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Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion

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John Turri

Acknowledgments

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1For helpful feedback on the manuscript and intellectual comradery, I thank Matthew Benton, Peter Blouw, Wesley Buckwalter, Ori Friedman, Ashley Keefner, and David Rose. Special thanks go to Angelo Turri, who commented generously and insightfully on multiple versions. Thanks to Peter Blouw for work on the index too.

2My work on this book was supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and an Early Researcher Award from the Ontario Ministry of Economic Development and Innovation.

3I am grateful for permission to reuse material from the following publications:

  • Turri, J. 2012. ‘Preempting Paradox’, Logos & Episteme, 3(4): 659–62.

  • Turri, J. 2014. ‘Knowledge and Suberogatory Assertion’, Philosophical Studies, 167(3): 557–67.

  • Buckwalter, W., & Turri, J. 2014. ‘Telling, Showing and Knowing: A Unified Theory of Pedagogical Norms’, Analysis, 74(1): 16–20.

  • Turri, J. 2015. ‘Evidence of Factive Norms of Belief and Decision’, Synthese, 192(12): 4009–30.

  • Turri, A., & Turri, J. 2015. ‘The Truth about Lying’, Cognition, 138(C): 161–68.

  • Turri, J. 2015. ‘Selfless Assertions: Some Empirical Evidence’, Synthese, 192(4): 1221–33.

  • Turri, J. 2015. ‘Understanding and the Norm of Explanation’, Philosophia 43(4): 1171–75.

4I dedicate this book to my daughter Sarah, whose precocious conversational acumen inspired my work on the topic. This is but one of the many ways she has inspired me and those around her. If she chooses, she will one day be a better scientist and writer than I was ever capable of.

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