1In the era between Cleisthenes and Lykourgos, classical Athenian democracy enjoyed its heyday: never before and never after those two turning points did male citizens participate in political office on such a scale1. When it came to articulating what being a citizen entailed, however, the Athenians never mentioned political office or judicial duties. This deafening silence does not mean that political institutions were not important to the polis, but it signals that in the Athenians’view archē and krisis were simply not the essence of citizenship. Instead, they captured this in the formula meteinai or metechein tōn hierōn kai tōn hosiōn, to have a share and participate in the hiera and hosia2.

2Four passages may exemplify how this formula was used. The first two concern the naturalisation of non-Athenians into Athenians, in modern words citizenship grants. A decree concerning a group of Plataians who had survived the sack of their city and were given refuge at Athens in 427 stated:

“That the Plataians shall be Athenians from this day, valued just like the other Athenians, and that they share in everything in which the Athenians share, both hiera and hosia3.”

3Demosthenes referred to a similar decree of the mid-fourth century for Charidemus, a mercenary:

“It was we, men of Athens, who made Charidemus a citizen, and by that gift bestowed upon him a share in our hiera kai hosia, in our traditions, and in everything in which we ourselves are entitled to have a share4.”

4A third example is a line in the oath sworn by adolescent males when ritually transformed into adult citizens, known as the ephebic oath:

“I will not bring shame upon the sacred weapons, nor shall I desert the man beside me, wherever I stand in the line. I shall fight in defence of hiera kai hosia…”5

5The last instance, a reference in Apollodoros’ suit against Neaira, shows the use of the formula for female citizens in contrast to women who are not entitled to a such share:

“At this point the most virtuous of citizen women will be angry at you that you have considered this woman worthy to participate equally with themselves in the polis and the hiera”6.

6These passages give an impression of what citizenship at Athens was taken to be. Meteinai means to be an acknowledged member of the community and have a share in all its possessions, metechein means to take an active role in something together with others. Participating in the polis meant participating in hiera kai hosia: the things humans give to the gods in return for their divine gifts, and all human acts, thoughts and possessions that conform to hosiē, rules of conduct in which the gods have a particular interest. The formula opens a window on the underlying covenant between humans and the gods on reciprocal obligations and expectations7. In this covenant, the whole community is involved, each individual having a share as member of the group8; in this sense, hiera kai hosia represent their common interests and identity.

7Realising this common potential requires social structures, authority, institutions and decision making, in other words the domain of politics. Political acts highlight human agency, but the formula reminded all citizens of the fact that such acts derived their legitimacy from the covenant and would be evaluated on its terms. Participating actively in the hiera kai hosia was simultaneously an honour and an obligation, which did not fall to all polis members equally9. The community assigned different roles (timai) to each, according to the social value (timē) granted to an individual based on to birth, age, gender, wealth and similar factors, in accordance with polis law10. Only men were entitled to political offices (archai), dependent on the wealth of their oikos. Men and women were both entitled to polis priesthoods that in their turn required double Athenian descent; representing the community in its exchange with the gods, they had to be acceptable to the gods as well as qualified in human eyes11. Comparable requirements could be applied to civic offices in which performance of traditional sacrifices was a major duty.

8The fundamental meaning of participation in hiera for polis membership has been explored by Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood, Robin Osborne and others, and Robert Parker’s magisterial Polytheism and society at Athens provides us with a comprehensive view of all Athenian hiera in their social context12. In this article, I will investigate the significance of hosiē and ta hosia to the polis through its transformation into polis law. Before turning to Athens, I will briefly sketch the emergence of hosiē and cognates in archaic literary texts. As a set of cultural values, hosiē is typically an orally transmitted imperative (agraphos nomos), and in the use of hosios as a value term we can see the persistent application of unwritten norms to human behaviour. Yet, hosiē equally evokes the notion of rules that need to be observed and invites the use of writing to be laid down in actual regulations. Originating in an oral shape, the transformation of hosiē into written laws took place from the seventh century onwards, which means from the very beginning of writing being used for polis decrees. In diachronic and synchronic respects, hosiē thus belonged to both oral and written discourse. Most laws were in fact concerned with hosiē or hiera kai hosia in some way; my discussion therefore can not be comprehensive, but at best representative13. Usually, the decisions laid down in these decrees were the outcome of political struggles; here, these conflicts will not be discussed but understood as the backdrop to the written decrees. Referring occasionally to texts from elsewhere, I shall focus on the legal forms in which hosiē was cast at Athens beginning before Cleisthenes and terminating shortly after Lykourgos.

