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World of Walls

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Said Saddiki

4. The U.S.-Mexico Border Wall1

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  • 1 Part of this chapter is drawn, with permission from the publisher, from: “Border Fences as an Anti (...)
  • 2 According to the International Organization of Migration, in 2010 immigrants make 13.5% of the U.S (...)

1The United States has a long history of immigration. It has attracted immigrants from all over the world since the first European settlers arrived on the American shores, and today has one of the world’s highest migration rates. However, it is accurate to say that, from a legal point of view, the Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the Treaty of Paris of 1783, which accorded to the U.S. recognition as a nation, mark the beginning of the country’s immigration history. Immigration flows have been a major source of U.S. population growth and have greatly enriched its culture and history. The United States remains home to the largest number of international migrants in the world. Today, according to the U.S. Census Bureau (2010 American Community Survey), there are 36.7 million foreign-born persons legally residing in the U.S., making up 12 percent of the nation’s population;2 more than half (58 percent) do not have American citizenship. Approximately half of them were born in Latin America and almost one-third were born in Mexico.

2Immigration flows to the U.S. are not related to temporary circumstances and have never ceased since the first white man set foot on North American soil. Statistics from recent decades indicate that more than 1.5 million new immigrants settle in the country every year.3

  • 4 Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina and Bryan C. Baker, “Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Populati (...)
  • 5 Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, “U.S. Unauthorized Immigration Flows are Down Sharply since Mid (...)

3In general, there is convergence in the estimates of the number of undocumented migrants in the United States. For example, the Department of Homeland Security estimates that the unauthorized immigrant population living in the country decreased to 10.8 million in January 2009 from 11.6 million in January 2008. Between 2000 and 2009, the unauthorized population grew by 27 percent. Of all unauthorized immigrants living in the United States in 2009, 63 percent entered before 2000, and 62 percent were from Mexico.4 A report by the Pew Hispanic Center put the estimate at 11.1 million unauthorized immigrants living in the country in March 2009, about a million fewer than in 2007.5 Approximately 80 percent of them are of Hispanic origin. It should be noted that Mexico as well as being the major country of origin of irregular migration to the U.S. also functions as a transit country for illegal migration from Latin America and a point of entry to the U.S.

  • 6 Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016, 3rd edition. Washington: The World Bank Group, 2016, pp. (...)

4In 2013, the United States ranked first in the world as an immigration host country with 46.1 million immigrants, and the Mexico-U.S. border was the largest migration corridor with 13 million users. In the same period, the United States was ranked first as a remittance-sending country, with USD 56 billion being sent abroad. A large part of this remittance was sent to Mexico which ranked, with USD 25.7 billion, as the third largest remittance-receiving country.6

From the “Open Border” Policy to Anti-Immigration Legislation

  • 7 Joseph Nevins, “‘Illegal Aliens’ and the Political Geography of Criminalized Immigrants”, paper pr (...)

5The regulation of immigration in the United States is much older than other western immigrant-receiving countries. The regulation of immigration to the U.S. dates backs to the end of the eighteenth century, specifically to 1798, the year in which three important acts concerning the status of aliens in the United States (the Naturalization Acts, the Alien Friends Act and the Alien Enemies Act) were adopted. Nearly a century later, in 1891, Congress passed the “Immigration Act”, which is considered to be the country’s first comprehensive immigration law. Subsequently, U.S. lawmakers created a number of acts to regulate the immigration influx and to redefine the status of aliens in the country. One of the most important legislations on the topic, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, also known as the McCarran-Walter Act, restricted immigration into the United States. According to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the INA collected and codified many existing provisions and reorganized the structure of immigration law. The Act has been amended many times over the years, but it still represents the basic body of legislation on immigration, providing the country with a variety of legislative instruments in the field of migration. Until recent decades, however, the American government had not seen immigration as a serious threat and had paid little attention to the issue. For example, the platform of the Republican Party did not even mention immigration control until 1980, and only four years later did it affirm the country’s right to control its borders, expressing concern about illegal immigration.7 This set off a flurry of immigration laws in the late 1980s-2000s aimed at preventing irregular immigrants from entering the country. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), adopted by Congress in 1986, increased border enforcement and introduced sanctions for knowingly hiring irregular aliens. This act marks the beginning of a stringent legislative policy. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) released in 1996 placed further restrictions on irregular and irregular immigration by making, for example, access to welfare benefits more difficult for legal aliens and by tightening border control by allocating USD 12 million for a 14-mile triple fence along the U.S.-Mexico border from San Diego eastward.

