Eamon De Valera as seen from the archives of the French Foreign Ministry
p. 95-115
Résumés
L'étude de De Valera à partir des archives du Ministère des relations extérieures française révèle l'image d'un homme qui a vite conquis ses observateurs. Sa personnalité et sa présence les ont profondément marqué. Il reste toutefois des ombres ; des vides qui s'expliquent mal ; aucune référence par exemple au Traité de 1921 ; L'on ne peut donc avoir, pour le moment, qu'une vue partielle de cette image.
A study of de Valera in the papers of the archives of the French Foreign Ministry gives the image of a person who appealed to the French observers. They were profoundly aware of his personality and his presence. Yet there are elements which are missing: no reference for instance to the 1921 Treaty. It is only possible therefore, for the moment, to have a partial image of the Irish leader.
Texte intégral
1When Eamon De Valera died on 29th. August 1975, Le Monde carried the story on two consecutive days and announced that the first French television channel had decided to programme, in order to honour the event a one-hour-long documentary entitled "Eamon De Valera ou l'Irlande insurgée" for 2nd. September, day of his State funeral in Dublin. The Quai d'Orsay, indeed even the President of France himself, likewise wasted no time in publicly expressing their sympathy to the Republic of Ireland in the form of official condolences1.
2All in all, this French reaction was a high tribute indeed to the greatness of President De Valera and a fitting mark of the deep-felt affection which France, according to one writer has always nourished for
"cette soeur de race… Entre la France et l'Irlande vit depuis des siècles une amitié qu'on pourrait appeler familiale"2.
3By 2nd. Sept. almost as if one were assisting at some kind of monumental theatrical performance, the scene had dramatically changed. The first T.V. Channel did, in fact, broadcast a documentary film as promised, but not the one on De Valera. Instead, in the series "Les Animaux du Monde", they showed a study of "La Faune Américaine", which despite the gratuitous coincidence in geographical location, (De Valera, it will be remembered, was born in New-York) was not a tongue in cheek analysis of the life and predatory habits of the late President. Le Monde likewise seems to have lost interest in the event, for it consecrated only a tiny A.F.P. despatch on 4th. Sept. to confirm the President De Valera had in fact been buried on 2nd. as planned… Sic transit gloria mundi.
4In fairness to Le Monde, it should be said that momentous world events concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict were hypnotising public opinion. Irish affairs seemed unquestionably of a humbler more prosaic order. As Le Monde itself had put it:
"Peu de Chefs d'Etat du XXe. siècle auront incarné aussi complètement les aspirations de leur peuple à l'indépendance qu'Eamon de Valera. Si ce n'est peut-être certains leaders du tiers-monde. Mais l'Irlande du début du siècle n'était-elle pas un pays du tiers-monde avant que le mot ne fut inventé ?"3.
5In a sense, after the emotional tribute, the return to reality. But what then of the diplomats? How sincere could we expect their public declarations to be? Diplomacy is, after all, according to the old adage:
"The art of doing and saying the nastiest of things in the nicest of ways".
6and examples abound of how far this art form has been raised to perfection by the political animal… especially at funerals. Former Prime Minister, H.H. Asquith, for instance, is reported to have remarked, after having respectfully attended the funeral of his archenemy, Andrew Bonar-Law, in Westminster Abbey:
"It is fittng that we should have buried the Unknown Prime Minister by the side of the Unknown Soldier"4.
7Or again, at the funeral of Tom Driberg, the original William Hickey of Daily Express fame, one prominent Labour M.P. after having paid his "official" tribute to the outstanding qualities and achievements of his "late friend and colleague", is reputed to have quipped as his suggestion for the epitaph:
"Under this sod, lies another".
8How, under these circumstances, would the official French image of President De Valera stand up to confrontation with the working reality? How did the French diplomatic representatives, in the privacy of their own internal information circuit, liberated from the constraints of protocol and the prying eyes of the media, assess the man who more and more came to represent the Republic of Ireland?5 What human portrait do they paint of De Valera the man, what impressions of the politician, and what assessment of the statesman, the head and founder of the Irish State? Finally, to what extent is one able to identify and chart modifications to this projection during the course of the violent crises and the troubled times of this century?
9On the first of these levels, the projection of the late president of Ireland to be seen from the archives of the French Foreign Ministry is totally harmonious and positively eloquent. From the steady turnover of French diplomats in Dublin comes a remarkable portrait of De Valera the man which is both of flattering proportions and indisputable sincerity: his personality, his charisma, his presence, it would appear, had an irresistable quality which particularly appealed to his French guests. Nowhere do we find any sympathy for the quick-fire description of enigmatic obscurity which Lloyd George no doubt wished offensive when he said of him:
"he is like lifting mercury with a fork"6.