Hosiē and hosios: the emergence of a concept

9Hosiē and its adjective hosios appear in archaic oral poetry from the mid-seventh century onwards: the Odyssey, several Homeric Hymns, Theognis and Simonides14. In the Iliad and the Hesiodic corpus they are not attested, but themis and cognates abound, which in certain contexts operate as equivalents of hosiē15. In the Odyssey (16.421-425; 22.411-13) hosiē refers to the duty to observe the safety of suppliants and piety regarding the dead, norms of human conduct regulating interaction among humans, safeguarded explicitly by the gods. Simonides (fr. 541 Loeb) seems to refer by hosiē to norms to be respected in conduct towards one’s fellow-beings in general. In the Hymn to Demeter (210-1), hosiē first recalls the rules of guest friendship, imperative among humans and protected by Zeus. Next, as Demeter will not drink (human) wine but asks for (divine) kukeon, a ritual is established in which the humans partake with the goddess. This ritual, too, is implied in hosiē: Demeter’s action turns the one set of rules into the other. In the Hymn to Apollo (237-8), hosiē refers entirely to the ritual relation of humans with the gods16. It concerns a set of rules about the things humans owe to the gods and how they are to offer these gifts. These obligations grant to the divine recipient what befits his moira, the portion due to each mortal and immortal17. Hosiē thus refers to the cosmic order known to and protected by Zeus, in which the gods are to receive what is due to them, in return for what they give to mortals, but it points especially to the obligations on the human side of this relationship.

10The adjective hosios means ‘being in a condition conform hosiē’, living up to its norms or obeying its rules; in this sense, hosios means “law-abiding”, with reference to the gods as guardians of these “laws”. It is attested for the first time in Theognis (130-1):

“Nothing, Kyrnos, among humans is better than a father and a mother who observe hosios dikē18.”

11Dikē (justice) evokes settling claims to honour and property in a way that satisfies the parties involved in a reciprocal relationship, both human and divine, (re) creating a fair balance of interests and preventing conflict from turning into violence. Like moira, the archaic idea of dikē reflects the notion that each mortal and immortal should receive a portion befitting his or her social value19. The gods collectively, but Zeus above all were considered to oversee the distribution of these portions, in observance of the cosmic order20. The passage in Theognis exemplifies the ubiquity of dikē as an issue in archaic poetry, ranging from Hesiod’s complaints of its abuse by basileis to Theognis’ censure of unjust kakoi. Commending dikē to be hosios, Theognis claims that the dikē he knows and represents in his poetry is in accordance with divine norms; it is inherently just, more just than any other. This dikē depends on the virtue of one’s parents, in other words, the qualities of birth and education. The social strife between wealthy elites and poor peasantry, which in many poleis increased in the seventh century, may have stimulated the application of hosios and cognates to the sphere of dikē.

12Hosiē, then, refers to norms of human agency sustaining human reciprocity with the gods, in harmony with the cosmic order that guides both gods and humans. Prescribing conduct that creates charis between both parties in the covenant, hosiē orders human life by rules, which for the sake of clarity can be distinguished into two components:

1. Rules of conduct of humans towards the gods, notably their exchange with and obligations to the gods – more generally, how they are to deal with ta hiera. Hosios in this sense may overlap with eusebēs, i.e. having proper reverence for the gods, and with katharos, being pure, a necessary condition when one is in touch with the divine. Pollution and purification typically concern birth and death, human conditions that need to be separated from the sphere of the gods21. Such rules are usually relevant to ritual and lend themselves relatively easily to be formalised into detailed regulations. In the context of cult and ritual, hosiē defines who is to be a member of the ritual group; how portions of sacrificial meat are to be distributed; who is to perform the ritual, notably the sacrifice; how the ritual is to be performed, including behaviour, acts and thoughts required during the ritual; which sacrifices are to be made and when (a.k.a. sacrificial calendars), the expenditures required and how the costs are to be met. Moreover, the community appoints cult personnel and sees to all aspects necessary to organise the cults and other rituals. Scholars used to label such regulations “sacred laws”, but the ancient Greeks saw no essential difference between such laws and other laws22.
2. Rules of conduct among humans valued particularly by the gods and guarded by them. These rules are normative among humans and hosios operates as a powerful value term. In this context, hosiē includes all conventions or regulations considering guests, strangers and suppliants; all actions involving oaths, in particular jurisdiction; all actions involving curses, including laws with entrenchment clauses; everything to do with death and burial; respect for parents and care of them in old age; and all conventions between poleis regarding warfare and treaties that likewise comprise piety for the dead, respect for hiera and taking oaths23.

