Version classiqueVersion mobile

Cultural Heritage Ethics

 | 
Constantine Sandis

II. History and Archaeology

4. History as Heritage: Producing the Present in Post-War Sri Lanka

Nira Wickramasinghe

Note de l’auteur

I thank Marina Carter, Anup Grewal, Sanayi Marcelline, Nilu Abeyratne and Sasanka Perera for their thoughtful reading of the original draft of this essay which enabled me to sharpen many of the arguments made here. A much longer version has been published as ‘Producing the Present: History as Heritage in Post-War Patriotic Sri Lanka’, Economic and Political Weekly, 48 (43), 2013, pp. 91-100

Texte intégral

  • 2 M. Herzfeld, Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation State (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 5.

The state – actually a shifting complex of peoples and roles…2

Introduction

  • 3 S. Mathur, India by Design: Colonial History and Cultural Display (Berkeley, CA: University of Cali (...)

1Walter Benjamin warned against the ‘appreciation of heritage’, describing it as a greater ‘catastrophe’ than indifference or disregard.3 Indeed, heritage can be considered an essentially cultural practice centred in the present, and an instrument of cultural power. Cultural heritage is as much a construction of the present as it is an interpretation of the past.

  • 4 L. Smith, The Uses of Heritage (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 3.
  • 5 Ibid, p. 11.
  • 6 Ibid.

2The changing fortunes and popularity of historical sites indicate that no specific place is inherently valuable as heritage. There is therefore no heritage per se and all heritage, as Laurajane Smith argues, is ultimately intangible.4 What make sites valuable are the contemporary cultural interpretations and activities that are undertaken around them. It is through the practice of cultural appropriation that artefacts and places acquire meaning and value. In this chapter we will investigate an example of hegemonic discourse on heritage ‘which acts to constitute the way we think, talk and write about heritage’5 by exploring the situation in post-civil war Sri Lanka, a country where political ideals, contemporary cultural and social values, debates and aspirations directly translate into a partisan interpretation of selected heritage sites.6

Return to Heritage

3After the decimation of the Tamil Tigers in 2009 brought Sri Lanka’s long civil war to an end, President Rajapaksa promised there would no longer be minorities, in spite of the fact that the idea of a multicultural society was endorsed in the Thirteenth Amendment to the 1987 Constitution. In the new ‘civic nation’ fleshed out in the President’s speech, citizen-patriots would be ethnically undifferentiated, although at the same time all religions and ethnic identities would supposedly be respected. However, the President’s vision of a nation at one with the state is based on patriotic feelings stemming from a particular reading of the history and foundation myth of the Sinhala people. In this context all other groups – those formally known as minorities – are relegated to a secondary role with no room in the country’s common political culture. At the same time there has been, in the last few years, a singular but clearly identifiable phenomenon in the public sphere which I would describe as a ‘return to heritage’.

Economic Development and Heritage

  • 7 Cited in N. S. M. Tennekoon, ‘Rituals of Development: The Accelerated Mahaväli Development Program (...)

4Since the 1930s – when a measure of self-government was granted to the crown colony under the Donoughmore constitution – Sri-Lankan society has experienced an underlying nostalgia for a bygone age when the peasantry was proud, prosperous, and embodied the moral values destroyed in modern times. As a consequence the post-colonial state invested heavily in restoring ancient irrigation tanks in the north-central province areas, constructing new dams in the south-east (Gal oya and Welawe ganga), and finally, from 1968, undertaking the large-scale project of developing the area around the Mahaweli river and its affluent. The purpose of the latter project was not purely economic. Developmental goals were intertwined with nationalist underpinnings centred on the Sinhala peasant, represented in popular ideology as a ‘sublime object’. In the state ideology of the United National Party (UNP) government, which introduced a new economic policy based on economic liberalisation and an export-led economy, development through irrigated agriculture achieved a prominent place and was presented as a reincarnation of the ancient, indigenous and Buddhist culture of Sri Lanka’s golden age. The Minister of Mahaweli Development in the UNP regime, Gamini Dissanayake, declared quite candidly in 1983 that ‘the soul of the new Mahaweli society will be cherished values of the ancient society, which were inspired and nourished by the Tank, the Temple and the Paddy Field’.7

5The link between economic policy and state ideology has been demonstrated by Hennayake who has shown the involvement of the agro-technology and insurance sectors in the process of connecting development to the concept of an ideal past. She cites the text from the advertisement of a fertiliser company from the post-1977 period:

  • 8 N. Hennayake, Culture, Politics and Development in Postcolonial Sri Lanka (Lanham, MD: Lexington Bo (...)