10Quite on the contrary, in file after file his deep religious conviction, his moral rectitude, his simplicity of manner to the limit of austerity, are stressed and favorably commented upon. General de Gaulle was not the first to be attracted by this strange mixture, this emanation of inner strength and spiritual detachment which he quite clearly found very much to his taste. M. Blanche, Consul in Dublin 1922, wrote glowingly to Poincaré of his deep sense of duty, his "unflagging energy" and his almost superhuman strength7. For Count Ostrorog in 1947, his political engagement also has a spiritual dimension to it, like some form of religious vocation:
"Cet homme de vie austère, uniquement occupé des affaires publiques, n'a d'autres distractions dans la vie que les mathématiques et la philologie"8.
11While Mr. Felix on his arrival in Dublin in 1957 admitted being agreeably surprised by his meeting
"alors qu'on lui reproche, m'a-t-on dit, une certaine raideur et même de la froideur envers ses interlocuteurs, ses paroles sans éclat d'éloquence témoignent de beaucoup d'autorité et malgré une apparence de modestie, c'est une impression de haute dignité qui se dégage de sa personne"9.
12All through the archives De Valera's personal image is thus positively flattering, with its emphasis on profound moral commitment, high minded dedication and sense of duty. But at the same time these spiritual values do not appear to have nourished what one French commentator has termed "l'incurable désespoir romantique des irlandais"10. Blanche, no doubt quite conscious of this failing in other leaders of the period, goes to quite some length to dispel this facile misconception:
"ce ton mystique donne un des traits de son caractère : mais dans les discours qu'il prononce presque chaque jour le côté pratique n'est pas négligé et la modération y tient une grande place. C'est sans aucun doute une exagération et une calomnie de le représenter comme un extremist : il n'a d'extrême que ses convictions… Lui seul parmi les hommes politiques qui jouent un rôle en ce moment en Irlande (Avril 1922) à l'honnêteté, le courage et l'intelligence"11.
13All in all, rich praise indeed.
14As a politician, De Valera seems likewise to have captivated his French audience and this despite the negative implications for France of some of his political stances. During the whole of the period in question, and totally irrespective of whether he was in or out of power, it is he who unquestionably, even exclusively, is seen to occupy the centre of Ireland's political stage. For Blanche in 1922 after De Valera's defeat:
"Le personnel du gouvernement provisoire… n'est remarquable que par sa faiblesse, son inexpérience, son manque de cohésion et d'inspiration"12.
15His rivals Griffith and Collins (who is incidently identified as a "legendary figure"), are projected as bungling novices by comparison "d'une légèreté", "d'une insouciance", "d'une inexpérience qui se manifeste dès qu'il s'agit d'aborder une oeuvre administrative concrète"13. De Valera stands alone in his clear-sightedness, his almost superhuman activity and his remarkable strategic and tactical ability, alone able to conjure up the mystical forces of Irish nationalism and give direction to the momentum thus engendered. Blanche, for instance is quite unimpressed by the apparent magnitude of his defeat in 1922, and feels sufficiently confident in the ultimate outcome of his struggle, to warn the Quai d'Orsay that:
"malgré l'absence de journaux qui constitue pour son parti un si grand désavantage, toute la presse quotidienne de l'Irlande à Dublin et dans La Province donnant comme un seul homme pour l'Etat Libre, il arrive à faire prévaloir (ses idées)… il voit clairement le jeu des uns et n'approuve pas la tactique des autres et… probablement finira par se justifier"14.
16In despatch after despatch to Poincaré at this time, Blanche goes to great efforts to counter the erroneous impression of De Valera's blunder. It is, affirms Blanche, simply a question of perspective, and he goes on to suggest that almost the opposite is in fact the case. He, thereupon, identifies De Valera as almost single-handedly controlling the political scene in Ireland, and using Griffith and Collins to carry out his plans:
"En réalité M. De Valera, le seul homme d'Etat véritable que possède l'Irlande; celui sans lequel aucun gouvernement, aucun parti national ne pourra se maintenir, est redevenu le maître de l'heure"15.
17In one of his many long-winded despatches to Washington in 1940, Sir David Gray the American Ambassador to Dublin, a person by upbringing and political sympathies resolutely hostile to De Valera had this to say about him:
"He is probably the most adroit politician in Europe and he honestly believes that all he does is for the good of his country. He has the qualities of martyr, fanatic and Machiavelli. No-one can outwit, frighten or blandish him. Remember that he is not pro-German, nor personally anti-British, but only pro-De Valera"16.
18No endorsement of the negative aspects of this opinion is to be found anywhere in the French archives. Général de la Panouse, the French military attaché in London, and one with ample reason to show impatience with De Valera's ideals, repeatedly and not unflatteringly compares his stance to that of General Herzog of South Africa17. Blanche similarly rejects any notion of egoism or fanaticism in De Valera's conduct. Even in his hour of defeat, he remains
"le seul homme doué de l'autorité et du prestige nécessaires, le seul homme qui ait l'habitude du commandement et qui sache réellement répandre autour de lui l'inspiration et créer l'unité d'efforts… le seul clairvoyant et le seul incorruptible !"18.
