Like Nobody’s Business
|10. Facilities & Finance
Texte intégral
10.1 What do campus buildings cost?
1It depends. Of course, there is no such thing as a typical campus building and they vary by size, purpose, intended lifespan, local labor and construction costs, as well as by the precise definition of cost. That said, numbers from $50M to $100M are not unusual for construction of a new medium-sized campus building with a few floors totaling, say, 100,000 square feet, while smaller buildings the size of large houses might cost just a few million dollars and massive laboratory complexes can cost hundreds of millions. Let’s dig in a little further.
2It’s easy to focus only on direct construction costs (a.k.a. brick-and-mortar or hard costs paid to a contractor) and not on the total project cost, which also includes associated design costs, permit fees, local taxes, legal fees, cost of land, utility expansion/connection, roadway alterations, landscaping, interior furnishings and specialized equipment (some or all of which are counted as soft costs depending on the definition). Together, these other items add 20–50 % on top of basic construction costs, as can be seen in Figure 10.1.
Figure 10.1. Hard costs (construction and construction contingency) and soft costs ( “everything else”) per gross square foot for a variety of campus building types from a 2016 study.

Source: D’Angelo (2016).
3Figure 10.1 also illustrates the differentiation in hard and soft costs across a range of campus building types. New “wet labs” (and high acuity healthcare) are the most expensive kinds of space because of specialized needs: heating, ventilation and air conditioning (e.g., fume hoods, positive/negative pressure, air filtering); extra plumbing for purified/contaminated water; supplementary electrical and IT infrastructure; laboratory gas handling; additional sprinkler and fire safety equipment, and special rooms for delicate or large equipment. Fitting out and renovating such space costs somewhat less than new construction, as with most space (except for historical or other unique buildings). So-called “dry labs” (simple teaching laboratories, computer laboratories, sorting rooms, etc.) can cost substantially less. Multi-use structures such as student centers with a mix of catering, hospitality, meeting, retail, etc. space can cost almost as much as an average laboratory on a per square foot basis. Offices, classrooms, and residence halls are more moderate in cost, while the lowest costs are associated with large box-like spaces typified by libraries (and open-plan floors of office cubicles).
4It is not uncommon for those who know commercial construction costs to balk at the perceived cost of new university construction. Universities tend to cite project costs, which as we’ve seen can be substantially higher and are easily confused with basic construction costs. Also, universities usually build for a facility lifespan of fifty to one hundred years, far longer than the typical commercial building. Figure 10.2 shows a comparison of cross-sector construction costs using consistent definitions and data collection. It is clear that, in fact, higher education construction costs are very much in line with commercial construction costs as well as other sectors similar to higher education such as healthcare and K-12 education. Laboratories and acute healthcare spaces are the most expensive, academic/classroom and administration spaces are on a par with mid-rise commercial space, while residence halls and K-12 spaces have a similar cost to single-story commercial space.
5This is a convenient point to explain the distinctions between gross square footage (GSF, essentially the entire structure), net assignable square footage (NASF, all rooms and usable areas), and unassigned or common space such as hallways and stairwells. Construction cost calculations are generally made on gross square footage, while internal space and cost allocations (such as for a department or college) usually use net assignable square footage.
6Total GSF on a campus ranges from under 1 million GSF at small colleges to more than 15 million GSF at the largest universities. Space per student varies substantially across type of institution with, for public and private schools combined, baccalaureate colleges (that are predominantly private) averaging about 650 GSF per FTE, R1 universities averaging about 500, R2 about 350, and R3-M3 institutions about 300 GSF per FTE (Cotter 2009). There are economies of scale from smaller to midsize institutions, with research space adding to overall space totals at R1 schools.
