• Contenu principal
  • Menu
OpenEdition Books
  • Accueil
  • Catalogue de 16163 livres
  • Éditeurs
  • Auteurs
  • Facebook
  • X
  • Partager
    • Facebook

    • X

    • Accueil
    • Catalogue de 16163 livres
    • Éditeurs
    • Auteurs
  • Ressources numériques en sciences humaines et sociales

    • OpenEdition
  • Nos plateformes

    • OpenEdition Books
    • OpenEdition Journals
    • Hypothèses
    • Calenda
  • Bibliothèques

    • OpenEdition Freemium
  • Suivez-nous

  • Lettre d’information
OpenEdition Search

Redirection vers OpenEdition Search.

À quel endroit ?
  • Presses de l’Inalco
  • ›
  • AsieS
  • ›
  • Les Liens de la mémoire
  • ›
  • Tourments et consolation
  • ›
  • Territorial Nationalism and Nostalgic In...
  • Presses de l’Inalco
  • Presses de l’Inalco
    Presses de l’Inalco
    Informations sur la couverture
    Table des matières
    Liens vers le livre
    Informations sur la couverture
    Table des matières
    Formats de lecture

    Plan

    Plan détaillé Texte intégral Review of research literature on the Diaoyutais issue The example of Wang Xiaobo and the unexpected return of the past Life Stage, Nostalgia, and the Baodiao memory From depression to optimism: the return of the Baodiao generation Leftists-rightists rapprochement and intense nostalgia Conclusion Bibliographie Notes de bas de page Auteur

    Les Liens de la mémoire

    Ce livre est recensé par

    Précédent Suivant
    Table des matières

    Territorial Nationalism and Nostalgic Intellectuals

    The Memory Boom about the Defend Diaoyutai Islands Movement in Taiwan

    Nationalisme territorial et intellectuels nostalgiques : Le boom mémoriel du mouvement de défense des îles Diaoyutai à Taïwan

    A-Chin Hsiau

    p. 259-302

    Résumés

    Territorial dispute between countries often has significant and lasting impact on civil society and different civil society actors usually have different relationship with territorial dispute. This article first gives a brief overview of the “Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement” (Baodiao) in Taiwan and America. The territorial dispute over the Diaoyutai Islands (Senkakus Islands) in the East China Sea between Taiwan, Japan, and China emerged in the late 1960s. Over the last four decades, non-state actors devoting themselves to Baodiao included intellectuals, local politicians, fishermen, and so on, whose ideologies, interests, and practical approaches to defending the Diaoyutais are not necessarily the same. Among them, the intellectual-activists who pioneered Baodiao either in America or Taiwan during 1971, especially the “leftist-unificationist” members (Zuotong) who have strongly advocated Taiwan’s unification with China, have been most vocal in calling for the defense of the “Chinese” territory of the Diaoyutais since the turn of the new millennium in the context of Taiwan’s democratization and “Taiwanization” in politics and culture. This article then explains why there has been an unexpected Baodiao memory boom created mainly by the leftist-unificationists in the recent two decades, highlighting their high cultural capital compared with that of local politicians and fishermen, nostalgic tendency typical of their late adult stage of life, the significant development of Taiwanese nationalism, and the rising of China as a global power. The article further points out that many highly antagonistic leftist and rightist members of Baodiao intellectual-activists have since the mid-1990s reached rapprochement because of their shared Chinese identity, opposition against Taiwanese nationalism, and support for the rising China, thus echoing China’s rising popular nationalism. The article concludes that the high capability of these intellectual-activists in constructing collective memory, as demonstrated in their nostalgia for the Baodiao past, shows that they have been one of most unyielding civil society actors demanding to defend the Diaoyutais, and one of the most important agents of territorial nationalism, which arguably must be overcome in order to solve the territorial dispute over the Diaoyutais, maintain stability in the East China Sea, and achieve peaceful coexistence among Taiwan, China, and Japan.

    Les conflits territoriaux entre pays ont souvent un impact significatif et durable sur la société civile et ses différents acteurs. Cet article donne d’abord un bref aperçu du « Mouvement de défense des îles Diaoyutai » (Baodiao) à Taïwan et aux États-Unis. Il s’agit d’un différend territorial concernant les îles Diaoyutai (îles Senkakus), en mer de Chine orientale, opposant Taïwan, le Japon et la Chine et apparu à la fin des années 1960. Au cours des quatre dernières décennies, les acteurs non étatiques qui se sont consacrés au Baodiao comprenaient des intellectuels, des politiciens locaux, des pêcheurs, etc., dont les intérêts et les approches pratiques de la défense des Diaoyutai n’étaient pas nécessairement les mêmes. Parmi eux, les intellectuels-activistes qui ont été les pionniers du Baodiao en Amérique ou à Taïwan en 1971, en particulier les membres « gauchistes-unificateurs » (Zuotong) qui ont fortement défendu l’unification de Taïwan avec la Chine, ont été les plus virulents pour appeler à la défense du territoire « chinois » des Diaoyutai. Dans un deuxième temps, l’article traite du « boom » inattendu de la mémoire Baodiao nourrie par les gauchistes-unificationnistes ces vingt dernières années, en soulignant leur capital culturel élevé par rapport à celui des politiciens locaux et des pêcheurs ; l’attachement nostalgique propre à la fin d’une vie d’adulte ; le développement significatif du nationalisme taïwanais et l’ascension de la Chine en tant que puissance mondiale. L’article souligne en outre que de nombreux membres des factions très antagonistes de gauche et de droite parmi les intellectuels-activistes de Baodiao se sont rapprochés depuis le milieu des années 1990 en raison de leur identité chinoise commune, de leur opposition au nationalisme taïwanais et de leur soutien à la Chine comme puissance montante. L’article conclut que la grande capacité de ces intellectuels-activistes à construire une mémoire collective, comme le montre leur nostalgie du passé des Baodiao, montre qu’ils ont été les acteurs les plus inflexibles de la défense des Diaoyutai, et les agents les plus importants du nationalisme territorial, qui doit sans doute être surmonté afin de maintenir la stabilité dans la mer de Chine orientale, et de parvenir à une coexistence pacifique entre Taïwan, la Chine et le Japon.

    Entrées d’index

    Mots-clés : Taïwan, mémoire, nationalisme, sciences politiques, militantisme, îles Diaoyutai

    Keywords : Taiwan, memory, nationalism, political science, activism, Diaoyutai Islands

    Texte intégral Review of research literature on the Diaoyutais issue The example of Wang Xiaobo and the unexpected return of the past Life Stage, Nostalgia, and the Baodiao memory From depression to optimism: the return of the Baodiao generation Leftists-rightists rapprochement and intense nostalgia Conclusion Bibliographie Notes de bas de page Auteur

    Texte intégral

    1Possession of territory is a necessary condition for statehood and a basic goal of every nationalism.1 Territorial dispute not only triggers conflicts between governments involved but often has a major impact on civil society actors within these countries. This has been precisely the case of the Republic of China (ROC), or Taiwan, which has been involved in the territorial dispute about Diaoyutai lieyu 釣魚台列嶼,(the Diaoyutai Islands called Jiange zhudao 尖閣諸島 [the Senkakus Islands] in Japan, a group of uninhabited islets in the East China Sea, about 120 sea miles northeast of Taiwan) for more than half a century.2

    2At the turn of 1970, university students in Taiwan followed the step of Taiwan students in the U.S. to launch the Baowei diaoyutai yundong 保衛釣魚台運動 (Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement, or simply Baodiao yundong 保釣運動, Diaoyun 釣運, and Baodiao 保釣) in response to the dispute between Taiwan and Japan over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands, when the U.S. was preparing to return them to Japan together with Okinawa and the rest of the Ryukyu Islands according to its reversion settlement with Tokyo. The positions of Baodiao activists, composed mainly of Taiwan university students and young intellectuals in the U.S. as the locus of Baodiao, could be roughly divided into three categories:

    • zuopai 左派 (leftists), who strongly criticized the KMT government and supported the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the reunification of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland under the control of the CCP;
    • youpai 右派 (rightists), who supported the KMT government and the idea of gexin baotai 革新保台 (reforming to preserve Taiwan) but in general also endorsed the idea of China’s unification. They later organized Quan mei zhongguo tongxue fangong aiguo lianmeng 全美中國同學反共愛國聯盟 (All American Chinese Student Anti-Communist Patriotic Alliance), or “Aimeng”(愛盟) in December 1971;
    • disantiao luxian 第三條路線 (third-way) activists, who pursued democratization and “social enlightenment” in Taiwan, arguing that they did not exclude the possibility of Taiwan’s unification with China based on the consent and interest of the people of Taiwan.3

    3However, in Taiwan, Baodiao soon died away and in America, it had nearly completely disappeared by the mid-1970s.

    4Over the past four decades, in addition to the initial Baodiao mentioned above, there have been other different versions of Baodiao—different actions to protect the Diaoyutais—organized by different civil-society actors, such as local politicians or fishermen, in Taiwan, especially since the 1990s. In the several waves of actions to protect the Diaoyutais, various activists emerged in different historical contexts whose interests, political agendas, and strategic actions were not necessarily identical, albeit sharing the common goal of defending the islets from the Japanese. Among these various activists, compared with local politicians, fishermen, etc., those Baodiao university students and young intellectuals emerging domestically or overseas in the early 1970s were generally characterized by a higher educational background, having more “cultural capital,” discursive capabilities, and access to a variety of media to make their voices heard. In fact, the leftist and pro-PRC intellectual-activists, the so-called zuotong 左統 (leftist-unificationists), have unexpectedly set foot again into Taiwan’s political landscape and been most vocal in calling for the defense of the “Chinese” territory of the Diaoyutais since the turn of the 21th century in the context of Taiwan’s democratization and rising Taiwanese nationalism. In recent years, they have become the main force in constructing Baodiao discourse and collective memory in Taiwan.

    5The main purpose of this article is to analyze why there has been an unexpected Baodiao memory boom created mainly by the leftist-unificationist intellectual-activists over the last two decades. It will be argued that it has grown out of the contingent conjuncture of their high cultural capital compared with that of other non-state Baodiao activists, nostalgic tendency typical of their late adult stage of life, the significant development of Taiwanese nationalism, and the rise of PRC as a global power. The article further points out that in general, originally antagonistic leftist and rightist Baodiao intellectual-activists have been gradually reconciled and cooperated since the mid-1990s because of their shared Chinese identity, opposition against Taiwanese nationalism, and support for a rising PRC, thus echoing the PRC’s growing popular nationalism. The article concludes that the high capability of these intellectual-activists in constructing collective memory, as demonstrated in their nostalgia for the Baodiao past, shows that they have been one of the most unyielding civil society actors demanding to defend the Diaoyutais, and one of the most important agents of Chinese territorial nationalism, which arguably must be overcome to secure international peace in the East China Sea, and achieve peaceful coexistence among Taiwan, the PRC, and Japan.

    Review of research literature on the Diaoyutais issue

    6The existing literature related to my topic falls into two categories. The first constitutes the main source on which the recent Baodiao memory boom in Taiwan has drawn, comprising a variety of articles, documents, magazines, memoirs, interviews, etc. produced by those intellectual-activists who pioneered Baodiao either in America or Taiwan in the early 1970s and later. In general, this kind of materials documents their experiences of and feelings about Baodiao during the movement and after, and thus serve as my major research data source, especially those produced by leftist-unificationist activists.4 Moreover, Hong Sanxiong’s (洪三雄) book and Zhang Junkai’s (張鈞凱) master’s thesis, contain the most complete descriptions of Baodiao and ensuing student movements organized mainly by students of the National Taiwan University (NTU) in the early 1970s.5 Ren Xiaoqi’s (任孝琦) book narrates the origins and development of both Baodiao and the Patriotic Alliance in America, providing a detailed history of the rightist intellectual-activists.6

    7The second category is academic research literature mostly from the fields of history, international law, international relations, geopolitics, etc., focusing on such issues as the origins and development of the Diaoyutais territorial dispute between Taiwan, the PRC, and Japan, and how these claimants have demanded sovereignty over the islets and their justifications, actions, and interactions, how to solve this territorial dispute, etc.7 This kind of research literature is helpful to understand the Diaoyutais territorial dispute at the international level, and actually reflects the international research trends on this issue dominated by the English-speaking academic community. However, except a few pieces of research,8 this kind of literature focuses mainly on the actions of the states and there has been a dearth in research that explores the relationship between territorial dispute and civil society. With a focus on the role of intellectuals in territorial dispute and territorial nationalism, my article is intended to fill this gap.

    The example of Wang Xiaobo and the unexpected return of the past

    8Since the summer of 1968, news had begun to break that there might be rich oil deposits in the East China Sea, sparking off the dispute between the ROC and Japan over the sovereignty of the Diaoyutais. About two years later, in November 1970, Wang Xiaobo (王曉波), a then graduate student at the NTU Department of Philosophy, under his pen name Mao Han (茅漢), and Wang Shun (王順) published an essay “Baowei Diaoyutai!” 保衛釣魚台! (Defend the Diaoyutais!) in the politico-cultural magazine China Magazine (Zhonghua zazhi 中華雜誌). Starting their article with the anti-imperialist slogans of the May Fourth Movement in China in 1919, they argued that Japan, with rekindled imperialist ambition, had attempted to seize “the Chinese territory of the Diaoyutais.” These two indignant young authors insisted that the islets’ geographic location close to Taiwan and a variety of historical records of them showed that the Diaoyutais without doubt belonged to China (that is, the ROC). Also, they criticized the KMT government for being cowardly dealing with the territorial dispute, for it had been soft internationally especially when the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) was expected to vote whether to replace the ROC with the PRC as the sole legal China. Moreover, the two authors accused Japan of “shielding [those figures who promoted] ‘taidu’ 台獨 (Taiwan independence), and tearing the Chinese in Taiwan apart.” At the end of the essay, they pledged to demonstrate the determination of their generation to follow the step of the May Fourth generation to fight Japanese imperialism by protecting the Diaoyutais.9

    9“Defend the Diaoyutais!” was presumably the first public voice coming from members of the postwar generation in Taiwan addressing the territorial dispute. By January 1971, by the time when concerned Taiwan students in the U.S. held the first Baodiao demonstration, through the medium of a network of members of Science Monthly (Kexue yuekan 科學月刊) established by student-activist Lin Xiaoxin (林孝信) and others this essay had widely circulated among them.10 Since NTU students launched Baodiao in Taiwan in April 1971, Wang Xiaobo had played a major role in it, significantly contributing to the organization of on-campus Baowei diaoyutai weiyuanhui 保衛釣魚台委員會 (Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Committee).11 The transfer of administration rights over the Ryukyu Islands (including the Diaoyutai Islands) from the U.S. to Japan was signed by the two countries on June 17, 1971. On that same day, the Committee organized a street demonstration in Taipei and Wang Xiaobo was the draftsman of “Gao quanguo tongbao shu” 告全國同胞書 (“Letter to All Compatriots of Our Country”) and the two letters of protest NTU students filed to the U.S. and Japanese embassies respectively.12 Moreover, on May 15, 1972, the transfer was officially completed. A week later, the Committee eventually announced its disbandment and the draftsman of the disbandment notice was also Wang Xiaobo. In fact, by devoting himself to Baodiao, he pioneered the rise of a huigui xianshi shidai 回歸現實世代 (return-to-reality generation) in this decade when a vast number of young intellectuals, both local Taiwanese and Mainlander, rejected the “exile mentality” prevailing in postwar Taiwan and challenged the political system and cultural conventions.13

