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Is Behavioral Economics Doomed?

 | 
David K. Levine

Index

Texte intégral

1Adverse selection, 38

2Allais paradox, 78, 79, 80, 10-12, 104, 105, 106

3Altruism, 30-32, 34, 36, 37, 43, 70, 74

4American Airlines flight 11, 129

5Anchoring effect, 81

6Approximate optimization. See Approximate Nash equilibrium

7Auction, 14-15, 67, 69, 122

8Backward induction, 51, 60

9Bank regulation, 37

10Bank runs, 38-40

11Beauty-contest game, 119-121

12Becker-DeGroot-Marschak elicitation procedure, 81, 122

13Behavioral economics, ix, 2-3, 5, 7, 66, 77-80, 86, 90-91, 93, 95, 98, 99, 105, 107, 112, 114, 123, 124, 127-130

14Behavioral mistake, 90-91

15Beliefs, 6-7, 24, 26, 64, 68, 111-116
correct, 111, 113-115, 116
incorrect, 78, 83-85, 112, 113, 114
superstitious, 116

16Best response, 29, 53, 67-68, 74

17Best-shot game, 47, 53-55

18Biblical game, 33

19Bounded rationality, 18-19

20Bus seating game, 33-35
polite, 34

21Code of Hammurabi, 115-116, 118

22Coefficient of relative risk aversion, 103-104, 106, 119

23Cold War, 50, 52, 53

24Commitment, 50-53, 95, 96

25Common knowledge, 111, 119, 122

26Competitive equilibrium, 15, 17, 18, 19, 82

27Competitive market clearing equilibrium, 17

28Competitive markets, 6, 14-17, 58

29Consumption lock-in model, 110

30Continuity axiom, 101

31Cooperation. See Altruism

32Coordination failure, 44-45

33Coordination failure equilibrium, 44, 45

34Coordination game, 43, 119

35Crime, 22-24, 37, 86, 116-118

36Decision node, 48

37Deep Blue, 49

38Diamond-Dybvig model, 40

39Discount factor, 27-28, 35

40Discounting 27, 29, 96
geometric, 94, 95
hyperbolic, 95, 127

41Discrimination, 88, 89
negative, 87, 88, 89
positive, 88, 89

42Dominant strategy equilibrium, 24, 33, 34, 35

43Drug use, 87

44Dynamic programming. See Backward induction

45Economic crises, 3, 83, 85, 96, 115

46Efficiency wages, 83

47Efficient-market hypothesis, 75

48Endowment effect, 80

49Epsilon equilibrium. See Nash equilibrium

50Equity premium puzzle, 108, 109, 110

51Evolutionary biology, 90

52Excess volatility puzzle, 108

53Expected utility theory, 80, 100, 102, 104, 106, 107

54Exponential growth, 11

55Extensive form game, 56

56Fallacy of composition, 22-25, 33, 127

57Framing effect, 78, 79, 80-81

58Game thoery, ii, 5-7, 14, 15, 24, 32-33, 38, 48, 50
evolutionary game theory, ii See also Mechanism design theory

59Game tree, 47-48, 51, 56, 61

60Grab-a-dollar game, 47, 60-61

61Great Depression, 45

62Habit formation, 64, 79, 109, 110, 127

63Hail Mary pass, 107

64Harrod-Domar model, 45

65Health club memberships, 95, 99

66Health insurance, 37-38

67Herding model, 86

68Homo economicus, 1, 2, 5, 63, 94

69Imagination, 91

70Impulsive behavior, 97

71Independence axiom. See Independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom

72Independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom, 101-102

73Inflation, 114-115

74Information set, 56-57

75Iterated dominance, 35

76Kandori-Mailath-Rob model, 44

77Laboratory experiment, 7, 30-31

78Learning, 61, 128
active, 113
passive, 113

79Learning theory, 59, 61, 63, 72, 77, 79, 99, 112-13, 118, 119, 122

80Level-k theory, 120-121, 128

81Logistic choice model, 68

82Loss aversion, 78, 80, 100

83Matching-pennies game, 69-70, 71, 72

84Matrix of payoffs, 23

85Mechanism design theory, 15

86Money illusion, 78, 83-84

87Nash equilibrium, 6-7, 8, 9, 10, 12-15, 17, 18, 24-25, 28, 29, 30-31, 34, 35, 44, 47, 49-50, 59, 60, 63, 67, 68-69, 73, 74, 77, 110, 117, 118-119, 120
and learning, 7
and randomization, 71
approximate, 64-65, 77
mixed strategy, 71, 72
pure strategy, 29 43
strict, 57