Agriculture is a part of Sri Lankan heritage, its culture and tradition. Our ancient kings were inspired agriculturists. Our people here, from the time immemorial, combined an affinity for the earth with a talent for innovative technology. Anglo-Fert and Anglo-Chem are two companies who share a corporate commitment to the growth of agriculture in this country.8

  • 9 Cited in R. Silva, ‘The Cultural Triangle of Sri Lanka’, in Henry Cleere (ed.), Archeological Herit (...)

6Another aspect of the appropriation of cultural heritage by the post-1977 liberalised state is testified by the government’s policy of invoking the past and displaying its commitment to nurture the nation’s heritage in order to push through its development agenda. The UNP government was responsible for requesting the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) to provide guidance and assistance in managing the archaeological sites in the regions containing the three ancient capitals of Anuradhapura, Polonnaruwa and Kandy in 1978. Two years later, the director general of UNESCO, when appealing internationally for the funds necessary to safeguard the Cultural Triangle, reminded his interlocutors that it ‘must be preserved for the sake of the world at large because it forms an integral part of man’s heritage’.9 As these examples show, from the late 1970s the state’s intention was to display its commitment to the deepest values of the nation. While the opening up of the economy was radically transforming other aspects of society, sometimes brutally bringing a peasant society into a modern world of consumption, the dominant discourse was more and more imbued with a sense of the pastoral care of the material past. Caring for the heritage of the nation would give the government the self-assigned right to radically alter the present. As Michael Herzfeld points out:

  • 10 Herzfeld, 1997, p. 206.

The static image of an unspoiled and irrecoverable past often plays an important part in present actions. It legitimizes deeds of the moment by investing them with the moral authority of eternal truth and by representing the vagaries of circumstance as realization of a larger universe of system and balance.10

7In the early twentieth century proponents of a nation that was modern yet unsullied by western influence defined their ancient past as heritage in order to create pride in the nation in the making, whereas the liberal state of the late 1970s, focusing on economic development, used heritage to strengthen their claim to moral authority to transform an agrarian society into a market-oriented export processing zone. The twenty-first-century government, however, uses heritage for purely political purposes. In the years since the end of the civil war in 2009, the concept of national heritage has been used to depoliticise citizens and to mute any possible dissent. A number of institutions, groups and personalities are involved in the construction of the present discourse around national heritage.

The Construction of the Present Hegemonic Discourse

8Local and international bodies, governmental and non-governmental organisations and individuals all play a role in the creation of a specific understanding of ‘heritage’ that has gradually merged with what is generally known as history. This new interpretation of national heritage is shaped in a number of ways: through acts and practices that define heritage, through legislation and policy decisions about specific heritage sites, through the allocation of state funding, and, finally, through conservation practices that transform heritage sites.

Education and Heritage

  • 11 P. Bourdieu, ‘Strategies de reproduction et modes de domination’, Actes de la recherche en science (...)
  • 12 Data Management Branch, Ministry of Education, 2010, http://www.moe.gov.lk/web/images/stories/stati (...)
  • 13 R. Siriwardena, S. Bastian, K. Indrapala and S. Kottegoda, School Textbooks and Communal Relations (...)

9As Bourdieu has argued, educational structures aim to produce social agents worthy and capable of receiving the heritage of the group and adept at transmitting it in turn to a larger group.11 Education in Sri Lanka is free at primary, secondary and tertiary levels. In 2010 there were 3,932,722 students enrolled in primary and secondary education.12 A principal manner in which ideas about heritage are conveyed to a large public is through teaching in schools, universities and Daham Pasala (Buddhist Sunday schools), and through textbooks. Indeed, textbooks provide a fairly accurate reflection of the way history as critical assessment of the past has been superseded by a version of history that conveys a simplified account of the past.13 This process is not a recent one, but it did gain momentum after the war against the secessionist movement in the north and east entered its last and bloodiest phase.