    10Baodiao activists in the U.S. were all university students and young intellectuals of Mainlander background almost without exception, despite their different positions mentioned earlier.14 In Taiwan, Wang Xiaobo also reflected this general ethnic background of Baodiao intellectual-activists. Born in Jiangxi (江西) in 1943, he escaped to Taiwan with his family in 1948 and grew up in Taiwan. In 1979, 36-year-old Wang Xiaobo published a collection of his essays entitled The Call of the Age (Shidai husheng 時代呼聲), in which he introduced himself as “a truly authentic Chinese.” In the preface to the book, he reviewed his past life, stressing that thanks to Baodiao, he and many young people of his generation in Taiwan had come to “have a deep understanding of modern imperialism.” He further argued that: “since the Japanese colonial period, the suffering of Taiwanese compatriots had indeed been part of the suffering of the entire Chinese nation which was caused by China’s backwardness and foreign imperialism.” “To stop China’s and Taiwan’s suffering, the imperialist control must be ended first,” which he believed in turn necessitated the unity of the nation and the unification of China.15 Moreover, in the preface to The Call of the Age, written on December 9, 1979, Wang emphasized the importance of the principles of democracy and “checks and balances” for a modern government to lessen the risk of corruption. Therefore, he admired the efforts of the dissidents of “Dangwai” 黨外 (literally, “outside the party [i.e. KMT]”), the anti-KMT opposition movement supported mainly by local Taiwanese, for upholding these principles, though he urged them to “transcend current limitations and promote peaceful and democratic reform in politics based on the premise of the entire Chinese nation”.16

    11However, the next day after Wang wrote his preface, the Kaohsiung shijian 高雄事件 (Kaohsiung Incident) occurred. There was a bloody conflict between Dangwai supporters and the police resulting from a demonstration in the major city in southern Taiwan organized by Dangwai dissidents to celebrate international “Human Rights Day.” Many major Dangwai leaders were arrested and sentenced to terms in prison. The Incident led to the radicalization of Dangwai’s challenge to KMT rule in the following years, including promoting a nationalist Taiwan yishi 台灣意識 (Taiwanese consciousness). Since Dangwai dissidents founded the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in September 1986, Taiwanese nationalism had gained growing momentum. The parallel development was the “Taiwanization” of the KMT, characterized mainly by the rise of local Taiwanese elites in the party and the government under the new leadership of Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), a local Taiwanese succeeding Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) as President of the ROC and then as Chairman of the KMT. In brief, the 1980s and 1990s saw the peak of political and cultural “indigenization” or Taiwanization.17

    12As for overseas Baodiao which was based mainly in the U.S., initially there were no obvious factions among the intellectual-activists. However, since the summer of 1971 the majority of them gradually turned leftist, and thus the movement became dominated by the leftists who enthusiastically identified themselves with the PRC under Mao Zhedong’s control and highly eulogized the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution conducted by Hongwenbing 紅衛兵 (Red Guards). In response to this transformation, those activists, who identified themselves with the ROC, as mentioned earlier, established the Patriotic Alliance in Washington D.C. as a rallying point for the rightists with strong support from the KMT.

    13Either in the U.S. or in Taiwan, Baodiao had obviously died away by the mid-1970s. In the U.S., several dramatic political changes, including the PRC’s being admitted to the UN in October 1971, PRC-U.S. rapprochement following Nixon’s visit to the PRC in February 1972, and Japan and the PRC’s joint decision to shelve the territorial dispute because of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, had to a significant degree satisfied the leftists, who were also troubled by such factors, amongst others, as the infighting raging in their ranks and the flagging of Baodiao on university campuses resulting from the graduation of activists. Added to these, the bitter reality of the PRC, especially the historic disaster brought about by the Cultural Revolution, revealed after Deng Xiaoping’s reform project was launched in late 1978, disillusioned many of the leftists.18 In general, from the mid-1970s until the mid-1990s, it was not unusual to find the leftists lamenting Baodiao’s waning and even regretting that its history had ended. Furthermore, the decline of the leftist Baodiao in the U.S. was accompanied by the similar fate of the rightists, who used to derive their momentum from their confrontation with the leftists.19

    14In Taiwan, the disbandment of the NTU Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Committee spoke volumes to the end of Baodiao in Taiwan following the signing of the transfer of administration rights over the Ryukyu Islands in June 1971. Let’s evoke Wang Xiaobo, for example: his feelings about the decline of Baodiao were quite similar to those of overseas leftists and also representative of other domestic intellectual-activists. Experiencing Taiwan’s dramatic political change from the late 1970s to the 1990s, Wang published an article collection, An Unfinished History: The 25th Anniversary of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement (Shangwei wancheng de lishi – Baodiao ershiwu nian 尚未完成的歷史–保釣二十五年), in the fall of 1996, when he, at the age of fifty-three, served as the Director of Division of General Studies, Shih Hsin College of Journalism and Communications (now Shih Hsin University). In addition to his earlier articles, such as the co-authored “Defend the Diaoyutais!,” this volume featured those written from the 1980s onward, whose targets of bitter attack included Japanese “revived militarism,” the KMT government’s “pro-Japan attitude and incompetence” in its handling of the Diaoyutais territorial dispute under Chiang Ching-kuo’s and Lee Teng-hui’s leadership, Dangwai and the DPP’s pro-Taiwan independence idea and their suspected pro-Japan “tendency to relinquish the Diaoyutais,” etc. “Without a united and strong China, it is impossible to check Japan’s aggressive propensity,” Wang explicitly contended in one of his later articles in the volume.20

    15The overall tone of Wang’s remarks in An Unfinished History remained fiery and his enthusiasm for Baodiao and criticizing Japan seemed not to have abated. However, in the preface to his book intended to commemorate the twenty-five anniversary of Baodiao, Wang, with some regret and melancholy, explained the purpose of the publication was to “preserve a life memory for myself, and also to make a historical record of our time.”21 Looking back on Baodiao he was deeply involved with in the early 1970s, his preface revealed his nostalgic sentiments and intention to turn the page and close the history book on Baodiao. In fact, later in 2010 he admitted that “I once collected my writings on Baodiao under the title An Unfinished History: The 25th Anniversary of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement, which I originally thought could bring down the curtain on my life’s involvement with Baodiao.”22

    16What Wang expressed epitomized the general tendency of leftist-unificationist intellectual-activists during the two decades or so from the mid-1970s until the mid-1990s, a period when they believed that Baodiao and the China unification movement, regarded as the two sides of the same coin and dubbed as “Diaotongyun” 釣統運 (The Defend the Diaoyutai Islands / China Unification Movement), were at a low ebb with no hope of revival in the near future.23 Over the quarter of century following the end of Baodiao, up to the mid-1990s, not too many recollections about Baodiao of the 1970s could be found in the public arena, either in Taiwan, America or elsewhere. There had been hardly any collectively organized efforts to preserve the memory of it, except for individual remembrances with nostalgia found sporadically, such as Wang’s, let alone public memorial activities.24 In a mood to close the history book on Baodiao, those pioneering activists, such as Wang, especially leftist-unificationist members, presumably never expected a boom in the construction of Baodiao memory, in which they would be pivotal (see discussion below). Under this situation, there hardly existed a “collective” memory, in its full sense, of Baodiao. For many in Taiwan, Baodiao of the 1970s has been a very distant memory. This is especially true among the younger generations growing up in the post-Baodiao years.

    17However, compared with the period before the mid-1990s, since the turn of the 21th century an increasing number of various activities, events, and publications that thematized the Diaoyutais territorial dispute and Baodiao of the 1970s have emerged in Taiwan, in the form of lectures, workshops, forums, anniversaries, conferences, demonstrations, books, organizations, document exhibitions, library collections, etc. In terms of initiators and/or organizers, first of all, the emergence of Baodiao-related workshops, document exhibitions, etc. has been due mainly to the activism led by a prominent “third-way” activist, Lin Hsiao-hsin (林孝信) and his supporters via Diaoyutai gongmin jiaoyu jihua 釣魚台公民教育計畫 (The Citizenship Education Project on the Diaoyutai Islands) at the Center for General Education, Shih Hsin University. Roughly since 2012, with Chinese nationalist fervor, they have been very active in raising popular awareness about the Diaoyutai territorial dispute and anti-Japanese (and also, to a lesser degree, anti-American) sentiments and promoting the memory of Baodiao of the 1970s by organizing a series of Renshi Diaoyutai yanxiying 認識釣魚台研習營 (Understanding the Diaoyutai Islands Edu-cation Camp) and related activities.25

    18Second, it is not unusual that forums, anniversaries, conferences, etc. involved former intellectual-activists with different positions - leftist, rightist, and third-way, such as the forum on “Cong Xinxiwang dao Diaoyun” 從新希望到釣運 (From New Hope to the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement) held in Taipei in May 2007 and the conference on “Dongya shiye zhong de Baodiao yundong” 東亞視野中的保釣運動 (The Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement in East Asian Perspective) held at NTU in December 2011.26 This reflected not only that they shared similar interest in promoting the memory of Baodiao but also that despite their conflicts in the 1970s, they had reached a certain rapprochement of standpoints and were willing to cooperate (see further discussion below).

    19Third, the members of the Patriotic Alliance have been another important agent in increasing public awareness about the Diaoyutais territorial dispute and promoting the memory of Baodiao. For example, former president of Soochow University 東吳大學, Liu Yuantsun (劉源俊), has been highly active, insisting that Taiwan and the PRC work together to protect the Diaoyutais. Liu, a leading initiator for both Zhonghua baodiao xiehui 中華保釣協會 (Chinese Alliance in Defense of the Diaoyutai Islands, founded in November 2008) and Taiwan diaoyutai guangfu hui 臺灣釣魚台光復會 (Taiwan Society for Recovering the Diaoyutai Islands, founded in July 2013), also served as the first chairman of the two organizations.

    20Fourth, the book series Spring Thunder (Chunlei 春雷), including several thick volumes published by leftist-unificationists from 2001, has become a major source for preserving the memory of Baodiao and a channel for advocating their political belief. Furthermore, the library of National Tsinghua University, based in Hsinchu, has become a primary organization for retaining the Baodiao memory since 2006 by collecting a variety of historical materials on Baodiao and interviewing many former intellectual-activists.27

    Life Stage, Nostalgia, and the Baodiao memory

    21While the significant boom in various activities and publications related to the Baodiao memory, beginning at the turn of the 21th century, has been brought about by former intellectual-activists—especially those from the leftist-unificationist camp—motivated by some personal agenda, their agency can also be attributed to factors beyond individual-level characteristics and control, i.e., to features of the conditions under which they live. From a life stage and structural perspectives, the three generational or political factors underpinning the memory boom to be examined are: 1) the fact that similar in age, the former activists are, in sociologist Karl Manheim’s term, in the same “generation location” and at the same life stage;28 2) the intensification of tongdu zhi zheng 統獨之爭, the conflict in Taiwan between supporters calling for Taiwan’s independence and supporters demanding Taiwan’s unification with the PRC, since the beginning of the 1990s; and 3) the rise of China as a global power. In other words, although the Baodiao memory boom as an unexpected return of the past can be attributed to a group of individuals’ conscious efforts in constructing a collective remembrance, it is actually the result of the contingent conjuncture of individual lives’ history and broader historical changes. In the rest of this article, I will be drawing on psychologist James V. Wertsch’s theory of collective memory, and sociologist Fred Davis’s theory of nostalgia, to examine this particular conjuncture.

    22First of all, as Wertsch argues, based on the findings of many studies in psychology and sociology, one’s “autobiographical memory”, which formed out of experiences of the events occurring during his or her lifetime, especially during young adulthood, “have a unique impact both on individual memory and on the collective memory of a generation,” whether people actually participated in them or not. Closely linked to the individual’s concerns and goals, people’s “autobiographical memory” usually provides a “usable past,” and thus has a particularly profound impact on their generation’s collective memory and political outlook for the rest of their lives. This, as Wertsch further indicates, has been verified by many political and cultural debates which involve highly subjective collective memories and deeply committed perspectives.29

    23But why are people’s autobiographical memory focused on their young adulthood? In this regard, while based on the experience of Western society, Davis’s analysis of nostalgic sentiments and phenomena is enlightening in examining the case of the Baodiao memory boom. Davis argues that while people may feel nostalgic for any prior period in life, the period from adolescence to adulthood typically occupies a privileged positon in nostalgia. From the perspective of “life cycle,” he explains rather convincingly the reason:

    Basically, there is the circumstance that (for men in particular) few of life’s transitions are as difficult, as strongly contrasted, as prolonged and replete with fateful uncertainties as that from adolescence to adulthood. Whether it be a matter of starting work, going off to college, performing military service, getting married, becoming a parent, or simply leaving home—typically it is a stressful combination of several of these—the essential psychosocial transition involves being carried in relatively short order from familiar places and persons to settings that are new, unfamiliar, and thus problematic in crucial respects. Not infrequently the change is so marked or abrupt … as to make it appear utterly alien and unassimilable. From a subjective standpoint then, the transition from social adolescence to adulthood is especially dramatic and well marked. This, in turn, accounts for its etching a sharping figure-ground contrast in one’s life space.30

    24When discussing American “perduring aesthetic enchantment with adolescence,” Davis further indicates that people’s adolescence historically marked by dramatic change (such as war, economic depression, and civil disorder) and some special turn in popular tastes and lifestyles (like the emergence of rock’n’roll and the hippie movement) would make it easier to evoke subsequent nostalgia than does one endowed with less disruptive turns of history. “If nostalgia most savors the adolescent years, then those most given to savoring thereof are the aging and the aged…,” Davis also adds. He argues that nostalgia functions in the lives of the older in a similar way to that in the lives of younger persons or any category of persons. That is, the key aim of nostalgia is to “assuage the uncertainties and identity threats engendered by proble­matic life transitions.” However, the particularity of older people’s nostalgia lies in the fact that it is not “a transient or episodic response to a problematic life situation;” rather, it “tends to be assimilated into a larger and more continuous process of reminiscence and assessment,” an inner experience of “life review” typical of this life stage.31

    25When involved in the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement in the early 1970s, typical Baodiao intellectual-activists were in their twenties or thirties. At the turn of the 21th century, when the Baodiao memory boom started, they began to age, roughly in their fifties or sixties. Viewed from the perspectives of autobiographical memory and life review based on Wertsch’s and Davis’ arguments, the Baodiao memory boom as an unexpected return of the past is due first to the simple fact that those Baodiao activists began to enter their elderly stage: the remembrance of Baodiao has become part and parcel of their life review. Baodiao, which has emerged as the focus of their nostalgia or autobiographical memory, occurred precisely during their young adulthood. On the one hand, it was a period when they in their personal lives presumably faced difficult transitions and major uncertainties, and obviously this was especially true for those who went abroad to study and thus had to adjust themselves to alien environments. On the other hand, the territorial dispute lost to Japan, the former invader of the country and national enemy, and Baodiao, to which they ardently devoted themselves, left a deep mark not only on their young adulthood but on their following lives. The contingent conjuncture of the major transition in personal life cycle and the sudden historic event facilitated Baodiao in the early 1970s to become the highlight of the activists’ autobiographical memory and therefore the focus of their nostalgia later. Just as Baodiao in the early 1970s represented a particular conjuncture of the major transition in personal life cycle and broader historical changes, so did the Baodiao memory boom beginning roughly from the mid-1990s. That is, the revisiting of the Baodiao past has been contingent on the conjuncture of the aging of the former intellectual-activists, the indigenization of politics in Taiwan, and China’s rise, as it is analyzed below.

