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The Battle of Konotop 1659

 | 
Oleg Rumyantsev
, 
Giovanna Brogi Bercoff

The Commonwealth’s position towards resumption of the Hadjach Union in 1660-1682

Mariusz Robert Drozdowski

Texte intégral

  • 1 Noteworthy in the wealth of literature on the subject of the hadjach Union: Tomkiewicz W., Unia Had (...)

1The Hadjach Union between the Commonwealth and Ukraine, declared on 16 September 1682 and solemnly ratified and sworn in May of the following year, turned the Commonwealth into a federation made up of the Kingdom of Poland, the grand Duchy of Lithuania and the grand Duchy of Rus’.1 The latter was to be a Cossack country comprising the voivodships of Bratslav, Chernihiv and Kyiv.

2The Hadjach Union gave rise to the «Commonwealth of Three Nations», which was to have a commonly-elected monarch, a sejm (Parliament) as well as a common foreign policy. A newly-emerged «Ruthenian Duchy» with its own judicial system as well as a separate administrative system was to be governed by a hetman of the Rus’ army accountable only to the king.

3Issues of confessional denomination were key to the resolutions behind the formation of the Union. The Cossacks’ opposition to the Church Union was unrelenting and led to the Hadjach resolutions including a clause about it being eliminated throughout the Crown lands and the grand Duchy of Lithuania. Moreover, the Orthodox metropolitan of Kyiv and five Orthodox bishops were guaranteed seats in the Commonwealth parliament. The Union also introduced equal civil rights between Orthodox and Roman Catholic believers.

4Despite being a work of indisputable political wisdom, the Hadjach Union remained a dead letter, responsibility for its failure being equally shared by both parties to the negotiations. However, its resolutions were later to become fundamental for further attempts to work out a new agreement between the Commonwealth and the Cossacks.

5This article aims to explain how the Commonwealth’s attitude to the idea of reviving the Hadjach Union evolved in the period mentioned.

*

6In Autumn 1659 certain fateful events took place in Ukraine: Ivan Vyhovs’kyj gave up the hetman’s mace (the bulava, the emblem of the hetman’s authority) and power passed into the hands of Jurij Khmel’nyts’kyj, whose main political action resulted in the resumption of the Perejaslav Agreement. This was the final blow for the Hadjach Agreement and it soon became clear that, in the given situation, conflict between the Commonwealth and Moscow was only a question of time.

  • 2 See Kubala L., Wojny duńskie i pokój oliwski 1657-1660, Lwów, 1922: 355-413.
  • 3 For more information about the mission of the Volhynian castellan, cf.: ibid., 382-385; Kroll P., O (...)
  • 4 P. Kroll, op. cit., 352.

7As early as November the Russian Army, under the command of Ivan Khovanskij, launched an offensive in Lithuania which led to the capture of Grodno (Hrodna) and Brest. Another Muscovite army, under the command of Vasilij Sheremet’ev, headed for Ukraine.2 On its part, the Polish Court declared war against’ Sweden: unable to launch any decisive military operations on the Russian front, the king tried to win over the Cossacks by means of agreements. The Volhynian castellan Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniawski was sent to Ukraine for negotiations. Despite considerable efforts, he failed to sever the link between the Cossacks and the Tsar3. As Piotr Kroll puts it: «The Cossacks, balancing between those two countries, trying to retain their self-reliance, had to stick to the Perejaslav resolutions because the Commonwealth was unable to defend itself on its own, hence, it could not help the Cossacks».4 Only after the end of the conflict with Sweden was the Commonwealth in a position to send significant military forces to the Ukrainian theatre of military operations.

  • 5 See Romański R., Cudnów 1660, Warszawa, 1996.
  • 6 Istorija ukraïns’koho kozatstva. Narysy v dvokh tomakh, vol. I, vidp. red. V. A. Smolij, Kyïv, 2006 (...)
  • 7 Wojna polsko-moskiewska pod Cudnowem odprawiona za panowania króla Jana Kazimierza pod wodzą Stanis (...)
  • 8 Kubala L., Wojny duńskie i pokój oliwski 1657-1660: 398.

8The defeat of Khmel’nyts’kyj’s Cossacks in Slobodyshche (Słobodyszcze) and the setback of Sheremet’ev’s troops in Chudniv (Cudnów)5 were decisive for the whole campaign, and for subsequent events: they made the superior officers of the right-bank Cossacks aware of the need to start negotiations with the Commonwealth.6 On the second day after the Chudniv victory of 15 October 1660, the colonel of Chyhyryn Petro Doroshenko reached the Polish camp with a letter from Jurij Khmel’nyts’kyj: the Cossack hetman declared his readiness to start immediate peace talks, promising to place himself once again under the protection of the Commonwealth7. Doroshenko also stated that the Cossacks were not enemies of Poland, and that their main reason for coming to Slobodyshche was to sever relationships between Tsytsjura and Moscow.8

  • 9 Wojna polsko-moskiewska: 92; Kroll P., Od ugody hadziackiej do Cudowna: 384.
  • 10 Wojna polsko-moskiewska: 93.