  • 8 Mathew Coleman, “Immigration Geopolitics beyond the Mexico-US Border”, Antipode, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2 (...)
  • 9 Ibid.

6One of the most important aspects of international immigration currently is the link between immigration and security and criminality in the national policies of host countries. This aspect has been more obvious, especially after 9/11 events, so that illegal immigration has been presented as a possible national-security threat. Mathew Coleman8 documented two significant recent shifts in U.S. immigration policing in conjunction with the border militarization process. Firstly, since the mid-1990s, lawmakers have sought to bind immigration control to criminal law enforcement so that a criminal conviction can be used as grounds for deportation from the U.S. Coleman argued that this mode of immigration governance means that immigration law is ultimately exempted from judicial review, even as it works largely on the basis of criminal law. Secondly, a concerted effort on the part of lawmakers and the Bush administration, particularly since 9/11, has been made to use local proxy forces — or non-federal delegates — to enforce immigration law. Coleman concluded that, taken together, the criminalization of immigration law and the enrolment of proxy immigration officers at sub-state level constitute a new localized or rescaled geopolitics of immigration policing.9 In summary, since the 9/11 attacks, several legislative measures have been taken to tighten security control on the U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada. Furthermore, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, some American politicians called for severe restrictions on immigrant admissions to the United States, and many “anti-illegal” immigration groups have taken advantage of the opportunity to increase their demands.

7The U.S. immigration policy entered a new phase after the election of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency and marked a sharp break with previous policy. The new president has adopted many bills concerning illegal immigrants, deportation, security border control and banning entry from seven majority-Muslim countries: Syria, Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Libya, Somalia and Yemen. Trump’s Executive Order 13767 on Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements of 25 January 2017 states that irregular immigration presents a clear and present danger to the interests of the United States. This new immigration policy will likely put almost 11 million people who have lived illegally in the U.S. for years or decades at risk of deportation or at least make them live in fear and anxiety.

  • 10 See for example, Mica Rosenberg and Jonathan Stempel, “U.S. Judges Limit Trump Immigration Order; (...)

8Regardless of the attractive arguments the Trump administration uses to justify the new immigration legislations, such as the protection of the nation from the foreign terrorists, it will face considerable difficulties in implementing them. For example, the first version of the Trump’s Executive Order on Immigration has been temporarily blocked by some federal judges10 and widely criticized by human-rights advocates and the media.

9It is clear that, even if the historical context of immigration regulation in the U.S. is different from other western countries, the objective of its immigration policy is almost the same as all other immigrant-receiving countries. But there is a significant difference in its capacity to absorb new immigrants. The U.S. continues to receive thousands of immigrants from all corners of the world each year, while other western countries — except for the influx of asylum-seekers from the areas of tension, especially Syria — have become fed up with all kinds of new immigrants, especially after the financial crisis of recent years.

Construction of the Border Wall: A Militarization of Immigration Control

10The U.S.-Mexico border fences are legitimate under international law since they are built on American territory. Despite critics’ claims to the contrary, it is not unlawful for a state to establish fences or walls on its own territory to control access to that territory.

11Although the federal government funded the construction of fences around some southern-border cities (Nogales, San Ysidro and El Paso) before the 1990s, it started seriously building fences and escalating control measures along its borders with Mexico in 1994 under Clinton’s administration, as a comprehensive policy. The border south of San Diego, which has been identified as an area of high human smuggling and drug trafficking, was the first borderland to be fenced. Republican representative Duncan Hunter, the former Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, played a significant role in the construction of the first security fence (23 kilometers) on the U.S. southern border separating San Diego County and Tijuana (Mexico).

Fig. 4.1 U.S.-Mexico border fence at Tijuana (6 February 2017). Photo by Tomas Castelazo, CC BY-SA 4.0.11

  • 12 The Homeland Security Act (Public Law 107–296), passed by Congress and signed by the President in (...)

