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Chemins d'outre-mer

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Damien Coulon
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Catherine Otten-Froux
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Paule Pagès
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et al.

The Crusades and military history

John France

Texte intégral

  • 1 For general bibliographies of the crusades see: H.E. Mayer, Bibliographie zur Geschichte der Kreuz (...)
  • 2 Ibn al-Qalanisi, Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades, ed. H. A. R. Gibb, London 1932, p. 175-177, 2 (...)

1This study is concerned with the military history of the crusades to the Eastern Mediterranean.1 Because of my own limitations, it is chiefly about the period down to the end of the thirteenth century. Now the Crusades seen in this way occupy an interesting position in the historiography of medieval warfare. They were for long seen as the triumph of a particularly western style of warfare which, it was believed, depended for its success on the mass charge of heavily armoured cavalry which broke its enemy by ‘shock’ effect. For a very long time this was believed to have been the dominant element in European warfare by the time of the First Crusade. Thereafter the history of the warfare of the settlers in the Holy Land appeared to demonstrate the value and continuity of this style of war. The ‘famous charge’ of the cavalry of the western settlers was rightly feared by their enemies.2 The study of crusading warfare, therefore appeared to reinforce the existing view of warfare as practised in the West, ‘proving’ it to be correct. To understand this rather convoluted process we need to understand how the old received view of western warfare in the eleventh century evolved.

  • 3 The term ‘Brunner thesis’ is used here as a convenience for the ideas expressed in H. Brunner, Der (...)

2The general shape of the military history of Western Europe, as it was accepted until very recently, was first largely defined by H. Brunner, writing in 1887. In bald terms, Brunner dismissed the early medieval states as having fielded poorly armed, disorganised and largely infantry armies. These, Brunner suggested, were revolutionised by Charles Martel who, in response to the challenge of the mounted warriors of Islam, developed the heavily armoured cavalrymen who later generations called ‘the knights’. Their characteristic tactic was the shock effect of the mass charge. This heavy shock cavalry enabled the Carolingians to fight off the Islamic challenge from Spain, to conquer the peoples around them and so to establish a mighty ‘Empire’ under Charlemagne. The foundation of this empire was the ‘fief’, the land granted to enable a soldier to equip himself in the new and dominant style of war. Some writers of classic works of military history, Oman, Delbrück and Lot, rejected this vision of a sudden invention of the knight. They suggested that the heavily armed cavalryman was an instrument which evolved through late Merovingian times. However, they offered no challenge to Brunner’s view of the supremacy of ‘shock’ cavalry, and their different explanation of how it came about simply subsisted with his.3

3The idea that shock cavalry were the dominant force in western warfare at the time of the First Crusade enjoyed an extraordinarily long life for a number of reasons. There was no alternative explanation for the success of the Carolingian armies. Brunner’s elegant construct, even as modified by Oman et al., provided a single explanation for the growth of ‘feudalism’ and for Carolingian success and also suggested reasons for its fall – the centrifugal tendencies inherent in feudalism. It provided a highly convincing explanation for the origins of the ‘knight’ who was seen as dominating warfare for the rest of the Middle Ages until the emergence of new and disciplined armies with large contingents of bowmen in the ‘Hundred Years War’. This was particularly important because for a long time military history was not part of the main stream of medieval history which was centred on the constitutional, political, administrative and intellectual areas. Those who studied these areas were reluctant to concern themselves with the details of military history, and found the Brunner thesis, either in its original or in its modified form, a highly convenient framework of explanation that supported their views of the other issues.

  • 4 E. Creasy, Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World, London 1851.
  • 5 C. W. Hollister, Anglo-Saxon Military Institutions on the Eve of the Norman Conquest, Oxford 1962.