9On receiving the Crown hetmans’ permission to start negotiations, Cossack envoys came to the Chudniv Camp the very same day. Among others, the delegation included Mykola Khanenko, Ostap Hohol’, Hryhorij Leshnyts’kyj, Ivan Kravchenko and Herasym Kaplons’kyj.9 The delegates for negotiations on the Polish side were: the Bratslav voivode Michał Czartoryski, the Halych castellan Aleksander Cetner, the crown standard bearer Jan Sobieski, the Sandomierian master of the table (stolnik), Jan Szumowski and the L’viv (Lwów) standard bearer Andrzej Sokolnicki.10

  • 11 Ibid.

10The talks began in a friendly atmosphere with the Polish commissioners reassuring the participants that «nothing would be imposed that might be perceived by them [the Cossacks – MD] as difficult; they will retain their traditional freedoms and privileges, as they were granted to the Zaporizhian armies by the Kings and the Commonwealth according to the ancient law».11

  • 12 Ibid., 94.

11The situation changed diametrically, however, when the Cossack representatives realized that the intention was to restrict the Hadjach Agreement. As we can read in the report about the Polish-Moscow War, the Zaporizhians «[…] were adamant that it [the Hadjach Agreement] had to be maintained in its entirety and in every detail, because it had been confirmed by the sworn oath of the King and the Commonwealth».12 The negotiations came to an impasse caused by the reluctance of both sides to solve the conflict with a compromise. Hence, the Polish hetmans decided to call a council of all the senators, officials and representatives of senior commanding staff present.

  • 13 Volumina Legum, vol. III,ed. J. Ohryzko, Petersburg, 1859: 440
  • 14 «Przeto nie na pobłażaniu będącem u tego narodu w pogardzie, ale na krwi i zniszczeniu buntowników (...)

12It is worth noting that, to solve the Cossack question, the participants expressed the same two ideas that had divided the Commonwealth’s nobility for several decades. One idea, expressed by most of those taking part in the council, was that the Cossacks should be subdued by force and that their fight for independence should be viewed as a simple rebellion; this reflected the tradition of the 1638 constitution, which considered the Cossacks as «peasants who had turned into plebs» («chłopy obrócone w pospólstwo»).13 This part of the nobility felt outraged when the Cossacks, who had lost the war, mentioned some kind of rights: «Long-lasting peace – their representatives maintained – should not be based on mercy for them, because these people scorn mercy. It should be based on blood and on the destruction of the rebels. We have enough forces against Sheremet’ev and Khmel’nyts’kyj, as the latest battles with them have shown».14

  • 15 Ibid., 93.
  • 16 Kroll P., Od ugody hadziackiej do Cudowna: 385

13Only a minority was inclined to look for a policy of consensus, in search of new juridical solutions that could combine the specificity of the Cossack community with the statehood of the Commonwealth. Both crown hetmans Stanisław Potocki and Jerzy Lubomirski supported this option. They «showed neither arrogance nor bitterness», in spite of the bad results in war, they spoke of the Cossacks as «future companions in arms, born within the boundaries of the same kingdom and common defenders of the same fatherland».15 In their opinion it was better to win the Cossacks’ favour as this would strengthen the Commonwealth in the war with Moscow, enabling the exhausted Polish troops to spend the winter in Ukraine, thus improving their efficiency and military readiness16.

  • 17 Wojna polsko-moskiewska: 95.
  • 18 Ojczyste spominki w pismach do dziejów dawnej Polski, Diariusze, Relacje, Pamiętniki mogące do obja (...)

14The hetmans’ argumentation won, but, on the issue of recognizing the Hadjach Agreement as a whole, it was remarked that the situation was quite different from previous peace agreements, because this happened when the Cossacks revolted and broke the holy peace, to the great shame of the Commonwealth.17 These arguments were opposed to the expectations of the Cossack delegates. Two other points of the Chudniv agreement are worth noting: one stated that the Zaporizhian troops would abandon the Tsar’s protection and immediately proceed to take over the fortresses in Moscow’s hands; the other stated that the Polish hetmans would keep one or two Cossack regiments under their control in order to support the Commonwealth’s army near Chudniv18.

  • 19 «Commissią hadziacką tak iako się w sobie zawiera Ichmość PP hetmani przysiegą swoią potwierdzić ma (...)

15Finally, both sides agreed to sign an agreement restoring the Hadjach Agreement, except for the points that referred to creating a Duchy of Rus’ in the Ukrainian lands. That decision was up to the King.19

  • 20 The whole question related to the sejm is discussed by Ochman S., Sejmy lat 1661-1662. Przegrana ba (...)

16The sejm summoned in Warsaw on 2 May 1661, which was dominated by the fight to re-organize the country, also had to reconsider the issue of Ukraine20. Its fundamental task in this matter was to officially ratify the Chudniv Agreement and to pass a final resolution about the Duchy of Rus’.

