetary, political and defence matters to see whether we now say things sufficiently in common to cooperate “in a way which our two countries have never done before”.
3. I will be sending you early tomorrow a detailed report of our talk and my best judgement of what interpretation we should place on the General’s offer.
2. Télégramme confidentiel n° 123 de Christopher Soames (Paris) au Foreign Office le 5 février 19692
- 2 Ibid.
21. Before going to see the General, I had reread the records of the talks which he had had with Mr. Macmillan in 1961 and 1962, with Mr. Wilson in 1965 and 1966, and with sir Patrick Reilly before his departure in September 1968. The common theme running through these records is the General’s view that all European countries other than France are for one reason or another already attached to America: and that to admit Britain in the EEC would be to admit a country which was committed to support American policies even more than the others.
2. After welcoming me very agreeably, the General began by asking me what I thought about Nos Affaires. I replied that I thought it would be difficult to find any period in our history, other than when we were at war, when our relationships were much worse than they were today. This flowed directly from the refusal on the part of his government even to discuss our joining the EEC and what was more, their refusal to discuss with us within WEU any form of political consultation or cooperation. This state of affairs had lasted for six years and was not only having a serious effect on relations between our two governments but was also biting deep into the feelings of the British people. He knew well how at heart the British people liked and esteemed France, but this was wearing pretty thin now. I thought this was a dangerous situation: what did he think about it.
3. The General then treated me to a lecture on how impossible it had been to arrive at a European view because of the pro-American feelings of all the countries in Europe and particularly of ourselves. He repeated almost word for word the arguments that I had read in the previous records. I told him this and said that it seemed to me that he was saying exactly the same to me as he had said to Mr. Macmillan at Rambouillet in December 1962. Was he not failing to take into account that many things had changed since then? For instance, I said, I acknowledged that in 1962 we could not claim that there was a consensus of political view in Britain that we should join the Common Market, although the government of the day aspired so to do. He must be aware that there had been a considerable evolution of political thought in Britain since that day: if our desire was to become an American satellite, why then were we trying so hard to participate in the creation of a European Economic and Political entity? It was true that on the great questions of world affairs, we found ourselves much more in harmony with American thinking than we did with Russian thinking. This was surely true of France also: and the extent to which each country acted or did not act in common with the United States was more a matter of degree and emphasis than a matter of principle. Did he not feel the same?
4. The General replied that the fact remained that whereas France had succeeded in achieving a totally independent position this was not so in the case of either Germany or Italy or of the Netherlands, and certainly not the United Kingdom. The whole essence of a European entity must be an independent position in world terms and he was not yet convinced that it was possible for us to accept this. I asked him whether, for instance, this meant that he thought it necessary for us to leave NATO in order to prove that we were European. He replied that he was not looking for that, but in his view once there was a truly independent Europe there would be no need for NATO as such “with its American dominance and command structure”.
5. The General then went on to talk of the Common Market. See my IFT.
3. Télégramme confidentiel n° 124 de Christopher Soames (Paris) au Foreign Office le 5 février 19693
- 3 Ibid.
31. The General said that he had had no part in the creation of the Common Market neither did he have any particular faith in it. What was more, he was quite certain that if we and our friends joined it, it could be no longer the same. This would not necessarily be any bad thing. Quote it might have been created differently and it could still be made different unquote. He by no means excluded that for the future. But we seemed to have set our hearts on joining it for better or for worse. He personally foresaw it changing, and would like to see it change, into a looser form of a free trade area with arrangements by each country to exchange agricultural produce. He would be quite prepared to discuss with us what should take the place of the Common Market as an enlarged European economic association. But he was also anxious first to have political discussions with us. His thought was that there should be a large European economic association, but with a smaller inner council of European political association consisting of France and Britain, Germany and Italy. But it was necessary first to find out whether France or Britain saw things sufficiently in common, because this was the key to any such political association.
2. He then gave me a brief expose on the history of Anglo/French relations as he saw it. Over the centuries, he said it had been the rule and not the exception for relations between our two countries to be bad, a relationship between rivals and not allies. It was only our common fear of Germany which had exceptionally brought us together in this century. This fear no longer existed and with it had also disappeared the one spur which had enabled France and Britain to work together. Fear of Russia, which he admitted to a certain extent replaced fear of Germany, was not the same because it affected so many others, especially of course the United States, that it did not provide a specifically Franco-British bond. It now remained to be seen whether France and Britain could achieve what they had never achieved or tried in the past, namely a real co-operation based not on a common fear but on a genuine desire to build something in Europe together. It struck me that I was hearing from the General almost word for word what I had said in my speech at Lille.
3. The General then said that he knew that M. Debré had suggested that we should have talks together on political matters, but he had understood that I had told him that the British Government was not interested in doing that: was this really the case? He was now asking me again.
4. I said that the British Government felt that the relationship between our two countries had now reached such a pitch of distrust that it hardly seemed possible that we could talk with the French Government bilaterally on any subject other than specific ones in which we both had an evident common interest. If he was now saying to me that he thought we ought to talk bilaterally about general affairs, of course I would report this to my Government but they, I felt sure, would wish to know what object he had in view in these discussions. As I said to M. Debré when he raised the same question with me, there was all the difference in the world between on the one hand bilateral discussions on specific issues and on the other a positive attempt to mend our relationships with a view to arriving at a point where we could cooperate in a European sense. Which had the General in mind?
5. The General said it was the latter “c’est le dernier” he would like to see talks between us on economic, monetary, political and defence matters, to see whether we could resolve our differences. What he would like to see was a gesture by the British Government suggesting that such talks should take place, which he would then welcome. I said that he would not be expecting me to comment immediately on his general proposal, but one thing that sprang straight to my mind was that if there was to be a gesture it would be nice if it could come from him. The suggestion might be made by the French govt [sic] that they would like to talk to us. “Well” he said “I don’t dismiss that as a possibility, but the first thing to do would be to see whether this would interest your government”.
6. I asked the General whether he envisaged the fact that these talks were taking place being kept in secret or known publicly. He said his proposal would be secret until we decided to have talks. If we did decide to do so, the fact would then of course be public.
7. We then went into lunch which was small and agreeable.
8. After lunch the General told me that he was glad to have this chance of putting this proposal to me and he hoped that I would transmit it to the Prime Minister and to you, sir. He would like me to have further talks with Mr. Debré when he returned from his visit to Spain. He said that furthermore he would gladly see me himself if I so wished and that if things progressed the right way, he would welcome later a talk with the Prime Minister.
9. Courcel was at the luncheon and I noticed that the General kept him back afterwards doubtless to tell him of our talk.
See MIFT.
4. Télégramme confidentiel n° 125 de Christopher Soames (Paris) au Foreign Office le 5 février 19694
- 4 Ibid.
41. When the General began with his classic lecture on our pro-American fixation, I thought nothing had changed in his attitude towards us. Later, however, I had the impression that he was taking a line different from the one in the records of his talks with British Leaders between 1961 and 1968. It was closer to the above proposals he made to Mr. Churchill in Paris in November 1944 for a far-reaching Anglo/French entente.
