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Les Parva naturalia d’Aristote

 | 
Pierre-Marie Morel
, 
Christophe Grellard

Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs

Aristotle’s Parva naturalia in Arabic Guise

Rotraud Hansberger

Texte intégral

  • 1 For details, see R. Goulet ed., Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, Paris, 1989, s.v. “Aristote (...)
  • 2 I.e. from De sensu et sensibilibus to De longitudine et brevitate vitae.

1By the end of the 10th century, most of the texts that constitute the Aristotelian corpus had been translated into Arabic,1 and on the face of it the Parva naturalia are no exception to that: at least their first six treatises2 were transmitted in Arabic, known by the collective title of Kitâb al-Hiss wa-lmahsüs, ‘Book of Sense-Perception and the Perceived’. However, this ‘transmission’ was of a peculiar kind: Kitāb al-Hiss wa-l-mahsūs does not constitute what we would call a ‘translation’ of the Parva naturalia. Instead it is an adaptation that is, in fact, characterised far more by Neoplatonic and Galenic than by Aristotelian ideas.

  • 3 Ms. Rampur 1752, fol. 7a-54b; see I.‘A. ‘Arshi, Catalogue of the Arabie Manuscripts in Raza Library (...)

2Given that the text of Kitāb al-Hiss wa-1-mahsüs itself has only recently been rediscovered, this circumstance has long put constraints on any enquiry into the transmission of the Parva naturalia, since not much was known about the text Arabic authors were referring to by the title Kitāb al-Hiss wa-lmahsūs – that it was not identical with the version of the Parva naturalia we know, however, was obvious. Thanks to Hans Daiber’s discovery, now some twenty years ago, of an acephalous copy of Kitāb al-Hiss wa-1-mahsūs in a17th century manuscript in the Raza Library in Rampur (India),3 we are now in a position to examine the text itself. While this presents a big step forward in our understanding of the transmission of Aristotle’s Parva naturalia in Arabic, the text raises many questions of its own, and does not allow us to reach many definitive answers regarding its origins. A lack of reliable external data, for instance on date and authorship of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs, contributes to the problem.

  • 4 R. Hansberger, ibid.

3In this article, I will present, in summarised fashion, some of the results of my doctoral thesis, the first edition and study of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs.4 After a general description of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs and its relation to the Greek Parva naturalia (1) I will sketch the main theories that dominate the adaptation (2), and outline the tentative conclusions regarding the origins of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs(3); I will then illustrate the character of the adapted text, and the modus operandi of the adaptor, with textual examples (4), before concluding with a brief survey of the reception of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs in the mediaeval Arab world (5).

  • 5 Cf. below p. 145, n. 6, p. 150.

41. Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs is divided into three sections (maqālas). The first maqāla contains the equivalent to De sensu et sensibilibus; its beginning is missing in the Rampur manuscript. The second maqāla is again subdivided; the first part represents De memoria et reminiscentia, the second one, entitled Bābal-Nawm wa-l-yaqaẓa (Chapter on Sleep and Waking), comprises the equivalents of De somno et vigilia, De insomniis, and De divinatione per somnum. The third maqāla contains the Arabic counterpart of De longitudine et brevitate vitae. That said, the Arabic text does by no means constitute a faithful rendering of the Greek Parva naturalia. First of all, only parts of the Aristotelian treatises are represented in the Arabic text; conversely, those passages in the Arabic text that do reflect text from the Parva naturalia do not themselves make up even half of the text of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-lmaḥsūs. In the surviving parts of the first maqāla we find nothing that would amount to a translation or paraphrase of any passage in De sensu;5 in the case of De memoria and De somno, roughly 30% of the Greek text can be said to be represented (however vaguely) in the Arabic, accounting for about 35 and 30% of the equivalent parts of the second maqāla respectively. As for De insomniis and De divinatione, only traces of the Greek text are left in the Arabic version. The third and final maqāla of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs reflects about 40% of the Greek De longitudine, the Aristotelian passages making up about the same percentage of the Arabic text.

  • 6 This is the case to a lesser degree in the third maqāla, where all chapters of De longitudine are r (...)

5Apart from the issue of quantity, even where the Arabic represents Aristotelian text it rarely does this in a faithful manner. This may partly be due to shortcomings of the translation itself, but for the most part it is a result of the adaptation, which fuses its additional, non-Aristotelian material together with passages taken from the Parva naturalia. In those cases where more substantial amounts of the Aristotelian text are identifiable in the Arabic, i. e. De memoria, De somno, and De longitudine, a recurring pattern can be observed: the beginning of the Greek treatise is translated comparatively exactly and completely; further on, however, the translation becomes more patchy and less precise. More and more of the Aristotelian text is omitted; the last chapters of the Greek treatises are more or less left out altogether.6 Meanwhile the passages of added material grow longer and longer; in the last third or so of the Arabic counterparts of De memoria and De somno, added material makes up the bulk of the text, with only occasional appearances of short phrases or keywords relating to the Greek Parva naturalia.

6Consequently, not much of the original philosophical content of the Parva naturalia can be detected in Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs. The Arabic Parva naturalia are dominated by ideas expressed in the added material. At the same time, the text does not reveal the author or the source of this additional material, maintaining Aristotle, and Aristotle alone, to be its author. As a result, the theories proposed by the adaptor (or adaptors) were introduced into later Arabic philosophy as those of the Stagirite.

  • 7 For a more detailed account, see R. Hansberger, “HOW Aristotle Came to Believe in God-given Dreams: (...)
  • 8 The adaptor may have drawn upon translations of works by Galen himself, or texts from the later med (...)