7I’ve occasionally been asked about the total value of all facilities on campus, a number that is tough to quantify. University financial statements will list older buildings as depreciated assets, but that kind of book value doesn’t necessarily align with value for practical purposes (what a university might spend on functionally similar space) and it certainly isn’t the same as replacement value. In any case, the total value of all facilities naturally scales with the overall size of the institution, and the figures are clearly in the hundreds of millions on smaller campuses and in the several billions of dollars for large R1 schools.
Figure 10.2. 2019 construction costs per square foot of gross floor area for selected sectors, calculated as the average of high and low values within the city limits of 20 US cities. Land, permits and other soft costs are excluded.

Source: Cumming Corporation (2019).
10.2 What are the trends in campus construction and deferred maintenance?
8As any homeowner knows, once a building is built it still needs regular maintenance, which will eventually involve major outlays as essential components age and need to be updated or replaced (e.g., roofs, mechanical systems, windows, interiors). And, just like at home, it’s easy for cash-strapped institutions to put off those costs for just another year or two, leading to a mounting and ever more expensive backlog of deferred maintenance projects.
9Industry benchmarks suggest that institutional investments into maintenance of campus facilities should be 2–3 % of total asset value, a target not met by most campuses (EAB 2017). For a $50M building of 100,000 GSF that’s about $1M to $1.5M per year, or about $10 to $15 per GSF. Of course, this guideline is not per building, but for the entire portfolio of campus facilities, some new and many older. The average deferred maintenance backlog in 2015 was $88 per GSF at private institutions and $108 per GSF at public institutions, both of which grew faster than the inflation rate since 2007 (EAB 2017).
10Major maintenance expenses rise around twenty to thirty years after a building is built. Of course, there are few campuses with an even mix of building ages and fewer yet that have dutifully kept up a consistent maintenance schedule amid other budget pressures. On many campuses the result is that major maintenance costs tend to surge. Figure 10.3 illustrates the century-plus age profile of campus buildings as a share of national higher education GSF. On top of the overall growth trend, we see two big surges in construction: the 1960s and 1970s, and the 2000s into the 2010s. Each of these had, or will have, an echo in major maintenance costs a few decades later.
Figure 10.3. Building construction age as a share of total gross square footage (GSF) across US higher education.

Source: Gordian (2018).
11The first surge is easy to understand as a response to massive sustained enrollment growth during that time (as we saw in Section 4.6). The recent surge is a combination of pre-recession investments and response to post-recession enrollment growth, both taking place in an environment of intense competition for additional students. Paying for this recent wave of construction and the associated major maintenance will become extremely challenging in the next ten years, especially for institutions that have not managed to grow enrollments at the same time. The early signs of that challenge are clear in Figure 10.4, which shows the mismatched growth curves for space and enrollment across research, masters and baccalaureate institutions since 2007. The two rates are comparable at research schools, masters’ institutions saw the largest cumulative space growth along with weak post-recession enrollment growth, and baccalaureate colleges grew space while seeing several years of flat or negative enrollment growth. These are troubling patterns for all but the research campuses. Not only will it be challenging to pay off the associated debt with modest or declining enrollment revenues, but also the major maintenance bills will start to hit in the coming decade, requiring additional debt if those schools don’t have adequate maintenance funding built into their budget plans.
Figure 10.4. Recent trends in rates of space expansion and enrollment growth across US higher education.

Source: Gordian (2018).
10.3 How much is the university’s “mortgage” and debt payment?
12Universities borrow money for large capital projects, much as homeowners obtain a mortgage to buy or build a house, enabling large one-time costs to be spread over many years. Mortgages are issued in the residential loan market by lending institutions based on the creditworthiness of the buyer and use of the property as collateral. In contrast, like other corporations, universities generally issue bonds to finance large capital projects. Direct borrowing from banks tends to be costlier and more restrictive than selling debt on the bond market. While bonds do not use collateral, universities are rated by independent agencies as to the likely reliability of the institution to repay them.
13Unlike most homeowners with a single mortgage for a single home, universities typically have multiple bonds that cover many capital projects of various ages, some from years ago that are about to end and others that are more recent. Thus, a university’s overall debt portfolio can extend its interest payments several decades into the future, and the institution has to weigh any consideration of new debt against those obligations.