  • 14 In 2005 I was Consultant to the Ministry of Education on curriculum revision for schools (chairpers (...)

10Issues pertaining to heritage are introduced in both history textbooks and Buddhism textbooks. History is now a compulsory subject in primary and secondary schools and a cursory look at the texts produced by the National Institute of Education reveals an emphasis on monumental histories associated with royal lineages. History as a subject that interprets the past, rather than glorifying it, is unrecognisable in these textbooks, which offer children a narrative of the glorious days before invaders from India and colonial powers shattered the equilibrium of Sri Lankan society by ushering in modernity.14

11Alongside grade-school history books, the syllabi and texts used for teaching Buddhism in Daham Pasala should be looked at as one of the main vehicles for transmission of ideas about heritage to a younger and often more naïve generation. Even a quick examination of the present Daham Pasala texts that contain sections on Sri Lankan history reveals certain trends. Just as in school histories, the history of Buddhism appears as one peppered with glorious deeds and exceptional individuals (shresta minissu). It is a history full of omissions and chosen emphases, one which resembles the heritage/mythic mode of recounting the past rather than modern historiography. If heritage is about the meanings placed upon artefacts or other traces and the interpretations that are created from them, what is dispensed in Daham Pasala is a ‘heritagised’ version of history in which interpretations are presented as evidence that cannot be contested or questioned.

Institutions

12At the University of Colombo, where I taught for nearly 20 years, student Buddhist monks often chose to study history expecting to be taught a national culture set in stone, able to provide certainties in a world in constant flux. They were, of course, disappointed to find that the courses we offered did not deal with history as heritage but rather questioned their received ideas about monastic history conveyed by the Chronicles. History, as we taught it, was conceived as precisely the opposite of heritage studies. But this is not always the case in those fields of study where notions of the past are being fashioned – departments of history, archaeology, heritage studies, Pali and Buddhist studies.

13Outside academia there are a number of ministries and government departments directly involved in the definition, production and preservation of heritage: the Ministries of Buddha Sasana and Religious Affairs, of Culture and the Arts, of National Heritage; the Archaeological Department, and those of the National Archives, National Museum, Buddhist Affairs, Christian Affairs, Hindu Religious and Cultural Affairs, Muslim Religious and Cultural Affairs, and Cultural Affairs and Educational Publications. These institutions earn their power and credibility by making themselves visible before the public eye, in particular through print and audio-visual media.

14In addition to government ministries, a number of statutory bodies and non-governmental organisations are concerned with particular aspects of heritage, either through teaching, research or funding conservation. These include the Central Cultural Fund (CCF), the Galle Heritage Foundation (GHF), the National Art Council (also covering non-tangible heritage), the National Crafts Council (NCC), the National Performing Art Centre, and the UNESCO National Commission. These institutions earn power and credibility in various ways as they target different audiences through a variety of projects. Many experts sit on a number of these commissions, thus creating a message on heritage that consolidates its own foundations rather than questioning them.

15Finally, non-governmental organisations play a considerable role in generating interest in heritage issues, among them the Royal Asiatic Society of Sri Lanka (RASSL), The National Heritage Trust, The Dutch Burgher Union (DBU), The Archaeologists Association, local branches of the International Commission on Museums (ICOM), and the local section of the International Commission on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS).

Vying for Popular Appeal: Merging History and Heritage in Popular Culture

16The realm of popular culture has always been filled with accounts of Sri Lankan history drawn from the Chronicles, myths, and Jataka tales which portray heroes and gods as the agents of history. Social forces or class conflict have no place in these accounts. The gap between histories written in English by professional academics and popular histories in the vernacular is not new, but widened with the opening up of the economy in the late 1970s, when a cosmopolitan class chose to consume western modernity with a vengeance after a decade of austerity. They consciously detached themselves from a past that was linked to myths and legends. The vernacular domain of culture was, however, recently re-energised under the influence of an entertainment industry that pandered to many people’s need for reassurance at a moment when the nation was threatened by secessionist anti-systemic groups. The trend became especially pronounced in 2008, when the state began its full-scale patriotic war to overthrow the Tamil rebels in the north and east of the country.