4Equally importantly, the isolation of military history was institutionalised because much military history was very different – being taught at Staff Colleges as part of the professional formation of officers. From this source historians received a heavy dose of Clausewitz whose ideas produced the popular battle histories of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, exemplified by E. Creasy’s Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World.4 Under this kind of influence, whole sequences of war – without battles or any obvious decisive outcome – tended to be dismissed. This reinforced the impression of medieval war as shapeless and muddled, and hardly, therefore, deserving of study. As a result, the pervasiveness of war in medieval society was obscured. Moreover, in so far as there was real interest in medieval warfare, it was in the later middle ages. This was partly because the substantial record resources available for England and France in the ‘Hundred Years War’ provided a view of an apparently more organised and, in a sense, more familiar, form of war. Furthermore, it was war fought between ‘states’ of a reassuringly familiar kind. The theory that the knight gave way to the English longbowman flattered the tendency of English historians to emphasise the uniqueness of English development and spared the blushes of equally patriotic French historians by offering a deterministic technological explanation for defeat. Anglo-Saxon England did not fit into the Brunner pattern, because the Anglo-Saxons fought on foot. However, Oman argued that in 1066 the ‘old-fashioned’ Saxon footmen were conquered by the ‘modern’ knight and this provided a satisfactory framework of explanation. The tendency to see English history as something apart is perhaps the chief weakness of the highly important work of C. W. Hollister.5

  • 6 L. White, Medieval Technology and Social Change, Oxford 1962; P. Sawyer, R. Hilton, Technical Dete (...)
  • 7 D. A. Bullough, Europae Pater: Charlemagne and his Achievement in the Light of Recent Scholarship, (...)
  • 8 J. F. Verbruggen, De Krijkunst in West-Europa in de Middeleeuwen, Brussels 1954, translated as Art (...)
  • 9 J. F. Verbruggen, L’armée et la der Grosse: Persönlichkeit und Geschichte, ed. H. Beumann, 5 vols (...)

5Moreover, the Brunner thesis was buttressed at various times by convergent arguments. In 1962 L. White discounted the idea that the knight was a response to Islam’s mounted tactics. He argued that the knight emerged as a result of the diffusion of a new technical device, the stirrup, which provided the rider with the stability in the saddle vital if he was to fight in the style of ‘shock’. This gave a modern technological respectability to Brunner’s thesis, entirely congenial to the age, and so extended its life. White’s arguments were savagely attacked as ‘Technological Determinism’ by Hilton and Sawyer.6 This review certainly damaged White, but inflicted little ‘collateral damage’ upon Brunner, and in its new form his ideas continued to enjoy popularity. In 1970 the Brunner thesis was effectively demolished in two articles. That of D. Bullough was a very wide-ranging piece of work that has profoundly influenced thinking about the Carolingian world in a number of spheres, while that of B.S. Bachrach was specifically military and much narrower in focus. Both took a new and refreshing look at the source material which showed how little basis there was for the whole structure of ideas about Carolingian feudalism and the notion of cavalry warfare.7 However, just as it should have been on the point of expiry, the Brunner thesis enjoyed yet another blood transfusion with the English translation of Verbruggen’s Art of Warfare in Western Europe in the Middle Ages.8 Verbruggen, in a distinguished article, had suggested an alternative to the cavalry thesis: that organisation and strategy were the reasons for Carolingian success.9 But he was deeply wedded to the supremacy of cavalry across the Middle Ages and so did not question the central tenet of the Brunner thesis, whose life was, thereby, prolonged.

  • 10 Ph. Contamine, La Guerre au moyen age, Paris 1980, translated as War in the Middle Ages by M.Jones(...)

6The attacks on Brunner were more widely diffused and given a new force in 1980 with the appearance of Ph. Contamine’s La Guerre au moyen age. It was welcomed with open arms as a modern synthesis, and widely reviewed in many languages. Contamine rejected the cavalry thesis. Instead he developed the ideas of Verbruggen to suggest that Carolingian armies may have owed their success to their size and organisation, and to the skill with which they were handled. He also pointed out that the idea of the knight can hardly be traced before the tenth century, and that ‘shock tactics’ depending on the knight with couched lance, were a particular development which seems to have come to the fore only at the turn of the 11th and 12th centuries. Simultaneously J. France pointed out that the evidence suggests that Carolingian armies had always been largely infantry, and that the first evidence of a new kind of heavy cavalry dates only from the second quarter of the tenth century.10 In fact it became clear that at the time of the First Crusade shock tactics were only in their infancy.