    26In April 1995, a group of former intellectual-activists held the commemoration of the 25th anniversary of Baodiao at Columbia University in New York. The open letter from the organizing team of the commemoration stated: “In those years, we were just young people in our twenties and thirties, in the full bloom of youth and vigorous, but now we are already middle-aged in our fifties or sixties.”32 A participant, Huang Ruiwo (黃瑞我), thus described the commemoration:

    Once in the conference hall, everyone was looking for familiar figures. What we found were some with their hair gone gray, and others having put on much weight; some who were originally single came along with their partners and the other who previously always enjoyed the company of their partners had lost them. The youth had become middle-aged, and the middle-aged people were already graying. It was blatant that the passage of time had left its mark on everyone. Although we hadn’t seen one another for many years, we could still recognize or vaguely remember who was who from their shapes and voices. Unfortunately, many people could not come. Many people had parted company. In short, people had changed in the past twenty-five years. No matter what, it’s a good time to get together and we were really happy to talk about the past.33

    27In their preface to the first volume of the book series Chunlei, Roaring Spring Thunder: Selections of Historical Literature in Memory of the 30th Anniversary of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement (Chunlei shengsheng: baodiao yundong sanshi zhounian wenxian xuanji 春雷聲聲: 保釣運動三十週年文獻選輯), former leftist-unificationist activist Lin Guojiong (林國炯) and his co-editors explained their reason for editing the volume, revealing a great nostalgic longing for times past. These co-editors lamented thus:

    In those years, we Baodiao champions were young, in their twenties and thirties, fully blossoming in our lives and full of energy. But today, we are all already graying middle-aged people, in our fifties and sixties. Some of us have retired and entered their elderly age; some have even passed away .... We cannot help bemoaning when we contemplate the present, recall the past, and realize that we have not achieved our ambitious dreams.34

    28They thought that “if we don’t seize our time to write down some remembrances, or to collect and sort the materials about Diaotongyun, when we have not lost our energy and our memories are still there, we will fail to meet our expectations in the past and also feel sorry for the future generations.”35 In 2006, when a group of similar co-editors published the three-volume After Spring Thunder: Selections of Historical Literature in Memory of the 35th Anniversary of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement (Chunlei zhihou: baodiao yundong sanshiwu zhounian wenxian xuanji 春雷之後: 保釣運動三十五週年文獻選輯), they confessed even greater nostalgia as they were getting older than before:

    The elderly have two common problems. One is a strong sense of urgency caused by the feeling that time is running out, because after all, they are already near the end of their lives.... Shouldn’t we hurry to preserve the records of the patriotic deeds of Diaotongyun veterans who have already gone or sooner or later will pass away by means of memoirs, commemorations, oral history, etc., and pass them on to the future generations?

    The other common problem is that old people love to look back - to recall the bumpy roads they once took, those turbulent days, and those unusual and glory years. What we old Baodiao activists love most to recall, of course, has been those unusual and glory Baodiao years.36

    29The leftist-unificationist activists’ above descriptions of themselves can be said to be a classic expression of nostalgia. In fact, their nostalgic narrative is imbued not only with a bitter lament for the passing of youth but with heroic remembrance of the past. First of all, the focus of their nostalgic recall is precisely on their early adulthood affected by significant milestones and turbulent events in history. Second, the emphasis on their “bumpy roads,” “turbulent days,” “unusual and glory years,” and the like illustrates Davis’ other argument: Nostalgia “likes to fasten on those periods in our past when we thought and felt ourselves different” and shows a strong partiality for a “genre of amour propre.” He further points out that the reason lies:

    …not so much with what actually may have been unique in our pasts as it has to do with nostalgia’s abiding involvement with the existential problem of sustaining continuity of identity in the face of new demands, with assimilating the inevitable alterations in relationship occasioned by our destined passage through the life cycle, and, more diffusely, with calming the disquietude aroused by almost any alteration in one or another of our many statuses… It is as if by harking back to those (probably recast) times of sweet strangeness, we assure ourselves that, just as we then felt odd, different, alone, and estranged, and yet managed somehow to emerge from it all intact and possibly even enhanced, so shall we again.37

    30The “genre of amour propre” and even heroic self-admiration has also been embodied by the titles of many books on Baodiao written or edited by former intellectual-activists, either leftist or rightist or belonging to other political leanings.38 The coincidental uses of the term “fengyun” 風雲 (turbulence) as well as the expressions “chunlei” 春雷 (spring thunder), “fenglei” 風雷 (thunderstorm), “zhengrong” 崢嶸 (unusual and glory), etc. in their book titles speak volumes to the former intellectual-activists’ desire to highlight the historic significance and “sweet strangeness” of their particular experiences during their young adulthood. Also, the sort of rhetoric of these books’ titles are obviously intended to convey a sense of having undergone many vicissitudes of life. As Davis argues, one primary way how nostalgia serves the purposes of continuity of identity is by “cultivating appreciative stances toward former selves,” which, based on simplifying and romanticizing the past, typically involve “some such self-appraisal as ‘Look how far I’ve come.’”39

    31Furthermore, nostalgia is of significance not only to individual identity but also to collective identity, especially in engendering generational identity. In this regard, Davis’ insight is also enlightening. He argues that “nostalgic experience is a primary vehicle in the generation-defining process” in the sense that it “mediates the selection, distillation, refinement, and integration of those scenes, events, personalities, attitudes, and practices from the past that make an identifiable generation of what would otherwise remain a featureless demographic cohort…” Via this process, nostalgia sentiment “cultivates a sense of history” and a “feeling of togetherness” among even distant and unknown contemporaries.40 In fact, in recollecting Baodiao, the former intellectual-activists have usually used it to define themselves and showed a clear generational identity, referring themselves as “Diaoyun yidai” 釣運一代 (the Diaoyun generation), “Baodiao de yidai” 保釣的一代 (the Baodiao generation), “Diaotongyun de shidai” 釣統運的世代 (the Diaotongyun generation), etc.41

    From depression to optimism: the return of the Baodiao generation

    32The Baodiao memory boom, however, cannot be attributed merely to such personal factors as nostalgic sentiments. It also has had much to do with two major historical changes at the turn of the 21th century: the indigenization of politics in Taiwan—especially the significant development of Taiwanese nationalism, and China’s rise as a global power. These significant changes, as showed below, further stimulated the transformation of former intellectual-activists’ political stances.

    33To begin with, Wang Xiaobo, who played an important role not only in Baodiao of the 1970s but recent construction of the Baodiao memory, still serves as a good example. Publishing the essay “Defend the Diaoyutais!” and devoting himself to Baodiao at the NTU in the early 1970s, he was criticized for “having illusions about the CCP” because of enthusiastically advocating “protecting the Chinese territory” based on Chinese nationalism and anti-Japanese and anti-American imperialisms.42 In January 1972, as Baodiao at the NTU had ended more than six months before and the ROC had been expelled from the UN for more than two months, Wang, who had recently obtained a master’s degree in philosophy from the NTU and become a lecturer in the department, under the pseudonym “Maili” (麥立), published an essay in the intellectual magazine The Intellectual (Daxue zazhi 大學雜誌) to clarify his position. Framed in the format of a communication dialogue with his overseas friend, the essay made it clear that he would definitely not betray Taiwan in its difficult time because he had been supported by the people of Taiwan rather than by what the leftist Baodiao activists called the “socialist motherland”—the PRC. He stressed his two fundamental concerns: first, China must be unified, but only under “a regime acceptable to Chinese people”; second, Taiwan must be protected as a springboard for “the future multi-dimensional development of Chinese culture.” Criticizing the Taidu fenzi 台獨份子 (pro-Taiwan independence figures) among Taiwan students who studied abroad and accusing them of committing “treason”, he admired the KMT’s adherence to the “One China” principle and anti-Taiwanese nationalism policy.43

    34Moreover, Wang also attacked the touji de zuopai 投機的左派 (opportunist leftists) among Taiwan students who studied overseas for being irresponsible because they were nurtured by the people of Taiwan but had never committed themselves to bettering Taiwan.44 He therefore accused the leftists of being hypocritical:

    …How can an intellectual who was supported by the people of Taiwan but cannot embrace the masses of 15 million peasants and workers in Taiwan embrace the masses of 700 million peasants and workers in China? How can [an intellectual who was supported by the people of Taiwan] and who cannot love the 15 million Chinese people in Taiwan whom it’s easy to love love the 700 million Chinese compatriots who are difficult [for him or her] to love?45

    35Highlighting the priority of the interests of Taiwan and its people and advocating political and social reforms, Wang’s criticisms do epitomize the general tendency of the young intellectuals of the “return-to-reality” generation in the 1970s mentioned previously.

    36When facing the rapid development of the Dangwai opposition movement, as indicated earlier, Wang Xiaobo made it clear, at the end of 1979, that while Dangwai’s contribution to the democratization of Taiwan should be appreciated, it should also act “based on the premise of the entire Chinese nation.” During the Beijing zhi chun 北京之春 (Beijing Spring), a short period of political tolerance in the PRC occurring in 1978 and 1979, in the wake of the end of the Cultural Revolution, he envisaged that once the democratic currents on both sides of the Taiwan Strait converged, Taiwan and the Chinese mainland would be unified.46 In brief, in the 1970s Wang not only prioritized the democratic reforms of Taiwan over its unification with China which was viewed as a long-term secondary goal. He also adopted a highly critical stance toward the PRC and insisted that China’s unification must be premised on democracy. All these showed that Wang, as a key Baodiao activist of the return-to-reality generation, differed markedly from those overseas leftist activists who identified with the PRC.

    37As pointed out earlier, either in the U.S. or in Taiwan, Baodiao had dissolved by the mid-1970s and the disastrous reality of the Cultural Revolution exposed by the end of this decade had disillusioned many of the leftist activists. In fact, the period from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, which they widely lamented as a “slump” of Baodiao or Diaotongyun, was also when the collective memory of Baodiao was fading among people in Taiwan. However, despite the regrets and self-criticisms of the disillusioned former leftist activists, many of them regained a positive attitude when recalling Baodiao with nostalgia after the so-called slump stage of Baodiao or Diaotongyun. This has especially been true since the mid-1990s and has been related to the significant political changes in Taiwan and China.

    38In Taiwan, Dangwai, dominated by local Taiwanese, actively promoted Taiwanese consciousness as the foundation of Taiwanese nationalism in the first half of the 1980s and then established the DPP in 1986, which in turn became the driving force behind the rapidly developing movement for Taiwan’s independence since the second half of this decade. As mentioned previously, this was accompanied by the Taiwanization of the KMT under the leadership of Lee Tenghui. The growing tension between supporters of Taiwanese nationalism and supporters demanding Taiwan’s unification with the PRC in the early 1990s stimulated the indigenization or Taiwanization of politics and culture further.47 As for the PRC, after the massacre of protesting students and civilians at the Tiananmen Square in June 1989, under the rigid political control of the CCP, the economy developed rapidly in the 1990s. Expected to retrieve sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macau in 1997 and 1999 respectively, the PRC was emerging as a world power.48

    39The development of Taiwan’s political indigenization made many former Baodiao activists feel quite outraged and on their guard. By contrast, the rise of China had been encouraging to them. These were especially true for the former leftist-unificationist activists who had long felt stuck in the slump stage of Diaotongyun. It was around 1995-1996, in particular, that this transformation began to be visible. These two years saw several major events which indeed demonstrated the seriousness of the conflict between the pro-independence and pro-unification camps in Taiwan, which was compounded by the tension between Taiwan and the PRC. In January 1995, the PRC president and CCP General Secretary, Jiang Zemin (江澤民), made a declaration on relations with Taiwan known as “Jiang ba dian” 江八點 (“Jiang’s Eight Points”), in which he claimed: “Both sides must strive toward peaceful unification. Chinese people should not fight Chinese people. Any unwillingness to forgo a military solution is not aimed at Taiwan compatriots but at foreign countries that try to meddle in China’s reunification process and against schemes promoting Taiwan independence.”49 In April, Taiwan President and KMT Chairman, Lee Teng-hui, responded with the so-called “Li liu tiao” 李六條 (“Lee’s Six Points”) which maintained: “Only by respecting the fact that Taiwan and mainland China have been governed by two sovereign political entities since 1949 can the unification problem be solved” and “The mainland should demonstrate its goodwill by announcing a willingness to forgo a military solution.”50

    40Moreover, the year 1995 saw the 100th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, whereby the Qing government of China ceded Taiwan in perpetuity to Japan. In April, a Gaobie zhongguo da youxing 告別中國大遊行 (Great March of Farewell to China) organized by Taiwan jiaoshou xiehui 台灣教授協會 (Taiwan Association of University Professors) was held in downtown Taipei to assert Taiwanese nationalism.51 Furthermore, Lee Tenghui’s visit to his alma mater, Cornell University, in the U.S. in June and Taiwan’s first democratic presidential election due to be held in March 1996 caused threats from the PRC, which held a series of military exercises and fired missiles near Taiwan’s major ports. The year 1995 also saw the 50th anniversary of the victory in the Chinese War of Resistance against Japan (the Second Sino-Japanese War) and of the retrocession of Taiwan to the ROC. Thus in August, a Wo shi zhongguoren 我是中國人 (I Am Chinese) march was staged in Taipei by the pro-unification groups, Zhongguo tongyi lianmeng 中國統一聯盟 (Alliance for the Reunification of China) and Xin tongmenghui 新同盟會 (New United Allegiance Society), to pronounce their anti-Taiwan independence stance and Chinese national identity.52 During the presidential election campaign, the DPP’s candidates for president and vice president, Peng Mingmin (彭明敏) and Xie Changting (Frank Hsieh 謝長廷), adopted “Taiwan independence” as their campaign theme. The KMT’s candidates for president and vice president, Lee Tenghui and Lien Chan (連戰) eventually won the election despite the PRC’s verbal and military threats and Lee’s alleged pro-independence stance.

    41Situated in the above-mentioned particular context, a rally held at Columbia University in New York in April 1995 to commemorate the 25th anniversary of Baodiao evidenced the fact that the former leftist intellectual-activists had begun to gain new momentum to recover from the slump or period of quietude. As mentioned previously, in their open letter the organizing team of this commemoration bewailed the passing of youth with nostalgia. However, in the wake of the gathering, an important former activist, Gong Zhongwu (龔忠武), expressed his feelings in the communication column of Straits Review (Haixia pinlun 海峽評論), a pro-unification magazine in Taiwan:

    We held the commemoration to honor Baodiao as scheduled, with old friends meeting one another, filled with bonhomie. Everyone recalled those old unusual and glory days as if they took place yesterday. Facing the rising fire of [the movement promoting] Taiwan’s independence or dutai 獨台 (independent Taiwan), we old Baodiao activists all think that we must regroup and pull ourselves together for a fresh start. We hope that the old Baodiao activists are old but still energetic and feel young and that they get even stronger than before in order to lend a strong hand to tongpai 統派 (the pro-China unification camp)… As soon as a thing reaches its extremity, it reverses its course. If we hope that the China unification movement can regain its momentum, the contributions made by a few old friends would have little effect. This must depend on the help of the friends of the Taiwan independence and independent Taiwan camps. The more turbulence they stir up, the better. Only by this means can we have the Chinese government and the overseas Chinese work together to crack down on those traitors to the Chinese nation.53

    42Gong’s remarks showed that the leftist-unificationists’ vehement opposition to Taiwanese nationalism evidently motivated them to rally again and triggered their getting out of the slump. In fact, Wang Xiaobo, who had abandoned his previous opposition to the leftists, sent from Taiwan a congratulatory message to the commemoration, which stressed: “On the eve of the Chinese national revival, the pro-Taiwan independence separatists supported by international hegemonism have been stepping up their pace, dreaming of uprooting China’s sovereignty in Taiwan.... Let’s once again unite and chant the slogans: ‘Defend China’s Territory, the Diaoyutais! Defend China’s Territory, Taiwan Province!’”54 Another example was Ye Xianyang (葉先揚), who taught in the U.S. Like other participants in the commemoration such as Gong Zhongwu, Ye harshly criticized the “national scum who are planning [the scheme for] Taiwan’s independence and an independent Taiwan.” Believing that “Jiang’s Eight Points,” “Li’s Six Points,” and China’s imminent restoration of sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macao all started the process of China’s reunification, he called on “our old Baodiao and Tongyun 統運 (The China Unification Movement) comrades to adhere to our own ideals and to motivate ourselves to act at such a critical historical moment!”55 Also, Cheng Junfu (程君復), a member of the organizing team of the commemoration, based on the new situation of the time, hope his “…old Baodiao friends live up to the ideals they had in their youth by making contribution to China’s prosperity, powerfulness, and unity.”56 Besides, one of the participants mentioned earlier, who vividly described the scene of the commemoration, Huang Ruiwo, wrote down the thoughts occurring to her on the way back home after the gathering: “Looking forward to the future, everyone thought that we must do more to promote the unification of China.... Thinking that a rich and powerful China was now in sight, I felt warm and happy. The day when we may hold our heads high was coming, so my spirits were lifted and I forgot all the fatigue of the journey.”57