  • 21 Wójcik Z., Traktat Andruszowski 1667 roku i jego geneza, Warszawa, 1959: 70.
  • 22 Ibid., 34; Wójcik Z., Rywalizacja polsko – tatarska o Ukrainę na przełomie lat 1660-1661, «Przegląd (...)
  • 23 The term indicates the man in charge of receiving complaints and petitions, and delivering them to (...)
  • 24 Morstin do Lubomirskiego, Smiechowice 23 marca 1661, Biblioteka Polskiej Nauk w Krakowie (in furthe (...)
  • 25 Ibid., 231.

17Indeed, settling relations with the Cossacks was a vital matter for the Polish court. The army was completely unreliable at that time, and the security of the state was becoming increasingly unstable. In such a situation, the only operative force in the war with Moscow had to be the Cossack regiments21. It was important to gain the Cossacks’ support to elect a new king vivente rege22, as many planned to do: a letter written to marshal Lubomirski by the Polish referendary23 Andrzej Morstin in March 1661 testifies to this issue24. In his letter he underlined that it was not true that the Queen had negotiated the reform of the voting system with the Cossacks, or that she had tried to persuade them to support the King’s designs. However, he wrote that the Cossacks would support the King’s ideas if they received confirmation about these points of the Hadjach agreement at the next parliamentary session.25

  • 26 «Circa approbationem Pactorum z Kozakami pilno Ichmość Panowie Posłowie attendent, aby tam co szkod (...)

18The battle for confirmation of the October 17 Agreement had already started in March at the regional councils before the debate in Parliament. A further analysis of the instructions given to the nobles’ deputies proves that the majority of the regional councils had given their consent to ratification, though with some restrictions. Overall, they advised the deputies to pay particular attention to its resolutions and to make sure that they did not violate the liberties and privileges of the nobility in any way. Indeed, the instruction of the średzko council of 28 March 1661 contains this characteristic clause: «Concerning the approbation of the Pacts with the Cossacks, the deputies should make sure that there is nothing that infringes our rights and liberties».26

  • 27 Ibid.
  • 28 Instruction of the Łęczyca voivodship from 28 March 1661, bpan Kr., MS 8327, Pawińskiego (in furthe (...)
  • 29 Instruction of the Lublin voivodship dated 28 March 1661, ibid., MS 8323, TP, n. 6: 218ff.
  • 30 Instruction of the Wołyń voivodship dated 28 March 1661, in: Arkhiv Jugo-Zapadnoj Rossii, izdavaemy (...)
  • 31 Instruction of the halych sejm dated 21 May 1661, Akta grodzkie i ziemskie z czasów Rzeczypospolite (...)

19Moreover, the deputies demanded that the lands of the Crown and of the nobles should not be given to the Cossacks, and that the prefectures and other lands seized by the Zaporizhians should be returned to their previous owers27. Similar demands were also included in the instruction of the councils of Łęczyca28, Lublin29, Luts’k30 and Halych.31

  • 32 Instruction of the general sejm of the Mazovian Duchy dated 28 April 1661, bpan Kr., MS 8334, TP, n (...)

20The Mazovian nobility had a different attitude to the Ukrainian problem. They felt that scaling down the oppression and exploitation of the Ukrainian population was the most effective way to stop new rebellions and they demanded that all the revenues from Ukraine should go into the State’s coffers.32

  • 33 Instruction of the Lublin voivodship dated 28 March 1661: 218
  • 34 «Lubo Rzpta rozlania krwie dalszemu w Ukrainie zabiegając paktami hadziackiemi pokój zawarła była, (...)

21Some local councils also referred to the question of changing the points with the Cossacks. The Lublinian nobility advocated: «moderatia or melioratia» of the Agreement on the condition that the sejm would consider this suitable.33 The Halych council justified the need to revise the Hadjach resolutions as a consequence of the latter having been violated by the Cossacks, who had taken up arms against the Commonwealth.34

  • 35 Instruction of the Wołyń voivodship dated 28 March 1661: 90.
  • 36 Instruction of the Kyiv voivodship dated 28 March 1661, AJuZR, Part 2, vol. II: 110.
  • 37 Instruction of the Wołyń voivodship dated 28 March 1661: 90.
  • 38 Quoted after Ochman S., Sejmy lat 1661-1662: 72.
  • 39 Among other things, the Cossacks demanded confirmation of the hadiach pacts, guaranteeing freedom o (...)
  • 40 Volumina Legum, vol. III: 357.