19In a detailed analysis of the evolution of the Irish political scene from 1914 to 1918, prepared for the French Foreign Ministry in March 1918, De Valera is presented as a vigourous and highly intelligent leader constantly striving to elevate the struggle to the level of honour and principle and to channel the rising tide of nationalism away from riot towards the ballot box. It is he who strives to maintain the internal cohesion of the movement by defending the positions of Griffith and MacNeil (sic) during the Rising. It is he, finally, who is identified as the guiding spirit behind the drive to extricate the question of Irish independence from the quicksands of internal British politics and place it firmly on the level of international rights, by assimilating it to the allies declared war aims, and above all, by presenting it in an intelligent fashion to American public opinion19.
20To this intellectual acumen Blanceh adds an unconcealed admiration for the deep sense of honour and dignity which overns his political conduct even in his most trying moments. De Valera's speech to Griffith after his election to the Presidency in 1922, is cited as a perfect example of this:
"Un discours digne du leader de l'opposition de sa Majesté dans la Chambre des Communes"20.
21But the highest tribute of all to De Valera the politician and freedom fighter, however, comes from the pen of the military attaché in London, a man by breeding and conviction quite detached from the passions of political intrigue. Placing himself above the confusion of daily activity, he ventured the following appreciation of the Irish leader in 1922:
"Dans tous les Dominions il y a des gens tels que M. Herzog, en Sud-Afrique, qui comme M. De Valera, demande l'indépendance absolue de leur pays. Ce sont des gens qui sont venus au monde trop tard ou trop tôt, et qui ne sont pas de leur temps"21.
22But what of De Valera the statesman? How well would this image of greatness stand up to the ultimate test for here the composite portrait would be illuminated from two quite distinct perspectives; on the one hand, from the diplomat accredited to the country who would have direct contact with the living reality of the man, but, on the other, from a totally objective source with a completely different hierarchy of values, the resident analysts at the Quai d'Orsay, responsible for the overall coordination of French diplomatic activity. In a real sense De Valera the statesman here would become very much one with the country he contributed so much to liberate.
23It was with a vigilant eye that all aspects of Irish foreign policy, and particularly that directed at France, were scrutinised and evaluated by the Quai d'Orsay. When, for instance, during a heated debate in the Dail in 1954 Mr. Sean MacBride accused De Valera of having no foreign policy the French Ambassador to Dublin, Mr. Felix felt obliged to warn Robert Schuman against accepting such an excessive and dangerously simplistic argument. For Felix this lack of direction was more apparent than real:
"en réalité, s'il paraît exagéré de prétendre… que le gouvernement n'a pas de politique étrangère, il faut bien constater que cette politique se cristallise autour d'une seule question, celle de la partition… (c'est une) politique à base d'isolationisme"22.
24and in fact all through the archives these three themes of "partition", "isolation" and consequently "caution" are the dominant guidelines which characterise not only De Valera's foreign policy outlook, but also by extension, Franco-Irish relations in general and ones which, as we shall see, France took particular, even excessive care to preserve intact. The resulting mixture is a curious concoction of low level initiative and high grade complicity, fortified by a stong dose of empathy and emotional commitment quite detached from considerations of hard-headed international bargaining or even constructive diplomatic initiatives. Not exactly what one would have expected, yet surprisingly both parties seem to have found this situation ultimately to their satisfaction.
25As is evident from his public speeches, De Valera appears to have considered foreign affairs if not with inherent suspicion, then at least as a topic of relatively minor practical importance, vaguely situated somewhere in the sphere of necessary human cooperation, somehow useful perhaps as a means of preventing war. More than a means to a tangible end, the concept of foreign affairs became an end in itself, for possession of this faculty was the very symbol of Irish Independence. Inside this rather nebulous concept, however, the "French connection" unquestionably occupied a position of exceptional privilege, of which the diplomatic representatives were extremely proud, but which on occasions, could lead to acute embarrassment. It is also questionable to my mind, at least in the period under consideration, to what extent this privileged status was indeed rightfully merited, but then as has been said "some are born great and some have greatness thrust upon them".
26Eamon De Valera's attitude towards France was one founded on an immense fund of sympathy and good-will. In a frank interview with a French journalist in 1946, he conceded this inherent attraction for France, even although, no doubt referring to his "cloak and dagger" visit to Paris in 1922,
"il s'est plaint tout d'abord de ne pas avoir été bien accueilli lors de son dernier passage à Paris"23.