2. Is the General’s approach purely tactics, or could there be something sincere in it? I can see how it could be purely tactics. If he has us in play the Americans will be less worried about the prospects in Europe and the Germans will be even less inclined than they now are, if that is possible, to have a row with him on our behalf. The knowledge that Anglo/French talks were taking place about the future economic structure of Europe would strengthen the fear among the five that the General was ready and willing to break up the Common Market. It could also present us in a bad light if it seemed that we were ready to discuss what might amount to breaking up the existing Common Market and replacing it by something looser as soon as the General dangled the possibility before us. (See para 5 (111) on how I think we should handle this serious danger.)
3. On the other hand, there are reasons why the General’s offer might be sincere. First of all the idea is not new, but one that he apparently had in mind towards the end of the war then shelved. Moreover, we have heard from a number of sources, including Malraux that he is worried about the present weakness of France and the rise of Germany. When I said to him that the Germans were getting stronger economically, he replied that the Germans were getting stronger in every way. He also admitted to a certain fear of Russia. This would also make him instinctively look to the West.
4. The order of the proposed talks is also an important question. The General seemed to be thinking of talking about the basic political questions first and only moving onto discuss the possible economic structure of Europe with us if the political talks showed that there was enough common ground between us.
5. I think we need to probe further in order to estimate the General’s intentions. If you agree, I should like to see Mr. Debré soon after his return from Spain next week and make the following points to him:
- Are we right in thinking that the General is proposing bilateral talks, not just
on specific questions but aimed to clearing the way to a common Anglo/French
approach to the political and economic future of Europe? - If so, does he envisage talks on political matters preceding those on economic
structures? - At present it is our policy to join the existing Common Market. We and
the Five believe this can be done in the framework of the Treaty of Rome. If the
French really believe this to be impossible, should they not begin by explaining
their reasons and their alternative ideas to the Five? (Lipkowski has told me that
all the advice of French officials and experts is that the entry of Britain, Ireland and
Scandinavia would inevitably break up the existing structure of the EEC and in
particular make continuation of the present agricultural policy impossible.) If the
Six agree at replacing the Treaty of Rome by a new form of economic association
including all of us, the British Government would naturally be willing to discuss
it very seriously. But we would not countenance putting ourselves in the position
of appearing to want to break up the Treaty of Rome while the Five still think it
should be the basis for rebuilding Europe. - If agreement is reached to have bilateral talks it is important that the French
should make it clear when the agreements become public that the initiative for
the talks came from them. This will protect our position with our friends without
hurting the French position.
5. [Sic] At the moment I am inclined to believe that the General has proposed these talks with an open mind and is not writing off in advance the possibility of their leading to a new Anglo/French entente. He has many worries about the unstable situation here and he knows that success would be popular with the French opinion. We shall, however, obtain a better idea of the possibilities if we pursue the kind of probe I have suggested with Mr. Debré and also sound out others close to the General.
Incidentally, as I was calling on Lipkowski, whom you will be seeing in Luxembourg, yesterday afternoon, I gave him a brief account of the General’s proposals, but not of my reaction. He professed to believe that the General’s idea should be taken seriously.
5. Compte rendu des échanges du 4 février 1969 entre Christopher Soames et Charles de Gaulle, remis à Bernard Tricot le 5 février 19695
- 5 Ibid.
51. The General asked what I thought about our affairs. I replied I thought it would be difficult to find any period in our history, other than when we were at war, when our relationships were much worse than they were today. This flowed directly from the refusal on the part of his Government even to discuss our joining the EEC and, what was more, their refusal to discuss with us within WEU any form of political consultation or cooperation. This state of affairs had lasted for six years and was not only having a serious effect on relations between our two governments but was also biting deep into the feelings of the British people. He knew well how at heart the British people liked and esteemed France, but this was wearing pretty thin now. I thought this was a dangerous situation.
2. The General said it had been impossible to arrive at a European view because of the pro- American feelings of the countries in Europe, and particularly of ourselves. He quoted examples of our tendency to adopt the American point of view ever since the war. I said that many things had changed since he had seen Mr. MacMillan [sic] at Rambouillet. For instance in 1962, we could not claim that there was a consensus of political views in Britain that we should join the Common Market, although the Government of the day aspired to do so. But there had been a considerable evolution of political thinking in Britain since that day. If our desire was to become an American satellite, why then were we trying so hard to participate in the creation of the European economic and political entity? It was true that on the great questions of world affairs we found ourselves more in harmony with American thinking than we did with the Russian thinking. This was surely true for France also: and the extent to which each country acted or did not act in common with the United States was more a matter of principle. Did he not feel the same?
3. The General replied that the fact remained that whereas France had succeeded in achieving a totally independent position this was not so in the case of either Germany or Italy or the Netherlands, and certainly not of the United Kingdom. The whole essence of a European entity must be an independent position in world terms and he was not yet convinced that it was possible for us to accept this. For instance, Britain followed American policy in the Middle East, although Israel was the aggressor.
4. I asked whether for instance the General thought it necessary for us to leave NATO in order to prove that we were European. He replied that he was not looking for that, but that once there was a truly independent Europe there would be no need for NATO as such, with its American dominance and common structure.
5. The General said that he had had no part in the creation of the Common Market, neither did he have any particular faith in it. What was more, he was quite certain that if we and our friends joined it, it could no longer be the same. This would not necessarily be any bad thing, “it might have been created differently and it could still be made different”. He by no means excluded that from the future. But we seemed to have set our hearts on joining it for better or worse. He personally foresaw it changing, and would like to see it change, into a looser form of free trade area with arrangements by each country to exchange agricultural produce. He would be quite prepared to discuss with us what should take the place of the Common Market as an enlarged European economic association. But he was also anxious first to have political discussion with us. His thought was that there should be a large European political association, but with a small inner council of a European political association consisting of France and Britain saw things sufficiently in common, because this was the key to any such political association.
5. [Sic] He then gave me a brief expose on the history of Anglo/French relations as he saw it. Over the centuries, he said, it had been the rule and not the exception for relations between our two countries to be bad, a relationship between rivals and not allies. It was only our common fear of Germany which had exceptionally brought us together in this century. This fear no longer existed and with it had also disappeared the one spur which had enabled France and Britain to work together. Fear of Russia which he admitted had to a certain extent replaced fear of Germany, was not the same thing because it affected so many others, especially of course the United States, that it did not provide a specifically Franco/British bond. It now remained to be seen whether France and Britain could achieve what they had never achieved or tried in the past, namely a real cooperation based not on a common fear but on a genuine desire to build something in Europe together.
6. The General said that he knew that Mr. Debré had suggested that we should have talks together on political matters, but he had understood that I had told him that the British Government was not interested in doing that: was this really the case? He was now asking me again.
7. I said that the British Government felt that the relationship between our two countries had now reached such a pitch of distrust that it hardly seemed possible that we could talk with the French Government bilaterally on any subject other than specific ones in which we both had an evident common interest. If he was now saying to me that he thought we ought to talk bilaterally about general affairs, of course I would report this to my Government. But they I felt sure would wish to know what objects he had in view in these discussions. As I said to Mr. Debré when he raised the same question with me, there was all the difference in the world between on the one hand bilateral discussions on specific issues and on the other a positive attempt to mend our relationship with a view to arriving at a point where we could cooperate in a European sense. Which had the General in mind?