13If this distinction into two components clarifies the range of issues involved in hosiē, ultimately they belong together, as both take account of divine will and operate in the context of the covenant. The association of hosios with dikaios, for instance, evokes the normative condition when everyone, human and divine, receives what is due and proper, a condition that is the particular concern of Zeus. Jurisdiction involves taking oaths, engaging the gods in relations among humans and vice versa24; in this context, hosiē represents both dikē and eusebeia. Greek laws generally begin with invoking the gods (theoi) as party witnessing the regulations, presumably a shorthand record of an oral prayer or oath25. The texts fix the agreements for perpetuity, reminding human and divine readers of their terms, deposited under divine protection in a sanctuary26. Early Cretan laws, for instance, distinguished between divine and human matters (theia and anthrōpina)27. The two terms indicate that the human community (dēmos or polis) has different obligations towards the gods and towards humans and is responsible for creating and observing appropriate rules. While thus both terms represent human interests and duties, the gods are also involved in both, but in distinct ways: in ta theia as givers and recipients of gifts in exchange with humans, in ta anthrōpina as supervisors of human conduct. Ta theia and ta anthrōpina are clearly notion kindred to ta hiera kai ta hosia, but, unlike ta anthrōpina, ta hosia makes the norms to be observed in human affairs explicit. Transgression of the rules, for instance those on purity or justice, will sooner or later be noticed in the disasters that befall the human community due to divine displeasure. The entire community is therefore responsible, collectively and individually, for observing and keeping the rules captured in hosiē. While hosiē defines all the conditions of the exchange with the gods, it pertains to the foundations of human society and hence its politeia.

Hosiē and the composition of the citizen body

14The first condition to be established is the composition of the group who is to be involved in the exchange with the gods. Several scholars have pointed to the congruence in shape of cults of the polis and of its subgroups and their formative role in group identity, a pattern that can be traced in detail in classical Athens28. Many laws laying down the conditions of a ritual use the formula hosiē (esti) or hosion (esti) = it is (conform with) hosiē29. On a small scale, hosiē defined participation in a single cult or sanctuary. Generally speaking, sanctuaries were open to all worshippers unless certain groups were excluded, whereas specific festivals and cults were constitutive of particular groups who had authority over participation. Each cultic community thus established its identity by defining insiders and outsiders, precluding certain groups, for instance strangers, uninitiated members or women from participation30. On a larger scale, hosiē comprised the covenant of a whole polis with all the gods, establishing its identity by defining insiders and outsiders of its cultic community31. I will first discuss an example of the hosiē-formula outside Athens, which excellently illuminates its use in a polis decree, before turning to the Athenian variety.

15When the so-called Hypoknemidian Lokrians decided to send a group of their citizens to settle in Naupaktos, a decree inscribed in bronze in the early fifth century regulated the relations between the new community and the remaining Lokrians, notably claims to participation of the former Lokrians in their polis of origin.

“The apoikia (goes) to Naupaktos on these terms. A Lokrian of the Hypoknemidians, when he has become a Naupaktian, being a Naupaktian, is permitted to receive (langanein) his due portion (by lot) and to sacrifice (thuein) where it is hosiē for a stranger, when he happens to be (in Lokris) if he so wishes. If he so wishes, he may sacrifice and receive his due portion (by lot) of the dēmos and of the subgroups, he himself and his descendants, for ever. Those of the Hypoknemidian Lokrians who live in the apoikia will not pay telos among the Hypoknemidian Lokrians, until someone has become a Hypoknemidian Lokrian again (etc.)32.”

16In the first paragraph, the new community is distinguished from the old one: the Lokrians are now turned into Naupaktians. Next, their membership of the old community is defined by rules of langanein and thuein: to receive by lot and to offer sacrifice, a phrase that, being repeated, appears to be a formula. Langanein can only mean “to receive one’s portion of sacrifice” here, because the decree states that a Naupaktian can langanein and thuein in Lokris “as a stranger” and there is no other way a stranger can receive a portion by lot than by participating in cult33. The correspondence between this phrase and the formula attested in the regulations on sanctuaries confirms this reading. The regulations distinguish between an inner group (here of Naupaktians) and an outer group, “foreigners”, whose status is differentiated in cultic terms, i.e. in the relationships of the inner and the outer group with the gods34. Once the community is thus defined, other rules and regulations, that will be valid among humans, are laid out, notably inheritance rights determining community membership of following generations. Likewise, obligations to contribute in money or kind to the human community (telos) are fixed35.

17The Naupaktos decree shows how the agreement with the gods creates the legitimate, binding framework of the agreements between humans: the identity of both parties in the covenant is established and the relationships between all laid down. Its terms had to be valid among humans and also to be accepted by the gods. Acceptance by the gods could be attained either by consulting the gods in an oracle or by assignment of office by lot, that is divine selection36. In the case of a colony such as Naupaktos, a polis with its covenant was more or less created on the spot. In existing poleis, the community evolved over time and fundamental changes in its composition had to be integrated into the covenant.