22The problem of the Duchy of Rus’ was raised in the instruction of the council of Luts’k35 and Zhytomyr36. The Volhynian nobility suggested trying to ignore the thorny problem of the Duchy of Rus’, unless this led to breaching the Agreement with the Cossacks.37 On their side, the Kyivan nobles expressed their agreement to liquidating the Duchy of Rus’, suggesting adequate compensation from the Polish Commonwealth. At the 1661 session of parliament only hieronim Wierzbowski, voivode of Brest and Kujawy, spoke about the Cossack issue. He reminded the house that the Cossacks had breached the resolutions of the previous sejm and suggested not ratifying the previous agreement with them.38 The deputies were also against the instructions that the Cossacks sent to the June 24 session of parliament.39 Finally, the sejm approved the Agreement of Chudniv, confirming the decisions of Hadjach, though one very important point was modified: the question of the Duchy of Rus’ was removed, never to be mentioned again.40

23Removing the most important point of the Hadjach Union ruled out any chance of a positive solution to the Ukrainian question. The Chudniv Agreement became a dead letter because most of the nobles cared more about their own positions and privileges than about any real chance of normalizing the situation in Ukraine and regaining the lands beyond the Dnipro.

*

  • 41 Kaczmarczyk J., Rzeczpospolita Trojga Narodów: 138.
  • 42 Chukhlib T., Hadjach 1658 roku ta ideja joho vidnovlennja v ukraïns’ko – pol’s’kykh stosunkakh (166 (...)

24In the opinion of Janusz Kaczmarek, the act ratifying the Chudniv Agreement was the final blow for the idea of the Commonwealth of Three Nations41. However, ensuing events showed that the modification of the Hadjach Union at the 1661 sejm did not mean the disappearance of the Hadjach idea of creating a «commonwealth» composed of three «peoples», a Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian federation. As Taras Chukhlib puts it, when all was said and done, the majority of the Cossack officers still demanded that the Zaporizhian Army be considered the third part of the Commonwealth along with the grand Duchy of Lithuania. They also demanded that the full privileges of the great ‘Prince’ of Rus’ (kniaz’ ruski) should be left in the hands of the leader of the Cossack Ukraine, i. e. the hetman.42

25The Cossack hetmans’ numerous attempts to return to the provisions of the Hadjach Union demonstrate the correctness of this thesis.

  • 43 Instructia na seym walny Warszawski, w roku 1664 dana ode mnie, hetmana, y wszytkiego Woyska je° Kr (...)

26A new proposal to settle political relations between Chyhyryn and Warsaw is testified by an instruction given to the Cossack deputies for the ordinary session of the Warsaw parliament in Autumn 166443. Many of its points were very similar to the Hadjach provisions, especially where «the Freedom of the Army» was concerned. Among other things, the Zaporizhians demanded that all the churches and foundations in Poland and in the grand Duchy of Lithuania should be returned to the Orthodox Church (point 3). The metropolitan of Kyiv was to be chosen by Orthodox believers (point 6), and privileges should be granted to «Kyiv academies and schools» (point 8). In addition (point 10) the deputies asked for permission to establish an academy in Mohylew (Mahilëŭ), they demanded that the houses and farm-owners should have the same privileges as the szlachta in the Crown and great Principality of Lithuania, and that a soldier who dared to trespass into a Cossack property was to be judged as an aggressor (point 16). They also postulated that Cossack courts should be independent and that «free election» (libera electio) of the hetman should be registered by common law. A newly-elected hetman was to be confirmed by the king, who had the right to appoint his own candidate: the latter was to be chosen from the Zaporizhian Army (point 23).

  • 44 See Kłaczewski W., W przededniu wojny domowej w Polsce. Walka sejmowa lat 1664-1665, Lublin, 1984.
  • 45 Quoted after Dąbrowski J. S., Polskie elity wobec Kozaczyzny oraz Moskwy w latach 1661- 1668, «Stud (...)

27The sejm of 1664/65 was so overwhelmed with the problems provoked by the conflict with Jerzy Lubomirski44 that it failed to consider the Cossack problem. Only after Piotr Telefus broke the sejm, did the Cossack deputies present their postulates at an official audience, which failed to find agreement between all the deputies. A note made by one of its participants relates that the Cossacks mentioned «the Orthodox Church, the Academy and many other matters distant from one another».45

  • 46 Instruktia wyraźna od nas wszystkiej starszyzny, oboźnego, sędziów generalnych, pisarza i asawułów, (...)

28Again, the vitality of the Hadjach idea in the mind of the Cossack officials is testified by an instruction with which the representatives of the Zaporizhian Army arrived in Warsaw at the first ordinary sejm of that year in March 1666. Connections with the Agreement from 1658 are suggested not only by its structure, but also by the order of the postulates included.46

  • 47 Perdenia J., Hetman Piotr Doroszenko a Polska, Kraków, 2000: 87-93; Chukhlib T., Hadjach 1658 roku: (...)

29Thus the first six points concerned safeguarding the common rights of the Orthodox Church: the Cossacks demanded the elimination of the Brest Union, the restitution of the Church in Lublin to Orthodox believers and the guarantee of seats in the Senate for the Kyivan metropolitan and bishops. Points 7-8 defined the status of the «Kyiv schools», the next points (9-10, 12) postulated a restoration of privileges and liberties for the Zaporizhian Army, point 11 referred to the Cossack register, in point 12 it was demanded that the Cossacks living in his Majesty’s lands, noble and spiritual, should not suffer in liberties or in property (nulla praeiudicia oppressionem et calamitates) on the part of heirs, prefects and tenants. Point 14 defined the status of the Cossack hetman, and finally point 18 postulated that the Chyhyryn prefecture, in its former size and with its former appendages, should be confirmed by a new privilege and by the constitution as the seat for symbol of power, the mace (bulava).47

  • 48 Dąbrowski J. S., Polskie elity wobec Kozaczyzny oraz Moskwy: 82.
  • 49 Ibid.
  • 50 Krykun M., Instrukcija poslam vijs’ka zaporoz’koho: 320-349.