8. The General said it was the latter “C’est le dernier”. He would like to see talks between us on economic, monetary, political and defence matters, to see whether we could resolve our differences. What he would like to see was a gesture by the British Government suggesting that such talks should take place, which he would then welcome. I said that he would not be expecting me to comment immediately on his general proposal, but one thing that sprang straight to my mind was that if there was a gesture, it would be nice if it could come from him. The suggestion might be made by the French Government that they would like to talk to us. The General said that he did not dismiss this as a possibility, but the first thing would be to see whether this would interest the British Government.
9. I asked the General whether he envisaged the fact that these talks were taking place being kept secret or known publicly. He said his proposal would be secret until we decided to have talks. If we did decide to do so, the fact would then be of course public. After lunch, the General told me that he was glad to have this chance of putting this proposal to me and hoped that I would transmit it to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. He would like me to have further talks with Mr. Debré when he returned from his visit to Spain. He said furthermore, he would gladly see me himself when necessary and that if things progressed the right way he would welcome later a talk with the Prime Minister.
6. Télégramme secret et personnel n° 118 de Michael Stewart (Foreign Office) à Harold Wilson (Bonn) le 11 février 19696
- 6 Ibid.
61. I have thought further about the matters we discussed in your room at the House of Commons this afternoon.
2. I agree entirely that the object of your talks should be to turn the four-two combination in Europe into a five-one combination. I liked your proposal that your opening gambit should be to remind Kiesinger that we are one hundred percent determined to get into the EEC: and then to go on to describe the problem we face through the increasing number of sceptics who have been discouraged by the Germans’ alignment with the French on one or two of the major issues which have arisen since the second veto. You might go on to say that nothing would be more welcome to us than to remove for all time the latent suspicion between our two peoples: (on this see also para 10 below). If the Germans gave full support to our policy of full membership of the EEC and made it clear that they were not working for any substitute, this would be quickly achieved. You might round off this part of what you have to say with a word of appreciation for Jahn’s steadfastness in Luxembourg last week.
3. As regards the question of conveying the substance of Soames’ conversations with de Gaulle and Debré to Kiesinger I am sure you were right to suggest that you should test the atmosphere in Bonn before we take a final decision on your tactics. The more I have thought about this since you left for the airport the more convinced I have become that you should not leave Bonn without telling Kiesinger the whole story. You might judge it right to begin by trying to find out what, if anything, he knows about these conversations. But whatever the result of your probing, the whole story should be laid on the table.
4. I hope it may help you if I set out again my reasons for urging this course on you. Until we have told the Five what de Gaulle and Debré have said we are exposed to the risk that the French will leak their version of these conversations at a moment and in a manner calculated to benefit their interests and harm ours. We know from bitter experience that the French will not scruple to act in this way. Our experience also teaches us that once any tendentious French version of an Anglo-French conversation has got out, we never really catch up. My first argument is, therefore, that the French will show us more respect if they see us doing this.
5. It could be argued – indeed the French will almost certainly do so – that our disclosing these conversations to the Five would be a breach of confidence. If what de Gaulle said were a matter of interest only to Britain and France this argument would have substance. But if anyone has broken confidence it is the French in proposing secret bilateral talks with us on matters which vitally affect the interests and security of their partners in the Six and the partners of both of us in NATO. One cannot get away from the substance of what de Gaulle has proposed. He is envisaging the dissolution of NATO and the replacement of the Communities by some ill-defined looser arrangement. These proposals will be anathema to the other five governments, and the sooner we tell them what their partner is up to the better. Indeed the Five might regard our not telling them as a breach of confidence on our part. These are countries with whom we have worked intimately over the past years and whose views on the future of Europe and its relationship with the United States we share. The importance of this point is underlined by the agreement we and the Five reached in Luxembourg last week to consult on important political questions.
6. The Americans are also affected as members of NATO and, for this reason and with Nixon’s visit in prospect, they should obviously be put in the picture at the same time as the Five.
7. I have thought further about the effect on the French if we act as I propose. As I suggested earlier, I believe that the French have more respect for those who look after their own interests and speak plainly. De Gaulle must have calculated that we would tell the Five about his ideas and he may intend, if we do, to accuse us of a breach of faith. He will know, however, that this argument will not take him very far and that, when we go on to make our formal reply to his proposals, we will bring him patiently back to our own square one, i.e. determination to enter the EEC. If this is indeed the calculation he has made, he must be banking on our accepting his proposal for secret bilateral talks on his own agenda, or something similar to it. He may hope in the course of such talks to weaken our determination to work for full membership of the Communities, or at least to persuade us to abandon our tactics of investing the citadel and seeking co-operation with the Six in fields outside the Treaty of Rome. These tactics may be damaging him more than we think. (I was interested in what Evelyn Shuckburgh had to say on this point, see Rome telegram n° 133.) Even if in such secret talks de Gaulle failed to achieve either of these objectives, he would still be free to exploit the fact that we were prepared to talk behind the backs of the Five to the serious disadvantage of our present European policy.
8. I do not wish to suggest in the preceding paragraphs that we should return no reply to de Gaulle. On the contrary I think that Christopher Soames should be instructed to tell Debré that we will be glad to express to the French our views on the important issues they have raised. It is in our interests and that of our like-minded partners that we should do so. I would not envisage Soames giving the French our substantive reply until after your return from Bonn: but he could at least accept the idea of talks when he tells him that we are informing the Five of what has passed. Many people in France and in this country would want us to agree to talks, even if they expected them to run into the ground at once. And by accepting we would deprive de Gaulle of the argument that we had turned down a quote reasonable offer unquote.
9. I do most earnestly advise you to accept the procedure I have outlined. I will look forward to hearing your first impressions of the atmosphere in Bonn.
10. I now want to add something on a quite different point – the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We have already suggested that you should point out to Kiesinger that it is in Germany’s own interest to sign the treaty since this would be consistent with her Ostpolitik, would deprive the Russians of a propaganda line against her and would reassure those who still have unhappy memories of the last war. It is this last point now I want to stress: and what I have to say is not for you to recite to Kiesinger but only for you to have in the back of your mind and to make such use of as the atmosphere of the talks seems to justify. The heart of the matter is this: in Western Europe there are unfortunately only two nations which are both powerful and capable of being resolute in the defence of the West: and these are Germany and ourselves. For this reason the relation of real mutual trust between our two countries would be an enormous advantage. One of the things which stands in the way is the memory of the last war, the realisation of the terrific efficiency of the Germans and a dread that they have not completely renounced aggression. Surprisingly this feeling is expressed more strongly in our country, which was not invaded, than in those who suffered more terribly than we did. If we are to get the relation of mutual trust to which I referred, it will be a great help if the Germans will do some solid, tangible thing which will help to lay the ghost of the past. The signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be such a tangible thing. As I say, I do not think one could put this argument direct as it stands to Kiesinger as one might be able to put it to Brandt. But if you will have it in mind and go as far toward it (but no further) than the degree of cordiality seems to warrant, I think it may help.