18At Athens, the first of such changes about which we have sufficient information are Solon’s laws. They laid the foundation for a politeia that remained in force partly until the mid-fifth century, partly to the end of the fourth. The laws defined the composition of the polis by stricter and more coherent rules for legitimacy, in other words socially acknowledged membership of the polis by legitimate descent from an Athenian parent and entitlement to inherit property and a share in the polis and its covenant37. Legitimacy as criterion of polis membership was particularly relevant for the fulfilment of civic office in matters of dikē, in which henceforth all male citizens could participate. Within this citizen body, Solon created a new system for the assignment of archai and timai grounded on criteria of birth and wealth. The new top class(es) consisted of a mixture of prominent citizens by birth (“aristocrats”) and by wealth; among these the offices of the three archons, who performed ancestral sacrifices, were to be allotted38. Solon’s procedure thus mixed the aristocratic and wealthy non-aristocratic candidates into a newly defined elite of equals39. Presumably, this procedure was modelled after the selection for office of the priestly families (genē), namely allotment among a group considered in human eyes to be equally qualified for office40.

19Cleisthenes maintained Solon’s rules of legitimacy, including the phratries who oversaw legitimate descent41, but he made several changes to the composition of the polis as community. A substantial number of new members seem to have been incorporated in the polis, and this mixture of old and new citizens was distributed into new administrative subgroups with hereditary membership. These “Cleisthenic” demes and phulai needed a cultic foundation, adding a host of new hiera to the polis cultic system42. The decades between 510 and 475 show a marked increase in visual representations of sacrificial activities at Athens, notably on vases, presumably reflecting this increased involvement of more citizens, male and female, in the polis43. The new system also engaged many more male citizens in active office representing the polis vis-à-vis the gods: the bouleutai as a civic body, for instance, offered sacrifice and prayed to Zeus Boulaios and Athena Boulaia on behalf of the polis44. Again, allotment brought about selection for office among the newly composed groups, beginning with the focal cult heroes of the new tribes themselves. According to Ath. Pol. 61.6, Cleisthenes asked the Pythia to select ten out of a preselected hundred heroes, who would be the new go-betweens between the Athenians and the gods and whose domains covered the entire Athenian polis in its new shape45. The priesthoods of the new cults probably were assigned to existing genē, who were qualified for these offices by their descent46.

20The third substantial change came about in Perikles’ Citizenship Law (451/0), which redefined the rules of membership by requiring two astos parents for legitimate citizen descent. This qualification gave access to polis priesthood and archai involving ancestral polis sacrifice to the whole citizen body, and seems to have caused a gradual disregard of the Solonian criteria for nearly all civic offices (see below)47. As of Perikles’ Law, the system remained in principle the same, albeit with periods when social needs or political disturbances led to temporary adjustments, until at least 22948.

21Was the composition of the Athenian citizen body explicitly cast in terms of hosiē? The earliest attestation of the lexeme in Athens occurs in the first extant literary texts after Solon, in Aeschylus’ tragedies, for instance in Suppl. 400-06 (ca. 460) where the chorus mentions hosia, i.e hosios acts of humans towards each other, a reward given by Zeus to people who are dikaios49. The word was apparently part of Athenian vocabulary in the first decades of the fifth century and next its use abounds in classical texts, not as the noun hosiē but as its many cognates, most prominently hosios used as an adjective or as a substantive50. As regards the citizen body, legitimacy and membership were rendered as participation in hiera and hosia of oikos and polis. The earliest extant references using this formula date to 427, the citizenship grant of the Plataians mentioned above, and to 403, when Perikles’ Citizenship law of 451/0 was reinforced51. It seems therefore quite likely that Perikles’ Law itself also cast membership of the polis in these terms. The first literary passage with the formula hiera kai hosia occurs in Thucydides’ account of the plague, where hosia refers all hosios acts and obligations among humans, notably the care of the dead52.

22An important but conjectural trace is the use of the formula in the ephebic oath, which now deserves being quoted in full53:

“I will not bring shame upon the sacred weapons, nor shall I desert the man beside me, wherever I stand in the line. I shall fight in defence of hiera kai hosia and I shall not hand the fatherland on lessened, but greater and better both as fas as I am able and in union with all. And I shall be obedient to whoever exercise power (krainontes) in a wise manner and to the laws (thesmoi) currently set up and to any set up in a wise manner in the future. If anyone destroys these, I shall not comply as far as I am able nor in union with all, and I shall honour the ancestral hiera. Witnesses: the gods Aglauros, Hestia, Enyo, Enyalios, Ares and Athena Areia, Zeus, Thallo, Auxo, Hegemone, Herakles, and the boundaries of my fatherland, wheat, barley, vines, olives, figs.”