17This patriotic war had a direct impact on the film industry. In August 2008 the historical movie Aba was released in 38 cinemas across Sri Lanka. Aba was produced by EAP Edirisinghe, a group of companies that owned a popular TV channel called Swarnavahini. The film, directed by Jackson Anthony, a well-known film actor and TV personality, depicted the life of King Pandukabhaya. Pandukabhaya was the first king of Anuradhapura who, according to the Chronicles, ruled for 70 years some 2,400 years ago. Cinema-goers watching the movie reached the impressive figure of 2,105,000, about 10 percent of the total population of the island.

  • 15 A stupa is a hemispherical structure containing Buddhist relics, typically the ashes of Buddhist mo (...)
  • 16 A. Appadurai, ‘The Globalization of Archaeology and Heritage: A Discussion with Arjun Appadurai’, J (...)

18This and other contemporary works revolve around common tropes, such as the hydraulic civilisation and the aesthetic of the gargantuesque. What is portrayed is not the past but Sri Lanka’s fame, which is related to its past ability, for instance, to build stupas15 deemed exceptional for being the largest brick structures known to the pre-modern world. Monumentality is a central value in the production of heritage by the state, businesses, journalists and consultants in Sri Lanka. The connection between the exceptional architectural prowess of the past and the present is implicit. Today’s patriotic state needs the ‘signatures of the visible’ to construct a national imagination.16 Creative works, monuments and archaeology thus create a heritage able to consolidate national identity and to strengthen the public profile of political figures.

19Fictionalised versions of the past consumed by adults and children are also vehicles for a heritage discourse that naturalises certain narratives as well as cultural forms and social experiences that are often linked to ideas of nation and nationhood. Historical novels, for instance, are in great vogue. A case in point is Jayantha Chandrasiri’s novel – soon to be made into a film – The Great Dutugemunu (Maha Dutugemunu), which relates the glories of a third century BC Sinhala hero who slayed the Tamil King Elara and recaptured the kingdom of Anuradhapura.

20Today, it is clear that the public idea of what constitutes the past is fashioned in a vibrant commercial environment. Publishers, authors, film and teledrama makers use print media as well as visual technologies and the internet to reproduce a monumental, often exclusive, personality-oriented vision of the past as heritage, a vision that the state apparatus is also conveying through educational institutions. This vision is, however, contested on occasion by dissenting views, as well as by members of communities that are excluded from the official discourse.

Heritage in Practice: Disputes and Dissent

21The transformation of history into heritage must also be understood as a transformation from a selective and individualistic practice performed by professional historians into a public performance. Heritage practice involves visiting, interpreting and especially managing and conserving.

  • 17 Formerly the Tourist Board of Sri Lanka.

22One initiative in this direction is the Ramayana Trail, which takes people to 52 sites related to the great Hindu epic of the same name, including the garden where the abducted Sita, wife of Prince Rama, was imprisoned by Ravana, king of Lanka. The National Tourism Development Authority (SLTDA)17 started this initiative in 2007 with the aim of attracting Indian tourists in search of an authentic historical experience. In 2009, after the civil war ended, 4,000 Indian tourists arrived and numbers have been growing since.

23The Royal Asiatic Society of Sri Lanka (RASSL), especially its director, Susantha Goonetilleke, were vehemently opposed to what they saw as the resurrection of a fictional trail based on no historical evidence and for purely commercial reasons. Historians, including those of a nationalist leaning, criticised the creation of an historical site that was not supported by ‘proper scientific knowledge’. The Ramayana Trail controversy shows how in Sri Lanka promoters of the patriotic nation state select myths useful for propaganda purposes and to neutralise historical interpretations that do not conform to the dominant ideology.