14So, just how big is university debt at any one time and how much are the interest payments? Figure 10.5 shows average debt by type of institution and the matching interest for FY2018. Both amounts scale with institution size, much as one would expect, with the annual interest across institutions in a consistent range of 3.5–4.5 % of the total debt. Average debt is about $800M at R1 public institutions and over double that amount at R1 privates, almost $1.8B. The smallest institutions average less than $100M in debt, public and private. Debt service, the interest that universities pay on their bonds and other loans, averages about $35M annually at R1 public universities and over $60M annually at R1 privates, while it is under $5M annually at smaller colleges and universities. Making those bond payments is a financial priority for the institution because not doing so would make any future borrowing much more expensive. Thus, bond defaults are rare and they occur only if the institution is undergoing significant financial distress. For example, as universities lost all or part of their anticipated residence hall revenue in FY2020 due to COVID-19 effects, most will find ways to cover the revenue shortfall gap from other sources rather than defaulting on the related debt.
Figure 10.5. FY2018 institutional debt (left axis) and interest on debt (right axis, note narrower scale) by Carnegie classification and control.

Source: IPEDS (2020).
15Those annual interest payments account for 2–3.5 % of the university budget depending on the type of institution, generally lower at public universities and higher at private institutions. Figure 10.6 illustrates the trend in debt service as a share of expenditures over three decades for public and private universities. While that share has remained in a narrow band for private institutions, at public institutions it almost doubled during the 2000s driven largely by non-R1 schools, in synchrony with increasing enrollment growth across all institutions. Worryingly, for the small group of BAS public colleges, their enrollment growth subsequently flattened and then declined in the 2010s, meaning that they will be challenged to meet their debt obligations in the coming years if enrollments and revenues continue on their current path.
Figure 10.6. Trends in interest on institutional debt as a share of total non-hospital expenditures, averaged across Carnegie classifications for public and private institutions.

Source: IPEDS (2020).
16The major rating agencies (Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch) rate the creditworthiness of higher education institutions. For example, Moody’s uses a scale of A (low risk), B (speculative, medium to high risk) and C (very high risk as well as near or in default), with nine subdivisions and three further modifiers for a total of 21 categories (Moody’s Investors Service 2020c). The range of ratings for four-year institutions is illustrated in Figure 10.7, which also shows that public institutions generally receive better ratings than private ones. Overall, the upper categories are typically dominated by elite private universities as well as major public universities or systems; remember also that the medium and smaller schools make up the majority of all institutions. To develop their ratings, the agencies examine multiple business-related metrics, including many covered in this book, to gain a comprehensive picture of each institution’s financial health. Agencies offer annual outlooks for the whole higher education sector, and in recent years they have varied between negative and stable, reflecting overall concerns about enrollment and net tuition revenue, state support, and endowment performance among other factors (Seltzer 2019e; 2020a).
Figure 10.7. Moody’s credit rating distribution for 226 public and 256 private four-year institutions, as shares of each for December 2018.

Source: Moody’s Investors Service (Shaffer 2019).
10.4 How much is the campus energy and utility bill?
17The national average for the cost of utilities (natural gas, steam, electricity, water & sewer) in 2018 was about $2 per GSF (Gordian 2018). That translates into an annual utility bill of tens of millions at a large R1 university down to single-digit millions at smaller colleges. For example, FY2018 utility expenditures were $84M at UNC Chapel Hill (R1 public), $103M at Stanford (R1 private), $10M at Creighton (M1 private), $1.1M at Henderson State University (M2 public), as well as $3.5M at Goucher and $1M at Juniata which are both BAS privates (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 2019; Stanford University 2017; Creighton University 2018; Henderson State University 2018; Goucher College 2018; Juniata College 2018). Utility expenditures thus account for a few percent of the overall institutional budget.