23A text of the oath was dedicated, together with the “oath of Plataia” (the battle of 479) by the priest of Ares and Athena Areia at Acharnai in the third quarter of the fourth century with a new altar “in order that the Athenians and the Acharnians may be pious (eusebēs) towards the gods54.” The oath, sworn by the majority of adolescent males in the sanctuary of Aglauros on becoming an adult member of the polis, was a hosios act, engaging the gods as guardians of fundamental human relationships laid down in polis laws. It was the first formal oath by which male citizens confirmed their part in the covenant, a commitment to be repeated when entering bouleutic, dikastic or other civic office. Lykourgos recalled the oath in his speech against Leokrates (76-7), who had deserted the ancestral hiera.

24The original oath and its date can only be assessed in connection with an evaluation how the fourth-century decree relates to previous testimonies of these oaths – intensively debated issues of which a few points must suffice here. The text of the inscription contains words, phrases and concepts much older than the fourth-century; in particular the use of thesmoi for written laws predates the fifth century and so does the conception, that persons in power (krainontes = archontes?) rather than the dēmos authorise the laws55. Although the ephebic ritual surely changed over time, as it famously did in the 330s, these features of the text suggest that the oath goes back to the sixth century before Cleisthenes. As an oral form, the oath could easily and unperceptively absorb words of later date, hence we cannot be sure that the formula belonged to it right from the start. Nevertheless, considering the spreading of hosiē and cognates in the late archaic age and their presence as common usage in the early fifth century, it is not impossible that a phrase with hosia, and perhaps the whole formula hiera kai hosia, was part of the ephebic oath in the sixth century.

Hosia and the distribution of wealth and honour

25The formula hiera kai hosia comprises an interesting specification of hosiē: it refers to it not as the set of the rules or norms shaping the relationships between gods and humans, but as the things, material and immaterial, involved in this relationship. Hiera belong to the gods, and the word also refers to the ritual process by which humans give to the gods what is their due. Hosia, referring to things of humans, can denote anything, provided its use or intention meets with the terms of hosiē. Material hosios objects thus can be property used in a hosios way, immaterial hosios matters (acts, words, thoughts) are signs of a hosios life56. Moreover, all wealth, owned either privately or by the whole polis, is ultimately the result of gifts from the gods and human effort57. A hosios life entails eusebeia but it also fulfils the terms of dikē, which recalls the distribution of honour according to birth, status, achievement and, again, property in a way fitting divine and human order. The same order rules the society of the gods and defines the kind and size of contributions they are to give and receive. In other words, the entire covenant is bound up with distribution of property and the honours each is entitled to58. A dikaios distribution is a sine qua non for social stability among humans, but also for the gods, who depend on a well-ordered human society to receive their gifts59. The gods, moreover, need to approve of the representatives of human society with whom they are to engage. Although humans could quarrel among themselves about the most dikaios way to distribute honours (one of the major topics of political strife), the polis as a whole was responsible for the selection of its representatives and the quality of their actions, which frequently involved direct exchange with the gods. Beside priests, this qualification was foremost imperative in the actions of the archons and the boulē. In sum, the organisation of timai on the level of humans was intimately connected with hosiē, at Athens rendered as having a share in hosia.

26The polis as cultic community shows again a similar structure as single cults: after identifying the members of the group, contributions to the expenditures of the community and the portions each is to receive are to be determined. All polis members contribute to the common (dēmosios) means according to their status and property; this contribution (telos) is an agreement between humans, as is the privilege to be freed from such contributions (ateleia)60. Telos, in Athens and elsewhere, was not levied per capita but per household, thus sealing the social and economic ties between oikos and polis, between idios and dēmosios property61. The system clearly was based on the premise that the more one gives to the community, the more one is entitled to expect in return in the shape of socially important roles (timai), parts of honour (geras) of sacrifices and similar benefits. Determining such contributions and their rewards, first in kind, later in coined money, allowed fine-tuning the relations among humans, while deriving both authority and purpose from the covenant with the gods62.

27A part of this dēmosios money was meant to be used for hiera, i.e. to pay for sacrifices and maintenance of sanctuaries. In due course, communal obligations to the gods in the shape of sacrifices due on regular moments came to be listed in writing – an excellent example of hosiē transformed into polis decrees63. To such lists, called “sacrificial calendars” in modern scholarship, the costs came to be added, explicating recompense for divine favour in monetary detail. Just like the status differences between humans cast in telē, the obligations in money and kind in the sacrificial calendars showed the role of each divinity in the community and the gifts received or expected from him or her64. Although some of these gifts to the gods were paid out of the gods’ own (hieros) property, human property provided a part of the expenditure – as would be fitting, considering it was a gift in return for divine gifts65. Gifts given by the polis and local communities from common means (dēmosios) were recorded in these lists, sealing the covenant and re-establishing its terms.