  • 11 J. Gillingham, Richard I and the science of war in the Middle Ages, War and Government in the Midd (...)
  • 12 There is a huge literature on Vegetius, but for interest in him in the middle ages see C. R. Schra (...)
  • 13 R. Higham, P. Barker, Timber Castles, London 1992; M. W. Thompson, The Rise of the Castle, Cambrid (...)
  • 14 J. France, Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades 1000-1300, London 1999.

7At the very same time that modern writers were casting doubt on the supremacy of shock cavalry at the time of the First Crusade, J. Gillingham was attacking the Clausewitzan vision of war and its emphasis on battle. He emphasized the rarity of battle and the rational preference for ravaging as a means of supplying an attacking army and disrupting its enemy’s economic base. Moreover, the prevalence of castles placed a certain importance upon siege in which cavalry had only a limited value.11 In effect, the vision of war dominated by Clausewitzan battles has been replaced by what might be called Vegetian warfare because it conforms to the principles laid down by the Roman writer, Vegetius whose work, though written in the late fourth or early fifth century, was a favourite in the Middle Ages.12 It is not surprising that recent years have seen a plethora of books about castles, together with new ideas about their purposes. At the same time there has been a considerable interest in sieges and siege-warfare.13 The result of all this is a new view of medieval warfare in the period between about 1000 and 1300. It is now seen as a more rational and controlled process in which cavalry were important, especially because mobility was important in a war of destruction and ravaging. However, in an age when battles were rare, the knights were nothing like as dominant and the shock charge was very rare. There were times when cavalry charges succeeded, as at Muret in 1213, and in all the major states there are clear signs of their importance because they provided commanders with valuable options. At the same time armies were more and more staffed by professionals and mercenaries, though standing armies did not emerge.14

  • 15 R. C. Smail, Crusading Warfare 1097-1193, ed. by C. Marshall, Cambridge 1992.

8Where, in all this development, is the study of crusader military history? The answer, rather curiously, is that for a very long time it was a very long way ahead, because of the extraordinary work of Smail first published in 1956.15 He showed us that the crusader armies of the twelfth century were handled with considerable care, that cavalry and infantry were interdependent and that campaigns without battles were very important. The field army of Jerusalem interacted with the fortifications of the kingdom to make it a very hard nut to crack, forcing the Muslims into a deliberate policy of raids and destruction. The development of the monastic military orders created rich and powerful military institutions whose forces greatly aided the kingdom. In fact much that Gillingham and others have more recently said about western warfare in general, was already evident in Smail’s study many years before, and I must say that I think his role as an inspirer of new thinking has been understated.

  • 16 For a general study of siege warfare see J. Bradbury, The Medieval Siege, Woodbridge 1992, but for (...)
  • 17 C. Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East 1192-1291, Cambridge 1992; T. S. Asbridge, S. B. Edgington, (...)
  • 18 N. Housley, The Later Crusades: from Lyons to the Alcazar 1274-1580, Oxford 1992.
  • 19 A. E. Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins. The Foreign Policy of Andronicus 11, 1282-1328, Cambri (...)