Disputes over Sites

  • 18 Smith, 2006, p. 4.

24Heritage can be used by official cultural institutions and social elites as a tool to promote a version of history which tones down cultural and social tensions in the present time. It can also, however, be used by marginalised groups in a progressive way, to rethink the past and express social identities excluded by the official discourse.18 Historical sites are a particularly powerful form of heritage as they are visual and material – and memory requires a display, an articulation via objects or representation to give it meaning. Moreover materiality makes these locations appear neutral as mere traces of history rather than political and social constructs, whilst in fact sites and landscapes are the terrain where conflicting claims over heritage clash. Post-conflict Sri Lanka is a case in point of cultural appropriation of national heritage by a state determined to present a glorified notion of the nation’s history.

  • 19 D. G. B. de Silva, ‘Kantarodai Buddhist remains: A Sri Lankan Boro-budur lost for ever?’, The Islan (...)
  • 20 N. Parameswara, Early Tamils of Lanka (Ilankai: KL Malaysia, 1999), pp. 123-24.
  • 21 V. E. Medhananda, Sinhala Bauddha Urumaya (Sinhala Buddhist Heritage), 4 th edition, (Colombo: Daya (...)

25A recent example is provided by Kandarodai in the Jaffna Peninsula, where a collection of circular structures on a megalithic site possibly dating from the early part of the second millennium was discovered in the early twentieth century. After the end of the civil war pilgrims began to visit the place again and its name was subsequently Sinhalised as Kandurugoda, while the structures were refashioned as stupas. This connection with the Buddhist past of the country’s north was meant to counter the entire Tamil nationalist historical narrative. Today, this interpretation of the site could fuel tension between communities as they battle over the cultural meaning of the place. Unlike the case of the Ramayana Trail, the stupas appear to offer concrete evidence of a Buddhist past, further strengthened by an inscription naming the place Kandurugoda. This serves Sinhalese claims that Buddhism encompassed the entire island, the stupas being dated to the ninth century AD, a period which bears similarities to Borobudur in Indonesia.19 Tamil scholars have acknowledged the Buddhist remains in Jaffna, described as ‘burial monuments of monks, a buddhicised version of megalithicism’, as proof of the existence of Tamil Buddhists in ancient times.20 Sinhalese nationalist Ven. Ellawalla Medhananda is championing the renovation of all Buddhist sites in areas ‘desecrated’ by decades of civil war.21 In the post-conflict period Tamils felt the state was investing too much in renovating traces of Buddhist heritage in the north and east as well as building new temples, while their Hindu heritage was being neglected:

  • 22 Navraj Parthiban, ‘Hindu temples of Vanni and the lands of the Tamils are in danger’, Global Tamil (...)

Buddha statues have been found in places like Kandarodai, and this shows that Tamils have followed Buddhism and that Tamil Buddhism was practiced in Eelam, in a lesser extent, but the Sinhalese show these as Buddhist antiques and claim parts of the Tamil motherland as Sinhala areas.22

  • 23 ‘People of the Great Stone Age Civilization had lived in Kandarodai’, Global Tamil News, 24 June 20 (...)

26Tamils are countering with similarly grandiose claims of a ‘Great Stone Age’ in Kandarodai, using new media to disseminate their ideas.23

27Monuments and sites are thus being invested with new meanings, a phenomenon that existed in the past but that has been infused with a new urgency in a post-conflict situation where power relations between communities are being redefined. Each group is trying to test the limits of toleration of the others under the watchful eye of the patriotic state.

The Conflict over the Nature of Restoration

28Protecting built heritage and restoring it according to certain agreed criteria is an idea that was born in Europe in the nineteenth century and travelled to Sri Lanka with antiquarianism and colonial archaeology under H. C. P. Bell. In the post-colonial period, these principles were enshrined in a number of international treaties, among which the Venice Charter of 1964 is the most influential. The preamble of this seminal document indicates the underlying ideas about the past that prevailed in the 1960s:

People are becoming more and more conscious of the unity of human values and regard ancient monuments as a common heritage. The common responsibility to safeguard them for future generations is recognized. It is our duty to hand them on in the full richness of their authenticity.24

29It is on this crucial issue of ‘authenticity’ and the need to respect this principle when restoring monuments and sites that differences in interpretation arise between international organisations upholding these values and other parties who feel they have trusteeship of a monument.