7. Lettre de Michel Debré à Michael Stewart le 1er mars 19697
- 7 NA/FCO/30/417.
7Monsieur le secrétaire d’État et cher collègue,
8Après tout ce qui s’est dit au cours des derniers jours, je n’ai pas l’intention d’engager avec vous une controverse particulière sur la manière dont l’entretien du général de Gaulle et de votre ambassadeur a Paris a été rapporté et divulgué. Je vous prie seulement de noter que je ne peux pas faire mienne la présentation et l’interprétation que vous en donnez par votre lettre du 24 février.
9En recevant M. Soames, le président de la République avait répondu à sa demande et lui avait fait part de perspectives européennes à long terme, dans la ligne de sa constante pensée. Ces perspectives eussent pu faire l’objet d’un échange de vue et de ce fait nos rapports auraient connu une amélioration.
10S’il est vrai que des désaccords séparent nos deux pays, il n’a pas dépendu du gouvernement français, soyez-en convaincu, que les choses en soient aujourd’hui où elles sont.
11Je vous prie, Monsieur le secrétaire d’État et cher collègue, d’agréer l’assurance de ma haute consideration.
12Michel Debré.
8. Lettre confidentielle de Christopher Soames à Harold Wilson le 11 mars 19698
- 8 NA/PREM/13/2641.
Dear Prime Minister,
1. Now that the dust is beginning to settle, and we are no longer concerned with immediate day-to-day tactics as we were when you kindly entertained me at Chequers, I feel I must write to give you my views on the lessons we should draw for the future from this unfortunate affair, and to see whether they correspond with your own and Michael Stewart’s. My object is to be constructive and to refer to the past only as a guide to the future. Two points stand out in my mind, both of which we touched on in our talk at Chequers.
2. Firstly, I still feel it was the greatest pity that I was not allowed to come home to talk with you and Michael Stewart after my conversations with the General and Debré. Had I come home I would have argued that the General had been brought to take this initiative by a number of people around him who were anxious to repair relations with us and who realised that this first had to be sold to the General. I was also convinced that those influential people who persuaded the General to launch this initiative (albeit with his own gloss on it) believed also that they could have carried him along on reasonable lines once our talks had started. I believed that there was a real chance – I put it no higher – of starting something which strong forces in France had every intention of seeing through to fruition.
3. I also wished to put to you and Michael that it was well within the bonds of British diplomatic skill to have covered ourselves with our friends in such a way as to be able to open honourably a dialogue with the French. I still believe that was so, if we had wanted to play the hand that way.
4. This brings me to my second point. When you and George Brown asked me to take this job, it seemed to me that you wished me to seek to get a dialogue going with the French with a view to resolving our differences. We were all three a bit sceptical of our chances but in fact the opportunity to talk to the French came sooner than we, or certainly I, had dared to hope. As I see it, the General handed me a cup which I handed on to Whitehall. It may have been full of peace or of poison. This only time and discussion would have told. I saw it as the beginning of what you wanted me to achieve when you sent me here. I was dismayed when it was deliberately smashed to pieces.
5. However, that is all water under the bridge. What matters now is the future. At Chequers the other day, I said that in view of the way the affair had been handled I thought it would be a long time before another opportunity presented itself. You replied that you were prepared to bet that you would be in Paris before the end of the summer for talks with the General and you know that nothing would give me more pleasure than to contribute to bringing this about. From talks that I and my staff have had since the explosion it is already clear that a number of influential Frenchmen will be anxious and willing to contribute. For instance, Edgar Faure to my surprise told me the other day that he wished to do all within his power to get a dialogue going between Britain and France; and senior officials at the Quai, such as Beaumarchais, are also talking of trying again once the dust has settled.
6. But I do want to be sure that I understood your wishes right. Do you want us to encourage these sentiments and activities or not? You will, I know, understand that it would be worse than pointless for us to seek to do so if in its heart of hearts HMG does not wish to enter into a dialogue with France.
7. If the answer to my question is “No” then the task of this Embassy is relatively simple. We should as I see it, have to tell one and all that we are only interested in talking to the French about Europe in a multilateral framework; and there is no point in our friends trying to re-sell the General the idea of Anglo/French bilaterals. We shall then have to carry on “bashing” the French (as Hancock put it when he came to see us on 10 February) until they lift their veto on our negotiating with the EEC for membership. I can only advise you that I cannot see such a policy bearing fruit not only while the General is in power but also for some considerable time thereafter.
8. I assume, however, from all that you have said to me, that you answer is “Yes”. Frankly, I think it ought to be; for in my judgement such rigid positions have now been taken up, and the degree of mistrust is such that an Anglo/French dialogue is an essential precursor to any negotiation. I cannot yet give you any idea if or when such a dialogue would be feasible, or how it might come about. But the fact that some prominent Frenchmen are already thinking in these terms leads me to ask whether you and Michael Stewart wish us here to encourage this and work for it. If you agree, we could perhaps consider together fairly soon how best we might seek to bring it about.
9. Lettre secrète et personnelle de Christopher Soames à Michael Stewart le 2 avril 19699
- 9 NA/FCO/31/419/1.
Dear Michael,
1. It is good that you will be seeing Debré in Washington.
2. Frankly I think you must be prepared to find him rather chilly and rather sore at the beginning of your meeting. He will be so for reasons which he cannot avow, as well as for those which he can.
3. As to the latter, it is worth having a look at my telegram No.194 reporting what he said to me on 22 February, since when I have not seen him. He understood why the Prime Minister had to put Kiesinger in the picture, but he does not see why we were in such a hurry to inform the Five. We have recently discovered that the French know that our telegram giving the substance of what the General said on 4 February was sent to our Ambassadors in the capitals of the Five some thirty six hours before the Prime Minister spoke to Kiesinger. The French regard this as further evidence of a coup monté, a deliberate effort to make a drama of what the General had said and thus to create difficulties for him, particularly with the Americans and the Germans. They have also heard that some of our Ambassadors embroidered their demarches with disparaging remarks about the General. As I think I told you when I saw you on 23 February, one of them is supposed to have said on the telephone at ten o’clock at night that he wanted to see the Foreign Minister immediately in order to tell him of “the greatest diplomatic scandal of the century”. Beaumarchais told Ledwidge all this and the Quai d’Orsay have told it to the press as well.
4. But Debré also has his unavowable reasons for being sore about the whole affair. It was he who urged the General to take an initiative with us, but I doubt the General gave him advance warning that he intended to do so or did he speak to me in the way that Debré wanted. Debré’s idea was, above all, that we should discuss together the future economic and political structure of Europe to see if we could find common ground and end the war between us. The General added to this a lot of stuff of his own about the need to reduce American influence, about the EEC being expandable, and a council of the big European Powers, which had the effect of distorting the whole approach and arousing our suspicions. I suspect Debré must have been much irritated by this. I am sure that he was also embarrassed by the fact that the Elysee accepted my compte rendu without challenge [... la suite du document est illisible]. Moreover, Debré knows that the General feels that he and Lipkowski are to blame for having led him to make a move which went disastrously astray. Naturally this irritates Debré still further. We have heard this from political gossip. I believe it is more or less true and that Debré will have all this in mind when you meet.