9Smail always recognised the limitations of his work, especially on castles and siege warfare. In fact on castles Smail’s stress on their non-military functions anticipated a strong theme in recent writings about their functions in the West. However, now an enormous volume of work on fortifications by a number of archaeologists is providing a new view of the fortifications of the kingdom, building on the earlier work of Deschamps and others, and it is to be hoped that these will extend to the other principalities of the crusader east. Our knowledge of siege warfare in the twelfth century has been greatly extended by R. Rogers.16 The obvious gap which Smail left was a study of the thirteenth century and this has been remedied by C. Marshall whose work particularly stresses the importance of castles and strongpoints. Much writing on the crusades has been centred on the Kingdom of Jerusalem. The recent translation of the Antiochene Wars of Walter the Chancellor by Asbridge and Edgington and the former’s studies of the early history of the principality of Antioch, which have a strong military interest, suggest that the focus is changing.17 N. Housley has made an enormous contribution to the history of the later crusades.18 The study of the history of war has been much more developed for the later middle ages than for the earlier period, and the crusades have rightly been very much seen in this context. There has been quite a heavy concentration on the remarkable career of the Grand Catalan Company, while there have a number of studies of major incidents during this period, notably Nicopolis.19

  • 20 J. France, Victory in the East: A Military History of the First Crusade, Cambridge 1994, p. 209-22 (...)
  • 21 J. Riley-Smith, The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading, London 1986, p. 58-90; Raymond of Agu (...)
  • 22 D. Nicolle, Medieval Warfare Source Book II. Christian Europe and its Neighbours, London 1996; R. (...)

10Another significant omission in Smail, and indeed in all crusader historiography, is a serious study of naval warfare and the crusades. J. France has written on this subject on the First Crusade, and there are various particular studies, notably by J. Pryor and M. Barber. I am aware of only one overall study of the subject, by S. Foster, but that is an unpublished Oxford thesis. For the most part we are reliant on general works on Mediterranean maritime history, notably those of Pryor and Balard. Curiously we are quite well informed about Islamic and Byzantine naval affairs.20 In some ways linked to questions of naval power is the matter of logistics which has attracted remarkably little attention. Staying alive on the First Crusade was a difficult business as J. Riley-Smith and others have made very clear. If we can trust Raymond of Aguilers, ordinary people were prepared to travel vast distances and even deal with the Muslims in the interests of finding food. J. Haldon has investigated the Byzantine army and supply and J. Pryor is now organising a conference on crusading and logistics.21 This is clearly an area of study which is opening up. A good deal of work has also been done on the warfare of the Muslim powers. D. Nicolle has brought this material together very usefully. R. Amitai-Preiss has worked especially on the Mamluks, but his outstanding overall grasp of the subject was made very clear to those of us who attended his session at the 1999 Conference of the Society for the Study of the Crusades. On the wider aspects of Islamic reaction, new ground has been broken by C. Hillenbrand.22

  • 23 France, Western Warfare, as in n. 14, p. 204-29; Id., Crusading Warfare and its Adaptation to East (...)

11But Smail’s book had one most interesting effect on military historiography, and that was a consequence of one of its omissions. Smail did not discuss the relationship between the warfare of the western settlers in the East and that of Western Europe where they came from. He recognised that Middle Eastern warfare was rather different from that of the western settlers, but he took the view that the strangers stuck to their familiar patterns and adapted only to a limited degree, notably in the use of the fighting march. He did, however, stress the importance of the charge of the crusader cavalry. This was already noted by Oman in his outline history of western warfare, Art of War in the Middle Ages. Thus Smail’s book had the curious effect of reinforcing an existing view of medieval warfare and rather discouraging, by its sheer brilliance, an examination of the differences which developed in the Middle East. My own work, both in a book and in a specialist article, suggests that the settlers in the east adapted their warfare in a number of other ways. In the first place, they were prepared to engage in battle to a degree really unknown in Europe. They were often tactically cautious, and certainly did not choose battle lightly, but the military situation in which they lived demanded a readiness to confront their enemies, and they did so with remarkable frequency. On the field of battle they developed the mass cavalry charge, the ‘shock’ charge, which was virtually unknown in their native west. They used light cavalry, Turcopoles, (a subject explored by Harari) to a degree unknown in their native lands. Their aggressiveness and readiness to challenge their enemies in battle were responses to their situation. Almost no area of the kingdom was safe from enemy raids and the frontiers were terribly exposed. They had no option but to fight, and the habit ingrained in them a degree of discipline unusual in medieval armies, which enabled them to risk the mass charge and the fighting march.23

  • 24 A. Forey, The Military Orders from the Twelfth to Fourteenth Centuries, Basingstoke 1992; H. Nicho (...)