72. The most prominent, and at the same time most influential, doctrine of the adaptation concerns divination through dreams — the issue in which the Arabic Parva naturalia most strikingly deviate from Aristotle’s text.7 Its most important psychological component, the ‘three-faculty theory’ (as I call it), is based on the Galenic concept of the mental faculties of imagination, cogitation, and memory which are located in the brain ventricles and are operated by the animal spirit’.8 In Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs, these faculties play an all-important role in dreaming: in contrast to the senses, they stay active during sleep, producing dreams by occupying themselves with prior perceptions. However, through them the human soul may become the recipient of veridical dreams as well, which are not related to prior perception but come to the dreamer from ‘outside’. Here the second component of the adaptor’s theory comes into play, a metaphysical framework that betrays Neoplatonic leanings. The ultimate cause of veridical dreams is God, their direct source, however, the ‘universal intellect’. In one act of creation, God has created everything that is ever going to exist in this intellect; there it exists as ‘intellectual form’ before eventually coming to be in the world as ‘corporeal form’. Therefore the universal intellect can reveal to human beings in veridical dreams what will come to pass in the future. What is revealed in a dream is not, however, the ‘intellectual form’ of a thing or event, but its ‘spiritual form’ which, having the same qualities as the stored images of past perceptions, is accessible to the aforementioned three (at times called ‘spiritual’) faculties of the dreamer. These faculties are not only responsible for the dream itself but also for assigning it the right interpretation, and for remembering both after awakening. The veridical dream owes its prophetic character to the fact that it as well as the prophesied event are just two different representations of one and the same ‘intellectual form’. This is also why it is sometimes possible for third persons to interpret divinatory dreams correctly: they are subject to the same revelation from the universal intellect, though they do not receive it in the form of a dream, but as ‘spiritual words’ (a concept not specified any further).

  • 9 This order reflects the location of the faculties in the ventricles of the brain as the adaptor wil (...)

8Although in this part of the theory we find a three-tier hierarchy of intellectual, spiritual and corporeal forms, suggesting that the ‘spiritual’ holds an intermediate position between the material and the immaterial realm (perhaps even retaining the ultimately material aspect that ‘spirit’ carried in Greek medicine), the adaptor generally favours a clear dichotomy between ‘spiritual’ and corporeal’, where spirituality is practically equated with immateriality, and represents the realm of the pure, perfect incorporeal ‘higher world’, as opposed to the impure, imperfect corporeal world. Against the background of this dichotomy, the mental faculties are ordered hierarchically in terms of their ‘spirituality’, with perception belonging to the corporeal world, and imagination, cogitation, and memory increasingly partaking of spirituality.9 The ambivalence with regard to the concept of spirituality may suggest that several adaptors were at work – generally a very real possibility in Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs – , but in the present case it more likely indicates that there are passages in Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs where the adaptor stays more closely to his source texts, and passages where he shapes the text more actively.

9While the added material introduces and discusses various other themes as well, many of them of medical nature, the three-faculty theory and the theory of divinatory dreams are the issues closest to the adaptor’s heart, as we can see from the prominence and the space they are given in Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs The three-faculty theory plays a role in both parts of the second maqāla and also appears in the extant pages of the first maqāla. (It is absent from the third maqāla, which of course deals with a rather unrelated topic, and which is the section of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs to have received the least attention from the adaptor.) Nevertheless it is the theory of divinatory dreams that seems to be the central concern of the adaptor: due mainly to the added material, Bāb al-Nawm wa-l-yaqaẓa is the longest section of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs (covering fifty-three of the surviving ninety-six manuscript pages), and it is effectively permeated by the topic of divinatory dreams from beginning to end.

10In any case the theory of divinatory dreams is certainly the most eyecatching and defining feature of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs. Being diametrically opposed to everything Aristotle has to say on the topic in De divinatione per somnum, it furthermore adds a particular edge to the question of how the Arabic adaptation of the Parva naturalia came into being.

  • 10 See below p. 160 f.

113. Unfortunately we have but little information on the origins of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs. The situation is complicated by the fact that we have to account for both a translation process and an adaptation process, which may (or may not) have been linked to each other. The Rampur manuscript does not reveal any dates or names that could help us identify the translator or the adaptor(s); and references in Arabic bibliographical works, although they do exist, do not provide any reliable data, either.10 The enquiry into genesis and provenance of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs therefore has to rely entirely on clues provided by the text itself.

12In my doctoral dissertation I have approached the problem through a detailed analysis of major parts of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs, with particular emphasis on the second maqāla. In what follows I will present the main results of this study without, however, being able to broach the underlying arguments in any detail.

13As mentioned earlier, the Aristotelian text is not separated clearly from the added material in Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs; we are not looking at the case of a text accompanied by a clearly demarcated commentary. Aristotelian and added material are fused together to constitute one text; the translated Aristotelian text in Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs can be identified as such solely in comparison with the Greek text of the Parva naturalia. The often rather fragmentary character of the Aristotelian text further reduces the number of passages that can actually be used to assess the style and quality of the translation.

  • 11 As, e.g., the doxographical work of Ps.-Ammonius, or Ps.-Ishaq’s translation of De anima. See R. Ha (...)
  • 12 For a comprehensive description of this group, their extant works and stylistic characteristics, se (...)

14As far as one can tell from the Aristotelian passages that survive in Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs, the text of the Parva naturalia was in all likelihood translated directly from the Greek; there is no evidence for a Syriac intermediary. The translation seems to be comparatively early, produced perhaps in the early 9th century A.D. It is generally of rather poor quality. Time and again the translator appears to struggle with Greek syntax, and even in those passages that come closest to the Greek text the Aristotelian doctrines are conveyed in a simplified, if not distorted fashion. The poor quality of the translation supports the assumption that it is early, an assumption otherwise endorsed by terminological characteristics that place the text in vicinity to other early Graeco-Arabica.11 The regular presence of certain introductory and summarising formulae in particular links the text to the style of the so-called ‘Kindi circle’,12 a group of translators working for the 9th century philosopher al-Kindī in Baghdad. However, these formulae are at least equally prominent in the additional material, and hence could be a feature of the adaptation rather than the original translation of the Parva naturalia. The same goes for the use of certain technical terms.