27In this it might be noted, De Valera was far from unique, for almost every other Irish leader likewise takes great care to stress the depth of friendship between the two nations. Sean MacBride it is noted with pride in the archives, was educated in Paris and is totally francophile. But no less significant, in the eyes of te French observers, is the attitude of President Sean T. O'Kelly who during his whole time in office accepted only one invitation to a diplomatic dinner and that was offered by the French representative. In like manner, Joseph Walshe it was noted is
"sincèrement attaché à notre pays ainsi qu'à notre culture et désireux de développer, dans tous les domaines, les relations entre la France et l'Irlande"24.
28The culmination of all this inherent good-will took a practical form in the first Budget of the Provisional government in March 1922 which attributed a handsome sum of £ 4960 to the development of Irish representation in France at a time when diplomatic affairs were not even of its competence. Blanche's triumphant minute to Paris was only too eager to mark the magnitude of the gesture:
"la subvention… est de beaucoup la plus importante de celles réservées aux pays européens. Rome vient au second rang avec £2018"25.
29To the Quai d'Orsay this type of foreign policy, based on centuries of accumulated goodwill but with limited objectives, direction or momentum, was highly attractive and soon was mirrored by French policy towards Ireland26. Caution became the watchword in all things political, innovation and solidarity being strictly reserved for the economic and the cultural planes. But where De Valera's caution was based essentially on considerations of sovereignty, France's mirror image appears to have had a much less honourable motive, springing as it did from an obsessional deference towards the supposed sensitivity of England in all matters Irish.
30Nowhere is there to be found, for example, the slightest instance of what could be termed French diplomatic initiative on the political level, within the accepted meaning of the word "spontaneous". Almost as if by reflex, soundings of potential English reactions were first taken and on these depended the successful completion of the project under examination. In the pre-1918 period this attitude was perfectly comprehensible given the nature of the problem and the constraints of the international scene. But even when these considerations are allowed for, deference of this kind could by excess become damaging to the interests of all concerned. On several occasions during the war, this limit was reached and breached despite strongly worded reminders sent by the French Consul in Dublin, Mr. Alphand to warn Paris of the danger of too blatant a neglect of Irish sentiments and a too obviously subservient attitude towards London. His suggestions for initiatives to try and rally Irish volunteers into the French armed forces which he believed might meet with some success, were rejected with horror by his superiors at the Quai d'Orsay27.
31Even after the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, nothing seemed to have changed for France. Mr. Blanche had to act on his own initiative and in a "strictly personal capacity" even in order to wish the provisional government well in its tasks, after waiting in vain for official instructions from Paris28. The full measure of this timidity may be grasped from the fact that by this time France was the only foreign country which had still failed to do so!
321922 was also the year in which the "Kerney" affair almost rocked the very foundations of Franco-Irish friendship. Kerney "De Valera's man in Paris", seems for a certain period to have been more or less recognised as "the official representative of the Irish Republic in France"29. On the arrival of the "official" representative of Dail Eirenn, however, after the formation of the Provisional Government, with formal demand that the "imposter" be expelled from France, French diplomatic embarrassment seemed to be acute. When word of the problem reached French Embassy staff in London the fat really was in the fire, for Kerney, or so it would seem, had been discretely tolerated on Blanche's recommendation, in order to keep De Valera sweet. The most catastrophic result imaginable seemed now to be the likely outcome, for not only would relations with Ireland be gravely compromised, but worse still, the publicity surrounding the affair might produce a sharp reprimand from Westminster. Mr. Daeschner wrote indignantly form the Embassy in London on the folly of Blanche's tactics and on the absolute necesity of keeping the Irish question in its British context:
"Mr. De Valera n'est pour nous et de plus en plus, qu'un chef d'insurgés vivant des subsides des Irlandais d'Amérique qui font de la guerre civile un sport à distance et sans danger pour eux, et qui, pendant toute la guerre, ont fait le jeu des Allemands"30.
33In extremis a solution was found, by refusing to comply with the Provision of government's request, which was deemed a "political act" and therefore exclusively a question for the British Embassy in Paris. Kerney in the meantime was discretely relegated into diplomatic obscurity. As for the English they seem to have had more serious preoccupations than to bother with such a petty affair.
34Nor could France be prodded into taking decisive action on the question of upgrading official diplomatic representation between the two countries despite Dublin's steadily mounting discontent. Thus we find that it was only after Argentina, Belgium and horror of horrors, Germany had transformed their Consulates in Dublin into Consulats-General that a French decision along the same lines appeared sufficiently innocent and without harmful consequences to the Quai d'Orsay31.
35The same scenario is again found as late as the 1950s, when the up-grading to full Embassy status became viable. Count Ostrorog seems to have been in the most awkward and embarrassing of positions for some considerable time pleading insistantly the cause fo stronger diplomatic links to Paris while being reduced to diplomatic contorsions in Dublin to avoid evoking the same topic32. Once more it was only after the United Kingdom's intention to do the same had been indiputably established that the process was set in motion by the Quai d'Orsay. The fact that the United States and Canada both had already established full embassy status some how did not seem to be enough. Only after British intentions had been clearly identified did Count Ostrorog's veiled hints that France's interests might be seriously compromised by delay produce the desired effect:
"Il m'a toujours semblé que la France, sans prétendre à la place exceptionnelle tenue ici par l'Angleterre et les Etats-Unis devrait venir immédiatement après et ne pas accepter que d'autres pays comme l'Espagne ou l'Italie prissent ce pas sur elle"33.