30Again, the sejm summoned in the spring of 1666 failed to pay due attention to the Cossack question. Only the Sandomierian castellan Stanisław Witowski pleaded to stop the internal fight, so that the King could later direct all his forces against the rebellious Cossacks and force them into obedience, in order to be able to move against Moscow.48 On 18 April Cossack envoys read their instruction in the Senate. In addition to the desiderata included, they demanded the withdrawal of Polish garrisons from Ukrainian towns and the nobility from their lands. The Poles’ response was to assure the Cossacks that their due rights would be recognized and that a commission would be sent to consider their postulates.49 Equally vague was Jan Kazimierz’s answer concerning the Cossacks’ requests included in the instruction. Claiming that he lacked the proper powers to satisfy their requests, he promised to propose them again in the following sejm.50

  • 51 For further information on the Pidhajci Campaign see Majewski W., Podhajce – letnia jesienna kampan (...)
  • 52 Pisma do wieku i spraw Jana Sobieskiego, vol. I, Part 1, Acta Historica res gestas Poloniaestrantia (...)

31Only the defeat of the Tatars, who were allied with the Cossacks, at Pidhajtsi (Pol. Podhajce) in 166751 led to the signing of a temporary treaty, which normalized relations between the Commonwealth and the Cossacks. The analysis of the content of the Pidhajtsi agreement, signed on 19 October between the hetman Doroshenko and the great marshal and Polish field hetman, allows us to find references to the Hadjach resolutions. Sobieski agreed that «the Cossacks and their futor-farms should be free» and undertook not to allow the Polish army to enter any towns or villages «where Cossacks belonging to the Zaporizhian Army live».52

  • 53 Wójcik Z., Jan Sobieski 1629-1696: 144

32It is worth noting that the Commonwealth recognized the Cossacks’ right to exert power over the territory which in fact was under the rule of Petro Doroshenko. However, Sobieski did not have full powers to satisfy the Cossacks’ demands. Hence, any future question or postulate was to be settled later, during the next sejm. As Zbigniew Wójcik puts it, this was «another document destined to remain worthless in the long run, once again empty words, which were not supposed to be kept».53

  • 54 Matwijów M., Ostatnie sejmy przed abdykacją Jana Kazimierza 1667 i 1668, Wrocław, 1992: 116.

33The victory won by the hetman Sobieski over the Tartars and the Cossacks at Pidhajtsi and the ensuing treaty were received with satisfaction by the nobility, as shown by the regional councils held in średzko, Proszowice, Lublin, Warsaw and Łomża. Only the Szadków council forbade its representatives to give their approval in case the articles contained «some nuisance for the Republic» («co nocivum Reipublicae było»).54

  • 55 Ibid., 125.
  • 56 Dąbrowski J. S., Polskie elity wobec Kozaczyzny oraz Moskwy: 89ff.

34The ordinary sejm assembled in Warsaw on Tuesday 24 January 1668. The deputy chancellor Andrzej Olszowski recommended appeasing the Cossacks and trying to get them into serving the Commonwealth by giving Doroshenko the insignia of the hetmanship and endowing him with the district of Chyhyryn. The parliament however, completely failed to address the Cossack problem.55 Chancellor Olszowski insisted that it was crucial to come to an agreement with the Cossacks because of «the Tatars’ suspecta fides», but his words fell on deaf ears. Only after the sejm, at the state council, was the question of how to keep the Cossacks in obedience actually discussed. In the end, Sobieski only managed to obtain an agreement for setting up a committee in which Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski56 was to take part.

  • 57 Instrukcja od Doroszenki i wojska zaporoskiego dana na sejm koronacyjny do króla i stanów posłom Iw (...)

35Meanwhile Doroshenko reinforced his power on the right-bank Ukraine and sent envoys for the coronation sejm of 1669: they were to demand acceptance of the postulates that had been sent already for the election council. Their content indicates that the Cossacks’ intention was to restore the Hadjach Agreement.57

  • 58 Perdenia J., Hetman Piotr Doroszenko a Polska: 192
  • 59 A detailed analysis of the instruction was made by J. Perdenia, ibid., 218-222.