15The distinction between features of translation and adaptation is in fact generally problematic in Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs. This is directly related to the poor representation of Aristotelian text in Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs (in terms of quality as well as quantity). It means that we cannot quite be sure whether what we identify as ‘Aristotelian text in Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs represents the original Arabic translation of the Parva naturalia, or a subsequently altered version, all the more so as-not surprisingly, perhaps-the additions of the adaptation are frequently linked to instances of‘misrepresentation’ of Aristotle’s text. Where does a flawed translation or paraphrase end and adaptation begin? What should count as an innocent mistake and what as deliberate distortion? Do deviations point to the translator’s limitations, the poor condition of the Greek manuscript he used, or a deviant Greek archetype? To what extent are they the responsibility of the translator, the adaptor(s), or glossators? Again, was the Aristotelian text in Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs excerpted from a more complete Arabic translation of the Parva naturalia? Or was the Greek text available to the translator already truncated and altered in comparison to the extant Greek version we know?

  • 13 That the Arabic tradition of the Parva naturalia points to the existence of a second Greek version, (...)

16Too little has survived of the Aristotelian text for us to determine to what degree the Greek text used by the Arabic translator was identical with the extant text of the Parva naturalia. This does not mean, however, that we have to assume that Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs is, as it stands, a more or less accurate translation of an altered Greek version of the Parva naturalia.13 On the contrary, there are indications that the bulk of the additions and alterations that are now visible in Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs were carried out in the Arabic text, i.e. after the translation process, or perhaps also in the course of it. The adaptation further seems to have been effected in several – two or more – stages (not counting later glosses).

17To begin with, the Arabic text does not give the impression of having been penned by one single author. In particular, there are stylistic differences between passages devoted to the aforementioned three-faculty theory, and passages that contain mainly Aristotelian text, even if the translation may in some instances have undergone alterations under the influence of the adaptation.

18Furthermore, the added material is not homogeneous in itself and its various themes and ideas are occasionally at odds with each other. On the one hand, there is the most distinctive theme of the adaptation, the three-faculty theory and the theory of veridical dreams. Some of the added passages, on the other hand, seem more closely connected to, or motivated by, the translated Aristotelian text. If the adaptation was carried out in several stages, the translator could thus have been the first (though not the main) adaptor of the text.

19The adaptation frequently takes its cues from, and builds on misrepresentations of the Aristotelian text. Prima facie this may appear to speak for deliberate distortions of the text at the hands of the adaptor. But whether deliberate or not, in many cases the nature of those misrepresentations is such as to be most easily explained within the scenario of a translation process. This not only concerns the general reduction and simplification of Aristotelian doctrine prevalent in Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs, but also features such as the rendering of a sentence from the Parva naturalia where every Greek word is accounted for in the translation, but which nevertheless conveys a meaning entirely different from that of the original; or the development of a thought depending on the misunderstanding (and consequently mistranslation) of a word that is equivocal in Greek. This does not mean that all misrepresentations of the Aristotelian text are due to simple translation errors, but it does show that the translator experienced difficulties with the text, a circumstance which, in turn, may have made him more prone to add to, and elaborate on his text, and which will have provided opportunities for a later adaptor to do the same.

  • 14 G. Endress, op. cit., n. 12, p. 59.
  • 15 See e.g. G. Endress, Proclus Arabus, “Beiruter Texte und Studien” 10, Beirut-Wiesbaden, E Steiner, (...)

20While the translator may have been the first adaptor of the text, the most prominent additions, i.e. the passages containing the three-faculty theory, seem to have been introduced at a different stage of adaptation, by the ‘main adaptor of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs. He will have worked with a translation of the Parva naturalia, possibly excerpting the text (if indeed it was originally more substantial), and combining it with material taken from other Graeco-Arabic sources. That he had ties to the Kindī circle, a group renowned for producing translations with ‘a tendency towards interpretation with a markedly Neoplatonic preference’,14 is suggested not only by stylistic and linguistic characteristics, but also by certain theoretical and doctrinal features, as for example the notion of‘spirituality’ which we find in Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs as well as in other Kindī-circle texts.15

  • 16 See G. Endress, ibid., and further F. W. Zimmermann, “The Origins of the so-called Theology of Aris (...)
  • 17 See R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 3, p. 190 ff.

21The link to the Kindī circle is further corroborated by the extant pages of the first maqāla, which contains what appear to be so far unknown excerpts from the Arabic translation of Plotinus’ Enneads IV-VI, a work which was produced in the Kindī circle.16 The fragments we find in the first maqāla stem, appropriately enough, from Ennead IV.6: On sense-perception and memory.17

22Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs is not, however, in all aspects a typical Kindī-circle text. It is unusual first of all in its general appearance: it is badly structured, inhomogeneous, repetitive, not always intelligible, and at times self-contradictory. This may partly be due to the incorporation of later glosses, or to other accidents of transmission; but nevertheless the text does leave the impression of never having been subjected to a final revision.

234. Despite this somewhat untidy appearance of the text, the adaptation does not seem to have been produced in a rushed or superficial manner. In the following, I will discuss three passages from the second maqāla where we can see the adaptor employ skill and diligence in fusing Aristotelian text and added material together. The examples are also meant to give a more tangible idea of the character of the text.

24Clauses are numbered for easy identification of parallel phrases in the Arabic and the Greek version. In addition, words or phrases that represent Greek text are printed bold in the English translation of the Arabic text. For editorial reasons the Arabic text (reproduced without critical apparatus) is printed on a separate page at the end of this article.

25i) Ms. Rampur 1752, fols. 10b, 25 – 11a, 12

(1) I also say that whatever a man sees, hears, senses, looks at or touches, when he acts [on it] with [his] memory, he will not say in his soul: ‘I have sensed [11a] this’or ‘I have heard it’ or ‘I have seen it’ (2) but he will search for it in another way which is more noble than finding it by senseperception. (3) For memory is not sense-perception, (4) by which things are perceived, because sense-perception can perceive things through a body only. (5) As for memory, it is an innate faculty which perceives things [in] abstracted [form], (6) and it perceives them only after time [has passed]. (7) As for perceiving them at the time of their existence or in the time to come, this is not the function of memory, nor can it be attributed to memory.

  • 18 Greek passages of the Parva naturalia are quoted according to Ross’ edition, W.D. Ross, Aristotle. (...)