18Utility activity by type of utility also scales with campus size (i.e., GSF), as illustrated in Figure 10.8. Consumptive metrics (energy use, carbon footprint, electricity use and water use) are generally higher at large schools and they decrease with smaller type, such that BAS colleges consume at 30–50 % of the rates at R1 universities. Across all institutions, natural gas comprises over 85 % of all fossil fuel usage with emissions per GSF declining at about 2 % per year (Sightlines 2014). Productive metrics (garbage and recycled waste) show the reverse pattern in Figure 10.8, with the highest rates at small campuses and the lowest rates at large campuses, dramatically so for recycling. The unusual water-use and recycling values for R2 institutions in particular may be a result of small sample size.
Figure 10.8. FY2018 utility activity per 1,000 gross square feet (GSF), with the scale for each indexed to 1 for comparison, by Carnegie classification of 172 institutions. The R3-M3 values are a weighted combination based on response count.

Sources: NACUBO (2019) and APPA (2019).
10.5 Does the university have a rainy-day fund?
19Yes. Institutions in sound financial shape keep cash on hand to cover unexpected revenue shortfalls or unforeseen emergency expenses (such as the financial impacts of COVID-19). You won’t typically find a specific fund to which money is allocated; rather, the institution will have cash accounts and cash equivalents (e.g., short-term investments) that can be liquidated almost immediately. There are many measures of liquidity, most of which reflect available cash relative to expenses, with variants depending on how those two figures are accounted for. One easy to understand example is “days cash on hand” that Moody’s uses in its ratings reports, and which is sometimes mentioned in a university’s annual financial report. It represents the number of days that the institution could cover operating expenses from cash. For example, starting with some public institutions, FY2017 days cash on hand was: 210 at Indiana (Moody’s Investors Service 2018a) and 68 at New Mexico (Moody’s Investors Service 2018d) that are both R1; 241 at Kent State, an R2 (Moody’s Investors Service 2019); 64 at Texas Southern (Hilltop Securities 2018), an R3; and 134 at Midwestern State (Hilltop Securities 2018), an M2. Examples from private institutions include: 620 at Vanderbilt (Moody’s Investors Service 2018f) and 954 at Notre Dame (Moody’s Investors Service 2018e) along with 187 at USC (Moody’s Investors Service 2020b), all R1 schools; 457 at Loyola University of Chicago (Moody’s Investors Service 2018b), an R2; 205 at Rollins College (Moody’s Investors Service 2018c), an M1; 534 at Kalamazoo College (Moody’s Investors Service 2020a) and 644 at Lafayette College (Prager & Co. 2019), both BAS colleges.
20From these examples we can see that while there are differences in liquidity across all schools, there is also a differentiation between public and private universities. Public institutions can typically cover a portion of a year while private institutions are usually able to cover hundreds of days and some even several years. The reason for the distinction is that private institutions typically keep a portion of their endowment as cash in addition to other operating cash reserves. This is not typically an option at public universities where an outside foundation holds the endowment and those funds are restricted. While endowment-related funds at a private university can fill a hole in the short run, if they are used, they will of course deplete the long-term resources of the institution. This public-private difference can be seen in Figure 10.9, which illustrates trends in simple liquidity ratios.
Figure 10.9. Trends in simple liquidity ratios averaged by Carnegie classification and control. Note that the vertical scale in the upper panel (Private) is 4X the lower panel (Public); see text for details.

Source: IPEDS (2020).