28At Athens, Solon’s laws reconstituted the foundations of the polis not only by identifying its legitimate members, but also by a new system of contributions and timai for humans and gods, representing prevalent views on eunomia66. Among humans, he distinguished four new classes based on newly defined telē with specified timai and archai accorded to each67. For the gods, the laws included what was presumably the first calendar of polis sacrifices and other obligations68. A list, reputedly drawn up by Solon, balancing fixed values in kinds (animals, agricultural produce) that in the course of time were converted into money, underpinned the system69. An additional measure to create fair distribution concerned fixed timai, awarded by the polis to those who had participated in pan-Hellenic hiera and been granted victory by the gods70. Since the victor was thus honoured as a member of the polis, while such timai in money or kind were to be converted into sacrifices and votives to the gods, the victory of a prominent individual was (ac)claimed as a benefit to the entire polis in the context of the covenant. This regulation inaugurated a tendency that was only to increase in the next two centuries. Successes of individual Athenians were incorporated in the symbolic capital of the whole polis by acclaiming the victor as an Athenian, rather than as a member of a family, awarding honorific accoutrements (crowns, stelai, statues) paid for with dēmosios money and to be dedicated to the gods71.

29Polis decisions dating to the first half of the sixth century – either as a part or as a result of Solon’s laws – saw to new polis officials to manage the hiera. The tamiai of Athena, selected by lot from the highest Solonian class, were to keep the hieros money of Athena and subsequently also dēmosios money kept on the Akropolis72. The year of office of the Tamiai was fixed from Panathenaia to Panathenaia, when they had to account for the expenditures. A group of hieropoioi was to supervise the Panathenaia, in particular laying out the dromos for running and chariot racing; some of the first groups in office set up stelai recording their votives for Athena73. Whether the costs involved in the festival were met by Athena’s, idios or dēmosios property, is not recorded, but it is attractive to suppose that the (re)organisation of the Panathenaia of 566 was facilitated by a decision to spend dēmosios means on this major polis festival. It is plausible that the city had a common fund at the time, as attested in other poleis74. The first extent reference, however, occurs in the Salamis-decree of ca. 500 (IG I³ 1), where payment is recorded ἐς δεμόσιο[ν], the polis treasury. The statement, that the Salaminian clerouchs are to pay their telos “as Athenians”, confirms their status in terms of obligations to the community. Of about the same date is an account of Rhamnous, mentioning dēmosios money belonging to the deme to be used for hiera75.

30Hieros and dēmosios refer to ownership by the gods and humans respectively, but do not indicate the purpose of the money; hosios, however, came to indicate just that. The steps from managing and recording financial obligations of the dēmos in the context of hosiē to accounting for such monies and labeling them hosios seem logical. The first extant instance of money actually called hosios occurs in an account of ca. 450-425 of the deme Ikarion (IG I³ 253). It refers to dēmosios money presumably to be used for the Dionysia, that are the subject of financial and other regulations on the reverse of the same stone (IG I³ 254). A similar association between financial obligations to the gods and hosiē is made in the Kallias-decree (IG I³ 52 A), by which the boulē and dēmos decided to create the Treasury of the Other Gods (434/or 433/2)76. Kallias proposed to repay all the polis’ debts to the other gods, i.e. loans of hieros monies plus interest, but to keep this money in a separate treasury, controlled by a new board of tamiai. This board was to take care of the money hόσα δυνατὸν ϰαὶ ὅσιον (l.16) “as much as in their power and hosios”. Here, the proper way of safekeeping money in the framework of obligations to the gods is called hosios77.

31From the fourth century onward, hosios money is often mentioned, both in Athens and elsewhere. Delphi had hosia monies owned by humans but meant to be used for gifts to the gods, notably sacrifice and votives such as by former slaves on manumittance; five hosioi, public finance officials, were to keep these monies78. In fifth-century Athens, hosios money referred primarily to expenditure for gifts to the gods, as we just saw, such as sacrifice, sanctuaries and festivals. In the fourth century, the use of hosios money belonging to the polis (dēmosios) seems to have been extended to financing hosios actions more generally, such as payment of dikastai or the theoric fund79. Raising hieros and dēmosios income was a prominent aim of Lykourgos’ policy, of which the leasing of newly acquired land to enhance the festivities of the Panathenaia is a telling example80. In the course of the fourth century, Athens distinguished between hieros and hosios money more formally: Demosthenes mentions two separate treasuries, the dioikēsis of hieros and of hosios money. Perhaps the latter were the dēmosios monies kept by the Tamiai of Athena81. Responsibility of this money in terms of expenses and accountability was in the first place the duty of the boulē, usually represented in special subcommittees. Inscriptions show how frequently the boulē had to deal with property of the gods82; handling this hieros money thus required acting hosiōs. Ultimately, the dēmos was responsible, since the bouleutai represented the dēmos, and the covenant within which these transactions took place involved the gods with the whole polis83.