5. I doubt if Debré will want to start a post mortem about all this. You will not have much time for your conversation and I am sure it will be better to try and bury the past as speedily as possible. The ball will be in your court at the beginning of the talk, since you have asked for it and have said that you will be mentioning “l’affaire Soames”. On reflexion, I believe that it would be best to take an advantage of this and to go straight into the subject at the beginning of the conversation without trying to ease matters by talking of the Middle East and Nigeria first. Debré is an honest man and an emotional one and he will have “l’affaire Soames” on his mind. Given his temperament, I still believe it will pay to come to the point at once. You might, I suggest, take the sort of line in the following paragraphs.
6. (i) “I am particularly glad of this opportunity to have a talk with you. Anglo/French relations are in such a mess. Our countries need to talk to each other and want to talk to each other but we haven’t so far been able to find a way to do it. It is your job – and mine – to find a way out of this impasse and to shake off the burden of so many years of misunderstanding and mistrust.”
(ii) “I would like you to know that both the Prime Minister and I regret the way things turned out in February, as I know you did too I am not seeking to indulge in post mortem. I would just like to say that we did genuinely want to talk to you and we still do. Our only proviso is one which is, I believe, acceptable in principle to the French Government. It is that our allies, i.e. the Europeans concerned, should be kept informed in a general way of how things are going. The Five will need to know more than other Europeans. I don’t mean that they have to see minutes of our discussions, but just that they should be kept in the picture because anything France and Britain can agree among themselves will not bear fruit unless we can sell our ideas to the Germans and the rest of the Five. I can imagine also that we would both wish to keep the Americans informed of how our talks are going. I would hope that we could agree between ourselves in advance, at each stage, what to say to the third parties concerned.”
(iii) “It is clear from what you have said to the General de Gaulle and you have told Soames, and from what we have told you at various times about our positions, that there will be notable differences in our points of departure. We want NATO to remain a going concern for a long time; we want to join the EEC if it is going to continue to exist, and we don’t want to give anyone the impression that we are trying to break it up as long as its members believe that it is in their interest that it should continue. Britain and France are also at loggerheads over W. E. U. and look like continuing to be for some time. Nevertheless, Britain and France have the same interest in strengthening Western Europe without allowing the Germans to dominate everything. It is because France and Britain have different points of departure that Europe is in such a mess today. That is why talks between us on the big economic and political questions are so very necessary.”
(iv) “When do you think that the dust will have settled sufficiently for us to begin in a modest way through diplomatic channels, talking about the future of Europe? We shall be ready when you are.”
7. I hope you will agree that this is the right sort of line. I have tried to suggest formulas which do not exaggerate our difference over NATO and do not give the impression that we are determined to be more royalist than the king over the EEC.
8. Anyway, if you can accept it, I think that something on these lines might have a good effect on Debré. I suspect that you will find that he has serious doubts as to HM Government’s willingness to talk with the French in good faith. I see your talk with him as our one chance at the present time of convincing him that HM Government sincerely want such a dialogue. Any sign of a meeting of minds on the subjects if the Middle East or Nigeria – particularly the latter – would help, but it seems to me that it is what is said about Europe that will matter most. One idea worth trying if Debré is relatively sympathetic might be to ask if a message from the Prime Minister to General de Gaulle would help a thaw, either now or at a later stage.
9. I cannot think of any proposal that you might put to Debré with any hope of success for solving the WEU deadlock at this stage. I believe we must hope that that can continue for a time without getting further inflamed. I was interested that Brandt said in his message to you that the Germans had had some indication from the French officials that the French line might soften in a few months’ time. We have heard nothing comparable ourselves, but perhaps it may turn out to be true if we can improve the general climate. That is going to be quite a formidable task. As I said in London the other day, I shall be surprised if we manage to get off the ground before autumn at the earliest. But your talk in Washington will be the first experiment and I wish you all good fortune with it.
10. Tableau de la structure interne du Foreign Office, du classement (« grade ») des fonctions et de leurs équivalences au sein du service diplomatique au moment de l’affaire Soames10
- 10 FCO, Geoffroy Moorhouse, op. cit., p. 85.
Ministre des Affaires étrangères (Foreign Secretary) PPS (Principal Private Secretary)
- 11 Permanent Under-Secretary, chef de la diplomatie britannique, cf. infra.
Rang | Fonction FCO | Equivalence |
1 2 3 4 5 6 7a 7e 8 9 10 |
PUS11 Deputy Under-Secretary Assistant Under-Secretary Responsable de département Premier secrétaire Premier secrétaire (branche exécutive) Deuxième secrétaire (branche administrative) Deuxième secrétaire (branche exécutive) Troisième secrétaire (branche exécutive) Troisième secrétaire (branche exécutive) Registry Clerk (branche exécutive) |
Ambassadeur senior Haut commissaire senior Ambassadeur Haut commissaire Ambassadeur Haut commissaire Ministre Consul-général senior Conseiller Ambassadeur Haut commissaire Consul-général Consul Consul Consul adjoint Consul adjoint ou attache Attaché |
11. Notices biographiques des principaux acteurs du service diplomatique britannique de l’affaire Soames12
- 12 Who’s Who, Londres, A & C Black, 1986 et 2010; Who Was Who, Londres, A & C Black, 1920-2008. Les in (...)
13Campbell, Sir Alan (Hugh) GCMG 1979 (KCMG 1976; CMG 1964); HM Diplomatic Service, born 1 July 1919; youngest son of late Hugh Campbell and Ethel Campbell (née Warren); married 1947, Margaret Taylor; three daughters; died 7 October 2007. Education: Sherborne School; Caius College, Cambridge. Served in Devonshire Regiment, 1940-1946. Third Secretary, HM Foreign (now Diplomatic) Service, 1946; appointed to Lord Killearn’s Special Mission to Singapore, 1946; served in Rome, 1952, Peking, 1955; UK Mission to UN, New York, 1961; Head of Western Department, Foreign Office, 1965; Counsellor, Paris, 1967; Ambassador to Ethiopia, 1969-1972; Assistant Under-Secretary of State, FCO, 1972-1974; Deputy Under-Secretary of State, FCO, 1974-1976; Ambassador to Italy, 1976-1979; Foreign Affairs advisor to Rolls Royce Ltd, 1979-1981. Chairman, British-Italian Society, 1983-90; Mem. Council, British School at Rome, 1982-84. Governor, Sherborne School, 1973-87 (Chairman of Governors, 1982). Publications: articles in International Affairs. Recreations: lawn tennis, painting in watercolour. Clubs: Brooks’s, Beefsteak.