21Unfortunately, while the data to calculate days cash on hand are readily found in individual university financial statements, sufficiently specific information to properly calculate days cash on hand for all schools is not publicly available, nor is it recorded in IPEDS. However, IPEDS does contain certain asset and liability data, from which simple liquidity ratios can be computed. In Section 1.4, I mentioned that we could generally handle technical accounting differences between public and private institutions in our comparisons, but this is one of the topics where those differences are marked. In the case of public universities, this simple IPEDS-based liquidity ratio is calculated as total current assets over total expenses, while for private universities it is calculated as total unrestricted net assets over total expenses. The numerator for the privates is a far broader quantity than that for the publics, which leads to two different scales as seen in Figure 10.9. Despite the resulting much higher ratios for privates versus publics, there are still some interesting differences among each group and some overall trends worth noting. At public universities, liquidity is similar across all sizes of institution except the group of small baccalaureate colleges that have lower cash reserves. Before the Great Recession there was variability in liquidity trends among the publics, but institutions made modest improvements to their liquidity post-recession. The privates, especially R1 universities and baccalaureate colleges, had distinct profiles pre-recession and they experienced dramatic reductions in liquidity as their endowments shrank. Interestingly, because endowments are relatively low at the smaller private research and master’s institutions the impact of the recession on their liquidity was comparatively muted. Post-recession, liquidity improved slightly across all types of private institution.
22In fact, it was the recession that prompted far more attention to liquidity across all of higher education: some institutions had to borrow money to meet debt obligations because their investments were inaccessible, and the credit rating agencies cited liquidity concerns in numerous cases as they downgraded institutions (Kiley 2011). Of course, liquidity is just one of many indicators used to assess institutional financial health, and composite financial indices are made available by the US Department of Education and in rankings exercises published by the media (Coudriet and Schifrin 2019; Seltzer 2019d).
10.6 Why isn’t parking free?
23A university is a series of individual faculty entrepreneurs held together by a common grievance over parking. This much-repeated witticism is attributed to Clark Kerr, and like many good jokes it contains just enough truth to be amusing. Because thousands and even tens of thousands of people flow on and off a typical campus every day, there is never enough parking for all of them and it’s only natural that the tensions between convenience and congestion make for regular grumbles about parking and transportation. Chief among those are questions about why parking fees are so expensive, and why parking can’t be free. Companies don’t charge their employees or their customers for parking, as the argument goes, so why do universities do it? Besides this rhetoric being partially untrue (many businesses in urban downtown settings don’t have onsite parking and expect their employees and customers to figure out their own public or private transportation and parking needs), the bigger point is really about who pays.
24We all know the economic truth that there is no such thing as a free lunch, so either the costs of providing parking or alternative transportation solutions are absorbed centrally and paid for by all whether they use the service or not, or they are paid by those who use the service. Individual faculty and staff members might consider parking fees a tax on wages while students may complain that it should be included in tuition; all have an interest in externalizing the cost away from the individual to the institution. On the other hand, many campuses have physical space constraints that severely limit parking availability, and even if they don’t, the university community still has an interest in reducing congestion and the physical costs of providing parking. Therefore, universities typically charge individuals for parking permits, often using a portion of parking fees to offset costs of other transit options such as free shuttles, bus passes, and the like.
25Surface lots are the cheapest to construct although they are the least efficient use of space, while multi-level parking garage structures enable higher density parking but they can cost an order of magnitude more to build; both require additional maintenance. Construction cost estimates range from $2,000 to $3,500 per space for surface parking, and between $12,000 and $25,000 per space for a parking structure (UNC Charlotte 2019; Texas A & M University 2020). Operations and maintenance expenses include custodial, repairs, staffing, and security. A back-of-the-envelope calculation that spreads construction and financing costs out over thirty years (assuming the university issues a bond for the project) and includes an allowance for maintenance puts the annual cost at a few hundred dollars per surface space and $1,500-$3,000 per garage space, an amount that needs to be recovered from parking charges or other sources (such as tuition). Because the faculty and students are not all on campus all the time, typical annual parking charges can be less than these numbers if the university issues more permits than there are physical spaces—the hunting license analogy. As an indication of the seriousness and emotion attached to campus parking issues, it is interesting to note that at UC Berkeley the ultimate academic recognition is being awarded a special reserved parking spot for winning the Nobel Prize (Figure 10.10).