36Doroshenko’s envoys arrived when the sejm had already ended, so the Cossacks’ petitions were examined by the senate council. The latter decided to appoint a committee to meet their demands.58 The members of the committee, however, were not appointed until after the sejm held in Spring 1670. The members included, among others, the voivode and commandant of Chernihiv Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski, the castellan of Wołyń and Puńsk, the starosta of the Lipnica district Jan Franciszek Lubowiecki, the Kyiv stolnik (responsible for serving the royal table) Jerzy Maniecki, the judge (podsędek) of Kyiv Jan Olizar, the marshal of Upick Krzysztof Białozor and the starosta of the districts of Bratslav and Sinnica Stefan Piaseczyński. They were provided with an instruction containing clear references to the Hadjach resolutions, but the main points offered few chances of any positive consideration of the Cossacks’ key requests.59 The talks started on 3rd May in Ostróg. The Cossacks were represented by the military judge Herman Hapanovych and the general scribe Michajlo Vozhevych.

  • 60 Cf. «Rozkaz ode mnie hetmana i całego wojska do Michała Wujechowicza (Wożewicz) generalnego pisarza (...)
  • 61 Ibid.

37The instruction prepared by Doroshenko for the Ostróg committee consisted of 24 points.60 These basically resumed the points of the two previous documents, but put greater emphasis on the need to fulfill the conditions of the Hadjach Agreement. As they had already done twelve years before, the Cossacks demanded that the Commonwealth respect their rights to practice the Orthodox religion without restrictions wherever the Ukrainian language was spoken, that it recognize state institutions, centres of education, and the demarcation of the territory for the Zaporizhian army within the boundaries of the voivodships of Kyiv, Bratslav and Chernihiv.61

  • 62 Pisma do wieku i spraw Jana Sobieskiego: 526
  • 63 Wójcik Z., Między traktatem andruszowskim a wojną turecką. Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie 1667-1672, War (...)

38These demands made it impossible for the negotiations to succeed. Attempts to exert pressure on Doroshenko by attacking the town of Bila Tserkva in the Kyiv province were fruitless, as was the advice given by hetman Sobieski, whose envoy Olszowski suggested preparing the forces needed to continue the war with the Cossacks.62 The Commonwealth did not want to give up Ukraine, but neither did it prepare an appropriate army to take it by force. The Polish government chose a third way, namely starting talks with the hetman Mykhajlo Khanenko.63

  • 64 Ibid.

39On 2 September 1670 an agreement was reached that ensured that the Cossacks would return to the Commonwealth fold, that they would not seek «protection» from another foreign monarch, send envoys without the king’s consent or raise any rebellions; moreover, the nobility and the clergy were to get back all their properties in Ukraine. In return for agreeing to these conditions, the Cossacks were granted religious freedom, recognition of their previous rights and free election of their hetman.64 This agreement was confirmed by the sejm in autumn 1670. From the Cossacks’ point of view, it was a clear defeat and, as a consequence, it radicalized divisions and increased conflicts within Ukraine.

  • 65 Quoted after Perdenia J., Hetman Piotr Doroszenko a Polska: 410

40The idea of settling relations between the Cossacks and the Commonwealth on the basis of the Hadjach resolutions was revived, along with the election of Jan Sobieski to the Polish throne. The new king managed to win back most of right-bank Ukraine at the end of 1674. This greatly influenced Doroshenko’s position. The concrete threat of losing the command of the hetmanate forced him to start conciliatory steps with Sobieski. In a letter of November 1674 the Cossack hetman asked for protection for Ukraine and her inhabitants.65 The Polish camp, however, was soon weakened by the desertion of the Grand Hetman of Lithuania Michał Kazimierz Pac. At the same time talks with Moscow about the possibility of bringing together their troops proceeded very slowly in Andrusovo (Andruszów) and induced Sobieski to start negotiations with the Cossacks.

  • 66 Cf.: Punkta główniejsze przez które wojsko wszystkiego, imieniem wszystkiego narodu ruskiego wolnoś (...)

41Talks between the Orthodox bishop of L’viv Josyp Shumljans’kyj (Józef Szumlański) and the podstoli (a deputy serving for the royal table) of Chełm Stanisław Morsztyn were held in Chyhyryn. They mainly concentrated on the issue of the demarcation of territorial and political borders which were to be reallocated from the whole of the Commonwealth,66 for the Ukrainian hetmanate. The points were based on the conditions of the agreements of Zborowiec (1649), Hadjach (1658) and Chudniv (1660).

  • 67 Ibid., 25.
  • 68 Ibid., 26ff.