36It might appear therefore a curious irony that French foreign policy towards Ireland should have so exactly mirrored that of President De Valera, giving such a strange impression of the "junior" partner leading the "senior". Yet on closer analysis the internal logic of this attitude is not unattractive to the French ming, given the fundamental incompatibilities of the Anglo-Irish situation. Seen from Paris, the low-key foreign policy line symbolised by De Valera allowed a squaring of the diplomatic circle, provided certain considerations were constantly kept in mind. These can perhaps be summarised as follows. A constant deference towards England in all matters political. As Blanche put it in 1922:
"Il va sans dire qu'elles (les démarches françaises) auraient à être combinées avec beaucoup de prudence et de discrétion pour n'éveiller en Angleterre aucun soupçon ni la moindre susceptibilité justifiée"34.
37If, in economic and cultural affairs a certain degree of latitude could then be permitted to the diplomatic representatives in Ireland no initiatives whatsoever were to be instigated in the political field by them without first receiving clearance from the London Embassy and the agreement of the Quai.
38One might however wonder at the apparent futility of such international activity. Indeed, one is almost tempted to suggest that there was a kind of Murphy's Law of Inverse Relevance which applied to French Diplomatic activity in Ireland and which, propounded, would read like this:
"The intrinsic value of any diplomatic initiative is directly proportional to its futility".
39Yet such futility, in the final analysis, is more apparent than real. Given the circunstances what exactly could France be expected to do? Solve the cancerous problem of Irish reunification in the face of English suspicion, seemed unrealistic, impractical and unappropriate even if it did not daunt some of the more adventurous spirits of the time35. The wisdom of prevailing French councils saw greater value in caution. "Partition", De Valera's obsession, therefore, became sublimated in French diplomatic thinking, from the realm of practical politics to that of the desirable principle36. Inevitably, the resulting diplomatic preoccupations took on another complexion, which, by contrast, appear exceedingly modest to us. Thus, for example, in 1949 the French Ambassador to Dublin personally intervened, even taking the initiative to short-circuit bureaucratic obstructionism, in order to further such concrete cooperation between the two nations, because
"L'Archevêque de Dublin a l'intention d'envoyer en présent trois vaches irlandaises au père Jean-Pierre, Prieur de Notre Dame"37.
40Affairs such as this, at first sight smack of high farce, but on analysis are not without meaning and arguably more in keeping with the fundamental realities of the situation. They reveal a policy which though hardly earthshattering in consequence is sound, practical, methodical and if parochial in vision nonetheless constructive in the long term; a policy furthermore ultimately to the satisfaction of all concerned.
41As can be seen, Eamon De Valera's image as projected from the archives of the French foreign ministry is therefore almost in perfect harmony with the official public one and is practically without variation during the whole of the period under consideration. This is perhaps more surprising than at first it might appear, given the extreme fluctuations in the three variables composing it: the "strategic" importance of Irish nationalist aspirations during the course of this troubled centry; the checkered career of the man himself; the impressive variety and high quality of his "judges" - the French diplomats in Dublin. Inevitably, the question of how far we can accept the authenticity of this image has to be raised, even if no definitive answer can at present be given.
42Three factors certainly appear in favour of their credibility. In general terms, the preservation and communication of archival material is far less constricted in France than in most other European countries. They do not suffer from the complex of secrecy so markedly present in England for instance38. In particular, what might be considered "irregular practices" in the diplomatic or in the political fields are more easily admitted as an integral part of public life and consequently more easily communicated to the historian. Trade union records are of this kind.
43Secondly, inside the records themselves there are intriguing indiscretions which would tend to confirm the unadulterated nature of this source. The documents relative to the police surveillance of De Valera and Kerney in 1922, already mentioned, are but one example of this. The "Secret" military pact proposed by General "Ginger" O'Connell to the French High Command in February 1922 is another39. Even more obscure is the report sent in French, by the "délégué irlandais proposé aux Affaires Etrangères" on the state of Irish preparedness to rise against England40. This report, apparently one of a series, is dated June 1899, at the time, it must be remembered, of the last great invasion scare in England when many informed observers were convinced of the imminence of a war with France. Although no further information concerning the authenticity of this source is available, it might perhaps be placed in the context of the strongly worded criticism made by the French Ambassador in London to his own minister in Paris protesting about the potentially damaging spying activities and military intrigue of the French Army in Ireland41.