    43It was also around 1995 that Lin Guojiong and other former leftist-unificationist activists decided to compile the historical material about Baodiao for publication.58 As indicated earlier, in the preface to their compilation, Roaring Spring Thunder, Lin and his co-editors lamented that Diaotongyun of the 1970s had been generally forgotten, showing great nostalgia for their lost youth. Nevertheless, when describing the purpose of their compilation, they believed that their contemporaries and the following generations could learn important lessons from Diaotongyun. If China’s leaders had fully appreciated the experience of overseas Baodiao, they argued, not only could the student-led protests at the Tiananmen Square in June 1989 have been prevented from happening, but also the surge in the power of the forces advocating Taiwan independence and independent Taiwan would have been checked.59 The co-editors added that the year 1995 saw not only the 25th anniversary of Baodiao, but also the 100th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the 50th anniversary of the victory in the Chinese War of Resistance against Japan, and the 50th anniversary of the retrocession of Taiwan, therefore they decided, at this unique historical moment, to compile the material about Baodiao into a volume with a view to passing the torch of “anti-imperialist patriotism” on to the next generation of Chinese.60 While feeling sorry about the slump of Baodiao, the co-editors also felt cheered up at the prospect of rallying, urging their “Diaotongyun friends” to stick to their initial dreams by resuming their activism to contribute to China’s unification in the new situation created by “Jiang’s Eight Points.”61

    44When it comes to general nostalgia, Davis typically holds a negative view of it, stressing that “nostalgia looks backward rather than forward, for the familiar rather than the novel, for certainty rather than discovery.” For him, the core of nostalgia, either personal or collective, is “to envelop all that may have been painful or unattractive about the past in a kind of fuzzy, redeemingly benign aura” based on the “good past/bad present” contrast, and “it is always62 the adoration of the past that triumphs over lamentations for the present.” Therefore, generational nostalgic sentiment is characterized by “a conviction of the essential superiority of what was over what is.”63 In this view, while nostalgia contributes to the maintenance of self-identity, it involves a somewhat escapist tendency, a withdrawing response to the changing present and according to Davis’ theory, this, by definition, is especially true of the elderly. However, this is not the case for the former Baodiao leftist intellectual-activists roughly after the mid-1990s and especially since the turn of the 21th century, whose sentimental, backward-looking engagement with history have been mitigated by their rekindled passion for political activism, which in turn has been nurtured by both their antagonism toward Taiwanese nationalism and embrace of a rising PRC. All these factors stimulated Lin Guojiong and his co-editors to compile Roaring Spring Thunder, which started the Spring Thunder series of thick volumes as a major marker of the Baodiao memory boom.

    Leftists-rightists rapprochement and intense nostalgia

    45Paralleling the aforementioned change of the leftist-unificationists has been the transformation of the former rightists who originally supported the KMT and similarly, their transformation can be attributed to the effects of the significant development of Taiwanese nationalism and the PRC’s rise. Later in the year 1985, a key former rightist Baodiao activist and one of the Patriotic Alliance’s initiators, Shao Yuming (邵玉銘), who was a PhD student in history at the University of Chicago during Baodiao, began to interview his co-members of the Patriotic Alliance when he served as the director of Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University. The volume Shao published later in 1991, The Turbulent Years: Remembrances of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement and the Life of Studying Abroad (Fengyun de niandai: Baodiao yundong ji liuxue shengya zhi huiyi 風雲的年代: 保釣運動及留學生涯之回憶) records their experience of being Baodiao activists in the U.S. in the early 1970s. The twenty-one interviewees included Shen Junshan (沈君山), Yu Muming (郁慕明), Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), Chen Yiyang (陳義揚), Liu Yuanjun (劉源俊), Weiyong (魏鏞), Guan Zhong (關中), etc., who, in the interviews, almost without exception reiterated what they had upheld during Baodiao: the pro-ROC, anti-leftist, anti-communist, and anti-Taiwanese nationalist stances, and the goal of building a free, democratic, and unified China.

    46Around 1995, however, despite the old animosities between them, obviously the leftists and the rightists had reached some rapprochement. In June 1995, to commemorate the 25th anniversary of Baodiao, several major members of the two factions were invited to a symposium in Taipei organized by the Taiwanshi yanjiuhui 台灣史研究會 (Taiwan History Research Society) and chaired by Wang Xiaobo. Talking about how many members of the Patriotic Alliance who returned to Taiwan after completing their studies abroad had felt uneasy and alienated in the changing political circumstances, which - he hinted - were shaped by democratization, the rise of Taiwanese nationalism, and the Taiwanization of the KMT under Lee Tenghui since the late 1980s, Chen Yiyang, the then president of the National Open University, stated at the symposium that they would cling to the belief which motivated them to initiate Baodiao: “As long as I exist, China will be strong.”64 Echoing Chen’s words, Wang Xiaobo emphasized: “I think today if friends here don’t protect the ROC, Taiwan will become Taiwan gongheguo 台灣共和國 (Republic of Taiwan). So no matter what, we have to continue to defend it.” He added: “To achieve China’s unification, the two factions, the leftists and the rightists, must unite. Otherwise, people will bid farewell to China...”65 Another former Baodiao activist in the U.S., also said:

    At that time, Baodiao was intended to protect only a tiny islet, and I think the biggest problem facing Taiwan today is that some people want to separate Taiwan from China. In my view, when we mark the 50th anniversary of Baodiao, the biggest issue to which we should be alert is the independence of Taiwan.

    ... An activity like what Xiaobo organizes today, which involves the leftist and rightist camps, would be a good opportunity for communication... So the leftists are patriotic and the rightists are also patriotic. Everyone should work together to understand that our real enemy is imperialism... Let’s hope China can be peacefully unified.66

    47This occasion shows not only that compared to who he was in the 1970s, Wang Xiaobo had changed much by the mid-1990s, supporting China’s unification without caring about democracy and abandoning his anti-communism to promote the leftist-rightist cooperation, but that due to their common Chinese national identity and anti-Taiwanese nationalism, the relations between the two camps of former intellectual-activists had been thawing.

    48Such a transformation leading to a rapprochement was seen more clearly during the intensification of the territorial dispute over the Diaoyutais in 1996, which even led to those former activists’ call for Taiwan-PRC cooperation to tackle Japan. In July 1996, a right-wing Japanese civil group built a lighthouse on one of the Diaoyutai islets, which sparked protests from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the PRC. Besides, Japan declared a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone that included the Diaoyutais. In August, Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda reasserted Japan’s sovereignty over the Diaoyutais on the occasion of his visit to Hong Kong. Chen Yiyang, then chairman of the Patriotic Alliance, immediately issued a statement demanding that the two governments across the Taiwan Strait unite to protect the Diaoyutais. He called on Chinese communists to “aim the cannon at its true enemy – Japan” rather than the Taiwanese compatriots, evoking the PRC’s military exercises and missile tests conducted earlier in March of that same year.67 Moreover, Jiao Renhe (焦仁和), then vice chairman of the Patriotic Alliance and deputy secretary-general of the semi-official Straits Exchange Foundation, urged “the Chinese across the Taiwan Strait” to fight foreign enemies “together like brothers” in order to secure the Diaoyutais as Chinese territory.68 Also Yu Muming, who at the time had withdrawn from the KMT because of his opposition to Lee Tenghui and co-founded Xin Dang 新黨 (New Party), called on the CCP to seize sovereignty over the Diaoyutais from Japan.69 As for Wang Xiaobo, in an article published under the pen name Mao Han, he showed his appreciation of the change of the Patriotic Alliance members by stating, “Twenty-five years after Baodiao, the ‘Patriotic Alliance’ finally realized that only when people across the Strait can unite and China can be unified will ‘foreign enemies be fought off.’”70 The marked change of the former Baodiao rightists represented by the Patriotic Alliance was well summarized by Xie Dingyu (謝定裕), an important leftist-unificationist, in his preface to Roaring Spring Thunder: “Although during those years many participants in Baodiao once helped the KMT appease and channel people’s discontent, now they are a major force in the Chinese unification movement.”71

    49The contributing factors to the transformation of the rightists were similar to those that spurred the leftists out of the depressing slump and jumpstarted their activism: the anger toward developing Taiwanese nationalism and the Taiwan independence movement and the hope a rising PRC had raised. In fact, the leftists counted on the PRC not only to seize back the Diaoyutais from Japan but also to curb Taiwanese nationalism and Taiwan’s independence movement. Taiwan under the Storm Clouds of War (Zhanyun xia de Taiwan 戰雲下的臺灣), published in Taipei during the PRC’s missile threat against Taiwan between 1995-1996, clearly expressed this desire by advocating the PRC’s seizing of Taiwan by force.72 Four of the co-authors of this book, Lin Guojiong, Ye Xianyan, Gong Zhongwu, and Chen Yingzhen (陳映真), were actually members of the co-editors of Roaring Spring Thunder.73 Taiwan under the Storm Clouds of War embodied the fact that the former Baodiao leftist-unificationists, who rekindled their activism fervently, echoed the PRC’s rising nationalism in the 1990s.

    50Roaring Spring Thunder, compiled from the mid-1990s and eventually published in 2001, started the construction of memory about Baodiao in the 1970s and was followed by three-volume After Spring Thunder and two-volume Unusual and Glory Years, Unachieved Ambitions. While the editors of the Spring Thunder series had never stopped pouring out their gloomy nostalgia for their Baodiao years, due to their excitement at the PRC’s rise, their memory construction was increasingly imbued with a mixture of self-admiration, a strong optimistic and fighting spirit, and radical Chinese nationalism. In their 1995 preface to Roaring Spring Thunder, Lin Guojiong and his co-authors had already acclaimed former Baodiao leftist-unificationists in the U.S., including themselves, for their anti-imperialist, patriotic, and nationalist spirits and contributions, but accused the pro-democracy Chinese dissidents exiled overseas after the Tiananmen Square crackdown of having “base” motives and misconceiving the “robust and sensible” system of socialist China.74

    51In their introduction to 2010’s Unusual and Glory Years, Unachieved Ambitions, the co-editorial team further heroized the Baodiao leftists by making a revisionist interpretation of the Cultural Revolution. They compared the Baodiao in the 1970s to the Cultural Revolution and dubbed it as “haiwai wenhua geming” 海外文化革命 (the overseas Cultural Revolution). Also the Baodiao leftists were compared to the Red Guards and referred to as hong weishi 紅衛士 (the Red Defenders).75 Effusively praising the positive contribution of the Cultural Revolution to the “revival of China,” they highlighted:

    …we find the ultimate goal [of the overseas Cultural Revolution] was the same as that of the Cultural Revolution in mainland China. All in all, the goal was to challenge the long-existing Euro-Americanophilia developing over the recent century, especially since the Cold War era, to destroy modern and contemporary Chinese unhealthy mentality and perversion of blindly worshipping and following Euro-American culture and thought as the authority, to return to the great family of the Chinese nation, and to establish the Chinese people’s or the Chinese nation’s own cultural, intellectual, and political identity.76

    52Characterizing the leftists as the Red Defenders, who were from Taiwan but ardently absorbed Maoism during Baodiao, these co-editors claimed that they, with high principles, had provided an excellent, enduring role model for following generations of Chinese intellectuals.77

    53In stark contrast to the regrets and self-criticisms expressed by the disillusioned leftists during the slump of Baodiao from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, the tremendous heroic self-admiration represented by the co-authors’ 2010 introduction in which the Baodiao past was radically heroized and romanticized shows extremely intense nostalgia. This kind of nostalgia arguably constitutes a central aspect of life reviewing at their late stage of life. It was not only the most positive appreciation of their former selves which helped to maintain their personal identity but intensify their identification with Chinese nationalism to an utmost degree. However, such Chinese nationalism was fervently celebrated, as Wang Chihming (王智明) argues when he comments on the collaboration between Taiwan and Hong Kong activists to land on one of the Diaoyutai islands where both a ROC and a PRC flag were planted in October 1996, “at the expense of the PRC’s domestic democracy and Taiwan’s national subjectivity.”78

    Conclusion

    54In the spring of 1981, situated in the so-called slump of Diaotongyun, Xie Dingyu, under his pen name Ding Yi (丁一), thus recalled Baodiao in the U.S. in the early 1970s, in which he once actively participated:

    It was a candid, open, fearless period, though only for a few months. A total stranger who made a phone call last night would come to stay overnight. Sleeping on the floor, we excitedly talked until three or four o’clock [in the morning]. In the name of the sacred territory of the motherland, how could we not speak our minds? A “territory” should be very concrete. But now I think, in fact, it is really highly abstract.79

    55Similarly, in 2009, Xiang Wuzhong (項武忠), a former leading Baodiao leftist in the U.S., recollected in an interview: “At that time, we met every week to discuss and study. I didn’t know where the Diaoyutais were. When things happened, we found a survey report by the United Nations in the 1950s which stated how much oil there was under [the Diaoyutai Islands]. We did not know whether it was true or not, but it was unreasonable to be bullied again by the Japanese.”80 As Xie’s and Xiang’s recollections show, the reason why those remote and unknown islets on which Baodiao activists had never trod could arouse so much nationalist fervor was that they excited considerable abstract imagination. National territory is a form of what I called “imagined territory,” in the sense that “most individuals have never even visited many areas within the territories of their social groupings, especially at the national level. Nevertheless, individuals, as members of nations, have strong emotional attachments to their nation’s territory and even express a clear sense of the areal extent of their nation’s territory.”81 In other words, a nation, which Benedict Anderson names an “imagined community,”82 involves an essential imagined territory. The Diaoyutais, where Baodiao activists placed a huge emotional stake, is precisely a typical representative of the imagined territory. For decades, except for some fishermen, law enforcement officers, and several activists, in fact, few people in the countries of Taiwan, the PRC, and Japan involved in the territorial dispute ever witnessed or visited the islets.

    56While national territory has a geographically concrete existence, the meaning of both national territory itself and territorial dispute is typically socially constructed.83 As human geographer Tuan Yifu argues, “It is a characteristic of the symbol-making human species that its members can become passionately attached to places of enormous size, such as a nation-state, of which they can have only limited direct experience.”84 People’s profound identity with and claim to an imagined territory, especially territorial nationalism, are derived primarily from internalizing its symbolic meanings and discourse plays a crucial role in the social construction of these meanings. Furthermore, it is usually intellectuals, who enjoy high “cultural capital,” that are good at discursive construction of the symbolic meanings of national territory. In the global history of nationalism, compared to other members of society, intellectuals typically “appear to have the greatest agency in the shaping of national understanding, propagating the values of the nation, disciplining the people internally, and enforcing the rules and boundaries of the constituent people.”85 This has been well demonstrated by the case of Baodiao intellectual-activists. The boom of nostalgic memory about Baodiao has shown not only the dynamics of their construction of the symbolic meanings of the Diaoyutais and the territorial dispute over them, but their particular discursive capability, unparalleled by any other activists with different backgrounds involved in the actions to protect the islets against the Japanese (such as fishermen and local politicians), in summoning the past to the aid of the present and constructing collective memory.

    57When recounting her childhood in south London in the 1950s, social historian Carolyn Kay Steedman remarks:

    We all return to memories and dreams like this, again and again; the story we tell of our own life is reshaped around them. But the point doesn’t lie there, back in the past, back in the lost time at which they happened; the only point lies in interpretation. The past is re-used through the agency of social information, and that interpretation of it can only be made with what people know of a social world and their place within it.86

    58As analyzed, the surge of Baodiao remembrances has been contingent on the conjuncture of the nostalgic impulse of the aging former intellectual-activists, the development of Taiwanese nationalism, and the PRC’s rise. It represents their re-interpretation and re-use of the past informed by their understanding of the changing social world and their place in it. Also as indicated before, people enthralled in nostalgia usually develop an appreciative view of former selves by simplifying and romanticizing the past. In light of Steedman’s insight, it can be said that the essence of nostalgia is a mixture of memories and dreams. A nostalgic memory is not a facsimile of the past but a reinterpretation of it usually shaped by dreams. New meanings would keep emerging out from the past remembered with passing time and changing context, especially when it is imbued with dreams; thus those unrealized dreams might look even more beautiful and lofty than before.