42Besides denominational matters concerning the request to convert members of the Uniate Church to Catholicism, the key point was the demand to restrict the territory of Ukraine to the voivodships of Kyiv, Bratslav and Chernihiv.67 The fact that the latter and most of Kyiv were subordinated to the Russian Tsar made the Cossacks’ demands unrealistic. Moreover, Doroshenko demanded an amnesty, the destruction of any resolution and letter violating the freedom of the nation of Rus’, confirmation of Cossack and Orthodox privileges, the withdrawal of the garrison from Bila Tserkva, the installation of a Cossack garrison in Kyiv and the return of the Metropolitanate’s cannons and liturgical objects.68

  • 69 Respons na punkta, pod imieniem wojska J. K. M. P. N. M. rycerskiego podane, ibid.,

43Most of the Cossacks’ requests were clearly unacceptable and were de facto refused. However, considering the serious threat of a Russian invasion in Ukraine, Sobieski decided against breaking off the negotiations. In his answer sent to Chyhyryn, he underlined his favourable disposition towards the Cossacks, promised further support for their demands and declared that the whole issue would be discussed at the coronation sejm.69

  • 70 Chukhlib T., Het’mani i Monarxy. Ukraïns’ka deržava v mižnarodnix vidnosinax 1648-1714, Kyïv/Nju Jo (...)
  • 71 Chukhlib T., Ukraïna ta Pol’sha pid čas pravlinnja korolja Jana Sobes’koho. Polky vtračenoho miru, (...)

44It is worth noting that from that time on, Jan III lost all hope of finding a solution to the ‘Ukrainian question’, compatible with the interests of the Commonwealth with hetman Doroshenko. Ignoring the fact that Doroshenko was still the ‘legal’ hetman of right-bank Ukraine, the king very soon (4 April 1675) nominated colonel Ostap Hohol’ as the appointed (nakazny) Cossack hetman.70 In February 1676 Hohol’ took part in the celebration of Sobieski’s coronation, during which he was made a noble, along with most of the Cossack officers.71

  • 72 Perdenia J., Stanowisko Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej wobec spraw Ukrainy na przełomie XVII -XVIII (...)
  • 73 Wojtasik J., «Wojsko JKMci i Rzplitej zaporoskie» w dobie króla Jana III Sobieskiego, in: Od Żółkie (...)

45During the coronation sejm, there was a debate about how to keep the Cossacks at the service of the Commonwealth. The king presented his plan for the defense of the country against the Turks. On a secret session of the two houses he proposed using the Jewish capitation tax (which was previously assigned for the purchase of fur coats for the Tatars) to pay the Cossack companies (sotny).72 In order to reinforce ties between the Cossacks and the Commonwealth, Sobieski addressed the Zaporizhians with a promise to observe and to confirm the Cossacks’ former liberties.73

  • 74 Quoted after Perdenia J., op. cit., 17.

46His generosity towards the Cossacks appears to have stemmed not only from the need to reinforce the Polish army with Cossack detachments, but also from Sobieski’s plan to increase the influence of the Commonwealth in the regions beyond the Dnipro, in the hope of winning back the left-bank territories lost in 1667: «Kozaków zaporoskich zdało się także w służbie zatrzymać – the senate resolution said – nie tylko, że ich usus w obozach ale ut representem dominium Rzeczypospolitej w Ukrainie».74

  • 75 Chukhlib T., Het’mani i Monarxy: 281.

47Sobieski felt that a conflict with the Ottoman Empire was inevitable. Therefore he increased his efforts to solve the question of the Cossacks. In July 1682 he sent his courtier Bazyli Iskrzycki (Vasyl’Iskryts’kyj) to Dymir. Iskrzycki’s task was to encourage the Cossacks, who had had no hetman for over three years after Hohol’s death in 1679, to call a council to discuss whether they should offer their help to the Polish king in the fight against the Turks. Following the instructions of the king, Iskrzycki promised not only to restore all the former liberties and privileges of the Cossacks, but also to grant equality for the «greek religion».75

  • 76 Wójcik Z., Jan Sobieski 1629-1696: 307.

48The plans to settle relations between the Commonwealth and the Cossacks were based on the agreements of 1658 or 1660. However, they had one fundamental flaw: they lacked any idea of independence for Ukraine and definitively nullified the Hadjach concept of the Commonwealth of Three Nations.76 The attempts made from the late 1660s to restore the Hadjach Union were doomed to fail. In the end, the decisions taken by most of the nobles failed to win over even those of the Cossack officers who were more inclined to cooperate with the Commonwealth. Blinded by their own selfishness, the leading nobles failed to recognize the need to acknowledge the liberties and rights that the Cossacks had gained through the Hadjach pacts, which had made them partners and ‘co-owners’ of the Commonwealth. The aristocratic government only ever consented to an agreement with the Cossacks when they were under threat and, even then, in the most restricted terms possible. Thus, they were increasingly inclined to settle Polish-Cossack relations according to pre-1648 rules.