Figure 10.10. The ultimate academic accolade at UC Berkeley, winning a special reserved parking space along with the Nobel Prize.

Source: De Comité (2017), Flickr, CC BY 2.0, https://www.flickr.com/photos/fdecomite/34688401634.
10.7 Do public-private partnerships and outsourcing save money?
26They can save money, but that should not be the sole reason that a university enters into a public-private partnership (P3) or similar form of privatizing or outsourcing. There are several important aspects of P3s that institutions should assess and manage to avoid non-financial (e.g., academic and reputational) as well as financial risks. We’ll cover those items below, but first let’s describe what we’re talking about. Outsourcing is a slightly older term that carries negative connotations for some. The P3 term is now widely used, although it is technically a misnomer for private universities that use these agreements as much as public institutions. Whatever we call them, the essence of such agreements is that the university contracts with a third party to deliver a service rather than the institution providing that service itself.
27P3s are not new and universities have been contracting out functions such as food service, vending and bookstores for decades (Bushman and Dean 2005; Phipps and Merisotis 2005). These areas are not close to the core academic mission and can often be delivered more effectively by a company with specialty expertise and economies of scale. Since the late 2000s, however, higher education has seen strong increases in P3s for facilities construction and/or operation as well as those much closer to the core academic mission, such as student services and online program management. Table 10.1 shows the extensive range of functions and services that may be provided by private partners. Across the country, higher education P3 deals now total in the billions of dollars annually (EY-Parthenon 2017), with a growing literature that describes them (Leeds 2019).
28P3 agreements differ depending on the level of control and risk for the company and the university, financial elements such as whether there are fixed payments or a revenue-sharing agreement, and timing. Depending on the needs of the institution the P3 could be a short-term contract or it might be a long-term partnership over many decades. A seemingly straightforward example might be a contract for janitorial services, where the university pays a certain amount to a company instead of hiring and managing its own janitorial staff. Clearly the university will want the costs to be lower, but it also has to consider how integrated it wants the “outside” staff to be and how the arrangement fits with union agreements. Furthermore, will the cost savings come from efficiencies or will the company workers be paid less than if they were university employees, and will they receive fewer benefits? These can be critical issues for a campus community.
29A facilities example might involve the construction and operation of a residence hall, where the institution provides a ground lease to the company, which in turn fronts the cost of construction and receives a significant portion of the student housing revenues. From the company’s point of view, it can rely on the captive audience of students for a relatively reliable tenant income to recoup its investment, while the university gets a building financed and built quickly without having to borrow. Concerns abound: to list just a few, can the university ensure that the construction quality meet its usual standards, will maintenance problems be dealt with to the satisfaction of students and parents, and will the university or the company be handling student behavior and support issues? If such issues are anticipated and managed well, then the project can work well for all, but poor revenue or management arrangements can severely undermine the hoped-for benefits. Also, for capital projects, universities can typically borrow money (through bonding) at lower rates than commercial developers, so the premium paid for that aspect of the project must be offset by other benefits such as speed to completion, level of service, or risk avoidance.
30A third example is online program management (OPM), which has received a lot of press over the last decade as higher education moved into online instruction. I mentioned OPMs briefly in Section 6.11 when discussing online programs, and it’s worth emphasizing again just how poorly structured many of these OPM deals have been for the universities (Hall and Dudley 2019). In their rush to get help recruiting online students and delivering instructional content, some institutions more-or-less sold their academic souls (Carey 2019), ceding over half the revenue and much of the academic control to the OPM partner. As universities gain more experience in the online space the nature of these deals will hopefully become more balanced. Nonetheless, in a recent survey of campus leaders the desire for OPM P3s came in second, right behind facilities and infrastructure P3s (Blumenstyk 2019a).