Ar., De mem., 1, 449b22-2518

(1) ἀεὶ γὰρ ὃταν ἐνεργῇ κατὰ τò μνημονεύειν, οὕτως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λέγει, ὃτι πρότερον τοῦτο ἣκουσεν ᾒσθετο ἐνόησεν.

(3) ἒστι μὲν οὖν μνήμη οὒτε αἲσθησις

οὒτε ὑπόληψις,

(5?) ἀλλὰ τούτων τινòς ἓξις πάθος,

(6) ὃταν γένηται χρόνος.

(1) For whenever someone is actively engaged in remembering, he always says in his soul in this way that he heard, or perceived, or thought this before.

  • 19 English translation by R. Sorabji, Aristotle on Memory, second edition, Londres, Duckworth, 2004, p (...)

(3) Therefore memory is not perception or conception, (5?) but a state or affection connected with one of these, (6) when time has elapsed.19

  • 20 The term ‘innate’ (ghariziyya) appears, rather unusually, to be derived from Greek hexis; this is s (...)

26This is a typical example of a passage where we can see the Arabic text following the Greek words, while at the same time diverging from its sense and spirit. In several instances elements of the three-faculty theory have found their way into the paragraph: in the description of memory as a ‘faculty’,20 and in the contention that memory is ‘nobler’ than sense-perception, that it ‘perceives in abstracted form’ and is not associated with corporeality in the same way as sense-perception. These references to the adaptor’s theory are all found in the additional material of clauses (2), (4), and (5). Nevertheless they are tightly linked to the ‘Aristotelian’ sentence (1) — to be exact: to the negation () that has somehow slipped in, converting the meaning of the translated sentence into the exact opposite of its original Greek counterpart. This negation could be the result of a misreading of the Greek original: houtôs (which is in fact not explicitly translated in the Arabic) could easily have been mistaken for the Greek negation oupôs, or perhaps for ou or ouk, if the Greek manuscript was illegible or defective. Alternatively, the negation could have been inserted deliberately by someone wanting to alter the meaning of (1), the most likely candidate being, of course, the main adaptor of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs.

27What is remarkable about this negation is that it seems extremely implausible. Up to this point, the one topic that the Arabic text has focused on more than anything else (and much more so than Aristotle’s De memoria) is memory’s being solely concerned with things that have happened, and have been perceived, in the past (cf. clauses 6 and 7). What would be more natural in such a context than to say that memory is accompanied by the awareness that one has perceived before what one is now remembering? In the Arabic adaptation, however, the additional sentences (2), (4), and (5) let the matter appear in a new light, alter the emphasis within (1) and in effect provide a coherent interpretation. (Needless to say, Aristotle’s point is completely lost in the process!) The focus is shifted away from the thought that we can remember only what we have perceived (thought, known) before; what the Arabic text says is rather that even if that is so, we do not remember through recourse to sense-perception, but by means of a higher, ‘nobler’ faculty that is removed from the corporeal objects of sense-perception, dealing instead with abstract’, immaterial objects. From the perspective of the adaptation this is a masterful reinterpretation of the passage: building on Aristotle’s own words, it promotes a concept of memory quite different from that of the Stagirite. Most importantly, the adaptor avoids calling memory a ‘state or affection connected with perception’; according to the Arabic text, memory is distinct from perception and of a very different quality.

28The at first sight implausible negation in clause (1) hence turns out to be very well suited to the adaptor’s purposes, and this may tempt one to think he inserted the negation deliberately, especially as this negation is implausible enough in the context of the original text as to make one wonder whether the translator should not have realised the mistake. On the other hand, there would have been no particular need for the adaptor to take this step which, after all, resulted in the statement of (1) – a statement that even within the adaptation strikes one as baffling and uncalled for, and that moreover is at odds with the paragraph directly preceding it (cf. De mem., 1, 449b9-21). Without the crucial negation, clause (1) would have been perfectly compatible not only with the preceding, but also with the following lines, where the text comes back again to the point that memory is to do with the past (6, 7). There would have been little need or motive to change (1), and there would have been easier ways for the adaptor to avoid committing himself to theoretical points he did not want to endorse. As there is a convincing textual explanation for the appearance of the negation it is, on the whole, more plausible to assume that it was present already in the translation of the Aristotelian text, and that the theoretically charged parts of the passage (2, the second part of 4, 5) were inserted by the adaptor in order to do away with the inconsistencies it created. That he should do so in the terms of his own favoured theory comes as no surprise.

29The hand of the adaptor is even more visible in Bāb al-Nawm wa-l-yaqaẓa, where we can see him reworking the Aristotelian text in an even bolder, and more deliberate way than in the part corresponding to De memoria. The following example stems from the first part of Bāb al-Nawm wa-l-yaqaẓa, a paragraph marking the transition from a passage of comparatively faithful translation of Aristotelian text (De som., 1,453b 11-31) to the first passage of mainly additional material in the chapter.

30ii) Ms. Rampur 1752, fol. 21b, 6 – 22a, 24

(1) This may [be shown to] prove true, and can be known, from [considering] the waking and the sleeping person. For a sleeper may perceive many things without doubting that those things that he is perceiving in his sleep are there while he is awake. (2) The difference between the perception of the waking and that of the sleeping person consists in that the sleeper perceives from inside only, whereby that [kind of] perception of his [takes place] without any movement on his part, whereas the waking person perceives from outside, that [kind of] perception [taking place] through movement. (3) Let us therefore say: the difference between sense-perception of the sleeping and of the waking person has become clear, [i.e.] which one of the two [types of] sense-perception is more apt and more correct; and this ought to be recognised and known. (4) The sense-perception of the sleeper, we shall then say, is sense-perception potentially, whereas the sense-perception of the waking person is sense-perception actually. (5) Whatever is potential is hard to perceive, whereas what is actual can be perceived and known. (6) However, the sense-perception of the sleeper, even though being potential, may emerge into actuality; although some of it will emerge in a clear and plain manner, while some of it will be difficult [to perceive] and unclear. (7) As for [the question which one is] the most perfect and the noblest of the two: the spiritual is nobler than the corporeal. However, [22a] the spiritual is not [considered] nobler than the corporeal by the corporeal, nor is the corporeal [considered] nobler than the spiritual by the spiritual; rather, the spiritual is [considered] nobler than the corporeal by the spiritual, whereas the corporeal is [considered] nobler than the spiritual by the corporeal; but it is not at all possible that the spiritual should be [considered] nobler by the corporeal, whereas it may indeed be possible that the spiritual, which we have said to be potential, is [considered] nobler by man than the corporeal, which we have said to be actual. (8) Evidence for the spiritual being nobler than the corporeal is that the spiritual indicates what will come to be in the future, whereas the corporeal indicates what has come to exist at the present time only. (9) When a person unifies his faculties through the most subtle of things and makes them one, he will see that thing which he sees potentially just as someone who sees it actually. It is because his faculties are separated that a man is prevented from seeing things potentially in the same manner as when he sees them actually...