12Since 9/11, irregular immigration has been placed in the same category as terrorism and security threats, including drug trafficking and organized crime. Thus, border-security and a hard-line policy against irregular immigration became key elements of the U.S’. s “war on terror”. One of the effects of the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. border-control system was the creation of the Homeland Security Department (HSD). The responsibility for border security transferred from the Department of Justice to the Department of HSD, and Immigration and Naturalization Service was abolished.12 Shortly after the creation of the Homeland Security Department in 2003, the Border Patrol was directed to formulate a new “National Border Patrol Strategy” that would better reflect the realities of the post 9/11 security landscape. The Border Patrol’s strategy comprised five main objectives:

  • Establish substantial probability of apprehending terrorists and their weapons as they attempt to enter illegally between the ports of entry;
  • Deter illegal entries through improved enforcement;
  • Detect, apprehend, and deter smugglers of humans, drugs, and other contraband;
  • Leverage “Smart Border” technology to multiply the effect of enforcement personnel; and
  • Reduce crime in border communities and consequently improve the quality of life and economic vitality of targeted areas.13
  • 14 The White House Archive, “President Bush Signs Secure Fence Act”, 26 October 2006, https://georgew (...)

13On 26 October 2006, then-President George W. Bush signed into law the Secure Fence Act of 2006 (P. L. 109–367), which has been deemed the most important law concerning the reinforcement of the border control. Bush considered the law to be “an important step toward immigration reform” that “will help protect the American people”.14 The Secure Fence Act of 2006 aimed to tighten border security by building 700 miles of double-layered fencing on the U.S.-Mexico border. Further, the law authorized more vehicle barriers, checkpoints and lighting to help prevent people from entering the country illegally. It also authorized the Department of Homeland Security to increase the use of advanced technology like cameras, satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles to reinforce infrastructure at the border. The main goal of the law was to help secure America’s borders against irregular entry, drug trafficking and security threats.

  • 15 Chad C. Haddal, Yule Kim and Michael John Garcia, Border Security: Barriers along the U.S. Interna (...)
  • 16 Ibid., p. 18.

14The financial cost of the project has increased year by year. Appropriations for the Homeland Security Department for fiscal year 2007 provided USD 1.2 billion for the installation of fencing, infrastructure and technology along the border; USD 31 million of this total was designated for the completion of the San Diego fence.15 Appropriations for fencing and other border barriers have increased markedly since the plan entered into force from USD 6 million in fiscal year 2002 to USD 647 million in fiscal year 2007. The fiscal year 2008 appropriation, according to Customs and Border Protection, included USD 196 million for fence construction.16

Fig. 4.2 South side of the United States-Mexico border wall in Progreso Lakes, Texas (21 March 2016). Photo by Rebajae, CC BY-SA 3.0.17

  • 18 Michele Waslin, “The New Meaning of the Border: U.S.-Mexico Migration Since 9/11”, paper prepared (...)

15In general, the construction of border walls and fences leads to diplomatic tensions between neighboring countries because it is usually viewed as an unfriendly action by targeted countries. The construction of the fence along the U.S.-Mexico border elicited much controversy from internal and external parties. Immediately prior to the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. and Mexico were on the verge of a historic opportunity to rewrite immigration laws and fundamentally alter the migratory relationship between the two nations, regularizing the status of millions of undocumented immigrant workers living in the United States. At that promising moment, the unexpected events of September 11th occurred, which caused relations between the two countries to deteriorate as greater attention, especially from the American side, was paid to national-security concerns and regional perspectives.18 Mexico opposed the U.S. plan to build more separation fences along the border between the two countries, considering them to be in opposition to the regional integration process in the NAFTA region. Felipe Calderón, then-President of Mexico, stated that

  • 19 Ken Herman, “Bush: Border Fence not Enough”, Austin American-Statesman, 27 October 2006, https://w (...)

it is deplorable to go ahead with this decision of the wall at the border […]. The wall will not solve any problem. Humanity made a huge mistake by building the Berlin Wall and I believe that today the United States is committing a grave error in building the wall on our border. It is much more useful to solve common problems and foster prosperity in both countries.19

16Although the events of 9/11 were neither connected to Mexican nationals nor committed by attackers entering American territory illegally from Mexico, their long-term effects on U.S.-Mexican migration relations and the regional integration process will last for decades.