Table des illustrations
![]() | |
---|---|
Titre | Figure 10.1. Hard costs (construction and construction contingency) and soft costs ( “everything else”) per gross square foot for a variety of campus building types from a 2016 study. |
Crédits | Source: D’Angelo (2016). |
URL | http://books.openedition.org/obp/docannexe/image/18563/img-1.jpg |
Fichier | image/jpeg, 27k |
![]() | |
Titre | Figure 10.2. 2019 construction costs per square foot of gross floor area for selected sectors, calculated as the average of high and low values within the city limits of 20 US cities. Land, permits and other soft costs are excluded. |
Crédits | Source: Cumming Corporation (2019). |
URL | http://books.openedition.org/obp/docannexe/image/18563/img-2.jpg |
Fichier | image/jpeg, 31k |
![]() | |
Titre | Figure 10.3. Building construction age as a share of total gross square footage (GSF) across US higher education. |
Crédits | Source: Gordian (2018). |
URL | http://books.openedition.org/obp/docannexe/image/18563/img-3.jpg |
Fichier | image/jpeg, 27k |
![]() | |
Titre | Figure 10.4. Recent trends in rates of space expansion and enrollment growth across US higher education. |
Crédits | Source: Gordian (2018). |
URL | http://books.openedition.org/obp/docannexe/image/18563/img-4.jpg |
Fichier | image/jpeg, 44k |
![]() | |
Titre | Figure 10.5. FY2018 institutional debt (left axis) and interest on debt (right axis, note narrower scale) by Carnegie classification and control. |
Crédits | Source: IPEDS (2020). |
URL | http://books.openedition.org/obp/docannexe/image/18563/img-5.jpg |
Fichier | image/jpeg, 24k |
![]() | |
Titre | Figure 10.6. Trends in interest on institutional debt as a share of total non-hospital expenditures, averaged across Carnegie classifications for public and private institutions. |
Crédits | Source: IPEDS (2020). |
URL | http://books.openedition.org/obp/docannexe/image/18563/img-6.jpg |
Fichier | image/jpeg, 25k |
![]() | |
Titre | Figure 10.7. Moody’s credit rating distribution for 226 public and 256 private four-year institutions, as shares of each for December 2018. |
Crédits | Source: Moody’s Investors Service (Shaffer 2019). |
URL | http://books.openedition.org/obp/docannexe/image/18563/img-7.jpg |
Fichier | image/jpeg, 23k |
![]() | |
Titre | Figure 10.8. FY2018 utility activity per 1,000 gross square feet (GSF), with the scale for each indexed to 1 for comparison, by Carnegie classification of 172 institutions. The R3-M3 values are a weighted combination based on response count. |
Crédits | Sources: NACUBO (2019) and APPA (2019). |
URL | http://books.openedition.org/obp/docannexe/image/18563/img-8.jpg |
Fichier | image/jpeg, 31k |
![]() | |
Titre | Figure 10.9. Trends in simple liquidity ratios averaged by Carnegie classification and control. Note that the vertical scale in the upper panel (Private) is 4X the lower panel (Public); see text for details. |
Crédits | Source: IPEDS (2020). |
URL | http://books.openedition.org/obp/docannexe/image/18563/img-9.jpg |
Fichier | image/jpeg, 52k |
![]() | |
Titre | Figure 10.10. The ultimate academic accolade at UC Berkeley, winning a special reserved parking space along with the Nobel Prize. |
Crédits | Source: De Comité (2017), Flickr, CC BY 2.0, https://www.flickr.com/photos/fdecomite/34688401634. |
URL | http://books.openedition.org/obp/docannexe/image/18563/img-10.jpg |
Fichier | image/jpeg, 74k |
![]() | |
Titre | Table 10.1. Examples of institutional functions and services that may be provided through public-private partnerships. |
URL | http://books.openedition.org/obp/docannexe/image/18563/img-11.jpg |
Fichier | image/jpeg, 75k |
Le texte seul est utilisable sous licence CC BY 4.0. Les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont « Tous droits réservés », sauf mention contraire.