30The Temple of the Tooth (Dalada Maligawa) in Kandy is believed by the Buddhist community to house the Buddha’s Tooth relic. The temple was constructed by King Wimaladharmasuriya (1593-1603) and is today under the control of two chief monks of the Malwatta and Asgiriya temples and a lay custodian (diyavadana nilame). The restoration of the Temple of the Tooth after part of it was destroyed by a Tamil Tigers bomb in 1998 offers a telling example of the local understanding of restoration as making anew. New tiles were laid, new sandakadapahana (moonstone) and new carvings were added, totally in contravention of the Venice Charter.25 The clash is here between an historical temple as a living heritage where people come to practice their rituals, and the World Heritage view of historical places as unalterable entities fixed in time. The vision of the bhikkhus, as far as stupas and other Buddhist sites are concerned, is that heritage is a living thing that can be modified. Hence the restoration of the Dalada Maligawa to look exactly as it looked before, even if this meant using present day materials, or the painting of ancient stupas in white, which is a common occurrence in Sri Lanka and serves to make them similar to all other modern stupas in the country.

Conclusion

  • 26 M. Askew, ‘The Magic List of Global Status: UNESCO, World Heritage and the Agendas of States’, in S (...)
  • 27 Ibid, p. 22.
  • 28 Nira Wickramasinghe, ‘After the War: A New Patriotism in Sri Lanka’, Journal of Asian Studies, 68 ( (...)

31In Sri Lanka, as in most states which are signatories of international conventions, ‘heritage’, in its multifarious guises, is endorsed simultaneously by UNESCO, an international bureaucratic organisation, by a global tourist industry and by the country’s government.26 UNESCO’s rhetoric appears to be progressive in that it purports to protect world cultures by means of protocols, declarations and inventories. But world heritage projects belong to a world system and world economy which are in no way at odds with the way nation states exhibit and promote a populist interpretation of the past. In that sense international organisations such as UNESCO facilitate the marginalisation of certain histories and the dominance of ideological and cultural appropriation by centres of political and economic power.27 The state uses the framework of World Heritage Sites for its own agenda of cultural hegemony. The contradictions between Sri Lanka’s nation state ideology, morphed into what I have elsewhere qualified as ‘new patriotism’ in the post-conflict years, and the lofty goals of UNESCO are rarely acknowledged by local representatives of UNESCO or members of ICOMOS.28 There are few voices left to dissent.

  • 29 Leo Tolstoy, ‘On Patriotism’ (1894) and ‘Patriotism or Peace’ (1896), in Writings on Civil Disobedi (...)

32At a time when Western thinkers have lost their legitimacy among the people of Sri Lanka, it might be strategic to re-introduce them to the thought of Rabindranath Tagore. Indeed, Tagore advocates that when a country is seen as morally transgressing, it forfeits its claim to the loyalty of its citizens. His contemporary, Leo Tolstoy, made the same point when he stated that one could be a critic while at the same time being a patriot. What both thinkers discredited was an extreme patriotism that entailed a belief in the superiority of one’s country and an exclusive concern for one’s country.29

33Tagore’s low-key nationalism is certainly at odds with the type of state patriotism promoted by the Sri Lankan government during the final phase of the civil war and the eventual victory over the Tamil Tigers. I have argued elsewhere that if the Rajapaksa regime takes patriotism seriously and expects non-Sinhalese communities to identify with a national identity that transcends their attachment to a specific group, it will need to avoid expressions of ‘banal nationalism’ that can easily alienate cultural minorities. Continuing to flag Sinhala-Buddhist traditions as the basis of the nation’s patriotism, a practice that started in the mid-1950s, is certainly not a way to win over the hearts of members of racial and religious minorities.

Notes

2 M. Herzfeld, Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation State (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 5.