    59People’s autobiographical memory based on experiences of the events in their generation’s early adulthood, as pointed out earlier, usually becomes a usable past and the foundation of this generation’s highly subjective collective memory and deeply committed political outlook, which may make related political conflicts and cultural debates difficult to resolve. By having high cultural capital and excelling in doing “the imaginative ideological labor,” intellectuals play a key role in creating ideologies of national identity “within a larger discursive universe of available materials,” including disparate cultural elements, selected historical memories, and interpretations of experiences.87 Therefore, intellectuals are typically a primary social carrier of nationalism, and presumably become most vocal and most unwilling to compromise among the social actors involved in international territorial dispute, as the Baodiao intellectual-activists have long shown.

    60Since the turn of the 21th century, the territorial dispute over the Diaoyutais has become increasingly bitter between Taiwan, the PRC, and Japan. All three parties’ claim to sovereignty over the islets has been highly nationalist, especially between the latter two. Both Baodiao in the 1970s and the recent boom in nostalgic remembrances of it are no exception to this ideological framework. However, territorial nationalism is at odds with the new demands pressed by our increasingly interconnected, resource-constrained, and environmentally endangered world. In such a world, arguably exclusive territorial nationalism must be overcome in order to solve the territorial dispute over the Diaoyutais, maintain stability in the East China Sea, and achieve peaceful coexistence and resource sharing between Taiwan, the PRC, and Japan.88

    Bibliographie

    Aimeng 愛盟 [All American Chinese Student Anti-Communist Patriotic Alliance] (ed.), 2012, Aimeng‧baodiao—fengyun suiyue sishi nian 愛盟‧保釣–風雲歲月四十年 [All American Chinese Student Anti-Communist Patriotic Alliance and the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement: the Turbulent Four Decades], Fengyun shidai, Taipei, 416 p.

    Anderson Benedict, 1991 [1983], Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Revised edition, Verso, London, 224 p.

    Bukh Alexander, 2020, These Islands Are Ours: The Social Construction of Territorial Disputes in Northeast Asia, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 209 p.

    Chen Yingzhen 陳映真, 2006, “Tupo liangan fenduan de gouzao, kaichuang tongyi de xin shidai” 突破兩岸分斷的構造,開創統一的新時代 [Overcoming the Cross-Strait Separation Structure and Creating a New Era of Unification], in Gong Zhongwu 龔忠武 et al. (eds.), Chunlei zhihou: baodiao yundong sanshiwu zhounian wenxian xuanji (1) 春雷之後:保釣運動三十五週年文獻選輯(1) [After Spring Thunder: Selections of Historical Literature in Memory of the 35th Anniversary of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement], vol 1, Renjian, Taipei, p. 4-14.

    Chung Chienpeng, 2004, Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China’s Territorial Disputes, Routledge, London and New York, 222 p.

    Chunlei Xilie Bianji Weiyuanhui 春雷系列編輯委員會 [Editorial Committee of the Spring Thunder Series], 2010, “Qianyan” 導言:傳遞釣統運聖火‧任重道遠—釣統運四十週年話滄桑‧溫故開新 [Introduction: Passing on the Holy Torch of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands / China Unification Movement and There Is a Long Way to Go - Reflections on the Vicissitudes of the 40th Anniversary of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands / China Unification Movement for Looking Back on the Old and Opening Up the New], in Chunlei Xilie Bianji Weiyuanhui 春雷系列編輯委員會 [Editorial Committee of the Spring Thunder Series] (ed.), Zhengrong suiyue, zhuangzhi weichou: baodiao yundong sishi zhounian jinian zhuanji (shang) 崢嶸歲月,壯志未酬:保釣運動四十週念紀念專輯 (上) [Unusual and Glory Years, Unachieved Ambitions: Special Volumes in Memory of the 40th Anniversary of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement], vol. 1, Haixia xueshu, Taipei, p. 46-67.

    Chunlei Xilie Bianji Weiyuanhui 春雷系列編輯委員會 [Editorial Committee of the Spring Thunder Series] (ed.), 2010, Zhengrong suiyue, zhuangzhi weichou: baodiao yundong sishi zhounian jinian zhuanji (erce)崢嶸歲月,壯志未酬:保釣運動四十週念紀念專輯 (二冊) [Unusual and Glory Years, Unachieved Ambitions: Special Volumes in Memory of the 40th Anniversary of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement], 2 vols, Haixia xueshu, Taipei.

    Davis Fred, 1979, Yearning for Yesterday: A Sociology of Nostalgia, The Free Press, New York, 146 p.

    Diao/Tongyun Ziliao Bianji Weiyuanhui 釣∕統運資料編輯委員會 [Editorial Committee for the Materials about the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands / China Unification Movement], 2001 [1995], “Xuyan: ba diao/tongyun de aiguozhuyi xinhuo yongyuan chuandi xiaqu” 序言:把釣∕統運的愛國主義薪火永遠傳遞下去 [Preface: Perpetually Passing the Patriotic Torch of The Defend the Diaoyutai Islands / China Unification Movement on], in Lin Guojiong 林國炯 et al. (eds.), Chunlei shengsheng—baodiao yundong sanshi zhounian wenxian xuanji 春雷聲聲—保釣運動三十週年文獻選輯 [Roaring Spring Thunder: Selections of Historical Literature in Memory of the 30th Anniversary of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement], Renjian, Taipei, p. 1-17.

    Diaotongyun Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui 釣統運文獻編輯委員會 [Editorial Committee for the Materials about the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands and China Unification Movement], 2006, “Xuyan: bianyin diaotongyun wenxian de ganku” 序言:編印釣統運文獻的甘苦 [Preface: Joys and Pains in Editing and Publishing Literature on the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands / China Unification Movement], in Gong Zhongwu 龔忠武 et al. (eds.), Chunlei zhihou: baodiao yundong sanshiwu zhounian wenxian xuanji (1) 春雷之後:保釣運動三十五週年文獻選輯(1) [After Spring Thunder: Selections of Historical Literature in Memory of the 35th Anniversary of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement], vol. 1, Renjian, Taipei, p. 15-28.

    Ding Yi 丁一, 1981, “Diaoyun shinian yougan” 釣運十年有感 [My Feelings a Decade after the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement], in Guangjiaojing 廣角鏡 [The Wide-Angle Len], no 106, p. 75-80.

    Downs Erica Strecker & Saunders Phillip C., 1998, “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands”, in International Security, vol. 23, no 3, p. 114-146, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2539340.

    Gao Yuan 高原, 1994, “Haiwai baodiao yundong de huigu” 海外保钓运动的回顾 [Recollection of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movements Overseas], in Beimei Xing 北美行 [North American Trip], no 19 (August), URL: http://www.lanxun.com/bmx/bmx019/nm01901.htm (consulted on 13/10/2016).

    Gong Zhongwu 龔忠武, 1995, “Baodiao yundong ershiwu nian” 保釣運動二十五年 [The 25th Anniversary of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement], in Haixia pinlun 海峽評論 [Straits Review Monthly], vol. 53, p. 3.

    Gong Zhongwu 龔忠武, 2005, “Guo shi yingcai, wo shi liangyou—shenqie daonian junfu xiong” 國失英才,我失良友—深切悼念君復兄 [The Nation Has Lost a Genius, and I Have Lost a Good Friend -- Deep Condolences for Brother Junfu], in Gong Zhongwu 龔忠武 et al. (eds.), Chunlei zhihou: baodiao yundong sanshiwu zhounian wenxian xuanji (3) 春雷之後: 保釣運動三十五週年文獻選輯(參) [After Spring Thunder: Selections of Historical Literature in Memory of the 35th Anniversary of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement], vol. 3, Renjian, Taipei, p. 2598-2601.

    Gong Zhongwu 龔忠武 et al. (eds.), 2006, Chunlei zhihou: baodiao yundong sanshiwu zhounian wenxian xuanji 春雷之後:保釣運動三十五週年文獻選輯(三冊) [After Spring Thunder: Selections of Historical Literature in Memory of the 35th Anniversary of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement], 3 vols, Renjian, Taipei.

    Guan Wenliang 關文亮, 2010 [1995], “Huainian ‘baodiao’. zhongji zaiqi: niuyue geda diaoyun ershiwu zhounian jinianhui shengkuang lueying” 懷念 「保釣」.踵繼再起:紐約哥大釣運二十五週年紀念會盛況掠影 [In Memory of “the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement”  Follow It to Rise Again: A Snapshot of the Spectacular 25th Anniversary of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement at Columbia University in New York], in Chunlei Xilie Bianji Weiyuanhui 春雷系列編輯委員會 [Editorial Committee of the Spring Thunder Series] (ed.), Zhengrong suiyue, zhuangzhi weichou: baodiao yundong sishi zhounian jinian zhuanji (shangce) 崢嶸歲月:壯志未酬:保釣運動四十週念紀念專輯 (上冊) [Unusual and Glory Years, Unachieved Ambitions: Special Volumes in Memory of the 40th Anniversary of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement], vol. 1, Haixia xueshu, Taipei, p. 213-217.

    Guoli Zhengzhi Daxue Dangdai Riben Yanjiu Zhongxin 國立政治大學當代日本研究中心 [Center for Modern Japan Studies, National Chengchi University] (ed.), 2011, Baodiao yundong sishi nian: diaoyutai wenti de lishi dingwei yu dongya quyu anquan 保釣運動40年: 釣魚台問題的歷史定位與東亞區域安全 [Four Decades of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement: The Historical Positioning of the Diaoyutais Problem and the Security of the East Asian Region], Guoli zhengzhi daxue dangdai riben yanjiu zhongxin, Taipei.

    Haixia Pinlun Bianjibu 海峽評論編輯部 [Editorial Board of Straits Review Monthly], 1996, “Baodiao shengming” 保釣聲明 [The Statement of Baodiao], in Haixia pinlun 海峽評論 [Straits Review Monthly], vol. 68, p. 28.

    Harrison Mark, 2006, Legitimacy, Meaning, and Knowledge in the Making of Taiwanese Identity, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 254 p.

    Hollihan Thomas A., (ed.), 2014, The Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: How Media Narratives Shape Public Opinion and Challenge the Global Order, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 317 p.

    Hong Sanxiong 洪三雄, 1993, Fonghuo dujuan cheng: qiling niandai taida xuesheng yundong 烽火杜鵑城:七〇年代台大學生運動 [The Signal Fires in Azalea City: Student Movements at National Taiwan University in the 1970s], Zili wanbao, Taipei, 438 p.

    Hook Glenn D., 2014, “Japan’s Risky Frontiers: Territorial Sovereignty and Governance of the Senkaku Islands”, in Japanese Studies, vol. 34, no 1, p. 1-23, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/10371397.2014.893809.

    Hsiau A-Chin 蕭阿勤, 2010, Huigui xianshi: Taiwan yijiuqiling niandai de zhanhou shidai yu wenhua zhengzhi bianquian (di er ban) 回歸現實:台灣一九七〇年代的戰後世代與文化政治變遷(第二版) [Return to Reality: Political and Cultural Change in 1970s Taiwan and the Postwar Generation], 2nd edition, Zhongyang yanjiuyuan shehuixue yanjiusuo, Taipei, 496 p.

    Hsiau A-Chin 蕭阿勤, 2012, Chonggou Taiwan: dangdai minzu zhuyi de wenhua zhengzhi 重構台灣:當代民族主義的文化政治 [Reconstructing Taiwan: The Cultural Politics of Contemporary Nationalism], Lianjing, Taipei, 444 p.

    Hsiau A-Chin, 2000, Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism, Routledge, London, 220 p.

    Hsiau A-Chin 蕭阿勤, 2017, “Jizhu Diaoyutai: lingtu zhengduan, minzu zhuyi, zhishi fenzi yu huaijiu de shidai jiyi” 記住釣魚台:領土爭端¡B民族主義¡B知識份子與懷舊的世代記憶 [Remember Diaoyutai Islands: Territorial dispute, nationalism, and generational memory of nostalgic intellectuals in Taiwan], in Taiwanshi yanjiu 台灣史研究 [Taiwan Historical Research], vol. 24, no 3, p. 141–208.

    Hsiau A-Chin, 2021, Politics and Cultural Nativism in 1970s Taiwan: Youth, Narrative, Nationalism, Columbia University Press, New York, 312 p.

    Hsiau A-Chin 蕭阿勤, et al., 2021, “Diaoyutai lie yu zhuquan zhengyi: chutan taiwan minyi de shidai chayi yu lichang leixing” 釣魚台列嶼主權爭議:初探台灣民意的世代差異與立場類型 [The Territorial Dispute over the Diaoyutai Islands: An Investigation of the Generational Differences and Types of Political Positions in Public Opinion in Taiwan], in Hsiao Hsin-Huang Michael 蕭新煌, et al. (eds.), Goule yu bijiao taigang shehui yisuo 勾勒與比較台港社會意索 [A Comparison of the Social Ethos of Taiwan and Hong Kong], Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, CUHK, Hong Kong, p. 147-202.

    Hsiau A-Chin, 2023, “Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement and Pan-Chinese Nationalism (Taiwan)”, in Snow David A., et al. (eds.), The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements, second edition, John Wiley and Sons, Oxford, UK, p. 1-4.

    Huang Ruiwo 黃瑞我, 1995, “Shidai lieche zai qianjin: canjia niuyue ‘baodiao yundong’ ershiwu zhounian dahui ceji” 時代列車在前進:參加紐約「保釣運動」廿五週年大會側記 [The Train of the Times Is Progressing: A Note about My Participation in the Conference in Memory of the 25th Anniversary of the “Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement” in New York], in Haixia pinglun 海峽評論 [Straits Review Monthly], vol. 54, p. 51.

    Huang Zhaoqiang 黃兆強 (ed.), 2004, Diaoyutai lieyu zhi lishi fazhan yu falü diwei 釣魚台列嶼之歷史發展與法律地位 [The Historical Development and Legal Status of the Diaoyutai Islands], Dongwu daxue, Taipei, 515 p.

    Jiang Zemin, 1999, “Eight-Point Statement”, 30 January 1995, in Asian Affairs: An American Review, vol. 26, no 2, p. 100, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00927679909601463.

    Kawashima Shin, 2013, “The Origins of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Issue”, in Asia-Pacific Review, vol. 20, no 2, p. 122-145, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2013.874619.

    Kennedy Michael D. & Suny Ronald Grigor, 1999, “Introduction”, in Suny Ronald Grigor & Kennedy Michael D. (eds.), Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, p. 1-51.

    Koo Min Gyo, 2009, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute and Sino-Japanese Political-economic Relations: Cold Politics and Hot Economics?”, in The Pacific Review, vol. 22, no 2, p. 205-232, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09512740902815342.

    Lee Teng-Hui, 1999, “Six-Point Reply”, 8 April 1995, in Asian Affairs: An American Review, vol. 26, no 2, p. 101, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00927679909601464.

    Li Guateng 黎蝸藤, 2014, Diaoyutai shi shei de? : Diaoyutai de lishi yu fali 釣魚臺是誰的? :釣魚臺的歷史與法理 [Who Owns the Diaoyutai Islands?: The History and Legal Status of the Diaoyutai Islands], Wunan, Taipei, 561 p.

    Li Jie 李傑, 1995, “Shengsheng shishi zuo zhongguoren: ji ‘wo shi zhongguoren’ dayouxing” 生生世世做中國人:記「我是中國人」大遊行 [Be Chinese Forever: A Note on the “I Am Chinese” March], in Haixia pinglun 海峽評論 [Straits Review Monthly], vol. 57, p. 57.