12One aspect of the military history of the crusades which Smail discussed was the Military Orders and their importance to the kingdom. There are plenty of studies of the Orders in general, like that of Forey and Nicholson. J. Riley-Smith has examined the Hospital and M. Barber the Temple. These are only a few distinguished studies which come to mind, but it should be noted that there is also a vast fantasy literature, especially involving the Templars, and that this has made a huge popular impression. On military aspects a good translation of the Templar Rule has been very helpful, and there is a very useful study of this by M. Bennett. What is, perhaps, lacking, is any judgement of the overall military value of the Orders. S. Schein has called the Templars ‘the regular army of the Holy land and the spearhead of its reconquest’, but in a relatively short article. I must say that while I was once impressed by the Templar Rule and inclined to see them as regular forces, reflection has changed my mind. Their record for coherence and discipline is not that obvious. The members of the Orders were, like the knights of the great lords, scattered about in lordships with local preoccupations. In these circumstances, while I have no doubt of the bravery and skill of the monk-knights, I doubt if their forces were anything like regular, and I tend to see their primary importance as being financiers of castles and mercenaries. I am sure, however, that there will be debate about this because the establishment of a standing conference on the Orders, which has published its proceedings for 1992 and 1996 and is doing so for 2000, provides a valuable forum.24 However, it is very odd that so little effort has been made to assess the military significance of the Orders.

  • 25 D. Pringle, The Red Tower, London 1986; Id., Town Defences in the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem, T (...)
  • 26 H. Kennedy, Crusader Castles, Cambridge 1994; A. J. Boas, Crusader Archaeology. The Material Cultu (...)

13But it seems to me that crusader military history is being carried forward chiefly by the archaeologists. Crusader archaeology is enjoying a real boom, and crusader castles, in particular, are being examined in new detail. The work of D. Pringle, particularly his archaeological gazetteer, reveals the sheer mass and variety of crusader building. His study of The Red Tower brought us face to face with realities of western settlement. He has had a major hand in the recently published work on Belmont Castle which elucidates one of the most unprepossessing and confused sites that I know. The excavations suggest that the transformation of this site from a Hospitaller grange into a castle took place fairly shortly before the fall of the kingdom – which has implications for the idea that the settler heartland enjoyed great security. R. Ellenblum has also looked at castles, especially Vadum Jacob and Belvoir, but his examination of European settlements is particularly exciting. This suggests a close association between western settlers and native Christians.25 This has obvious implications for military matters. The battle of Hattin in 1187 has been much studied, and despite a lot of source material it is difficult to reconstruct. But what is puzzling is the huge size of the crusader army, about 20,000, especially taking into consideration the small settler population. At Bouvines in 1214 the fate of Europe would be decided by 15,000 men in all. I am sure there were some western mercenaries in the East, but I am unconvinced by the idea of numbers on this scale hanging around the street corners of Jerusalem, waiting paid employment on the off-chance. It is far more likely that the settlers enlisted natives, though perhaps not always from their own lands. H. Kennedy has produced an excellent introduction to crusader castles which includes at least some of this new work. This book deals with the often neglected subject of Islamic castles and it is to be hoped that Chevedden’s work on this subject will soon see the light of day. A. Boas has attempted an overview of the crusader sites in the Holy Land.26

14What is particularly important about the new archaeology of the crusader East is that its leading practitioners also have an excellent knowledge of what might be called conventional crusader sources – documents of various kinds and chronicles. Too often medieval archaeology and conventional history have gone their own ways, and I hope the Society for the Study of the Latin East might like to consider ways of promoting a continuing interchange.