44Finally, to these indiscretions, must be added the unabashed candour of many of the opinions offered by the French diplomatic representatives about developments on the political scene in Great Britain and Ireland at this time. Archbishop Walsh of Dublin is qualified in 1917, as "fantasque et violent", while Count Plunkett is "un homme placide, avide d'honneurs et de dignités"42. Even more cutting are the reflexions of Cambon on Birrell and Lord Wimborne in May 1916:
"Le Secrétaire d'Etat pour l'Irlande, M. Birrell homme de beaucoup d'esprit, professeur de son métier est sans aucune notion des réalités. Quant au Vice-Roi… c'est un joueur de polo des plus distingués"43.
45Even as late as 1924, Blanche could write quite disparagingly of,
"la sinistre institution qui a été décorée du nom d'Armée Nationale Irlandaise… cette masse incohérente où d'anciens officiers britanniques coudoient leurs meutriers d'autrefois et où la moralité moyenne est certainement inférieure à celle d'un établissement pénitentiaire qui se respecte"44.
46Against the eloquence of this testimony, however, must be balanced what one might reasonably have expected to find and what is "missing". There is for instance no sign of any equivalent to the series of very complete dossiers on British political figures, so rich in reavealing biographical anecdotes45. Such dossiers surely must have existed? No sign either of any file on De Valera among the papers of the Renseignements Généraux or those of the equally efficient Préfecture de Police despite the detailed surveillance of his activities in the early 1920s46. No sign, finally, of any information concerning the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921, but an unexplained reference to interesting and much appreciated information sent from Dublin in April 192047.
47In the light of these considerations it is impossible to offer a definitive opinion on the faithfulness of the image of Eamon De Valera as projected by the Archives of the French Foreign Ministry. One thing however is certain, that the "controversial giant" of modem Irish History exerted a profound and lasting influence on his French audience fashioning, perhaps more that he knew or would have wished, the climate of Franco-Irish relations48.
Notes de bas de page
1 President Giscard d'Estaing sent a telegram of condolences to the president of the Irish Republic. The fullest reports on the international reactions to President De Valera's death are to be found in the Irish Times of 30th. Aug. and lst. Sept. 1975.
2 Louis Tréguiz L'Irlande dans la Crise Universelle. (3 août 1914 - 25 juillet 1917. Paris F. Alcan. 1917, p. 71.
3 "République d'Irlande - Les Obsèques nationales d'Eamon De Valera". in Le Monde 31 Août 1975.
4 Robert Blake The Unknown Prime Minister: The Life and Times of Andrew Bonar Law, 1858-1923. London Eyre and Spottiswoode 1955, p. 13.
5 For French opinion De Valera stands alone and uncontested in this position. See for instance Le Monde of 4th. Sept. 1975.
6 Frank Pakenham Peace by Ordeal. An account, from first-hand sources, of the negotiation and signature of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, 1921. London New English Library. 1967 p. 74. It is perhaps indicative of the total incompatibility of the two personalities, that De Valera is reported to have retorted to this "Why doesn't he use a spoon?"
7 Blanche to Poincaré, 25th. April 1922, in Série 'Z'. Europe 1918-1929. Irlande no2. Affaires intérieures, avril 1922-août 1922, p. 43.
8 Count Ostrorog to French Foreign Ministry on 14 th. Dec. 1947; It is perhaps interesting to note that when France wants to find a suitable present to give to De Valera as a token of the friendship which he contributed to deepen between the two countries, it is not diamonds but a copy of the Littré that they select. Série Z. Europe 1944-49. Irlande No9 août 1944 à juin 1949. Relations avec la France, pp. 62-64. A medal apparently had been attributed to him the previous year, not however to much effect.
9 Felix to Schuman on 18th. Sept. 1951. in Série Z. Europe. No1. Irlande nov. 1949-déc. 1955., p. 32.
10 Jean Plumyène Les Nations Romantiques : Histoire du Nationalisme. Le XIXe siècle. Paris Fayard 1979, p. 237.
11 Blanche to Poincaré in Série 'Z'. Europe 1918-1929. Irlande no2. Affaires intérieures, avril 1922 - août 1922, p. 43.
12 Idem. p. 44.
13 See the series of reports from Blanche to Poincaré of January to March 1922, in Série Z Europe - Europe 1918-1929. Irlande no1, Affaires Intérieures, juin 1918 - mars 1922, pp. 159-160, 213-221, and especially his analysis of their dealings with Craig in Jan 1922 on p. 208.
14 Blanche to Poincaré on 23 March 1922 in Série 'Z'. Europe 1918-1929, Irlande no12. Politique Etrangère, déc. 1921 - août 1924, p. 44.
15 Blanche to Poincaré on 24th. Feb. 1922 in Série Z Europe - Europe 1918-1929. Irlande no1. Affaires intérieures. Juin 1918 - mars 1922. p. 220 Also Blanche's report of 1st. March 1922 in iden p. 226-9.
