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Science as Social Existence

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Jeff Kochan

Appendix

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1This appendix supplements footnote 51 (p. 375) in this chapter.

2Barry Barnes’s interactionist attention to the emotional dynamics of ‘status groups’ complements, but has never yet been connected with, an earlier strand of research on scientific emotion by feminist scholars:

3Alison M. Jagger (1989), ‘Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology,’ in Women, Knowledge, and Reality: Explorations in Feminist Epistemology, ed. by Ann Garry & Marilyn Pearsall (Boston: Unwin Hyman), pp. 129–55.

4Evelyn Fox Keller (1982), ‘Feminism and Science,’ Signs 7(3), 589–602.

5Evelyn Fox Keller (1983), A Feeling for the Organism: The Life and Work of Barbara McClintock (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman).

6Helen E. Longino (1993), ‘Subject, Power, and Knowledge: Description and Prescription in Feminist Philosophies of Science,’ in Feminist Epistemologies, ed. by Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter (London: Routledge), pp. 101–20.

7Sharon Traweek (1992), Beamtimes and Lifetimes: The World of High Energy Physicists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

8In a recent article, feminist epistemologist Lorraine Code laments the ‘entrenched image’ of the knower from whom ‘affectivity is excised,’ describing this as ‘a curiously implausible conception of subjectivity’:

9Lorraine Code (2015), ‘Care, Concern, and Advocacy: Is There a Place for Epistemic Responsibility?,’ Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 1(1), 1–20 (p. 9).

10Despite this entrenched neglect, however, some recent work on the topic has been done in the psychological and sociological philosophy of science:

11Carlo Celluci (2013), Rethinking Logic: Logic in Relation to Mathematics, Evolution, and Method (Dordecht: Springer), chpt. 14.

12Jeff Kochan (2013), ‘Subjectivity and Emotion in Scientific Research,’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 44(3), 354–62.

13Jeff Kochan (2015e), ‘Reason, Emotion, and the Context Distinction,’ Philosophia Scientiae 19(1), 35–43.

14James W. McAllister (2002), ‘Recent Work on Aesthetics of Science,’ International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16(1), 7–11.

15James W. McAllister (2005), ‘Emotion, Rationality, and Decision Making in Science,’ in Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the Twelfth International Congress, ed. by Petr Jájek, Luis Valdés-Villanueva and Dag Westerståhl (London: King’s College Publications), pp. 559–76.

16James W. McAllister (2007), ‘Dilemmas in Science: What, Why, and How,’ in Knowledge in Ferment: Dilemmas in Science, Scholarship and Society, ed. by Adriaan in’t Groen, Henk Jan de Jonge, Eduard Klasen Hilje Papma and Piet van Slooten (Leiden: Leiden University Press), pp. 13–24.

17James W. McAllister (2014), ‘Methodological Dilemmas and Emotion in Science,’ Synthese 191, 3143–58.

18Lisa M. Osbeck and Nancy J. Nersessian (2011), ‘Affective Problem-Solving: Emotion in Research Practice,’ Mind & Society 10(1), 57–78.

19Lisa M. Osbeck and Nancy J. Nersessian (2013), ‘Beyond Motivation and Metaphor: “Scientific Passions” and Anthropomorphism,’ in EPSA 11: Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science, ed. by V. Karakostas & D. Dieks (Dordecht: Springer), pp. 455–66.

20Lisa M. Osbeck, Nancy J. Nersessian, Wendy C. Newstetter and Kareen R. Malone (2011), Science as Psychology: Sense-Making and Identity in Scientific Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

21Sabine Roeser (2012), ‘Emotional Engineers: Toward Morally Responsible Design,’ Science and Engineering Ethics 18(1), 103–15.

22Paul Thagard (2002), ‘The Passionate Scientist: Emotion in Scientific Cognition,’ in The Cognitive Basis of Science, ed. by Peter Carruthers, Stephen Stich and Michael Siegal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 235–50.

23Paul Thagard (2006a), ‘How to Collaborate: Procedural Knowledge in the Cooperative Development of Science,’ The Southern Journal of Philosophy 44, 177–96.

24And, much less recently:

25Ludwik Fleck (1979 [1935]), Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, trans. by Fred Bradley and Thaddeus J. Trenn, ed. by Thaddeus J. Trenn and Robert K. Merton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press)

26Michael Polanyi (1958), Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).

27As well as, in the history of science:

28Otniel E. Dror, Bettina Hitzer, Anjy Laukötter and Pilar León-Sanz, eds. (2016), History of Science and the Emotions (Osiris 31) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), and Paul White, ed. (2009), The Emotional Economy of Science, focus section in Isis 100(4), 792–851.