  • 20 It is not actually about a new wall. Rather, Trump’s policy aims at extending the barriers that al (...)
  • 21 The White House, “Executive Order: Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements”, 25 J (...)

17Tension between the two neighboring countries has recently escalated because of successive statements by Donald Trump — especially during his 2016 election campaign — who promised to build a border wall.20 The main point of tension is Trump’s call for Mexico to fund the construction of this wall. Immediately after his inauguration, Donald Trump adopted the Executive Order 13767 that aimed at securing the southern border of the U.S. “through the immediate construction of a physical wall on the southern border”.21

  • 22 Kate Drew, “This is What Trump’s Border Wall could Cost”, CNBC (26 January 2017), http://www.cnbc. (...)
  • 23 The U.S. Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke admitted that building the border wall “is complex in some (...)

18It is estimated that the new wall will cost a great deal of money. According to Mitch McConnell, a Republican congressman, the wall is expected to cost between USD 12–15 billion. Additionally, the maintenance of the wall could cost as much as USD 750 million per year.22 Moreover, Trump’s project will likely face significant funding challenges and practical difficulties, especially in native American reservations.23 It will have serious environmental effects along the Rio Grande River where the wall cannot be built in the middle of the valley. An electronic-control system is one possible alternative, but such virtual-security walls have proven to be ineffective in North America and elsewhere.

Virtual Fence: Technology in the Face of “Non-traditional Threats”

19To adapt to the information age, governments in developed and developing countries have made great efforts in recent decades to incorporate new information and communication technologies (ICTs) in their security policies. Today, border management and administration of immigration has become a high-tech area, especially in the “Global North”.

  • 24 Josiah McC. Heyman, “Constructing a Virtual Wall: Race and Citizenship in U.S.-Mexico Border Polic (...)

20The U.S. has not only built a physical fence along its southern borders but also adopted a virtual system to control its borderlands. The latter system, known as virtual wall or virtual fence, has been significantly intensified in the post-9/11 era. It is now a component of policy preferred by some countries in Europe and North America in response to trans-national security threats. Josiah Heyman distinguishes between two meanings of this virtual system — one narrower and one broader. The narrower meaning of the virtual wall refers to the use of advanced surveillance and computer technologies in border law enforcement by utilizing, for example, ground-level radar to detect the movement of persons and to define their orientation in the vicinity of the border. More broadly, the virtual fence, according to Heyman, points to the amassing of police forces, including military and intelligence agencies, in the border region.24 Virtual fences in the narrow sense is a first generation application of military technology in the border-control system which has been shown to be ineffective against smugglers’ and irregular immigrants’ intelligent use of developed technology and different styles of camouflage. The broader meaning refers to the total virtual militarization of the border to detect with high accuracy all kind of cross-border infiltrations around the clock and regardless of weather conditions.

  • 25 Rey Koslowski, “Immigration Reforms and Border Security Technologies”, Border Battles: The U.S. Im (...)

21The search for technological solutions to border control has been present in the debate over new immigration laws adopted by the U.S. in recent years. The Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 (H. R. 4437), passed by the House in December 2005, and the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006 (S. 2611), passed by the Senate in May 2006, both have provisions requiring implementation of new technologies to support border-control efforts at and between ports of entry, particularly along the U.S.-Mexican border.25

  • 26 United States Government Accountability Office, “Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Strengthen (...)
  • 27 Ibid., p. 1.

22The U.S. virtual border fence is largely linked to the “Secure Border Initiative” (SBI) launched by the Department of Homeland Security in November 2005. Through the SBI, the DHS intended to enhance surveillance technologies, increase staffing levels, enforce immigration laws and improve the physical infrastructure along the U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada26 in order to prevent trans-national security threats and reduce irregular immigration. A part of SBI, the Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet), is a multibillion dollar program initiated in 2006 that involves the acquisition, development, integration, deployment, operation and maintenance of surveillance technologies to create a virtual fence along the border, as well as command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) technologies to create a picture of the border in command centers and vehicles.27 The primary goal of SBInet is to strengthen DHS’s ability to control thousands of miles of American international frontier.