Chalfont, Baron, cr 1964 (Life Peer); (Alun) Arthur Gwynne Jones, PC 1964; OBE 1961; MC 1957; Chairman All Party Defence Group, House of Lords, since 1980; Director: IBM UK Ltd, since 1973 (Member, IBM Europe Advisory Council, since 1973); Lazard Bros & Co. Ltd, since 1983; President: Nottingham Building Society, since 1983; Abington Corporation (Consultants) Ltd, since 1981; born 5 December 1919; son of Arthur Gwynne Jones and Eliza Alice Hardman; married 1948, Dr Mona Mitchell; one child deceased. Education: West Monmouth School. Commissioned into South Wales Borderers (24th Foot), 1940; Served in: Burma 1941-1944; Malayan campaign 1955-1957; Cyprus campaign 1958-1959; various staff and intelligence appointments; Staff College, Camberley, 1950; Jt Services Staff College, 1958; Russian interpreter, 1951; resigned commission, 1961, on appt as Defence Correspondent, The Times; frequent television and sound broadcasts and consultant on foreign affairs to BBC Television, 1961-1964; Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1964-1970; UK Permanent Representative to WEU, 1969-1970; Foreign Editor, New Statesman, 1970-1971. Director: W. S. Atkins International, 1979-1983; Shandwick Consultants, 1985-95; Chairman: Industrial Cleaning Papers, 1979-86; Peter Hamilton Security Consultants Ltd, 1984-86. President: Hispanic and Luso Brazilian Consul, 1975-1980; RNID, 1980-87; Llangollen International Music Festival, 1979-90; Freedom in Sport, 1982- 88; Chairman: UK Committee for Free World, 1981-89; European Atlantic Gp, 1983-; Member: IISS; Board of Governors, Sandle Manor School FRSA. MinstD. Hon. Fellow UCW Aberystwyth, 1974. Liveryman, Worshipful Co. of Paviors. Freeman, City of London. Publications: The Sword and The Spirit, 1963; The Great Commanders, 1973; Montgomery of Alamein, 1976; (ed) Waterloo: Battle of Three Armies, 1979; Stars Wars: Suicide or Survival, 1985; Defense of the Realm, 1987; By God’s Will: a Portrait of the Sultan of Brunei, 1989; The Shadow of My Hand (autobiography), 2000; contributions to The Times, and other national and professional journals. Recreations: formerly Rugby football, cricket, lawn tennis; now music and theatre. Clubs: Garrick, MCG, Lord’s Taverners, City Livery.
Greenhill of Harrow, Baron cr 1974 (Life Peer), of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea; Denis Arthur Greenhill, GCMG 1972 (KCMG 1967; CMG 1960); OBE 1941; HM Governement Director, British Petroleum Co. Ltd, 1973-1978; Member, Security Commission, 1973-1982; born 7 November 1913; son of James and Susie Greenhill, Loughton; married 01941, Angela McCulloch; two sons; died 8 November 2000. Education: Bishop’s Stortford College; Christ Church, Oxford (Hon. Student 1977). Served War of 1939-1945 (despatches thrice): Royal Engineers; in Egypt, North Africa, Italy, India and SE Asia; demobilised with rank of Colonel. Entered Foreign Service, 1946; served Sofia, 1947-1949; Washington, 1949-1952; Foreign Office, 1952-1954. Imperial Defence College, 1954; UK Delegation to NATO, Paris, 1955-1957; Singapore, 1957-1959; Counsellor, 1959-1962; Minister, 1962-1964, Washington DC; Assistant Under-Secretary of State, FO, 1964-1966; Deputy Undersecretary of State, FO, 1966-1969; Permanent Under-Secretary of State, FCO, and Head of the Diplomatic Service, 1969-1973. Director: S. G. Warburg & Co., 1974-87 (Advisor, 1987-95); Clerical Medical and General Assce Society, 1974-86; Wellcome Foundn Ltd, 1974-1985; BAT Industries Ltd, 1974-1983; Hawker Siddeley Group, 1974-1984; Leyland International, 1977-1982; Mem., International Adv. Committee, First Chicago Ltd, 1976-1981. A Governor of the BBC, 1973-1978. Governor, BUBA, 1978-1984, Deputy Chairman, 1979-1984. President: Royal Society for Asian Affairs, 1976-1984; Anglo-Finnish Society, 1981-1984. Chairman, KCH Medical School Council, 1977-1983; Fellow, King’s College, London, 1984. Trustee, Rayne Foundn, 1974; Governor, Wellington College, 1974-1983; Chairman of Governors, SOAS, 1978- 1985. Grand Cross, Order of the Finnish Lion 1984. Publication: More By Accident (memoirs), 1992. Club: Travellers!
Ledwidge, Sir (William) Bernard (John), KCMG 1974 (CMG 1964); writer, HM Diplomatic Service, retired; Chairman, United Kingdom Committee for UNICEF, since 1976; born 9 November 1915; son of late Charles Ledwidge and Eileen O’Sullivan; married first 1948, Anne Kingsley (marriage dismissed 1970); one son one daughter; second, 1970, Flora Groult; died 20 February 1998. Education: Cardinal Vaughan School; King’s College, Cambridge; Princeton University, USA. Commonwealth Fund Fellow, 1937-1939; served War of 1939-1945: RA 1940; Indian Army, 1941-1945. Private Secretary to Permanent Under-Secretary, India Office, 1946; Secretary, Frontier Areas Cttee of Enquiry, Burma, 1947; Foreign Office, 1947-1949; British Consul, St Louis, USA, 1949-1952; First Secretary, British Embassy, Kabul, 1952-1956; Political Adviser British Military Government, Berlin, 1956-1961; Foreign Office, 1961-1965; Minister, Paris, 1965-1969; Ambassador to Finland, 1969-1972; Ambassador to Israel, 1972-1975. Mem., Police Complaints Bd, 1977-1982. Publications: Frontiers (novel), 1979; (jtly) Nouvelles de la Famille (short stories), 1980; De Gaulle, 1982; De Gaulle et les Américains, 1984; Sappho, La première voix de femme, 1987. Recreations: drinking, talking. Clubs: Travellers’, MCC.