Ar., De som., 1, 453b31-454a4; 454a7-11

(1) ἒτι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον γὰρ τòν ἐγρηγορότα γνωρίζομεν, τούτῳ καὶ τòν καθυπνοΰντῦ

(2) τòν δὲ αἰσθανόμενον ἐγρηγορέναι νομίζομεν, καὶ τòν ἐγρηγορότα πάντα τῶν ἒξωθέν τἰνος αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ κινήσεων.

[...] ἐπεὶ δὲ οὒτε τῆς ψυχῆς ἲδιον τò αἰσθάνεσθαι οὒτε τοῦ σώματος

(4) (οὖ γὰρ δύναμις, τούτου καὶ ἐνέργεια.

δὲ λεγομένη αἲσθησις ὡς ἐνέργεια κίνησίς τις διὰ τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστι), φανερόν ὡς οὒτε τῆς ψυχῆς τò πάθος ἲδιον, οὒτἂψυχον σῶμα δυνατòν αἰσθάνεσθαι.

  • 21 English translation by D. Gallop, Aristotle On Sleep and Dreams. A Text and Translation with Introd (...)

(1) Again, the point is clear from the following. We recognize a person as sleeping by the same mark as that by which we recognize someone as waking. (2) It is the person who is perceiving that we consider to be awake; and we take every waking person to be perceiving either something external or some movement within himself. [...] But given that perceiving belongs neither to the soul nor to the body solely (4) (for what owns any capacity also owns its exercise; and what is called perception, in the sense of exercise, is a certain movement of the soul by means of the body), it is plain that the affection is not peculiar to the soul, nor is a soul-less body capable of perceiving.21

31The most prominent (and crucial) feature of this paragraph is the dichotomy of spirituality and corporeality which, as I have mentioned above, is one of the favourite themes of the adaptor. We can see here how certain concepts stemming from the Aristotelian text, i.e. internal and external perception, movement, potentiality and actuality, are fitted into this dichotomy, which is at the same time equated with the distinction between waking and sleeping. Aristotle’s description of the waking state – always to be perceiving something, be it external objects or events within ourselves – is split up, resulting in a comparison of two opposite states: while external perception remains a characteristic of the waking state, internal perception is now made a feature of sleep. As a result, sleep and waking are not distinguished any longer by presence and absence of perception, but by two different kinds of perception. Again, in Aristotle’s text, a ‘movement within oneself’ constitutes an object of perception during the waking state. In the Arabic text, ‘movement within remains a feature of the waking state, but no longer as an object of perception: it represents the mode in which perception takes place, having become a criterion for the distinction between external and internal perception. The former is associated with movement, the latter with rest. The two keywords potentiality’ and ‘actuality’ (dunamis/energeia, clause 4), taken up in isolation from their immediate context, are integrated into the system with a similar manoeuvre. Potential perception is assigned to sleep, actual perception to waking. In (7) and (8), the ‘potential’ is finally identified as ‘spiritual’, perception during sleep hence declared spiritual; the ‘actual’ is identified as ‘corporeal’, and perception during waking accordingly pronounced corporeal. Spiritual things are then declared to be ‘nobler’ and ‘more perfect’ than corporeal things: while the corporeal (object of perception, we have to understand) can indicate only what exists at present, the spiritual points to things that will come to exist in the future.

32Obviously it has been the adaptor’s aim, in redesigning the paragraph, to link the perception of future events not only to the realm of the spiritual, but also to sleep, thus setting the stage for the theory of divinatory dreams. The adaptor achieves this by associating sleep with ‘internal’ and ‘potential’ sense-perception – both of them notions that are inspired by keywords in the Aristotelian text. This is then relatively easily linked to the spiritual realm, by contrasting it to ‘external’, ‘actual’ sense-perception, which belongs to waking, informs us of the present state of things and is associated with the material world.

33How ‘potential’, ‘spiritual’ perception is supposed to work at a psychological level, so that one will indeed perceive things that are potential as if they were actual (i.e. one will perceive future events as if they were reality already) is indicated in the immediately following passage. This kind of perception, we learn, requires the ‘union’ of the ‘three faculties’. Once they are separated, and perform each their proper function only, the faculties will not be able to carry out the function of internal perception properly. There will still be perception during sleep, but it will consist in dreams that do not portray things correctly, i.e. that are not foretelling the future.

34Even before the discussion of divinatory dreams gets under way, Bāb al-Nawm wa-l-yaqaẓa thus presents its reader with a clear-cut dichotomy that is obviously developed with this topic in mind. Collecting a number of aspects, the adaptor assigns them neatly to two sides:

sleep

waking

spirituality

corporeality

perception of future

perception of present

rest

motion

potentiality

actuality

internal perception

external perception

union of faculties

separation of faculties

  • 22 The adaptor seems to ignore an inconsistency that this dichotomy introduces into his text through s (...)

35Sleep, spirituality, and perception of the future are thus associated with each other.22 The other aspects mentioned in the table have supportive character. The integration of rest, potentiality, and internal perception into the system is, as we have seen, motivated by keywords in the Aristotelian text. The same is true of union versus separation of the faculties, as transpires further down in the text:

36iii) Ms. Rampur 1752, fol. 27b, 20f.