    Li Yaming 李雅明 et al. (eds.), 2021, Baodiao fengyun banshiji: baodiao yundong lingjun renshi de zhuanzhe rensheng yu lishi zhanwang 保釣風雲半世紀:保釣運動領軍人士的轉折人生與歷史展望 [The Turbulent Half a Century of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement: A Turning Point in the Lives of the Leaders of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement and Their Historical Outlooks], Shibao wenhua, Taipei, 504 p.

    Li Yu 李渝, 9 September 1996, “Baodiao han wenge” 保釣和文革 [The Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement and the Cultural Revolution], in Zhongguo shibao (Renjian fukan) 中國時報 (人間副刊) [China Times (Human Realm Literary Supplement)].

    Li Zijian 李子堅, 2006 [1978], “Diyici diaoyun de huigu” 第一次釣運的回顧 [Recollections of the First Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movements], in Gong Zhongwu 龔忠武 et al. (eds.), Chunlei zhihou: baodiao yundong sanshiwu zhounian wenxian xuanji (yi) 春雷之後:保釣運動三十五週年文獻選輯(壹) [After Spring Thunder: Selections of Historical Literature in Memory of the 35th Anniversary of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement], vol. 1, Renjian, Taipei, p. 17-35.

    Lin Guojiong 林國炯, 2001, “Lun baodiao tongyun de shidai shiming” 論保釣統運的時代使命 [On the Contemporary Mission of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands / China Unification Movement], in Lin Guojiong 林國炯 et al. (eds.), Chunlei shengsheng: baodiao yundong sanshi zhounian wenxian xuanji 春雷聲聲:保釣運動三十週年文獻選輯 [Roaring Spring Thunder: Selections of Historical Literature in Memory of the 30th Anniversary of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement], Renjian, Taipei, p. 662-685.

    Lin Guojiong 林國炯 et al., 1996, Zhanyun xia de Taiwan 戰雲下的台灣 [Taiwan under the Storm Clouds of War], Renjian, Taipei, 388 p.

    Lin Guojiong 林國炯 et al. (eds.), 2001, Chunlei shengsheng: baodiao yundong sanshi zhounian wenxian xuanji 春雷聲聲:保釣運動三十週年文獻選輯 [Roaring Spring Thunder: Selections of Historical Literature in Memory of the 30th Anniversary of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement], Renjian, Taipei, 821 p.

    Lin Tianfu 林田富, 1999, Diaoyutai lieyu zhuquan guishu zhi yanjiu 釣魚台列嶼主權歸屬之研究 [A Study on the Sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands], Wunan, Taipei, 330 p.

    Lin Tianfu 林田富, 2002, Zailun diaoyutai lieyu zhuquan zhengyi 再論釣魚台列嶼主權爭議 [An Re-examination of the Sovereignty Dispute on the Diaoyutai Islands], Wunan, Taipei, 297 p.

    Lin Xiaoxin 林孝信, 2010, “Baodiao lishi de yuanyuan gen dui haixia liangan de shehui de yiyi” 保釣歷史的淵源跟對海峽兩岸的社會的意義 [The Historical Origin of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement and Its Significance to the Societies on Both Sides of the Taiwan Strait], in Xie Xiaoqin 謝小芩 et al. (eds.), Qimeng, Kuangbiao, Fansi – Baodiao yundong sishinian 啟蒙‧狂飆‧反思—保釣運動四十年 [Enlightenment, Sturm und Drang, and Reflections – the Four Decades of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement], Guoli qinghua daxue chubanshe, Hsinchu, p. 24-46.

    Liu Yuanjun 劉源俊, 1978, “Wo suo zhidao de liumei xuesheng baodiao yundong” 我所知道的留美學生保釣運動 [The Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement of Taiwan Students in the U.S. as I Know It], in Ren yu shehui 人與社會 [Man and Society], vol. 6, no 3, p. 41-52.

    Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九, 1980, Trouble Over Oily Waters: Legal Problems of Seabed Boundaries and Foreign Investments in the East China Sea, PhD diss., Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

    Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九, 1986, Cong xinghaiyangfa lun diaoyutai lieyu yu donghai haujie wenti 從新海洋法論釣魚台列嶼與東海劃界問題 [On the Demarcation Problem of the Diaoyutai Islands and the East China Sea from the Perspective of the New Ocean Law], Zhengzhong, Taipei, 266 p.

    Maili 麥立 (Wang Xiaobo 王曉波), 1972, “Ping liuxuesheng de sanzhong zhengzhi fangxiang—gei haiwai youren de yi feng xin” 評留學生的三種政治方向—給海外友人的一封信 [Comments on the Three Political Positions of Taiwan Students Studying Abroad: A Letter for an Overseas Friend], in Daxue zazhi 大學雜誌, vol. 49, p. 54-57.

    Makeham John & Hsiau A-chin (eds.), 2005, Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 287 p.

    Mannheim Karl, 1952[1927], “The Problem of Generations”, in Kecskemeti Paul (ed.), Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, p. 276-320.

    Mao Han 茅漢, 1971, “Liuyiqi xuesheng shiwei jishi” 六一七學生示威紀實 [A Report on the June 17th Student Demonstration], in Daxue zazhi 大學雜誌 [The Intellectual], vol. 43, p. 24-27.

    Mao Han 茅漢, 1996, “Diaoyutai shang zaiqi fongyun: yijiujiuliu baodiao ji” 釣魚台上再起風雲:一九九六保釣記 [The Resurgent Turbulence Surrounding the Diaoyutais: A Note on the 1996 Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movements], in Haixia pinglun 海峽評論 [Straits Review Monthly], vol. 68, p. 22-26.

    Okada Takashi 岡田充, 2014, Diaoyutai lieyu wenti: lingtu minzu zhuyi de moli 釣魚臺列嶼問題:領土民族主義的魔力 [The Problem of the Diaoyutai Islands: The Lure of Territorial Nationalism], trans. by Huang Amy Renfee 黃稔惠, Lianjing, Taipei, 336 p.

    Pan Zhongqi, 2007, “Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: the Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective”, in Journal of Chinese Political Science, vol. 12, no 1, p. 71-92, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-007-9002-6.

    Qiu Hongda 丘宏達, 1975, Guanyu zhongguo lingtu de guojifa wenti lunji 關於中國領土的國際法問題論集 [A Collection of Articles on Chinese Territory Issues Related to International Law], Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, Taipei, 240 p.

    Qiu Hongda 丘宏達, 1991, Diaoyutai lieyu zhuquan zhengzhi weiti ji qi jiejue fangfa de yanjiu 釣魚台列嶼主權爭執問題及其解決方法的研究 [A Study on the Issue of Sovereignty Dispute over the Diaoyutai Islands and Its Solutions], Guoli zhengzhi daxue guoji guanxi yanjiu zhongxin, Taipei, 73 p.

    Ren Xiaoqi 任孝琦, 1997, You ai wu hui: baodiao fengyun yu aiming gushi 有愛無悔:保釣風雲與愛盟故事 [With Love but No Regrets: The Turbulence of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement and the Story of the All American Chinese Student Anti-Communist Patriotic Alliance], Fengyun shidai, Taipei, 346 p.

    Shao Yuming 邵玉銘 (ed.), 1991, Fengyun de niandai: Baodiao yundong ji liuxue shengya zhi huiyi 風雲的年代:保釣運動及留學生涯之回憶 [The Turbulent Years: Remembrances of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement and the Life of Studying Abroad], Lianjing, Taipei, 320 p.

    Shao Yuming 邵玉銘, 2013, Baodiao fengyun lu: yijiu qiling niandai baowei diaoyutai yundong zhishi fenzi zhi jiqing, fenlie, jueze 保釣風雲錄:一九七〇年代保衛釣魚台運動知識份子之激情,分裂,抉擇 [The Turbulence of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement: The Passion, Split, and Choice of Intellectuals in the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement in the 1970s], Lianjing, Taipei, 234 p.

    Shui Binghe 水秉和, 1986, “Baodiao de lishi huigu” 保釣的歷史回顧 [A Review of the History of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement], in Dangdai 當代 [Contemporary Monthly], vol. 2, p. 62-72.

    Smith Anthony D., 1983, Theories of Nationalism, 2nd edition, Holmes & Meier Publishers, New York, 350 p.

    Song Jifeng 宋吉峰, 2013, Diaoyutai “chongtu” yu yatai zhanlüe anquan 釣魚臺「衝突」與亞太戰略安全 [The “Conflict” about the Diaoyutai Islands and the Strategic Security in Asia Pacific], Xiuwei zixun keji, Taipei.

    Steedman Carolyn, 1986, Landscape for a Good Woman: A Story of Two Women, Virago Press, London, 176 p.

    Su Steven Wei, 2005, “The Territorial Dispute over the Tiaoyu/Senkaku Islands: An Update”, in Ocean Development & International Law, vol. 36, no 1, p. 45-61, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320590904948.

    Taiwan jiaoshou xiehui tongxun [Journal of Taiwan Association of University Professors 台灣教授協會通訊], no 2, URL: http://taup.yam.org.tw/comm/comm9505/tpdc5500.html (consulted on 04/03/2024).

    Tuan Yifu, 1977, Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 235 p.

    Wakabayashi Masahiro 若林正丈, 2016, Zhanhou Taiwan zhengzhishi: Zhonghua minguo Taiwanhua de lichen 戰後臺灣政治史:中華民國臺灣化的歷程 [The “Republic of China” and the Politics of Taiwanization: The Changing Identity of Taiwan in Postwar East Asia], Guoli Taiwan daxue chuban zhongxin, Taipei, 544 p.

    Wang Chihming 王智明, 2012, “Yijiujiuling niandai hou de diaoyun: liangan baodiao de jiaoliu yu heliu” 1990 年代後的釣運:兩岸保釣的交流與合流 [The Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement since the 1990s: the Exchange between and Convergence of the Actions of Protecting the Diaoyutais on Both Sides of the Taiwan Strait], in Liu Rongsheng 劉容生 et al. (eds.), Dongya mailuo xia de diaoyutai: jicheng, zhuanghua, zaiqianjin 東亞脈絡下的釣魚台:繼承,轉化,再前進 [The Diaoyutai Islands in the East Asian Context: Carrying on, Working through, and Moving forward], Guoli qinghua daxue chubanshe, Hsinchu, p. 97-114.

    Wang Chihming, 2013, Transpacific Articulations: Student Migration and the Remaking of Asian America, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, Hawaii, 208 p.

    Wang Guofeng, 2017, “Discursive Construction of Territorial Disputes: Foreign Newspaper Reporting on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute”, in Social Semiotics, vol. 27, no 5, p. 567-585, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/10350330.2017.1292621.

    Wang Shun 王順 & Mao Han 茅漢, 1970, “Baowei diaoyutai!” 保衛釣魚台! [Defend the Diaoyutais!], in Zhonghua zazhi 中華雜誌 [China Magazine], vol. 8, no 11, p. 8-12.

    Wang Xiaobo 王曉波, 1979, Shidai husheng 時代呼聲 [The Call of the Age], Langdeng wenhua, Taichung, 241 p.

    Wang Xiaobo 王曉波, 1996a, “Shangwei wancheng de lishi – lun Zhonghua zazhi yu baowei diaoyutai yundong” 尚未完成的歷史—論《中華雜誌》與保衛釣魚台運動 [An Unfinished History - On China Magazine and the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement], in Wang Xiaobo 王曉波, Shangwei wancheng de lishi – Baodiao ershiwu nian 尚未完成的歷史–保釣二十五年 [An Unfinished History: The 25th Anniversary of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement], Haixia xueshu, Taipei, p. 319-368.

    Wang Xiaobo 王曉波, 1996b, Shangwei wancheng de lishi – Baodiao ershiwu nian 尚未完成的歷史–保釣二十五年 [An Unfinished History: The 25th Anniversary of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement], Haixia xueshu, Taipei.

    Wang Xiaobo 王曉波, 2010, “Qianyan” 前言 [Preface], in Chunlei Xilie Bianji Weiyuanhui 春雷系列編輯委員會 [Editorial Committee of the Spring Thunder Series] (ed.), Zhengrong suiyue, zhuangzhi weichou: baodiao yundong sishi zhounian jinian zhuanji (shang) 崢嶸歲月,壯志未酬:保釣運動四十週念紀念專輯 (上) [Unusual and Glory Years, Unachieved Ambitions: Special Volumes in Memory of the 40th Anniversary of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement], vol. 1, Haixia xueshu, Taipei, p. 9-14.

    Wang Xiaobo 王曉波 (ed.), 2011, Diaoyutai fengyun 釣魚台風雲 (The Turbulence of the Diaoyutai Islands), Haixia xueshu, Taipei, 246 p.

    Wang Yu 王渝 (ed.), 1986, “Baodiaoren jushou hua dangnian” 保釣人聚首話當年 [Activists of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement Gathered to Talk about the Old Times], in Taiwan yu shijie 台灣與世界 [Taiwan and the World], vol. 32, p. 19-27.

    Wertsch James V., 2002, Voices of Collective Remembering, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 202 p.

    White George W., 2000, Nationalism and Territory: Constructing Group Identity in Southeastern Europe, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland, 311 p.

    Wiegand Krista E., 2009, “China’s Strategy in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute: Issue Linkage and Coercive Diplomacy”, in Asian Security, vol. 5, no 2, p. 170-193, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/14799850902886617.

    Wong Mingxian 翁明賢 (ed.), 2012, Zhigeweishan: diaoyutai zhengyi de heping jiejue 止戈為善:釣魚臺爭議的和平解決 [To Stop Warring Is Goodness: A Peaceful Solution to the Diaoyutia Islands Controversy], Danjiang daxue guoji shiwu yu zhanlue yanjiusuo, New Taipei City, 301 p.

    Xiang Wuzhong 項武忠, 2 June 1988, “Diaoyun de pianduan huiyi bing jiyu qingnian pengyou” 釣運的片段回憶並寄語青年朋友 [My Fragmentary Memories of The Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement and Messages for Young Friends], in Zhongguo shibao (Renjian fukan) 中國時報 (人間副刊) [China Times (Human Realm Literary Supplement)].

    Xie Dingyu 謝定裕, 2001, “Qianyan” 前言 [Foreword], in Lin Guojiong 林國炯 et al. (eds.), Chunlei shengsheng:baodiao yundong sanshi zhounian wenxian xuanji 春雷聲聲:保釣運動三十週年文獻選輯 [Roaring Spring Thunder: Selections of Historical Literature in Memory of the 30th Anniversary of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement], Renjian, Taipei, p. 23-24.

    Xie Xiaoqin 謝小芩 et al. (eds.), 2010, Qimeng, Kuangbiao, Fansi – Baodiao yundong sishinian 啟蒙‧狂飆‧反思—保釣運動四十年 [Enlightenment, Sturm und Drang, and Reflections – the Four Decades of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement], Guoli qinghua daxue chubanshe, Hsinchu, 360 p.

    Yang Shile 楊仕樂, 2014, “Jiangou diaoyutai zhengyi: Taiwan zhuyao baozhi de jianshi 1971-2012” 建構釣魚台爭議: 台灣主要報紙的檢視1971-2012 [Constrcuting the Diaoyutais Dispute: An Analysis on Taiwan’s Major Newspapers, 1971~2012], in Yatai yanjiu tongxun 亞太研究通訊 [Asia-Pacific Forum], vol. 12, p. 1-34.

    Ye Xianyang 葉先揚, 1995, “Shishang wu nanshi, zhiyao ken pandeng: baodiao he tongyun de xianshi yiyi” 世上無難事,只要肯攀登:保釣和統運的現實意義 [No Difficulty in the World Once We Are Willing to Overcome: The Significance of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement and the China Unification Movement to Reality], in Haixia pinglun 海峽評論 [Straits Review Monthly], vol. 54, p. 53-56.