15Looking to the future of the military history of the crusades, certain areas commend themselves for attention. I have no doubt that the archaeologists will continue their work, and I hope that they will invade the northern principalities, above all, Antioch, before very long. An extension of their work in this direction would be very welcome, while perhaps political conditions will once more open up the castles of South Lebanon. We need more of a debate on the relation between the warfare of the settlers in the Holy Lands and that of the West and the Muslim East. There is clearly a need for the implications of recent views of crusader population to be studied. We need a serious effort to assess the military worth of the Orders. Overall, military history shares in the vibrancy of the crusades as a field of study and its prospect for the future look exciting.

Notes

1 For general bibliographies of the crusades see: H.E. Mayer, Bibliographie zur Geschichte der Kreuzzüge, 2nd edition, Hannover 1965; A History of the Crusades, ed. K. M. Setton, M. W. Baldwin, 6 vols, 1959-1989,6, p. 641-731; A. V. Murray, Bibliography of the First Crusade, From Clermont to Jerusalem. The Crusades and Crusader Societies 1095-1500, ed. A. V. Murray, Turnhout 1998, p. 267-310; M. Balard, L’historiographie des croisades au xxe siècle, Revue Historique 302, 2000, p. 973-999.

2 Ibn al-Qalanisi, Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades, ed. H. A. R. Gibb, London 1932, p. 175-177, 285-287, 292.

3 The term ‘Brunner thesis’ is used here as a convenience for the ideas expressed in H. Brunner, Der Reiterdienst und die Anfänge des Lehnwesens, Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Germanistische Abteilung 8, 1887, p. 1-38, though in reality they were far from original. There is an excellent summary of the Brunner thesis and the attacks upon it in K. Devries, Medieval Military Technology, Ontario 1992, p. 95-110; C. Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages 378-1515, Oxford 1884, was a prize essay expanded and republished as The Art of War in the Middle Ages 378-1485, 2 vols, London 1924; H. Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, 6 vols, Berlin 1920-1932, of which the 3rd. volume of 1923 was translated by W. J. Renfroe, Jr as History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History. III, The Middle Ages, Lincoln 1982; F. Lot, L’Art militaire et les armées au moyen âge en Europe et dans le Proche Orient, 2 vols, Paris 1946.

4 E. Creasy, Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World, London 1851.

5 C. W. Hollister, Anglo-Saxon Military Institutions on the Eve of the Norman Conquest, Oxford 1962.

6 L. White, Medieval Technology and Social Change, Oxford 1962; P. Sawyer, R. Hilton, Technical Determinism, the Stirrup and the Plough, Past and Present 24, 1963, p. 90-100.

7 D. A. Bullough, Europae Pater: Charlemagne and his Achievement in the Light of Recent Scholarship, English Historical Review 85, 1970, p. 84-90; B. S. Bachrach, Charles Martel, Shock Combat, the Stirrup and Feudalism. Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History 7, 1970, p. 47-75.

8 J. F. Verbruggen, De Krijkunst in West-Europa in de Middeleeuwen, Brussels 1954, translated as Art of Warfare in Western Europe in the Middle Ages by S. Wlllard, R. Southern, Oxford 1977, revised edition, Woodbridge 1997.

9 J. F. Verbruggen, L’armée et la der Grosse: Persönlichkeit und Geschichte, ed. H. Beumann, 5 vols, Düsseldorf 1965-1967, p. 420-434.

10 Ph. Contamine, La Guerre au moyen age, Paris 1980, translated as War in the Middle Ages by M.Jones, Oxford 1984; J. France, La guerre dans la France féodale a la fin du ixe et au xe siècle. Revue Beige d’Histoire Militaire 23, 1979, p. 177-198; Id., The Military History of the Carolingian Period, ibid. 26, 1985, p. 81-99.