Hosiē, human conduct and polis laws

32Hiera and hosia represent two sides of one system of reciprocity between gods and humans. The domains of human behaviour covered by hosiē are of particular concern to the gods: observance of justice, respect for cults, in particular ancestral cults of oikos and polis, piety towards the dead, respect for parents, commitment to oaths and observing rules of purity. Since the polis was responsible for the conduct of its members, it had to create appropriate laws and to exclude those who broke these laws from the covenant, i. e. from participation in hiera. Taken together, the laws show the polis fulfilling its obligations on the human side of the covenant. The committee responsible for the new edition of Athens’ laws in the years 410399, for instance, was “to write down the hosia and the hiera84”. Among these laws were Drako’s law on homicide, the laws of Solon (brushed up or re-inscribed) and the polis’ sacrificial calendar. The duties of the archons as listed in the Athenaiōn Politeia (56-58) illuminate how the responsibility of the polis was specified in the authority of their archai; Ath. Pol. includes some recent changes, but the lists consist for the major part of traditional elements, beginning with those of the Archon Eponymous85. I add labels 1 (hosiē = human organisation of giving hiera), 2 (hosiē = hosios human conduct) and 3 (hosia = human property (potentially) involved in hosiē 1) to summaries of the archons’ duties.

33The name of the Archon Eponymous (Ath. Pol. 56) fixed the Athenian year in time (1: themis!); he announced that all would keep and control their property until the end of his office (3); he appointed three chorēgoi for tragedies from among the wealthiest (1, 3); he authorised chorēgoi appointed by the phulai for men’s and boys’ competitions, for the comedies at the Dionysia, for men’s and boys’ choruses at the Thargelia (1, 3); he dealt with antidosis for these choruses and claims of exemption of this leitourgia (1, 3); he appointed chorēgoi for Delos and a procession-leader for the ship (1, 3); he supervised processions of Asklepios, of the City Dionysia (together with epimeletai, formerly 10 wealthy men elected, now 10 allotted with 10 mnai dēmosios money), of the Thargelia, and of Zeus Soter (1, 3); he was in charge of the competitions at the Dionysia and Thargelia (1, 2); he was in charge of the graphai and dikai for ill-uses of parents, of heiresses, of orphans (2); and of everything concerning epiklēroi, orphans and widows (2, 3)86.

34The Archon Basileus (Ath. Pol. 57) was in charge of the Eleusinian mysteries (with four epimeletai: two elected from all Athenians, one from the Eumolpidai, one from the Kerykes) (1); of the Dionysia Lenaia (procession Basileus plus epimeletai, competition Basileus), torch races and ancestral sacrifices (1); of the graphai for asebeia (2); of dikai about priesthoods and perquisites in the genē (1, 2, 3); of cases for homicide with various courts on various locations depending on the charge (2); he announced exclusion from hiera (1, 2). The Polemarchos (Ath. Pol. 58), finally, sacrificed to Artemis Agrotera and Enyalios (1, 3), was in charge of the funeral games of the war dead (1, 2), sacrificed enagismata for Harmodios and Aristogeiton (1, 2), and was in charge of dikai concerning foreigners (metoikoi and proxenoi), distributing such cases by lot to phulai and assigning dikastai (2).

35While these nomoi exemplify how the polis organised participation in hiera kai hosia, conversely a wrongdoer against polis laws guarding hosiē could be punished with exclusion from hiera (see above, Archon Basileus), which effectively cast him or her outside the community sustained by the covenant, tantamount to a social death87. An essential element of the polis’ integrity was its ritual purity, for instance when affected by homicide. A killer, whether justified in his act or not, was polluted until he was ritually purified. He could not enter any sanctuary (hieron) and was excluded from the group sharing the ritual. Drako’s law dealt with restrictions on a killer’s membership of a community (meteinai) defined by its hiera:

“[The lawgiver] debars the offender from everything in which the deceased used to have a share (meteinai) in his lifetime, first from his fatherland (patris) and everything therein, both the hiera and the hosia, assigning the frontier-market as the boundary from which he declares him excluded [...] and from the hiera of the Amphictyonic communities, in which he, if he was a Greek, had a share.. and from the Games pertaining to the whole of Greece, in which all have a share (meteinai) and hence also the victim88.”