16 Quoted in Hoseph T. Carroll: Ireland in the War Years, Newton Abbot. David and Charles. 1973. p. 101.
17 See for instance, Panouse to the Minister for War, 24th. jan. 1922 in Série 'Z'. Europe 1918-1929. Irlande No1. Affaires Intérieures. Juin 1918-mars 1922. pp. 183-5.
18 Blanche to Poincaré, Président du Conseil, 29th. Janv. 1922, in idem p. 115.
19 "Résumé de la politique Irlandaise d'août 1914 à mars 1918", prepared on 25 April 1918, in idem pp. 8-10.
20 Blanche to Briand, Président du Conseil, on 11th. Jan. 1922. in idem p. 115.
21 Panuse to the Minister for War, on 8th. Jan. 1922, in Série 'Z'. Europe 1918-1929. Irlande No12. Politique étrangère, déc. 1921-août 1924., p. 11.
22 Felix to Schuman 18th. Jan 1954 in Série 'Z'. Europe nov.1949 - déc. 1955. Irlande No6 Documentation Générale. Déc. 1949-janv. 1955 pp. 56-66, and 15th. Janv. 1951, idem p. 13 ; see also Série 'Z'. Europe nov. 1949-déc. 1955. Irlande no1 ; Légation de France, janv. 1950 - déc. 1955. p. 49.
23 See for instance De Valera's speeches on "the authority of Dail Eireann" on 10 th. April 1919 and on "the aims of Fianna Fail in office" on 17th. Marc 1932 in Maurice Moynihan, ed: Speeches and Statements by Eamon De Valera 1917-1973 Dublin Gill and Macmillan 1980 pp. 20 and 194-5. Also Ostrorog to Schuman on 15th. Jan. 1951 and Felix to Schuman on 18th. Jan. 1952 in Série 'Z'. Europe nov. 1949 - déc. 1955. Irlande no6 Documentation Générale. Déc. 1949 - Janv. 1955.
24 Interview accorded to M. Morin of Libération some time in 1946. This was the second time that this journalist of Irish family origin had been granted such a favour by De Valera. Série Z Europe 1944-49. No9 Irlande août 1944 à Juin 1949 Relations avec la France, P.60-61. Also on De Valera's favourable attitude towards France see Serie Z Europe, No1, Irlande nov. 1949-Déc. 1955, p. 38. The "cloak and dagger visit" in question is no doubt his appearance at the "World Congress of the Irish Race", the first since "King Brian's historic hosting in 1041", the Freeman's Journal rather pompously announced, which was held in Paris in 1922. This whole episode is remarkably well documented in the Archives and reads somewhat like a Marx Brothers comedy. We find for instance that the French authorities were in a blind panic at the potentially explosive nature of the congress, fearing a hostile reaction form London if it took place as much as the backlash from Irish world opinion if it were cancelled. The preparatory stages of the congress therefore were ones of intense diplomatic and police activity which oscillated betwwen warm welcome and hints of immediate expulsion. During this time De Valera swotted up on his impersonation of Father Walsh in order to fool French police surveillance, even going so far as to change into his dog collar behind a confessionnal in Notre Dame, while all along, agents from the Renseignements Généraux were quietly filing reports to their superiors on his every move. The whole event can be followed in Série 'Z'. Europe 1918-1929. Irlande No1. Affaires Intérieures, juin 1918-mars 1922. pp. 110-159.
25 Idem p. 36 and Ostrorog to Schuman, 30 Dec. 1949, in idem Irlande no6 Documentation Générale, déc. 1949 - janv. 1955, pp. 1-9.
26 Report sent by Blanche to the Foreign Ministry on 16th. March 1922 in Série 'Z'. Europe 1918-1929. Irlande no12. Politique Etrangère. Déc. 1921-août 1924, p. 37.
27 It was suggested by M. Rivière that "La France, dans les circonstances actuelles, n'a d'autre politique à faire en Irlande que celle de la présence et du développement de l'amitié traditionnelle unissant les deux pays" in Série 'Z'. Europe 1944-49. Irlande No9 - août 1944 à juin 1949. Relations avec la France, p. 27.
28 Blanche to Pignon on 19th. Feb. 1918 in Guerre 1914-1918. No547 Grande-Bretagne, Irlande III, fév. à mai 1918, pp. 19-21, and on 25th April 1918 in indem pp. 151-2.
See also the long and detailed analysis of the situation sent by Tardieu in New-York to Pichon in Paris on 14th. March 1918 in idem pp. 49-50.
29 Blanche to Poincaré on l st. Feb. 1922 in Série 'Z'. Europe 1918-1929. Irlande No12. Politique Etrangère, déc. 1921-août 1924.