  • 28 United States Government Accountability Office, “Secure Border Initiative Fence Construction Costs (...)
  • 29 Arthur H. Rotstein, “Officials Ready to Build Virtual Fence Along Border”, USnews & World Report ( (...)

23The U.S. virtual border fence was very costly financially. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, for fiscal years 2006 through 2009, the SBI program received about USD 3.6 billion in appropriated funds. Of this amount, about USD 2.4 billion has been allocated to complete approximately 670 miles of vehicle and pedestrian fencing along the roughly 2,000 miles of border between the United States and Mexico.28 Adam Comis, the Press Secretary for the House Homeland Security Committee, stated that the cost of the entire south-western virtual fence project (if it was not stopped) is estimated to be about USD 6.7 billion by 2014.29

  • 30 Rey Koslowski, “Immigration Reforms and Border Security Technologies”, Border Battles: The U.S. Im (...)

24Although the U.S. government spent much money to make a technological instead of a physical fence, the SBI did not achieve its desired results. For example, many of the sensors proved difficult to maintain in a variety of weather conditions, and they cannot differentiate animals and humans.30 The ineffectiveness of the U.S. virtual border fence program also shows itself in other aspects. Smugglers and irregular immigrants developed many ways to circumvent the virtual fence along the U.S. international border, especially the one shared with Mexico. Sophisticatedly deep and long tunnels have been dug secretly under the U.S.-Mexico border and are used for smuggling drugs and immigrants. This remains one of the big challenges because if can evade control by the virtual-control system.

25After the many failures of the U.S. virtual border fence, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano on 11 January 2011 cancelled the Secure Border Initiative-network (SBInet) program. Napolitano justified the decision on the basis of technical problems suffered by the program, cost overruns (USD 1 billion) and schedule delays since its inception in 2005. At the same time, Napolitano announced a “new border security technology plan” that is tailored to the technological needs of each border region, including commercially available mobile surveillance systems, unmanned aircraft systems, thermal imaging devices and tower-based remote video surveillance systems.

26Trump’s project, though it aims to erect a concrete wall along the entirety of the U.S.-Mexico border, will face geographical and physical challenges that will prompt the U.S. government to resort to technology as a complementary measure. It will be able to reuse the technological surveillance system that has been already been in place along the border. So, high-tech fences, at least on some parts of the border, will be among the possible options and may significantly reduce the cost of the project.

Conclusion

27The U.S.-Mexico border wall marks the fault line between two different worlds. Regardless of how many billions of dollars will be spent on the further fortification and militarization of the common border, illegal cross-border activities will continue so long as there is a huge disparity in economic prosperity, political stability and social security between the two countries.

28Regional integration and advanced partnerships may reduce the attractiveness of emigration, but they cannot erase the American dream from the mind of millions of Latin Americans who will continue to seek new ways to reach the America El Dorado — regularly or irregularly.

Notes

1 Part of this chapter is drawn, with permission from the publisher, from: “Border Fences as an Anti-immigration Device: A Comparative View of American and Spanish Policies”, in Elisabeth Vallet (Ed.), Borders, Fences and Walls: State of Insecurity? Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2014, pp. 175–90.

2 According to the International Organization of Migration, in 2010 immigrants make 13.5% of the U.S. population; and the net migration rate between 2005 and 2010 was 3.3 migrant (s)/1000 population. World Migration Report 2010: The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change. Geneva, Switzerland: IOM, 2010, https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2010_english.pdf

3 Cf. especially statistics gathered by the U.S. Census Bureau available at https://www.census.gov/

4 Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina and Bryan C. Baker, “Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2009”, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics (January 2010), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2009.pdf

5 Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, “U.S. Unauthorized Immigration Flows are Down Sharply since Mid-Decade”, The Pew Hispanic Center (1 September 2010), p. i.

6 Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016, 3rd edition. Washington: The World Bank Group, 2016, pp. 1–5, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/23743/9781464803192.pdf

7 Joseph Nevins, “‘Illegal Aliens’ and the Political Geography of Criminalized Immigrants”, paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association of American Geographers [Boston] (8 March1998), cited in Peter Andreas, Border Games: Policing the US-Mexico Divide. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2000, p. 86.