36Against this background, the law of the Lykourgan reconstruction period of 337/6 “against tyranny” is notable. It stated that “whoever kills the man who has done any of these things (= establish a tyranny) shall be hosios89”. In other words, the polis decided that killing someone who planned to destroy the politeia would be not only dikaios but also katharos and apparently would need no purification. The integrity of the politeia thus ranked higher on the scale of obligations of hosiē than purity with regard to homicide.

37Another interesting passage in the Athenaiōn Politeia (43.2-6) concerns the agenda of the boulē and Assembly. The Assembly was to meet at least four times in each prytany, to deal with, respectively:

1. confirmation of the magistrates in office; food supply; defence; requests for trials by anyone who wishes (ho boulomenos); and issues regarding confiscated estates or heiresses;
2. petitions, namely anyone wishing to discuss a matter, either idios or dēmosios, taking the form of a supplication;
3. and 4. all other business, in two sessions, dealing with three cases of hiera, three audiences of heralds and ambassadors, and three cases of hosia.

38This order of items cannot easily be recognised in extant decrees, but priority of the hiera is well attested90. It seems that meetings nos. 3 and 4 dealt with all relationships of the polis beyond those of the oikos in which the gods were particularly involved. As we saw, hiera and hosia were not only conceptually, but also in practice closely related. Nevertheless, the Assembly apparently distinguished between them in terms of administration. Hiera were in the first place the gods’ properties and sacrifices, and on the agenda presumably included all human management necessary to handle this properly. Hosia would concern human property and conduct, and in fact covered a great variety of hosios acts or things, as exemplified in the duties of the archons. Since many kinds of dikē were already provided for in the first two meetings, hosia here probably concerned the finance of hiera and hosiē in the widest sense from dēmosios funds91. In addition, they might have included other hosios issues, to do with purification, oaths, or burial, such as the dēmosios burials at the Kerameikos.

39As the boundaries of the domain covered by hosiē cannot be sharply drawn, the value term hosios could be applied to many things and acts making hosios a useful tool in political debates. Yet, as we just saw, there seems to have been a certain sense of the core issues comprised in hosiē and that these were the heart of the politeia. An eloquent testimony is found in Xenophon’s evocation of the darkest days of civil war of 404/3 when the democratic partisans faced the Thirty tyrants and their troops. The herald of the Eleusinian mysteries with his fine voice loudly addressed the latter across the plain:

“Fellow politai, why do you drive us out of the city? Why do you wish to kill us? For we did you never any harm, but we have shared with you the most solemn hiera and sacrifices (thusia) and the most splendid festivals (heortai) and we have been in choruses together and schoolmates and comrades in arms and we have faced many dangers with you by land and by sea in defence of the common safety and freedom of us both. In the name of the gods of our fathers and our mothers, of our ties of kinship and comradeship, for all these many of us share with one another, cease, out of shame before gods and men, to act wrongly towards your fatherland and do not obey those most anhosios Thirty [who bring upon us] a war utterly shameful and terrible and utterly anhosios and hateful to gods and men92.”

40The herald casts the commonality of all politai in terms of shared hiera and shared descent, and growing up together as young men. His words seems to echo the ephebic oath (see above), with its pledge to keep the hiera kai hosia and to stick to one’s comrade in the battle line. Oath taking was a particularly hosios act, and, after the ephebic oath, adult (male) citizens repeatedly took such oaths on the polis’ gods. Acting against these oaths once sworn before their ancestral gods, the oligarchic party acted anhosiōs: waging anhosios war against their fellow politai, they wrecked the politeia.

***

41In classical Athens, membership of the polis was articulated as participation in hiera, gift-giving of humans to the gods, and hosia, everything humans have, use, or do that complies with hosiē, rules about the relations between humans and the gods. Hosiē included regulations about the composition of a group of sacrificers and this also applied to the polis as community in its exchange with the gods. Moreover, it referred to rules of human conduct especially safeguarded by the gods. Hiera kai hosia thus included all material and immaterial interests of the polis entailed in the covenant between the polis and the gods, in other words the political in the widest sense. The polis’ responsibility for its side of the covenant vis-à-vis the gods was embodied in its laws and in its offices, i.e. archai and priest(ess)hoods, and the distribution of wealth and honours underlying them. Running this human side of things can be defined as the domain of politics. From well before Solon until after Lykourgos, the political was considered to be a continuity, the ancestral politeia of Athens preserved over time. Politics were the legitimate area of change: Solon, Cleisthenes, Perikles and Lykourgos created far-reaching alterations in the domain of humans, which derived their legitimacy from the perpetual covenant with the gods.