11 J. Gillingham, Richard I and the science of war in the Middle Ages, War and Government in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of J. O. Prestwich, ed. J. Gillingham, J. C. Holt, Woodbridge 1984. p. 78-91; Id., William the Bastard at War, Studies in History presented to R.Allen Brown, ed. C. Harper-Bill, J. Holdsworth, J. Nelson, Woodbridge 1986, p. 141-148; Id., War and Chivalry in the History of William the Marshal, Thirteenth Century England II, ed. P. Cos, S. Lloyd, Woodbridge 1988, p. 1-13.

12 There is a huge literature on Vegetius, but for interest in him in the middle ages see C. R. Schrader, A handlist of extent manuscripts of the De Re Militari of Flavius Renatus Vegetius, Scriptorium 33, 1979, p. 280-305; B. S. Bachrach, The practical use of Vegetius’s De Re Militari in the early Middle Ages, The Historian 21-7, 1985, p. 239-255.

13 R. Higham, P. Barker, Timber Castles, London 1992; M. W. Thompson, The Rise of the Castle, Cambridge 1991; N. J. G. Pounds, The Medieval Castle in England and Wales: a Social and Political History, Cambridge 1990; C. Coulson, Hierarchism in conventual crenellation: an essay in the sociology and metaphysics of medieval fortification, Medieval Archaeology 26, 1982, p. 69-100; Id., Fortress policy in Capetian tradition and Angevin practice; aspects of the conquest of Normandy by Phillip II, Battle 6, 1983, p. 13-38; Id., Cultural realities and Reappraisals in English Castle-Study, Journal of Medieval History 22, 1996, p. 171-207; R. A. Brown, English Castles, London 1976.

14 J. France, Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades 1000-1300, London 1999.

15 R. C. Smail, Crusading Warfare 1097-1193, ed. by C. Marshall, Cambridge 1992.

16 For a general study of siege warfare see J. Bradbury, The Medieval Siege, Woodbridge 1992, but for much material specifically on the Holy Land R. Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare in the Twelfth Century. Oxford 1992, who has a good excursus on siege engines p. 249-273.

17 C. Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East 1192-1291, Cambridge 1992; T. S. Asbridge, S. B. Edgington, Walter the Chancellor’s The Antiochene Wars, Aldershot 1999 (Crusade texts in translation 4); T. S. Asbridge, The significance and causes of the battle of the Field of Blood. Journal of Medieval History 23, 1997, p. 301-316; Id., The Creation of the Principality of Antioch 1098-1130, Woodbridge 2000.

18 N. Housley, The Later Crusades: from Lyons to the Alcazar 1274-1580, Oxford 1992.

19 A. E. Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins. The Foreign Policy of Andronicus 11, 1282-1328, Cambridge. Mass 1972; A. Lowe, The Catalan Vengeance, London 1972; N. Housley, The mercenary companies, the Papacy and the Crusades, 1356-1378, Traditio 38, 1982, p. 253-280; J. Magee, Crusading at the court of Charles VI, 1388-1396, French History 12, 1998, p. 367-383; the special edition of Annates de Bourgogne, t. 68. fasc. 3, 1996.

20 J. France, Victory in the East: A Military History of the First Crusade, Cambridge 1994, p. 209-220; Id., The First Crusade as a Naval Enterprise. Mariner’s Mirror 83/4, 1997, p. 389-397; Rogers, Latin Siege, as in n. 16, especially p. 64-90; J. H. Pryor, Transportation of horses by sea during the era of the Crusades, eighth century to AD 1285, The Mariner’s Mirror 68, 1982, p. 9-27; Id., Geography, Technology and War: Studies in the Maritime History of the Mediterranean 649-1571, Cambridge 1992; M. Barber, Supplying the Crusader States: the role of the Templars. The Horns of Hattin, ed. B. Z. Kedar. London 1992, p. 314-326; G. Airaldi, The Genoese Art of Warfare, Across Medieval Frontiers, ed. D. A. Agius, I. R. Netton. Turnhout 1997, p. 36-45; P. Edbury, The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades 1191-1374, Cambridge 1991; S. M. Foster, Some Aspects of Maritime Activity and the Use of Sea Power in Relation to the Crusading States, D. Phil, thesis, University of Oxford 1978; M. Balard, Gênes et l’outre-mer, Paris 1980; H. Ahrweiler, Byzance et la mer : la marine de guerre, la politique et les institutions maritimes de Byzance aux viie-xve siècles, Paris 1966; A. S. Ehrenkreutz, The Place of Saladin in the Naval History of the Mediterranean Sea in the Middle Ages, Journal of the American Oriental Society 75, 1955, p. 100-116.