8 Mathew Coleman, “Immigration Geopolitics beyond the Mexico-US Border”, Antipode, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2007), p. 56.

9 Ibid.

10 See for example, Mica Rosenberg and Jonathan Stempel, “U.S. Judges Limit Trump Immigration Order; Some Officials Ignore Rulings”, Reuters (29 January 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-immigration-courts-idUSKBN15D0XG

11 Source: Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AMexico-US_border_at_Tijuana.jpg

12 The Homeland Security Act (Public Law 107–296), passed by Congress and signed by the President in November 2002.

13 Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, “National Border Patrol Strategy” (1 March 2005), p. 2.

14 The White House Archive, “President Bush Signs Secure Fence Act”, 26 October 2006, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061026.html

15 Chad C. Haddal, Yule Kim and Michael John Garcia, Border Security: Barriers along the U.S. International Border, RL33659. Washington, D. C.: Congressional Research Service (16 March 2009), p. 37.

16 Ibid., p. 18.

17 Source: Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:United_States-Mexico-border-wall-Progreso-Lakes-Texas.jpeg

18 Michele Waslin, “The New Meaning of the Border: U.S.-Mexico Migration Since 9/11”, paper prepared for the conference on “Reforming the Administration of Justice in Mexico”, The Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California [San Diego] (15–17 May 2003), pp. 10–12, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3dd8w0r6

19 Ken Herman, “Bush: Border Fence not Enough”, Austin American-Statesman, 27 October 2006, https://www.pressreader.com/usa/austin-american-statesman/20061027/281573761191370

20 It is not actually about a new wall. Rather, Trump’s policy aims at extending the barriers that already exist on many parts of the border.

21 The White House, “Executive Order: Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements”, 25 January 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/25/executive-order-border-security-and-immigration-enforcement-improvements

22 Kate Drew, “This is What Trump’s Border Wall could Cost”, CNBC (26 January 2017), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/09/this-is-what-trumps-border-wall-couldcost-us.html

23 The U.S. Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke admitted that building the border wall “is complex in some areas”. See Matthew Daly and Alicia A. Caldwell, “Zinke: Border Wall ‘Complex’, Faces Geographic Challenges”, Washington Times (29 March 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/29/zinke-border-wall-complex-faces-geographic-challen/

24 Josiah McC. Heyman, “Constructing a Virtual Wall: Race and Citizenship in U.S.-Mexico Border Policing”, Journal of the Southwest, Vol. 50, No. 3 (2008), p. 305.

25 Rey Koslowski, “Immigration Reforms and Border Security Technologies”, Border Battles: The U.S. Immigration Debates. New York: Social Science Research Council (2006), http://borderbattles.ssrc.org/Koslowski

26 United States Government Accountability Office, “Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Strengthen Management and Oversight of Its Prime Contractor”, report to Congressional Requesters (October 2010), p. 1.

27 Ibid., p. 1.

28 United States Government Accountability Office, “Secure Border Initiative Fence Construction Costs” [Washington, D. C.] (29 January 2009), p. 4, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-244R

29 Arthur H. Rotstein, “Officials Ready to Build Virtual Fence Along Border”, USnews & World Report (8 May 2009), http://www.usnews.com/science/articles/2009/05/08/officials-ready-to-build-virtual-fence-along-border

30 Rey Koslowski, “Immigration Reforms and Border Security Technologies”, Border Battles: The U.S. Immigration Debates, http://borderbattles.ssrc.org/Koslowski

Table des illustrations

Légende Fig. 4.1 U.S.-Mexico border fence at Tijuana (6 February 2017). Photo by Tomas Castelazo, CC BY-SA 4.0.11
URL http://books.openedition.org/obp/docannexe/image/4563/img-1.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 117k
Légende Fig. 4.2 South side of the United States-Mexico border wall in Progreso Lakes, Texas (21 March 2016). Photo by Rebajae, CC BY-SA 3.0.17
URL http://books.openedition.org/obp/docannexe/image/4563/img-2.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 152k

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