If this is so, then waking will inevitably [equal] the unfastening of the bond of the faculties, whereas sleep will [equal] the [fastened] bond of the faculties. Thus it has been established clearly and soundly that waking is the opposite of sleep.

Ar, De som., 1, 454b25-27

τῆς δαἰσθήσεως τρόπον τινὰ τὴν μὲν ἀκινησίαν καὶ οἶον δεσμòν τòν ὕπνον εἶναί φαμεν, τὴν δὲ λύσιν καὶ τὴν ἂνεσιν ἐγρήνορσιν.

  • 23 English translation by D. Gallop, op. cit., n. 21, p. 67.

And we maintain that sleep is, in a certain way, an immobilization or ‘fettering’ of perception; whereas its liberation or release is waking.23

37(That the expressions ‘bond of the faculties’ and ‘union of the faculties’ refer to the same thing is evident from a further passage (fol. 23b-24a), where both terms are used.)

38The quoted examples stand for many more passages of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l maḥsūs in which we can see the adaptor actively interfering with the Aristotelian text, reshaping it for his purposes. Such passages are particularly instructive in that they can tell us something about the adaptor’s very own interests and concerns. The main theories that the adaptation of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs puts forward, such as the three-faculty theory, are presented most clearly in the longer, continuous passages of additional material. These theories, however, are not the adaptor’s free invention; based as they are on Greek medical theory and philosophy, he will have drawn on Greek, or Graeco-Arabic, sources. So far, we do not know the specific sources he used; hence we cannot tell whether he quoted literally or freely, or how much of the added material in Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs he actually composed entirely himself. In those places, however, where he joins Aristotelian text and added material together, we can be certain to see himself at work, and the fruits of his creativity tell us something about his own preferences-as, for example, his predilection for dividing things up along the lines of the dichotomy between spirituality and corporeality.

39The careful work that the adaptor has performed in adjusting the Aristotelian text to his favoured theory demonstrates that the text transmitted in Arabic as Aristotle’s Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs was never supposed to be a mere collection of several authors’ proclamations on a certain range of topics. It was meant to be an adaptation. Whether its author (I mean the adaptor) meant it to be transmitted under Aristotle’s name is a question that one may speculate about; so far, however, there is no evidence to the contrary.

  • 24 E.g. in his Mabādi’ arā’ ahlal-madīna al-fāḍila; see R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 7, p. 73 f.
  • 25 See R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 3, p. 221 ff. Ibn Sinā’s authorship of al-Risāla al-Manāmiyya, whic (...)
  • 26 See R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 7, p. 72 f.
  • 27 Kitāb al-Ta‘bīr fil-ru’yā aw al-Qādirī fil-ta‘bīr, see R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 7, p. 69 ff.

405. Transmitted under Aristotle’s name, Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs was read and drawn upon by several mediaeval Arabic scholars. How big its impact really was is yet to be determined by future research, but it is already clear that the text had considerable influence. However, it is first and foremost the ideas contributed by the adaptation, namely the three-faculty theory and the theory of veridical dreams, that commanded the scholars’ interest, inspiring philosophical theories of prophecy and divination (naturally a salient topic in Islamic philosophy). Elements of the theories of Kitāb al-Hiss wa-l-maḥsūs are reflected in theories of dreaming and of prophecy in the work of al-Fārābī (d. ~950),24 even though he does not explicitly quote Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs as his source; and the Arabic Parva naturalia have most certainly been a source of inspiration for important parts of Ibn Sinas philosophical psychology, including, most significantly, his famous theory of the ‘internal senses’.25 Furthermore the text may have inspired the theory of veridical dreams in the Book of the Elements by the Jewish philosopher and physician Isaac Israeli (~855-~955).26 The ‘Brethren of Purity’ (Ikhwān al-Safā’, 10th century) could also have been influenced by the Arabic Parva naturalia, a point that is yet to be studied. Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs was, however, of interest not only to philosophers: it was, for example, also quoted by Abū Sa‘d al-Dīnawarī (fl. ~1010), the author of a dream manual.27

  • 28 See C. Di Martino, “Les Parva naturalia dans la tradition arabe”, in R. Goulet, Dictionnaire des Ph (...)
  • 29 See R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 3, p. 230 ft.; and R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 7, p. 67 f.
  • 30 See R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 7, p. 67.

41Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs received a keen response also in mediaeval Spain, where it found the interest of both Muslim and Jewish thinkers, and from where, through Ibn Rushds (d. 1198) Epitome of the Parva naturalia (Talkhīs Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs) its influence was to reach the Latin West.28 Until Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs was rediscovered, Ibn Rushd’s Epitome was the most important witness to the text. As we know now, it is based on a version of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs that must have been the same as, or very similar to, the one preserved in the Rampur manuscript.29 Before Ibn Rushd, it is in particular the philosopher Ibn Bājja (d. 1 138) who, with his theory of‘spiritual forms’, enthusiastically embraced some of the characteristic ideas of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs.30

  • 31 See her forthcoming article for details, op. cit., n. 8. I am indebted to Dr. Kahana-Smilansky for (...)
  • 32 See R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 7, p. 66, and cf. S. Pines, op. cit. n. 13, p. 147 ft.
  • 33 See A. Ravitzky, “Hebrew Quotations from the lost Arabic Recension of Parva naturalia", Jerusalem S (...)
  • 34 As documented in H. Kahana-Smilansky, op. cit., n. 8.

42The reception of the Arabic Parva naturalia, in particular its theories concerning sleep and dreams, within the Jewish scholarly community is currently being studied by Hagar Kahana-Smilansky.31 Direct quotations from Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs are found in the work Kitāb al-Muḥāḍara wa-lmudhākara by Moshe ibn ‘Ezra (~1060-~1140)32 in the context of poetical inspiration during sleep; and quotations in Hebrew translation, again from passages devoted to the theory of divination in dreams in Bāb al-Nawm wa-lyaqaẓa, are attested in the 13th century Commentary on Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed by R. Zerahya b. Isaac b. She’alti’el Hen.33 Scholars that used the Arabic Parva naturalia as a source further include Maimonides (1135-1204), Joseph ibn Ṣaddiq (d. 1149), and Joseph ibn Waqār (d. ~1360).34

  • 35 See R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 7, p. 241 ff.; for al-Kindī see also P. Adamson, Al-Kindī, New York (...)