21 J. Riley-Smith, The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading, London 1986, p. 58-90; Raymond of Aguilers, Le “Liber” de Raymond d’Aguilers, ed. J. H. & L. L. Hill, Paris 1969, p. 68-74, 117; J. Haldon, State, Army and Society in Byzantium. Approaches to Military, Social and Administrative History, Aldershot 1995; Id., The organisation and support of an expeditionary force: manpower and logistics in the middle Byzantine period, Το εμπόλεμο Βυζάντιο (9ος-12ος αι.), ed. N. Oikonomides, Athens 1997, p. 111-151: Id., Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World 565-1204, London 1999; Id., Theory and Practice in tenth-century military administration. Chapters 11, 44 and 45 of The Book of Ceremonies, TM 13, 2000, p. 201-352.

22 D. Nicolle, Medieval Warfare Source Book II. Christian Europe and its Neighbours, London 1996; R. Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks. The Mamluk-Ilkanid War 1260-81, Cambridge 1995; C. Hillenbrand. The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, Edinburgh 1999.

23 France, Western Warfare, as in n. 14, p. 204-29; Id., Crusading Warfare and its Adaptation to Eastern Conditions in the Twelfth Century, Mediterranean Historical Review 15, 2000, p. 49-66; Y. Harari, The military role of the Frankish Turcopoles, Mediterranean History Review 12, 1997, p. 75-116.

24 A. Forey, The Military Orders from the Twelfth to Fourteenth Centuries, Basingstoke 1992; H. Nicholson. Templars, Hospitallers and Teutonic Knights. Images of the Military Orders, Leicester 1993; J. Riley-Smith. The Knights of St John in Jerusalem and Cyprus, London 1967; M. Barber, The New Knighthood. A History of the Order of the Temple, Cambridge 1994; The Rule of the Templars, ed. J. M. Upton-Ward, Woodbridge 1992; M. Bennett, La Règle du Temple as a military manual, or How to deliver a cavalry charge. Studies in Medieval History presented to R. Allen Brown, ed. С. Harper-Bill, J. Holdsworth, J. Nelson, Woodbridge 1989, p. 7-20; S. Schein, The Templars: the regular army of the Holy Land and the spearhead of the army of its reconquest, I Templari: mito e storia, ed. G. Minucci, F. Sardis, Sienna 1989. p. 15-28.

25 D. Pringle, The Red Tower, London 1986; Id., Town Defences in the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem, The Medieval City under Siege, ed. I. A. Corfis, M. Wolfe, Woodbridge 1995, p. 69-112; Id., Secular Buildings in the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem: an Archaeological Gazetteer, Cambridge 1997; R. Ellenblum, Frankish Rural Settlement in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, Cambridge 1998; Id., Frankish Castle-Building in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, Knights of the Holy Land. The Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem, ed. S. Rozenberg, Jerusalem 1999, p. 142-147.

26 H. Kennedy, Crusader Castles, Cambridge 1994; A. J. Boas, Crusader Archaeology. The Material Culture of the Latin East, London 1999; on Islamic fortifications see P. Chevedden, The Citadel of Damascus. Ph.D. thesis, Los Angeles 1986.

© Éditions de la Sorbonne, 2004

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