    Ye Xianyang 葉先揚, 2001, “Bian houji” 編後記 [Postscript], in Lin Guojiong 林國炯 et al. (eds.), Chunlei shengsheng: baodiao yundong sanshi zhounian wenxian xuanji 春雷聲聲:保釣運動三十週年文獻選輯 [Roaring Spring Thunder: Selections of Historical Literature in Memory of the 30th Anniversary of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement], Renjian, Taipei, p. 819-821.

    Zhang Junkai 張鈞凱, 2012, Shidai yu shidai: 1970 niandai taida baodiao yu xuesheng yundong 世代與時代:1970年代台大保釣與學生運動 [Generation and Epoch: the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movements and Student Movements at the National Taiwan University in the 1970s], unpublished master’s thesis, National Taiwan University, Taipei, DOI : 10.6342/NTU.2012.01560.

    Zhang Qixiong 張啟雄, 1993, “Diaoyutai lieyu de zhuquan guishu wenti—riben lingyou zhuzhang de guojifa yanzheng” 釣魚台列嶼的主權歸屬問題–日本領有主張的國際法驗證 [The Sovereignty Problem of the Diaoyutai Islands: An International Law-based Examination on Japan’s Claim to Ownership], in Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo jikan 中央研究院近代史研究集刊 [Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History Academia Sinica], vol. 22, no 2, p. 109-113, DOI: 10.6353/BIMHAS.199306.0018.

    Zhang Zongzhi 張宗智, 22 July 1996. “Aimeng yu liangan zhengfu gongtong ‘baodiao’, yaoqiu zhonggong yi duifu Taiwan de wuli weixie fangshi, ba paokou duizhun ‘zhenzheng de diren’ riben” 愛盟籲兩岸政府共同「保釣」要求中共以對付臺灣的武力威脅方式 把砲口對準「真正的敵人」日本 [The Patriotic Alliance Calls on the Governments on Both Sides of the Taiwan Strait to Work Together to “Protect the Diaoyutai Islands” and Requires the CCP To Use the Threat of Force against Taiwan to Target the “Real Enemy,” Japan], in Lianhebao (disanban jidian) 聯合報 (第3版焦點) [United Daily News (3rd page: Focus)], URL: http://udndata.com/ndapp/Print?id=100419874&udndbid=udndata&date=1996-07-22 (accessed on 03/04/2024).

    Zhang Zongzhi 張宗智, 6 October 1996, “Muqian muhou nianwu nianqian zai meiguo, cengjing jiji fanzhi zuopai xuesheng baodiao yiye cangsang aiming jixu wunai” 幕前幕後 廿五年前在美國,曾經積極反制左派學生 保釣一頁滄桑 愛盟幾許無奈 [Behind the Scenes: Twenty-Five Years Ago in the United States, We Actively Fought against Leftist Students. The Vicissitudes of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement Left the Patriotic Alliance Somewhat Helpless], in Lianhebao (disanban jidian) 聯合報 (第3版焦點) [United Daily News (3rd page: Focus)], URL: http://udndata.com/ndapp/Print?id=100419874&udndbid=udndata&date=1996-07-22 (accessed on 03/04/2024).

    Zheng Hailin 鄭海麟, 2003, Cong lishi yu guojifa kan diaoyutai zhuquan guishu 從歷史與國際法看釣魚台主權歸屬 [Examining the Sovereignty Problem of the Diaoyutai Islands from Historical and International Law Perspectives], Haixia xueshu, Taipei, 221 p.

    Zheng Hailin 鄭海麟, 2011, Lun diaoyutai lieyu zhuquan guishu 論釣魚台列嶼主權歸屬 [On the Sovereignty Problem of the Diaoyutai Islands], Haixia xueshu, Taipei, 354 p.

    Zheng Hailin 鄭海麟, 2013, Diaoyudao xin lun 釣魚島新論 [New Arguments on the Diaoyutai Islands], Haixia xueshu, Taipei, 368 p.

    Zheng Hongsheng 鄭鴻生 & Wang Xiaobo 王曉波 (eds.), 2011, Xunzhao fenglei: yijiu qiling niandai taida baodiao xuesheng yundong shiliao huibian (liu ce) 尋找風雷:一九七〇年代台大保釣學生運動史料彙編(六冊) [Pursuing the Thunderstorm: A Collection of the Historical Literature about the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement of the Students of the National Taiwan University in the 1970s], 6 vols, Haixia xueshu, Taipei.

    Zong Yuwen 宗育文 (ed.), 1995, “Qingchun wuhui hua baodiao: diaoyun ershiwu zhounian jinian zuotanhui” 青春無悔話保釣:釣運二十五周年紀念座談會 [No Regrets with My Young Years and the Story of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement: Symposium in Memory of the 25th Anniversary of the Defend the Diaoyutai Islands Movement], in Haixia pinglun 海峽評論 [Straits Review Monthly], vol. 55, p. 31-37.

    Notes de bas de page

    1 This research project is supported by the grant from Taiwan’s Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST 105-2410-H-001-071-MY3). I thank Professor Alexander Bukh for the exchange of ideas and inviting me to present the draft of this article at “BORDER STUDIES DOWN UNDER: Workshop on Borders and Non-state/Sub-state Actors” (Wellington, New Zealand, March 7-8, 2016). The draft was also presented at “2017 AAS-in-ASIA Conference” (Korea University, Seoul, Korea, June 24-27, 2017). This article is based on my previous one published in Chinese: Hsiau A-chin, 2017.

    Smith, 1983, p. xiii.

    2 Since 1949, when the Chinese government, controlled by Zhongguo guomindang 中國國民黨 (Chinese Nationalist Party, or KMT) at the time, lost the civil war to Zhongguo gongchandang 中國共產黨 (Chinese Communist Party, or CCP) and relocated itself from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan, the official name of Taiwan has been the ROC. While the territorial dispute about the Diaoyutai Islands is between the two sovereign states–the ROC and Japan–, for the convenience of discussion I use ROC and Taiwan interchangeably in this article. I mainly use “Taiwan,” instead of “ROC,” however.

    3 Lin Xiaoxin, 2010, p. 31-32; Wang Chihming, 2012, p. 98-100.

    4 See Lin Guojiong et al. (eds.), 2001; Gong Zhongwu et al. (eds.), 2006; Chunlei Xilie Bianji Weiyuanhui (ed.), 2010; Xie Xiaoqin et al. (eds.), 2010; Zheng Hongsheng & Wang Xiaobo (eds.), 2011; Shao Yuming (ed.), 1991; Shao Yuming, 2013.

    5 Hong Sanxiong, 1993; Zhang Junkai, 2012.

    6 Ren Xiaoqi, 1997.

    7 See Qiu Hongda, 1975; Qiu Hongda, 1991; Ma Ying-jeou, 1980; Ma Ying-jeou, 1986; Zhang Qixiong, 1993; Downs & Saunders, 1998; Lin Tianfu, 1999; Lin Tianfu, 2002; Zheng Hailin, 2003; Zheng Hailin, 2011; Zheng Hailin, 2013; Chung Chienpeng, 2004; Huang Zhaoqiang (ed.), 2004; Su, 2005; Pan Zhongqi, 2007; Koo, 2009; Wiegand, 2009; Guoli Zhengzhi Daxue Dangdai Riben Yanjiu Zhongxin (ed.), 2011; Wong Mingxian (ed.), 2012; Kawashima, 2013; Song Jifeng, 2013; Hook, 2014; Li Guateng, 2014.

    8 See Harrison, 2006, Chapter 5; Wang Chihming, 2013, p. 73-78; Yang Shile, 2014; Hollihan (ed.), 2014; Wang Guofeng, 2017; Bukh, 2020, p. 131-136; Hsiau A-chin et al., 2021; Hsiau, 2023.

    9 Wang Shun & Mao Han, 1970.

    10 Zong Yuwen (ed.), 1995, p. 35.

    11 Hong Sanxiong, 1993, p. 13.

    12 Mao Han, 1971, p. 24; Wang Xiaobo, 1996a, p. 352-355.

    13 Hsiau A-chin, 2010; Hsiau, 2021.

    14 Liu Yuanjun, 1978, p. 46; Shui Binghe, 1986, p. 65; Li Zijian, 2006 [1978].

    15 Wang Xiaobo, 1979, p. 1-2, 6 and 14.

    16 Ibid., p. 19.

    17 Hsiau, 2000; Makeham & Hsiau (eds.), 2005; Hsiau A-chin, 2012, p. 3-4.

    18 See Lin Guojiong, 2001, p. 674-681; Shui Binghe, 1986, p. 66-68; Wang Yu (ed.), 1986; Xiang Wuzhong, 2 June 1988; Li Yu, 9 September 1996.

    19 Ren Xiaoqi, 1997, p. 151.

    20 Wang Xiaobo, 1996b, p. 295.

    21 Ibid., no page number.

    22 Wang Xiaobo, 2010, p. 9.

    23 See, Gong Zhongwu, 2005, p. 2598.

    24 See Gao Yuan, 1994; Diao/Tongyun Ziliao Bianji Weiyuanhui, 2001[1995], p. 1.

    25 Lin Hsiao-hsin’s wife, Chen Meei-shia (陳美霞), has taken over the leadership from him ever since he passed away in late 2015.

    26 In May 1963 a young American student named Don Baron (writing under the pen name Di Renhua 狄仁華) and a Mainlander scholar named Yu Shuping (俞叔平) each submitted editorials to the KMT’s official newspaper, Zhongyang ribao 中央日報 (Central Daily News). They accused people in “Chinese” society, that is, Taiwan, of lacking civic-mindedness and of admiring all things Western, reflected in young people’s desire to purchase American products and go to America. Students at NTU started a zijue yundong 自覺運動 (Self-Awakening movement) in response. They called on young people to be less selfish and more patriotic. A campus magazine, New Hope (Xinxiwang 新希望), was soon established by NTU students to champion the cause of the movement. See Hsiau A-chin, 2010, chapter 2; Hsiau, 2021, chapter 2.

    27 A similar collection can be found in the library of Tsinghua University in Beijing.

    28 Mannheim, 1952[1927].

    29 Wertsch, 2002, p. 38-40.

    30 Davis, 1979, p. 57.

    31 Ibid., p. 60 (note 8), 64 and 69.

    32 Guan Wenliang, 2010 [1995], p. 213.

    33 Huang Ruiwo, 1995, p. 51.

    34 Diao/Tongyun Ziliao Bianji Weiyuanhui, 2001[1995], p. 1.

    35 Ibid.

    36 Diaotongyun Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui, 2006, p. 15.

    37 Davis, 1979, p. 41.

    38 See Lin Guojiong et al. (eds.), 2001; Gong Zhongwu et al. (eds.), 2006; Chunlei Xilie Bianji Weiyuanhui, (ed.), 2010; Wang Xiaobo (ed.), 2011; Zheng Hongsheng & Wang Xiaobo (eds), 2011; Aimeng (ed.), 2012; Shao Yuming, 2013.

    39 Davis, 1979, p. 44-45.

    40 Ibid., p. 101-102 and 111-112.

    41 See Chen Yingzhen, 2006, p. 16 and 21.

    42 Wang Xiaobo, 1979, p. 11-12 and 101; Maili, 1972, p. 54. Baodiao activism was arguably encouraged by the sweeping student and youth movements in many places in the world in the 1960s. Especially, the anti-Vietnam war movement’s anti-imperialist rhetoric and black American civil rights movement might have impact on Baodiao in America. However, I leave this topic up to other researchers.

    43 Maili, 1972, p. 54-56.

    44 Ibid., p. 54-55.

    45 Ibid., p. 54.

    46 Wang Xiaobo, 1979, p. 19-20.

    47 Hsiau, 2000, Chapter 4; Hsiau A-chin, 2012, Chapter 4; Wakabayashi, 2016.

    48 Cf. Wang Chihming, 2012, p. 101.

    49Jiang Zemin, 1999.

    50 Lee Teng-Hui, 1999.

    51 See Taiwan jiaoshou xiehui tongxun, no 2.

    52 Li Jie, 1995.

    53 See Gong Zhongwu, 1995. The pro-China unification camp used “dutai” to refer to Lee Teng-hui’s alleged pro-independence tendency under the guise of Chinese nationalist discourse.

    54 Guan Wenliang, 2010[1995], p. 214.

    55 Ye Xianyang, 1995, p. 55-56.

    56 Guan Wenliang, 2010[1995], p. 216.

    57 Huang Ruiwo, 1995, p. 51.

    58 Ye Xianyang, 2001.

    59 Diao/Tongyun Ziliao Bianji Weiyuanhui, 2001[1995], p. 2.

    60 Ibid.

    61 Ibid., p. 15-16.

    62 Italics original.

    63 Davis, 1979, p. 14-15, 108 and 115-116.

    64 Zong Yuwen (ed.), 1995, p. 33.

    65 Ibid., p. 33-35.

    66 Ibid., p. 36.

    67 Haixia Pinlun Bianjibu, 1996.

    68 Zhang Zongzhi, 22 July 1996.

    69 Zhang Zongzhi, 6 October 1996.

    70 Mao Han, 1996, p. 26.

    71 Xie Dingyu, 2001, p. 24.

    72 Lin Guojong et al., 1996.

    73 Ye Xianyang, 2001.

    74 Diao/Tongyun Ziliao Bianji Weiyuanhui, 2001[1995], p. 8-9.

    75 Chunlei Xilie Bianji Weiyuanhui, 2010, p. 57-58.

    76 Ibid., p. 60.

    77 Ibid., p. 60-64.

    78 Wang Chihming, 2012, p. 108.

    79 Ding Yi, 1981.

    80 See Li Yaming et al. (eds.), 2021, p. 220.

    81 White, 2000, p. 33.

    82 Anderson, 1991[1983].

    83 Bukh, 2020.

    84 Tuan, 1977, p. 18.

    85 Kennedy & Suny, 1999, p. 2.

    86 Steedman, 1986, p. 5.

    87 Kennedy & Suny, 1999, p. 2.

    88 Cf. Wang Chihming, 2012, p. 109-111; Okada, 2014, p. 15 and 22-23.

    Auteur

    • A-Chin Hsiau

      Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica

    Précédent Suivant
    Table des matières

    Creative Commons - Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International - CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

    Le texte seul est utilisable sous licence Creative Commons - Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International - CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. Les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont « Tous droits réservés », sauf mention contraire.

    Voir plus de livres
    Ville et fleuve en Asie du Sud

    Ville et fleuve en Asie du Sud

    Regards croisés

    Harit Joshi et Anne Viguier (dir.)

    2016

    Les Fleurs artificielles

    Les Fleurs artificielles

    Création, imitation et logique de domination

    Michael Lucken

    2016

    Sengo, le Japon après la guerre

    Sengo, le Japon après la guerre

    Michael Lucken, Anne Bayard-Sakai et Emmanuel Lozerand (dir.)

    2017

    Fantômes dans l'Extrême-Orient d'hier et d'aujourd'hui - Tome 1

    Fantômes dans l'Extrême-Orient d'hier et d'aujourd'hui - Tome 1

    Marie Laureillard et Vincent Durand-Dastès

    2017

    Fantômes dans l'Extrême-Orient d'hier et d'aujourd'hui - Tome 2

    Fantômes dans l'Extrême-Orient d'hier et d'aujourd'hui - Tome 2

    Marie Laureillard et Vincent Durand-Dastès

    2017

    La marche de Cao Bằng

    La marche de Cao Bằng

    La Cour et les gardiens de frontière, des origines aux conséquences de la réforme de Minh Mạng

    Thị Hải Nguyễn

    2018

    Le piège de l'orgueil

    Le piège de l'orgueil

    Un projet républicain en Orient au XVIIIe siècle

    Satenig Batwagan Toufanian

    2018

    Les institutions de l'amour : cour, amour, mariage

    Les institutions de l'amour : cour, amour, mariage

    Enquêtes anthropologiques en Asie et dans l'océan Indien

    Catherine Capdeville-Zeng et Delphine Ortis (dir.)

