Table des matières
2. Core Ideas and the Framework
- 2.1 Introduction
- 2.2 A preliminary definition of the capability approach
- 2.3 The capability approach versus capability theories
- 2.4 The many modes of capability analysis
- 2.5 The modular view of the capability approach
- 2.6 The A-module: the non-optional core of all capability theories
- 2.6.1 A1: Functionings and capabilities
- 2.6.2 A2: Functionings and capabilities are value-neutral categories
- 2.6.3 A3: Conversion factors
- 2.6.4 A4: The means-ends distinction
- 2.6.5 A5: Functionings and capabilities as the evaluative space
- 2.6.6 A6: Other dimensions of ultimate value
- 2.6.7 A7: Value pluralism
- 2.6.8 A8: The principle of each person as an end
- 2.7 The B-modules: non-optional modules with optional content
- 2.7.1 B1: The purpose of the capability theory
- 2.7.2 B2: The selection of dimensions
- 2.7.3 B3: Human diversity
- 2.7.4 B4: Agency
- 2.7.5 B5: Structural constraints
- 2.7.6 B6: The choice between functionings, capabilities, or both
- 2.7.7 B7: Meta-theoretical commitments
- 2.8 The C-modules: contingent modules
- 2.8.1 C1: Additional ontological and explanatory theories
- 2.8.2 C2: Weighing dimensions
- 2.8.3 C3: Methods for empirical analysis
- 2.8.4 C4: Additional normative principles and concerns
- 2.9 The modular view of the capability account: a summary
- 2.10 Hybrid theories
- 2.11 The relevance and implications of the modular view
- 2.12 A visualisation of the core conceptual elements
- 2.13 The narrow and broad uses of the capability approach
- 2.14 Conclusion
3. Clarifications
- 3.1 Introduction
- 3.2 Refining the notions of ‘capability’ and ‘functioning’
- 3.2.1 Capability as an opportunity versus capability as an opportunity set
- 3.2.2 Nussbaum’s terminology
- 3.2.3 What are ‘basic capabilities’?
- 3.2.4 Conceptual and terminological refinements
- 3.3 Are capabilities freedoms, and if so, which ones?
- 3.3.1 Capabilities as positive freedoms?
- 3.3.2 Capabilities as opportunity or option freedoms?
- 3.3.3 Are capabilities best understood as freedoms?
- 3.4 Functionings or capabilities?
- 3.5 Human diversity in the capability approach
- 3.6 Collective capabilities
- 3.7 Which notion of wellbeing is used in the capability approach?
- 3.7.1 The aim and context of accounts of wellbeing
- 3.7.2 The standard taxonomy of philosophical wellbeing accounts
- 3.7.3 The accounts of wellbeing in the capability approach
- 3.8 Happiness and the capability approach
- 3.8.1 What is the happiness approach?
- 3.8.2 The ontological objection
- 3.8.3 Mental adaptation and social comparisons
- 3.8.4 Comparing groups
- 3.8.5 Macro analysis
- 3.8.6 The place of happiness in the capability approach
- 3.9 The capability approach and adaptive preferences
- 3.10 Can the capability approach be an explanatory theory?
- 3.11 A suitable theory for all normative questions?
- 3.12 The role of resources in the capability approach
- 3.13 The capability approach and theories of justice
- 3.13.1 A brief description of the literature on theories of justice
- 3.13.2 What do we need for a capability theory of justice?
- 3.13.3 From theories of justice to just practices and policies
- 3.14 Capabilities and human rights
- 3.14.1 What are human rights?
- 3.14.2 The interdisciplinary scholarship on human rights
- 3.14.3 Why a capability-based account of human rights?
- 3.14.4 Are capabilities sufficient to construct a theory of human rights?
- 3.14.5 The disadvantages
- 3.15 Conclusion
4. Critiques and Debates
- 4.1 Introduction
- 4.2 Is everything that’s called a capability genuinely a capability?
- 4.3 Should we commit to a specific list of capabilities?
- 4.4 Why not use the notion of needs?
- 4.5 Does the capability approach only address the government?
- 4.6 Is the capability approach too individualistic?
- 4.6.1 Different forms of individualism
- 4.6.2 Does the capability approach pay sufficient attention to groups?
- 4.6.3 Social structures, norms and institutions in the capability approach
- 4.7 What about power and political economy?
- 4.7.1 Which account of power and choice?
- 4.7.2 Should we prioritise analysing the political economy?
- 4.8 Is the capability approach a liberal theory?
- 4.9 Why ‘human development’ is not the same idea
- 4.10 Can the capability approach change welfare economics?
- 4.10.1 Welfare economics and the economics discipline
- 4.10.2 Non-welfarism
- 4.10.3 Empirical possibilities and challenges
- 4.10.4 Towards a heterodox capabilitarian welfare economics?
- 4.11 Taking stock