43While the reception of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs is well attested from the late 10th and particularly the 11th century onwards, its early fate is much more in the dark: in the case of earlier authors like the philosopher al-Kindī (d.-870) or the physician Qusṭā ibn Lūqā (d. 912), who wrote on the topic of sleep and dreams as well as on that of length and shortness of life, it so far has not been possible to detect any particular influence of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-lmaḥsūs, and it is not easy to ascertain whether they were actually familiar with the text itself and, if they were, whether that version of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-lmaḥsūs would have been the same as the one extant in the Rampur manuscript.35 This is a particularly intriguing question with regard to al-Kindī, given that the adaptation of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs shows so many affinities to texts produced in the ‘Kindī circle’. In other cases, e.g. al-Fārābī and Isaac Israeli, who take up some of the characteristic ideas of the adaptation of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs, one still has to take into account the possibility that they may have encountered these ideas in other sources, perhaps the same that were used by the adaptor of the Parva naturalia.

  • 36 Cf. M.R. Tajaddud ed., Ibn al-Nadīm:Kitābal-Fihrist, Tehran, 1971, p. 312.
  • 37 For the Arabic text, see M.R. Tajaddud, ibid., p. 312.
  • 38 On the identity of this person, see A. Hasnawi, “Un élève d'Abū Bišr Mattā b. Yūnus: Abü Amr al-Ṭab (...)
  • 39 Cf. R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 3, p. 253 ff., where further bibliographical sources (partly depend (...)

44This uncertainty is reflected in reports about Aristotle’s Parva naturalia in Arabic bibliographical works, starting with the Fihrist of Ibn al-Nadīm (d. 990), which record information about Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs that does not square with the extant text. Ibn kal-Nadīm states that Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-lmaḥsūs consists of two maqālas, and that no reliable translation of the work is known.36 While the latter claim may arguably be compatible with what we find in Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs, the first one is clearly wrong. Ibn al-Nadīm goes on to say: “What has been mentioned is that it is a small piece which al-Tabari has commented on after Abū Bishr Mattā ibn Yūnus”.37 Apart from the question of how Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs could be described as a ‘small piece’ – could this perhaps refer to passages of Aristotelian text only? Or is Ibn al-Nadīm speaking of a different text altogether? –, it has not been possible so far to link the translator Abū Bishr Mattā ibn Yūnus (d. 940) to the extant text, and the same goes for al-Ṭabarī.38 The bibliographical sources39 hence raise similar questions about the Arabic Parva naturalia to those brought up by the analysis of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs: Was there ever a (more) complete Arabic translation of the Parva naturalia? At what point of time did the extant version of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs begin to be transmitted, and to be accepted, as the translation of the Aristotelian work? And who are the people responsible for the text? Despite the new insights the text of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs offers, there are still many questions that surround this work, and the transmission of Aristotle’s Parva naturalia in Arabic certainly needs and deserves further study.

Annexes

Textual Examples from Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs:

i) Ms. Rampur 1752, fols. 1 0b, 25 – 11a, 12

i) Ms. Rampur 1752, fols. 1 0b, 25 – 11a, 12

ii) Ms. Rampur 1752, fols. 21b, 6 – 22a, 24

ii) Ms. Rampur 1752, fols. 21b, 6 – 22a, 24

iii) Ms. Rampur 1752, fol. 27b, 20 f.

iii) Ms. Rampur 1752, fol. 27b, 20 f.

Notes

1 For details, see R. Goulet ed., Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, Paris, 1989, s.v. “Aristote de Stagire”; for an (incomplete) overview, see A. Badawi, La transmission de la philosophie grecque au monde arabe, Paris, Vrin, 1968.

2 I.e. from De sensu et sensibilibus to De longitudine et brevitate vitae.

3 Ms. Rampur 1752, fol. 7a-54b; see I.‘A. ‘Arshi, Catalogue of the Arabie Manuscripts in Raza Library, Rampur, Rampur University Press, 6 vols., Rampur, 1963-1977, vol. 4, p. 534 f., H. Daiber, “Salient Trends of the Arabic Aristotle”, in G. Endress, R. Kruk eds., Lite Ancient Tradition in Christian and Islamic Hellenism: Studies on the Transmission of Greek Philosophy and Sciences, dedicated to H.J. Drossaart Lulofs on his ninetieth birthday, Leyde, Brill, 1997, p. 29-41, p. 36 ff; R. Hansberger, The Transmission of Aristotle’s Parva naturalia in Arabic, D.Phil. Thesis, Oxford, 2006, p. 4 ft. The thesis is scheduled to be published, in modified form, in the series Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus (ed. by H. Daiber, Brill, Leyde). The Rampur manuscript also contains an anonymous commentary that is inserted into the text of Kitâb al-Hiss wa-1-mahsûs.

4 R. Hansberger, ibid.

5 Cf. below p. 145, n. 6, p. 150.

6 This is the case to a lesser degree in the third maqāla, where all chapters of De longitudine are represented in some way or other. – The recurrence of this pattern in all three cases supports the assumption that the lost beginning of the first maqāla did in fact contain a translation or paraphrase of (parts of) De sensu. This is further supported by the evidence of Ibn Rushd’s Epitome (Talkhs) of Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs.

7 For a more detailed account, see R. Hansberger, “HOW Aristotle Came to Believe in God-given Dreams: The Arabic Version of De divinatione per somnum”, in L. Marlow ed., Dreaming Across Boundaries: The Interpretation of Dreams in Islamic Lands, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 2008, p. 50-77.

8 The adaptor may have drawn upon translations of works by Galen himself, or texts from the later medical tradition. Possible sources are mentioned in G. Strohmaier, “Avicennas Lehre von den ‘inneren Sinnen’ und ihre Voraussetzungen bei Galen”, in Id., Von Demokrit bis Dante: Die Bewahrung antiken Erbes in der arabischen Kultur, Hildesheim-New York, Olms, 1996, p. 330-341: 331: 337; cf. also H. Kahana-Smilansky, “The Mental Faculties and the Psychology of Sleep and Dreams”, in G. Freudenthal ed., Science in Medieval Jewish Cultures, Leyde, Brill, forthcoming.