30 On the Kerney affair see idem pp. 137ff.
31 Opinion given by Mr. Daeschner official responsible for Irish affairs at Ministry, in April 1923 in idem pp. 138-9.
32 Blanche to Poincaré, 5 Dec. 1923 idem. pp. 169-170. In his numerous reports on the whole question of French representation in Ireland, Blanche had constantly to refer to the need for a "poste central" in order to avoid using the terms Consultat or Embassy, see for instance his study of French policy towards Ireland on 14th. Feb. 1922 in idem pp. 13-15. See also the protest by the "Directeur des affaires politiques et commerciales" at the Quai d'Orsay on the lack on interest in the question of France's Consular representation in Dublin in dan. 1918 in No546 Grande-Bretagne. Irlande II, janv. 1916-janv. 1918 p. 176.
33 Schonen to Foreign Ministry on 23rd. July 1950 in Série 'Z'. Europe nov. 1949-déc. 1955. Irlande No1. Légation de France. janv. 1950-déc. 1955, p. 5
34 Ostrorog to Schuman, 10 th. July 1950, in idem p. 8 The Embassy was established finally on 7th. September 1950.
35 Blanche to Poincaré on 14th. Feb. 1922 in Série 'Z'. Europe 1918-1929. Irlande no12. Politique Etrangère, déc. 1921-août 1924. Irlande No12. Politique Etrangère. déc. 1921-Août 1924. pp. 13-15. See also Blanche to Pichon on the Attitude of France towards Conscription in Ireland, 25th April 1918 in Guerre 1914-1918 No547 Grande-Bretagne. Irlande III. Fév. à mai 1918 pp. 151-2. And Tardieu to Pichon, 25th Janv. 1918, in No546 Grande Bretagne, Irlande II, déc. 1916-janv. 1918 pp. 173-5.
36 See for instance the study made on the question by M. Rivière "Légation de France à Dublin - Confidentielle - Programme d'activité" in Série 'Z'. Europe 1944-49. No9 Irlande août 1944 à juin 1949 Relations avec la France, pp. 27-35.
37 Ostrorog to Schuman on 25th. July 1951 in Série 'Z' Europe. No1. Irlande nov. 1949-déc. 1955, p. 32.
38 Ostrorog to Ministry of Foreign Affaires, 1st. Feb. 1949 in Série 'Z'. Europe 1944-49. No9 Irlande août 1944-juin 1949, p. 120.
39 See on this subject my article on "Les archives encore fermées au Public Record Office" in Les Cahiers d'Encrages, no5, 1985, Université de Paris VIII.
40 On this suject see the exchange of correspondence between the Ministry for War and the Président du Conseil in 3anuary and February 1922 in Série 'Z'. Europe 1918-1929. Irlande No9 "Armée - Marine I" janv. 1922-juillet 1926, pp. 2-18. I have been recently trying to follow up this intriguing lead among the papers of the Armed forces. They apparently found this information far more sensitive than did the Foreign Ministry for the relevant information has been very carefully hidden indeed.
41 This "note émanant d'une personnalité importante du parti nationaliste" was sent by Cambon to Delcassé on 10 th. 3une 1899 and was marked "très confidentielle". Its full title is "Notre Politique, Notre Succès" and is four pages in length. It was most probably written by an English speaker for the French, although correct, is nevertheless full of anglicisms. in Grande-Bretagne NS.4 Politique Intérieure. Question d'Irlande 1897-1914. No comments are made on the contents of the report which is full of praise and gratitude for French help towards the Irish nationalist movement.
42 Cambon to Briand, Président du Conseil, 3rd. May 1916 on "La Question Irlandaise" in Guerre 1914-1918 No545 Grande-Bretagne. Irlande I. mars 1915-nov. 1916, p. 26.
43 Cambon to Ribot, Président du Conseil, 15th. May 1917. in idem No546 Grande-Bretagne. Irlande II. déc. 1916-janv. 1918.
44 Paul Cambon - Correspondance 1870-1924 - Tome III 1912-1924. Les Guerres Balkaniques, La Grande Guerre, L'Organisation de la Paix. Paris Eds. Bernard Grasset 1946. p. 103.
45 Blanche to Poincaré, 14th. March 1924, in Série 'Z'. Europe 1918-1929. Irlande No9 "Armée - Marine I" Janv. 1922-juillet 1926, p. 66
46 See, for instance, Série 'Z'. Europe 1918-1929. Grande-Bretagne Nos. 7, 8 and 9. "Renseignements sur les personnalités politiques" on figures like Lloyd George, J. Ramsey MacDonald and others.
47 I was informed to my astonishment that there did not even exist the slightest information on the I.R.A. for this early period. Nothing, apparently, on this organisation had ever been collected, I was assured.
48 "Je tiens à vous remercier des intéressants renseignements que vous m'envoyez sur la situation en Irlande" date 6th April 1920. No documents are however to be found in Série ‘Z’. Europe 1918-1929. Irlande No1. Affaires Intérieures, juin 1918-mars 1922. p. 69.
Auteur
-
W. Findlay
Département d'Anglais
Université de Pau
64000 PAU
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