Maitland, Sir Donald (James Dundas), GCMG 1977 (CMG 1967); Kt 1973; OBE 1960; Director, Slough Estates, since 1983; born 16 August 1922; son of Thomas Douglas Maitland and Wilhelmina Sarah Dundas; married 1950, Jean Marie Young, daughter of Gordon Young, one son one daughter; died 22 August 2010. Education: George Watson’s College; Edinburgh University. Served India, Middle East, and Burma, 1941-1947 (Royal Scots; Rajputana Rifles). Joined Foreign Service, 1947; Consul, Amara, 1950; British Embassy, Baghdad, 1950-1953; Private Secretary to Minister of State, Foreign Office, 1954-1956; Director, Middle East Centre for Arab Studies, Lebanon, 1956-1960; Foreign Office, 1960-1963; Counsellor, British Embassy, Cairo, 1963-1965; Head of News Dept, Foreign Office, 1965-1967; Principal Private Secretary to Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, 1967-1969; Ambassador to Libya, 1969-1970; Chief Press Secretary, 10 Downing Street, 1970-1973; UK Permanent Representative to UN, 1973-1974; Deputy Under-Secretary of State, FCO, 1974-1975; UK Mem., Commonwealth Group on Trade, Aid and Develt, 1975; Ambassador and UK Permanent Representative to EEC, 1975-1979; Deputy to Permanent Under-Secretary of State, FCO, December 1979-June 1980; Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Dept of Energy, 1980-1982. Chairman, Independent Commission for World-Wide Telecommunications Develt, 1983-1985. Adviser to British Telecom, 1985-. Govt Dir, Britoil, 1983-1985. Chairman: UK National Committee for World Communications Year, 1983; Christians for Europe, 1984-97. Member: Commonwealth War Graves Commn, 1983-87; British Co-ordinator, Indo-British Coloquium; President: Bath Inst, for Rheumatic Diseases, 1986-95 and 1997-2004; Federal Trust for Educn. and Res., 1987-2003; Vice-Pres., Centre européen de prospective et de synthèse, Paris, 1990-95; Governor, Westminster Coll., Oxford, 1990-97 (chm., 1994-97); Pro-Chancellor, Bath Univ., 1996-2000. Private pilot, 1969-79. Hon. Fellow, Bath Spa UC, 2000. Hon. LLD Bath, 1995; Hon. DLitt UWE, 2000. Recreations: hill-walking, music.
Morland, Martin Robert, CMG 1985; HM Diplomatic Service; Under-Secretary, Cabinet Office, since 1984; born 23 September 1933; eldest son of sir Oscar Morland, GBE, KCMG and of Alice, daughter of Rt Hon. Sir F. O. Lindley, PC, GCMG; married 1964, Jennifer Avril Mary Hanbury-Tracy; two sons one daughter. Education: Ample-forth; King’s College, Cambridge (BA). Nat. Service, Grenadier Guards, 1954-1956; British Embassy, Rangoon, 1957-1960; News Dept, FO, 1961; UK Delegn to Common Market negociations, Brussels, 1962-1963; FO, 1963-1965; UK Disarmament Delegn, Geneva, 1965-1967; Private Secretary to Lord Chalfont, 1967-1968; European Integration Dept, FCO, 1968-1973; Counsellor, 1973-1977, Rome (seconded temporarily to Cabinet office to head EEC Referendum information Unit, 1975); Head of Maritime Aviation and Environment Dept, FCO, 1977-1979; Counsellor and Head of Chancery, Washington, 1979-1982; seconded to Hardcastle & Co. Ltd, 1982-1984. Under-Sec., Cabinet Office, 1984-86; Ambassador to Burma, 1986-90; Ambassador and UK Perm. Rep. to Office of UN and other internat. Orgns, Geneva, 1990-93; Air, Public Affairs, BNFL, 1994-96. Mem. Ctee, Supporters of Nuclear Energy, 2005-. Chm. Govs., Westminster Cathedral Choir Sch., 2001-08. Chm., Prospect Burma, 1994-. Club: Garrick.
Palliser, Rt. Hon. Sir (Arthur) Michael, GCMG 1977 (KCMG 1973; CMG 1966); PC 1983; HM Diplomatic Service, retired; Chairman, Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, since 1983; Chairman Samuel Montagu & Co. (Holdings) Ltd, since 1984 (Director, since 1983); Director, since 1983: BAT Industries plc; Booker McConnell plc; Eagle Star Holdings; Shell Transport & Tradings Co. plc; United Biscuits (Holdings); Director, Arbor Acres Farm Inc., since 1985; Member, Security Commission, since 1983; born 9 April 1922; son of late Admiral sir Arthur Palliser, KCB, DSC, and of Lady Palliser (née Margaret Eva King-Salter); married 1948, Marie Marguerite, daughter of late Paul-Henri Spaak; three sons; Education: Wellington College; Merton College, Oxford. Served with Coldstream Guards, 1942- 1947; Capt. 1944. Entered HM Diplomatic Service, 1947; SE Asia Dept, Foreign Office, 1947-1949; Athens, 1949-1951; Second Secretary, 1950; Foreign Office: German Finance Dept, 1951-1952; Central Dept, 1952-1954; Private Secretary to Permanent Under-Secretary, 1954-1956; First Secretary, 1955; Paris, 1956-1960; Head of Chancery, Dakar, 1960-1962 (Chargé d’Affaires in 1960, 1961 and 1962); Counsellor, and seconded to Imperial Defence College, 1963; Head of Planning Staff, Foreign Office, 1964; a Private Secretary to Prime Minister, 1966; Minister, Paris, 1969; Ambassador and Head of UK Deleg. to European Communities, Brussels, 1971; Ambassador and UK Permanent Representative to European Communities, 1973-1975; Permanent Under-Secretary of State, FCO and Head of Diplomatic Service, 1975-1982. Special Advr to PM during Falklands Campaign, 1982. Fellow, Center for Internal. Affairs, Harvard, 1982; Member: Council, IISS, 1982-91 (Chm., 1983-90; Vice-Pres., 1999-); Trilateral Commn, 1982-96; Security Commn, 1983-92; British N American Cttee and Res. Assoc., 1987-95; BOTB 1993-96; Adv. Bd, RAND Europe, 1995-2003 (Chm., 1999-2003); Adv. Council, British Consultants Bureau, 1997-2002. Mem., Royal Nat. Theatre Bd, 1988-96. Pres., Internal. Social Service of UK, 1982-96; Chairman: City and E London Confedn of Medicine and Dentistry, 1989-95; Major Projects Assoc., 1994-98. Trustee, The Tablet, 1989-. Governor, Wellington College, 1982-92. Chevalier, Order of Orange Nassau, 1944; Commandeur, Légion d’honneur, 1996 (Chevalier, 1957). Club: Buck’s.
Robinson, John Armstrong, CMG 1969; HM Diplomatic Service, retired; Ambassador to Israel, 1980-1981; born 18 December 1925; married 1952, Marianne Berger; one son one daughter; died 16 January 1998. HM Forces, 1944-1946; Foreign Office, 1949-1950; Second Secretary, Delhi, 1950-1952; Foreign Office, 1952-1953; Helsinki, 1953-1956; Second later First Secretary, Paris, 1956-1958; Foreign Office, 1958-1961; First Secretary in UK Delegation to European Communities, Brussels, 1962-1967; Counsellor, Foreign Office, 1967; Head of European Economic Integration Dept, FCO, 1968-1970; appointed Member of team of nine officials for negotiations on British entry into the Common Market, Brussels, 1970-1971; Assistant Under-Secretary of State, FCO, 1971-1973; Ambassador to Algeria, 1974-1977; Minister, Washington, 1977-1980.