29For more general discussions of epistemic emotion, see:

30Georg Brun and Dominique Kuenzle (2008), ‘A New Role for Emotions in Epistemology?,’ in Epistemology and Emotions, ed. by Georg Brun, Ulvi Doğuoğlu and Dominique Kuenzle (Aldershot: Ashgate), pp. 1–31.

31Louis C. Charland (1998), ‘Is Mr. Spock Mentally Competent? Competence to Consent and Emotion,’ Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 5(1), 67–81.

32Antonio R. Damasio (1994), Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons).

33Antonio R. Damasio (1999), The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company).

34Ronald de Sousa (1987), The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press).

35Ronald de Sousa, (2008), ‘Epistemic Feelings,’ in Epistemology and Emotions, ed. by Brun, Doğuoğlu and Kuenzle, pp. 185–204.

36Sabine A. Döring (2010), ‘Why Be Emotional?,’ in The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Emotion, ed. by Peter Goldie (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 283–301.

37George Downing (2001), ‘Emotion Theory Revisited,’ in Heidegger, Coping, and Cognitive Science: Essays in Honor of Hubert L. Dreyfus, vol. 2, ed. by Mark A. Wrathall and Jeff Malpas (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press), pp. 245–70.

38Catherine Z. Elgin (2008), ‘Emotion and Understanding,’ in Epistemology and Emotions, ed. by Brun, Doğuoğlu and Kuenzle, pp. 33–49.

39Nico H. Frijda, Antony S. R. Manstead and Sacha Bem, eds. (2000), Emotions and Beliefs: How Feelings Influence Thoughts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

40Nico H. Frijda and Louise Sundararajan (2007), ‘Emotion Refinement: A Theory Inspired by Chinese Poetics,’ Perspectives on Psychological Science 2(3), 227–41.

41Peter Goldie (2004), ‘Emotion, Reason, and Virtue,’ in Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality, ed. by Dylan Evans & Pierre Cruse (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 249–67.

42Patricia Greenspan (1988), Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification (London: Routledge).

43Patricia Greenspan (2000), ‘Emotional Strategies and Rationality,’ Ethics 110(3), 469–87.

44Christopher Hookway (1998), ‘Doubt: Affective States and the Regulation of Inquiry,’ in Pragmatism, ed. by C. J. Misak (Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 24), pp. 203–25.

45Christopher Hookway (2002), ‘Emotions in Epistemic Evaluations,’ in The Cognitive Basis of Science, ed. by Peter Carruthers, Steven Stich and Michael Siegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 251–61.

46Christopher Hookway (2008), ‘Epistemic Immediacy, Doubt and Anxiety: On a Role for Affective States in Epistemic Evaluation,’ in Epistemology and Emotions, ed. by Brun, Doğuoğlu and Kuenzle, p. 51–65.

47Adam Morton (2010), ‘Epistemic Emotions,’ in The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Emotion, ed. by Goldie, pp. 385–99.

48Robert C. Solomon (1976), The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Press).

49Robert C. Solomon (1977), ‘The Logic of Emotion,’ Noûs 11, 41–49.

50Robert C. Solomon (1992), ‘Existentialism, Emotions, and the Cultural Limits of Rationality,’ Philosophy East & West 42(4), 597–621.

51Robert C. Solomon (2003), ‘Emotions, Thoughts and Feelings: What is a “Cognitive Theory” of the Emotions and Does It Neglect Affectivity?,’ in Philosophy and the Emotions, ed. by Anthony Hatzimoysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 1–18.

52Michael Stocker (2010), ‘Intellectual and Other Nonstandard Emotions,’ in The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Emotion, ed. by Goldie, pp. 401–23.

53Paul Thagard (2001), ‘How to Make Decisions: Coherence, Emotion, and Practical Inference,’ in Varieties of Practical Reasoning, ed. by Elijah Millgram (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press), pp. 355–71.

54Paul Thagard, in collaboration with Fred Kroon, Josef Nerb, Baljinder Sahdra, Cameron Shelley and Brandon Wager (2006b), Hot Thought: Mechanisms and Applications of Emotional Cognition (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press).

55Paul Thagard (2008), ‘How Cognition Meets Emotion: Beliefs, Desires and Feelings as Neural Activity,’ in Epistemology and Emotions, ed. by Brun, Doğuoğlu and Kuenzle, pp. 167–84.

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