9 This order reflects the location of the faculties in the ventricles of the brain as the adaptor will have found it described in medical texts. Cf. R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 3, p. 138 ff.

10 See below p. 160 f.

11 As, e.g., the doxographical work of Ps.-Ammonius, or Ps.-Ishaq’s translation of De anima. See R. Hansberger, op. tit., n. 3, p. 212 ff.

12 For a comprehensive description of this group, their extant works and stylistic characteristics, see G. Endress, “The Circle of al-Kindi”, in G. Endress, R. Kruk eds., The Ancient Tradition in Christian and Islamic Hellenism: Studies on the Transmission of Greek Philosophy and Sciences, dedicated to H.J. Drossaart Lulofs on his ninetieth birthday, Leyde, Research School CNWS, 1997, p. 43-76.

13 That the Arabic tradition of the Parva naturalia points to the existence of a second Greek version, adapted perhaps under Stoic influence, is a hypothesis suggested by S. Pines in the context of a comparative study of Ibn Rushd’s Talkhīs Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs and Ibn Sïnas al-Risāla al-Manāmiyya. See S. Pines, “The Arabic Recension of Parva naturalia according to al-Risāla al-Manāmiyya and other sources”, Israel Oriental Studies 4 (1974), p. 154-163; cf. R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 3, p. 181 ff., and R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 7.

14 G. Endress, op. cit., n. 12, p. 59.

15 See e.g. G. Endress, Proclus Arabus, “Beiruter Texte und Studien” 10, Beirut-Wiesbaden, E Steiner, 1973, p. 127 ff.

16 See G. Endress, ibid., and further F. W. Zimmermann, “The Origins of the so-called Theology of Aristotle”, in J. Kraye, W.F. Ryan, C.B. Schmitt eds., Pseudo-Aristotle in the Middle Ages. The Theology and other Texts, Londres, The Warburg Institute, 1986, p. 110-240; R Adamson, The Arabic Plotinus. A philosophical Study of the Theology of Aristotle, Londres, Duckworth, 2002.

17 See R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 3, p. 190 ff.

18 Greek passages of the Parva naturalia are quoted according to Ross’ edition, W.D. Ross, Aristotle. Parva naturalia, a Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1955.

19 English translation by R. Sorabji, Aristotle on Memory, second edition, Londres, Duckworth, 2004, p. 48.

20 The term ‘innate’ (ghariziyya) appears, rather unusually, to be derived from Greek hexis; this is suggested by a parallel case in another passage of the second maqāla (fol. 16b) where hexis is translated as gharza, natural disposition’.

21 English translation by D. Gallop, Aristotle On Sleep and Dreams. A Text and Translation with Introduction, Notes and Glossary, second edition, Warminster, Aris & Philipps, 1996, p. 61 ff.

22 The adaptor seems to ignore an inconsistency that this dichotomy introduces into his text through suggesting that dreams generally are endowed with divinatory power, a position that the text clearly does not hold.

23 English translation by D. Gallop, op. cit., n. 21, p. 67.

24 E.g. in his Mabādi’ arā’ ahlal-madīna al-fāḍila; see R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 7, p. 73 f.

25 See R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 3, p. 221 ff. Ibn Sinā’s authorship of al-Risāla al-Manāmiyya, which mentions the text explicitly, is still under discussion; other texts that reflect Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs include al-Shifā and al-Najāt.

26 See R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 7, p. 72 f.

27 Kitāb al-Ta‘bīr fil-ru’yā aw al-Qādirī fil-ta‘bīr, see R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 7, p. 69 ff.

28 See C. Di Martino, “Les Parva naturalia dans la tradition arabe”, in R. Goulet, Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques, suppl. 1, Paris; Editions du CNRS, 2003, p. 375-378, p. 378.

29 See R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 3, p. 230 ft.; and R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 7, p. 67 f.

30 See R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 7, p. 67.

31 See her forthcoming article for details, op. cit., n. 8. I am indebted to Dr. Kahana-Smilansky for allowing me to consult a draft of her article.

32 See R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 7, p. 66, and cf. S. Pines, op. cit. n. 13, p. 147 ft.

33 See A. Ravitzky, “Hebrew Quotations from the lost Arabic Recension of Parva naturalia", Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, 3 (1981-82), p. 191-202 (1981-82), and R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 7, p. 68 f.

34 As documented in H. Kahana-Smilansky, op. cit., n. 8.

35 See R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 7, p. 241 ff.; for al-Kindī see also P. Adamson, Al-Kindī, New York-Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 135 ff.

36 Cf. M.R. Tajaddud ed., Ibn al-Nadīm:Kitābal-Fihrist, Tehran, 1971, p. 312.

37 For the Arabic text, see M.R. Tajaddud, ibid., p. 312.

38 On the identity of this person, see A. Hasnawi, “Un élève d'Abū Bišr Mattā b. Yūnus: Abü Amr al-Ṭabarī”, Bulletin d'études orientales, 48 (1996), p. 35-53, p. 35 ff., 40 ff.

39 Cf. R. Hansberger, op. cit., n. 3, p. 253 ff., where further bibliographical sources (partly dependent on Ibn al-Nadīm) ate discussed as well; see also H. Daiber, op. cit., n. 4, p. 39 f.

Table des illustrations

Titre i) Ms. Rampur 1752, fols. 1 0b, 25 – 11a, 12
URL http://books.openedition.org/psorbonne/docannexe/image/17667/img-1.jpg
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Titre ii) Ms. Rampur 1752, fols. 21b, 6 – 22a, 24
URL http://books.openedition.org/psorbonne/docannexe/image/17667/img-2.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 320k
Titre iii) Ms. Rampur 1752, fol. 27b, 20 f.
URL http://books.openedition.org/psorbonne/docannexe/image/17667/img-3.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 39k

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