Soames, Baron created 1978 (Life Peer), of Fletching in the Country of E Sussex; Arthur Christopher John Soames, PC 1958; GCMG 1972; GCVO 1972; CH 1980; CBE 1955; born 12 October 1920; married 1947, Mary Churchill (see Lady Soames); three sons two daughters; died 16 September 1987. Education: Eton; Royal Military College, Sandhurst, 2nd Lieutenant, Coldstream Guards, 1939; Captain, 1942; served Middle East, Italy and France. Assistant Military Attaché British Embassy, Paris, 1946- 1947, MP (C) Bedford Division of Bedfordshire, 1950-1966. Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, 1952-1955; Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Air Ministry, December 1955-January 1957; Parliamentary and Financial Secretary, Admiralty, 1957-1958; Secretary of State for War, January 1958-July 1960; Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 1960-1964. Director: Decca Ltd, 1964-1968; James Hole and Co. Ltd, 1964-1968, Ambassador to France, 1968-1972. A Vice-President, Commission of the European Communities, 1973-January 1977. Chm, ICL (UK) Ltd, 1984-; Director: N. M. Rothschild & Sons Ltd, 1977-1979; National Westminster Bank Ltd, 1978-1979. Governor of Southern Rhodesia, 1979-1980. Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Lords, 1979-1981. President, RASE, 1983. Hon. LLD St Andrews, 1974; Hon DCL Oxon, 1981. Croix de guerre (France), 1942; Grand Officier de la Légion d’honneur, 1972; Grand Cross of St Olav (Norway), 1974. Medal of the City of Paris, 1972. Clubs: White’s, Portland.
Stewart of Fulham, baron CR 1979 (Life Peer), of Fulham in Greater London; Robert Michael Maitland Stewart, Baron Stewart of Fulham; PC 1964; CH1969; born 6 November 1906; son of Robert Wallace Stewart, DSc and Eva Stewart; married 1941, Mary Elizabeth Henderson Birkinshaw (later Baroness Stewart of Alvechurch) (died 1984); no children; died 10 March 1990. Educ: Christ’s Hospital; John’s College, Oxford, Pres. Oxford Union, 1929; Asst. Master, Merchant Taylor’s School 1930-1931; Asst. Master, Coopers’ Company’s School and Lectr for Workers’ Educational Assoc., 1931-1942. Joined Army Intelligence Corps, 1942. Trans. To Army Educational Corps, 1943; commissioned and promoted to Capt. 1944. Contested (Lab) West Lewisham, 1931 and 1935; MP (Lab) Fulham East, 1945-1955, Fulham 1955-1974, Hammersmith, Fulham, 1974-1979; Vice-Chamberlain of HM Household 1946-1947; Controller of HM Household 1946-1947; Under-Sec of State for War 1947-1951; Parly Sec. Min of Supply May-Oct. 1951; Sec. of State for Education and Science, Oct. 1964-Jan. 1965; Sec. of State for Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1965-Aug. 1966; First Sec. of State, 1966-1968; Sec. of State for Economic Affairs, 1966-1967; Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 1968-1970. Mem. European Parliament 1975-1976. Pres. H. G. Wells Society, 1982-. Freeman of Hammersmith, 1967. Hon. Fellow, St. John’s College, Oxford, 1965; Hon. LLD Leeds, 1966; Hon. DSc Benin, 1972. Publications: The Forty Hour Week (Fabian Soc.), 1936; Bias and Education for Democracy, 1937; The British Approach to Politics, 1938; Modern Forms of Government, 1959; Life and Labour (autobiog.), 1980; European Security: the case against unilateral nuclear disarmament, 1981. Recreations: chess, painting.
Wilson of Rievaulx, Baron cr 1983 (Life Peer), of Kirklees in the County of West Yorkshire; James Harold Wilson; KG 1976; OBE 1945; PC 1947; FRS 1969; born 11 March 1916; son of late James Herbert and Ethel Wilson, Huddersfield Yorks. (formerly of Manchester); married 1940, Gladys Mary, daughter of Reverend D. Baldwin, The Manse, Duxford, Cambridge; two sons; died 24 May 1995. Educ: Milnsbridge Council School and Royds Hall School, Huddersfield; Wirral Grammar School, Bebington, Cheshire; Jesus College Oxford (Gladstone Memorial Prize, Webb Medley Economics Scholarship, First Class Hons. Philosophy, Politics and Economics). Lecturer in Economics, New College, Oxford, 1937; Fellow of University College, 1938; Praelector in Economics and Domestic Bursar, 1945. Dir. of Econs and Stats, Min. of Fuel and Power, 1943-1944. MP (Lab) Ormskirk, 1945-1950, Huyton, Lancs, 1950-1983; Parly Sec. to Ministry of Works, 1945-March 1947; Sec. for Overseas Trade, March-Oct. 1947; Pres. BoT., Oct. 1947-April 1951; Chairman: Labour Party Exec. Cttee, 1961-1962; Public Accounts Cttee, 1959-1963; Leader, Labour Party, 1963-1976; Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, 1964-1970, 1974-1976; Leader of the Opposition, 1963-1964, 1970-1974. Chairman, Cttee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions, 1976-1980; British Screen Adv. Council 1985-. Pres. Royal Statistical Society 1972-1973. An Elder Brother of Trinity House, 1968. Hon. Fellow, Jesus and University Colleges, Oxford, 1963. Hon. Freeman, City of London, 1975. Hon. Pres. Great Britain-USSR Assoc. 1976-. Pres., Royal Shakespeare Theatre Co., 1976-. Chancellor, Bradford University, 1966-1985. Hon. LLD: Lancaster, 1964; Liverpool, 1965; Nottingham, 1966; Sussex 1966; Hon. BCL, Oxford, 1965; Hon. DTech., Bradford, 1966; DUniv: Essex, 1967; Open, 1974. Publications: New Deal for Coal, 1945; In Place of Dollars, 1952; The War on World Poverty, 1953; The Relevance of British Socialism, 1964; Purpose in Politics, 1964; The New Britain (Penguin), 1964; Purpose in Power, 1966; The Labour Government 1964-1970,1971; The Governance of Britain, 1976; A Prime Minister on Prime Ministers, 1977; Final Term: the Labour Government 1974-1976, 1979; The Chariot of Israel, 1981; Harold Wilson, Memoirs 1916-64, 1986. Recreation: golf.
12. Caricature de l’affaire Soames par Leslie Gilbert Illingworth publiée le 24 février 196913
- 13 On reconnaît dans cette caricature par Leslie Gilbert Illingworth, publiée dans le Daily Mail du 24 (...)
Notes
1 NA/FCO/30/414.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 NA/FCO/30/417.
8 NA/PREM/13/2641.
9 NA/FCO/31/419/1.
10 FCO, Geoffroy Moorhouse, op. cit., p. 85.
11 Permanent Under-Secretary, chef de la diplomatie britannique, cf. infra.
12 Who’s Who, Londres, A & C Black, 1986 et 2010; Who Was Who, Londres, A & C Black, 1920-2008. Les informations pour chaque contribution sont communiquées a l’éditeur par les personnes concernées.
13 On reconnaît dans cette caricature par Leslie Gilbert Illingworth, publiée dans le Daily Mail du 24 février 1969, Michel Debré, Harold Wilson, Michael Stewart, Charles de Gaulle, Christopher Soames et Richard Nixon. Avec l’aimable autorisation de la Llyfrgell Genedlaethol Cymru (National Library of Wales) au Pays de Galles et de Solo Syndication à Londres. Nos remerciements aussi à la British Cartoon Archive de l’université du Kent.
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