3 S. Mathur, India by Design: Colonial History and Cultural Display (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007), p. 168.

4 L. Smith, The Uses of Heritage (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 3.

5 Ibid, p. 11.

6 Ibid.

7 Cited in N. S. M. Tennekoon, ‘Rituals of Development: The Accelerated Mahaväli Development Program of Sri Lanka’, American Ethnologist, 15 (2), 1988, p. 297.

8 N. Hennayake, Culture, Politics and Development in Postcolonial Sri Lanka (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), p. 123.

9 Cited in R. Silva, ‘The Cultural Triangle of Sri Lanka’, in Henry Cleere (ed.), Archeological Heritage Management in the Modern World (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 222.

10 Herzfeld, 1997, p. 206.

11 P. Bourdieu, ‘Strategies de reproduction et modes de domination’, Actes de la recherche en science sociale, 105, 1994, p. 6.

12 Data Management Branch, Ministry of Education, 2010, http://www.moe.gov.lk/web/images/stories/statistic/std_2010.pdf

13 R. Siriwardena, S. Bastian, K. Indrapala and S. Kottegoda, School Textbooks and Communal Relations in Sri Lanka, Part I (Colombo: Council for Communal Harmony through the Media, 1980); N. Wickramasinghe and S. Perera, ‘Assessment of Ethno-Cultural and Religious Bias in Social Studies and History Texts of Years 7, 8, 10 and 11’(Colombo: World Bank, 1999).

14 In 2005 I was Consultant to the Ministry of Education on curriculum revision for schools (chairperson of the History syllabus committee).

15 A stupa is a hemispherical structure containing Buddhist relics, typically the ashes of Buddhist monks, used by Buddhists as a place of meditation.

16 A. Appadurai, ‘The Globalization of Archaeology and Heritage: A Discussion with Arjun Appadurai’, Journal of Social Archaeology, 35 (1), 2001, p. 44

17 Formerly the Tourist Board of Sri Lanka.

18 Smith, 2006, p. 4.

19 D. G. B. de Silva, ‘Kantarodai Buddhist remains: A Sri Lankan Boro-budur lost for ever?’, The Island, 14 August 2002, http://www.island.lk/2002/08/14/midwee01.html

20 N. Parameswara, Early Tamils of Lanka (Ilankai: KL Malaysia, 1999), pp. 123-24.

21 V. E. Medhananda, Sinhala Bauddha Urumaya (Sinhala Buddhist Heritage), 4 th edition, (Colombo: Dayawansa Jayakodi and Company, 2008) describes sites in Anuradhapura, Vavuniya and Mullaitivu districts.

22 Navraj Parthiban, ‘Hindu temples of Vanni and the lands of the Tamils are in danger’, Global Tamil News, 29 September 2011, http://www.globaltamilnews.net/MobileArticle/tabid/81/language/enUS/Default.aspx?pn=articles&aid=53410

23 ‘People of the Great Stone Age Civilization had lived in Kandarodai’, Global Tamil News, 24 June 2011, http://www.globaltamilnews.net/GTMNEditorial/tabid/71/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/63096/language/en-US/People-of-the-Great-Stone-Age-Civilization-had-Lived-in-Kandarodai.aspx

24 See http://www.international.icomos.org/charters/venice_e.pdf

25 See Article 6 of the Venice Charter, http://www.international.icomos.org/charters/venice_e.pdf

26 M. Askew, ‘The Magic List of Global Status: UNESCO, World Heritage and the Agendas of States’, in S. Labadi and C. Long (eds.), Heritage and Globalisation (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), p. 19.

27 Ibid, p. 22.

28 Nira Wickramasinghe, ‘After the War: A New Patriotism in Sri Lanka’, Journal of Asian Studies, 68 (4), 2009, pp. 1945-54.

29 Leo Tolstoy, ‘On Patriotism’ (1894) and ‘Patriotism or Peace’ (1896), in Writings on Civil Disobedience and Non-Violence (New York: New American Library 1968).

Acheter

Rechercher dans OpenEdition Search

Vous allez être redirigé vers OpenEdition Search