    2018

    Le livre sur les calculs effectués avec des bâtonnets

    Le livre sur les calculs effectués avec des bâtonnets

    Un manuscrit du – iie siècle excavé à Zhangjiashan

    Rémi Anicotte

    2019

    Birmanie (Myanmar) 2010-2017 : un pays en transition ?

    Birmanie (Myanmar) 2010-2017 : un pays en transition ?

    Aurore Candier (dir.)

    2020

    Ce que j'ai vu en Malaisie

    Ce que j'ai vu en Malaisie

    Une ethnographe sur les ondes, 1934-1938

    Jeanne Cuisinier

    2023

    La Diète japonaise

    La Diète japonaise

    Pour un Parlement qui débatte

    Reiko Ōyama Arnaud Grivaud (trad.)

    2021

    Voir plus de livres
    1 / 12
    Ville et fleuve en Asie du Sud

    Ville et fleuve en Asie du Sud

    Regards croisés

    Harit Joshi et Anne Viguier (dir.)

    2016

    Les Fleurs artificielles

    Les Fleurs artificielles

    Création, imitation et logique de domination

    Michael Lucken

    2016

    Sengo, le Japon après la guerre

    Sengo, le Japon après la guerre

    Michael Lucken, Anne Bayard-Sakai et Emmanuel Lozerand (dir.)

    2017

    Fantômes dans l'Extrême-Orient d'hier et d'aujourd'hui - Tome 1

    Fantômes dans l'Extrême-Orient d'hier et d'aujourd'hui - Tome 1

    Marie Laureillard et Vincent Durand-Dastès

    2017

    Fantômes dans l'Extrême-Orient d'hier et d'aujourd'hui - Tome 2

    Fantômes dans l'Extrême-Orient d'hier et d'aujourd'hui - Tome 2

    Marie Laureillard et Vincent Durand-Dastès

    2017

    La marche de Cao Bằng

    La marche de Cao Bằng

    La Cour et les gardiens de frontière, des origines aux conséquences de la réforme de Minh Mạng

    Thị Hải Nguyễn

    2018

    Le piège de l'orgueil

    Le piège de l'orgueil

    Un projet républicain en Orient au XVIIIe siècle

    Satenig Batwagan Toufanian

    2018

    Les institutions de l'amour : cour, amour, mariage

    Les institutions de l'amour : cour, amour, mariage

    Enquêtes anthropologiques en Asie et dans l'océan Indien

    Catherine Capdeville-Zeng et Delphine Ortis (dir.)

    2018

    Le livre sur les calculs effectués avec des bâtonnets

    Le livre sur les calculs effectués avec des bâtonnets

    Un manuscrit du – iie siècle excavé à Zhangjiashan

    Rémi Anicotte

    2019

    Birmanie (Myanmar) 2010-2017 : un pays en transition ?

    Birmanie (Myanmar) 2010-2017 : un pays en transition ?

    Aurore Candier (dir.)

    2020

    Ce que j'ai vu en Malaisie

    Ce que j'ai vu en Malaisie

    Une ethnographe sur les ondes, 1934-1938

    Jeanne Cuisinier

    2023

    La Diète japonaise

    La Diète japonaise

    Pour un Parlement qui débatte

    Reiko Ōyama Arnaud Grivaud (trad.)

    2021

    Accès ouvert

    Accès ouvert

    ePub

    PDF

    PDF du chapitre

    Acheter

    Édition imprimée

    • amazon.fr
    • decitre.fr
    • mollat.com
    • leslibraires.fr

    1 This research project is supported by the grant from Taiwan’s Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST 105-2410-H-001-071-MY3). I thank Professor Alexander Bukh for the exchange of ideas and inviting me to present the draft of this article at “BORDER STUDIES DOWN UNDER: Workshop on Borders and Non-state/Sub-state Actors” (Wellington, New Zealand, March 7-8, 2016). The draft was also presented at “2017 AAS-in-ASIA Conference” (Korea University, Seoul, Korea, June 24-27, 2017). This article is based on my previous one published in Chinese: Hsiau A-chin, 2017.

    Smith, 1983, p. xiii.

    2 Since 1949, when the Chinese government, controlled by Zhongguo guomindang 中國國民黨 (Chinese Nationalist Party, or KMT) at the time, lost the civil war to Zhongguo gongchandang 中國共產黨 (Chinese Communist Party, or CCP) and relocated itself from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan, the official name of Taiwan has been the ROC. While the territorial dispute about the Diaoyutai Islands is between the two sovereign states–the ROC and Japan–, for the convenience of discussion I use ROC and Taiwan interchangeably in this article. I mainly use “Taiwan,” instead of “ROC,” however.

    3 Lin Xiaoxin, 2010, p. 31-32; Wang Chihming, 2012, p. 98-100.

    4 See Lin Guojiong et al. (eds.), 2001; Gong Zhongwu et al. (eds.), 2006; Chunlei Xilie Bianji Weiyuanhui (ed.), 2010; Xie Xiaoqin et al. (eds.), 2010; Zheng Hongsheng & Wang Xiaobo (eds.), 2011; Shao Yuming (ed.), 1991; Shao Yuming, 2013.

    5 Hong Sanxiong, 1993; Zhang Junkai, 2012.

    6 Ren Xiaoqi, 1997.

    7 See Qiu Hongda, 1975; Qiu Hongda, 1991; Ma Ying-jeou, 1980; Ma Ying-jeou, 1986; Zhang Qixiong, 1993; Downs & Saunders, 1998; Lin Tianfu, 1999; Lin Tianfu, 2002; Zheng Hailin, 2003; Zheng Hailin, 2011; Zheng Hailin, 2013; Chung Chienpeng, 2004; Huang Zhaoqiang (ed.), 2004; Su, 2005; Pan Zhongqi, 2007; Koo, 2009; Wiegand, 2009; Guoli Zhengzhi Daxue Dangdai Riben Yanjiu Zhongxin (ed.), 2011; Wong Mingxian (ed.), 2012; Kawashima, 2013; Song Jifeng, 2013; Hook, 2014; Li Guateng, 2014.

    8 See Harrison, 2006, Chapter 5; Wang Chihming, 2013, p. 73-78; Yang Shile, 2014; Hollihan (ed.), 2014; Wang Guofeng, 2017; Bukh, 2020, p. 131-136; Hsiau A-chin et al., 2021; Hsiau, 2023.

    9 Wang Shun & Mao Han, 1970.

    10 Zong Yuwen (ed.), 1995, p. 35.

    11 Hong Sanxiong, 1993, p. 13.

    12 Mao Han, 1971, p. 24; Wang Xiaobo, 1996a, p. 352-355.

    13 Hsiau A-chin, 2010; Hsiau, 2021.

    14 Liu Yuanjun, 1978, p. 46; Shui Binghe, 1986, p. 65; Li Zijian, 2006 [1978].

    15 Wang Xiaobo, 1979, p. 1-2, 6 and 14.

    16 Ibid., p. 19.

    17 Hsiau, 2000; Makeham & Hsiau (eds.), 2005; Hsiau A-chin, 2012, p. 3-4.

    18 See Lin Guojiong, 2001, p. 674-681; Shui Binghe, 1986, p. 66-68; Wang Yu (ed.), 1986; Xiang Wuzhong, 2 June 1988; Li Yu, 9 September 1996.

    19 Ren Xiaoqi, 1997, p. 151.

    20 Wang Xiaobo, 1996b, p. 295.

    21 Ibid., no page number.

    22 Wang Xiaobo, 2010, p. 9.

    23 See, Gong Zhongwu, 2005, p. 2598.

    24 See Gao Yuan, 1994; Diao/Tongyun Ziliao Bianji Weiyuanhui, 2001[1995], p. 1.

    25 Lin Hsiao-hsin’s wife, Chen Meei-shia (陳美霞), has taken over the leadership from him ever since he passed away in late 2015.

    26 In May 1963 a young American student named Don Baron (writing under the pen name Di Renhua 狄仁華) and a Mainlander scholar named Yu Shuping (俞叔平) each submitted editorials to the KMT’s official newspaper, Zhongyang ribao 中央日報 (Central Daily News). They accused people in “Chinese” society, that is, Taiwan, of lacking civic-mindedness and of admiring all things Western, reflected in young people’s desire to purchase American products and go to America. Students at NTU started a zijue yundong 自覺運動 (Self-Awakening movement) in response. They called on young people to be less selfish and more patriotic. A campus magazine, New Hope (Xinxiwang 新希望), was soon established by NTU students to champion the cause of the movement. See Hsiau A-chin, 2010, chapter 2; Hsiau, 2021, chapter 2.

    27 A similar collection can be found in the library of Tsinghua University in Beijing.

    28 Mannheim, 1952[1927].

    29 Wertsch, 2002, p. 38-40.

    30 Davis, 1979, p. 57.

    31 Ibid., p. 60 (note 8), 64 and 69.

    32 Guan Wenliang, 2010 [1995], p. 213.

    33 Huang Ruiwo, 1995, p. 51.

    34 Diao/Tongyun Ziliao Bianji Weiyuanhui, 2001[1995], p. 1.

    35 Ibid.

    36 Diaotongyun Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui, 2006, p. 15.

    37 Davis, 1979, p. 41.

    38 See Lin Guojiong et al. (eds.), 2001; Gong Zhongwu et al. (eds.), 2006; Chunlei Xilie Bianji Weiyuanhui, (ed.), 2010; Wang Xiaobo (ed.), 2011; Zheng Hongsheng & Wang Xiaobo (eds), 2011; Aimeng (ed.), 2012; Shao Yuming, 2013.

    39 Davis, 1979, p. 44-45.

    40 Ibid., p. 101-102 and 111-112.

    41 See Chen Yingzhen, 2006, p. 16 and 21.

    42 Wang Xiaobo, 1979, p. 11-12 and 101; Maili, 1972, p. 54. Baodiao activism was arguably encouraged by the sweeping student and youth movements in many places in the world in the 1960s. Especially, the anti-Vietnam war movement’s anti-imperialist rhetoric and black American civil rights movement might have impact on Baodiao in America. However, I leave this topic up to other researchers.

    43 Maili, 1972, p. 54-56.

    44 Ibid., p. 54-55.

    45 Ibid., p. 54.

    46 Wang Xiaobo, 1979, p. 19-20.

    47 Hsiau, 2000, Chapter 4; Hsiau A-chin, 2012, Chapter 4; Wakabayashi, 2016.

    48 Cf. Wang Chihming, 2012, p. 101.

    49Jiang Zemin, 1999.

    50 Lee Teng-Hui, 1999.

    51 See Taiwan jiaoshou xiehui tongxun, no 2.

    52 Li Jie, 1995.

    53 See Gong Zhongwu, 1995. The pro-China unification camp used “dutai” to refer to Lee Teng-hui’s alleged pro-independence tendency under the guise of Chinese nationalist discourse.

    54 Guan Wenliang, 2010[1995], p. 214.

    55 Ye Xianyang, 1995, p. 55-56.

    56 Guan Wenliang, 2010[1995], p. 216.

    57 Huang Ruiwo, 1995, p. 51.

    58 Ye Xianyang, 2001.

    59 Diao/Tongyun Ziliao Bianji Weiyuanhui, 2001[1995], p. 2.

    60 Ibid.

    61 Ibid., p. 15-16.

    62 Italics original.

    63 Davis, 1979, p. 14-15, 108 and 115-116.

    64 Zong Yuwen (ed.), 1995, p. 33.

    65 Ibid., p. 33-35.

    66 Ibid., p. 36.

    67 Haixia Pinlun Bianjibu, 1996.

    68 Zhang Zongzhi, 22 July 1996.

    69 Zhang Zongzhi, 6 October 1996.

    70 Mao Han, 1996, p. 26.

    71 Xie Dingyu, 2001, p. 24.

    72 Lin Guojong et al., 1996.

    73 Ye Xianyang, 2001.

    74 Diao/Tongyun Ziliao Bianji Weiyuanhui, 2001[1995], p. 8-9.

    75 Chunlei Xilie Bianji Weiyuanhui, 2010, p. 57-58.

    76 Ibid., p. 60.

    77 Ibid., p. 60-64.

    78 Wang Chihming, 2012, p. 108.

    79 Ding Yi, 1981.

    80 See Li Yaming et al. (eds.), 2021, p. 220.

    81 White, 2000, p. 33.

    82 Anderson, 1991[1983].

    83 Bukh, 2020.

    84 Tuan, 1977, p. 18.

    85 Kennedy & Suny, 1999, p. 2.

    86 Steedman, 1986, p. 5.

    87 Kennedy & Suny, 1999, p. 2.

    88 Cf. Wang Chihming, 2012, p. 109-111; Okada, 2014, p. 15 and 22-23.

    Les Liens de la mémoire

    X Facebook Email

    Les Liens de la mémoire

    Vous pouvez vous connecter à votre bibliothèque à l’adresse suivante : https://freemium.openedition.org/oebooks

    Suggérer l’acquisition à votre bibliothèque

    Si vous avez des questions, vous pouvez nous écrire à access[at]openedition.org

    Les Liens de la mémoire

    Vérifiez si votre bibliothèque a déjà acquis ce livre : authentifiez-vous à OpenEdition Freemium for Books.

    Vous pouvez suggérer à votre bibliothèque d’acquérir un ou plusieurs livres publiés sur OpenEdition Books. N’hésitez pas à lui indiquer nos coordonnées : access[at]openedition.org

    Vous pouvez également nous indiquer, à l’aide du formulaire suivant, les coordonnées de votre bibliothèque afin que nous la contactions pour lui suggérer l’achat de ce livre. Les champs suivis de (*) sont obligatoires.

    Veuillez, s’il vous plaît, remplir tous les champs.

    La syntaxe de l’email est incorrecte.

    Référence numérique du chapitre

    Format

    Hsiau, A.-C. (2024). Territorial Nationalism and Nostalgic Intellectuals. In S. Ferhat & A.-C. Hsiau (éds.), Les Liens de la mémoire. Paris: Presses de l’Inalco. Consulté à l’adresse https://books.openedition.org/pressesinalco/49349
    Hsiau, A-Chin. « Territorial Nationalism and Nostalgic Intellectuals ». In Les Liens De La mémoire, édité par Samia Ferhat et A-Chin Hsiau. Paris: Presses de l’Inalco, 2024. https://books.openedition.org/pressesinalco/49349.
    Hsiau, A-Chin. « Territorial Nationalism and Nostalgic Intellectuals ». Les Liens De La mémoire, édité par Samia Ferhat et A-Chin Hsiau, Presses de l’Inalco, 2024, https://books.openedition.org/pressesinalco/49349.

    Référence numérique du livre

    Format

    Ferhat, S., & Hsiau, A.-C. (éds.). (2024). Les Liens de la mémoire. Paris: Presses de l’Inalco. Consulté à l’adresse https://books.openedition.org/pressesinalco/49131
    Ferhat, Samia, et A-Chin Hsiau, éd. Les Liens de la mémoire. Paris: Presses de l’Inalco, 2024. https://books.openedition.org/pressesinalco/49131.
    Ferhat, Samia, et A-Chin Hsiau, éditeurs. Les Liens de la mémoire. Presses de l’Inalco, 2024, https://books.openedition.org/pressesinalco/49131.
    Compatible avec Zotero Zotero

    1 / 3

    Presses de l’Inalco

    Presses de l’Inalco

    • Plan du site
    • Se connecter

    Suivez-nous

    • Flux RSS

    URL : http://www.inalco.fr/presses-inalco

    Email : presses-inalco@inalco.fr

    Adresse :

    2, rue de Lille

    75007

    Paris

    France

    OpenEdition
    • Candidater à OpenEdition Books
    • Connaître le programme OpenEdition Freemium
    • Commander des livres
    • S’abonner à la lettre d’OpenEdition
    • CGU d’OpenEdition Books
    • Accessibilité : partiellement conforme
    • Données personnelles
    • Gestion des cookies
    • Système de signalement