88Negative externality, 25

89Neuroscience, 123-127

90Noise traders, 75, 76, 121

91Non-cooperative equilibrium. See Nash equilibrium

92Non-cooperative game, 5

93No-trade theorem, 118-119

94Overconfidence, 84

95Panic, 125
financial, 39
market, 39

96Pareto efficiency, 34

97Payoffs. See Utility

98Perfect foresight, 6, 17, 42

99Perfect foresight equilibrium. See Competitive market clearing equilibrium

100Pigouvian tax, 25-27

101Pivotal-voter game, 7, 9-10, 66

102Political game, 26

103Poverty, 22, 86-87

104Precommitment, 50

105Present bias, 78, 93-97

106Present discounted value. See Present value

107Present value, 27, 29

108Price stickiness, 84

109Prisoner’s dilemma, 33-35, 39, 43, 51

110Prisoner’s dilemma and fallacy of composition, 22-25

111Probability distortion, 104

112Probability matching, 124

113Procrastination, 78, 91, 97-99

114Prospect theory, 78, 79, 80, 102, 104-107, 109

115Public goods, 24, 47, 53

116Quantal response equilibrium, 68-69, 71-72, 74, 76

117Quasi-hyperbolic discounting. See Discounting

118Rabin paradox, 78, 80, 102-104, 106, 108, 110

119Rational expectations equilibrium. See Competitive market clearing equilibrium

120Rational expectations model, 2, 40, 41, 54

121Recursive analysis. See Backward induction

122Reduction of compound lotteries axiom, 100-101

123Reference point, 104, 106-107, 109

124Reinforcement learning, 124

125Repeated game, 27-28, 30, 32 and definite ending, 28 and indefinite ending, 28

126Risk aversion, 102-104, 106, 108, 109

127Risk premium, 103

128Rush hour traffic game, 12-13, 26

129Satisficing, 64, 79

130Satisficing behavior, 64

131Schelling game. See Coordination game

132Self-commitment, 94-95

133Self-confirming equilibrium, 113-119 and economic crises, 115 and economic policy, 114 and social norms, 117

134Self-control, ii, 2, 96-97, 110

135Self-fulfilling prophecies, 41, 116n.

136Selten game, 48-50, 56 elaborated, 56-57

137Social preferences, 32, 82
fairness, 32
reciprocal altruism, 32
spite, 59

138Stackelberg game, 50-51

139Strategies, 28, 34, 35, 49-50, 56, 69, 70, 74, 110

140Subgame, 47-61, 67, 112, 114, 117

141Subgame confirmed equilibrium, 117

142Subgame perfect equilibrium, 47, 49, 56, 58, 61, 67, 113
and robustness, 55

143Suicide, 21-22, 128

144Superstition, 115-118

145Systematic bias, 85
above average, 84
emotions, 85
limited attention, 85
prior information, 85
social pressure, 86
understimate adaptation, 85

146Torture, 11-13

147Tough game, 35-36, 37

148altruistic, 35, 36

149Transitivity, 23, 100, 101

150Turing machine. See Universal Turing Machine

151Ultimatum bargaining game, 57, 66, 113

152Unbounded rationality, 1, 18, 19

153Unbounded selfishness, 1, 2

154United Airlines flight 93, 129

155Universal Turing Machine, 126

156Utility, 22, 23-25, 33, 36, 39, 69-70, 79, 88, 89, 101, 102, 105, 109

157Von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function, 101

158Voter turnout paradox, 7-8

159Voting theory, 7

160Willingness to accept, 59, 80, 81-82

161Willingness to pay, 17, 81, 86

162Winner’s curse, 69

163Zero sum game, 70

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