Notes

1 Noteworthy in the wealth of literature on the subject of the hadjach Union: Tomkiewicz W., Unia Hadziacka, «Sprawy Narodowościowe», Warszawa, 1938; Kot S., Jerzy Niemirycz w 300 - lecie Ugody Hadziackiej, Paryż, 1960; Wójcik Z., Dzikie Pola w ogniu. O Kozaczyźnie w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej, Warszawa, 1961: 224-232; idem, Jan Kazimierz Waza, Wrocław/Warszawa/Kraków, 2004: 145n; Tazbir J., Jerzy Niemirycz (1612-1659), in: Polski Słownik Biograficzny (in further mentions – PSB), vol. xxii, Wrocław/Kraków, 1977: 811-816; idem, The Political Reversal of Jurij Nemyryc, «harvard Ukrainian Studies» (in further mentions – hus), 1981, vol. V, n. 3: 306-319; Kamiński A., The Cossack Experiment in Szlachta Democracy in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Hadiach (Hadziacz) Union, hus, 1977, vol. I, n. 3: 173-197; Kościałkowski S., Ugoda Hadziacka. W trzechsetną rocznicę: 1658-1958, in: Alma Mater Vilnensis. Prace spoleczności Akademickiej Uniwersytetu Stefana Batorego na obczyźnie. Prace zebrane, Opr. S. Koscialkowski, K. Okulicz, B. Podolski, A. Urbański, W. Wielhorski, Londyn, 1958; Kaczmarczyk J., Hadziacz 1658 – kolejna ugoda czy nowa unia?, in: «Warszawskie Zeszyty Ukrainoznawcze» (in further mentions – WZU), vol. II: Spotkania polsko-ukraińskie. Studia Ucrainica, S. Kozak (ed.), Warszawa, 1994: 35-40; idem, Rzeczpospolita Trojga Narodów. Mit czy rzeczywistość. Ugoda hadziacka – teoria i praktyka, Kraków, 2007; Chynczewska-hennel T., Od Unii Brzeskiej do Unii Hadziackiej – dzieje porażki czy szansy, WZU, vol. IV-V, Warszawa, 1997: 105-117, idem, Idea unii hadziackiej – pięćdziesiąt lat później, «Kwartalnik historyczny», 2002, vol. cix: 135-146; Mironowicz A., Prawosławie i unia za panowania Jana Kazimierza, Białystok, 1997: 149-189; Kroll P., Od ugody hadziackiej do Cudowna. Kozaczyzna między Rzecząpospolitą a Moskwą w latach 1658-1660, Warszawa, 2008; 350-lecie Unii Hadziackiej (1658-2008), pod red. T. Chynczewskiejhennel, P. Krolla i M. Nagielskiego, Warszawa, 2008; Kostomarov N., Getmanstvo Vyhovskogo, Sankt Peterburg, 1862; herasymchuk V., Vyhovshchyna i hadjats’kyj traktat, (« Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva imeni Shevchenka ”, lxxxvii-lxxxix) (in further mentions – ZNTSh), 1909: 5-36, 23-50, 46-90; Pritsak O., Concerning the Union of Hadjac (1658), hus, 1978, vol. II, n. 2: 116-118; Pernal A. B., The Union of Hadiach (1658) in the Light of Polish Historiography, in: Millennium of Christianity in Ukraine 988-1988, Winnipeg, 1989: 117-192; Lypyns’kyj V., Ukraïna na perelomi, 1657-1659. Zamitky do istoriï ukraïns’koho derzhavnoho budivnytstva v XVII-im stolitti, Filadel’fija, Skhidnojevropejs’kyj doslidnyj instytut im V. K. Lypyns’koho, 1991; Płochij S., Między Rusią a Sarmacją „ unarodowienie” Kozaczyzny ukraińskiej w xvii-xviii w, in: Między sobą, szkice historyczne polsko-ukraińskie, T. Chynczewska-hennel, N. Jakowenko (eds.), Lublin, Instytut Europy środkowo-Wschodniej, 2000: 161-164; Jakovleva T., Het’manshchyna v druhij polovyni 50-kh rokiv XVII stolittja. Prychyny i pochatok Ruïny, Kyïv, Osnovy, 1998: 305-320; Hadjats’ka unija 1658 roku, red P. Sokhan’, Kyïv, 2008.

2 See Kubala L., Wojny duńskie i pokój oliwski 1657-1660, Lwów, 1922: 355-413.

3 For more information about the mission of the Volhynian castellan, cf.: ibid., 382-385; Kroll P., Od ugody hadziackiej do Cudowna: 347-352.

4 P. Kroll, op. cit., 352.

5 See Romański R., Cudnów 1660, Warszawa, 1996.

6 Istorija ukraïns’koho kozatstva. Narysy v dvokh tomakh, vol. I, vidp. red. V. A. Smolij, Kyïv, 2006: 259.

7 Wojna polsko-moskiewska pod Cudnowem odprawiona za panowania króla Jana Kazimierza pod wodzą Stanisława Potockiego, wojewody krakowskiego i Jerzego Lubomirskiego, marszałka koronnego w roku pańskim 1660, trans. by A. hniłko, Warszawa, 1922: 91.

8 Kubala L., Wojny duńskie i pokój oliwski 1657-1660: 398.

9 Wojna polsko-moskiewska: 92; Kroll P., Od ugody hadziackiej do Cudowna: 384.

10 Wojna polsko-moskiewska: 93.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., 94.

13 Volumina Legum, vol. III,ed. J. Ohryzko, Petersburg, 1859: 440

14 «Przeto nie na pobłażaniu będącem u tego narodu w pogardzie, ale na krwi i zniszczeniu buntowników należałoby budować trwały pokój. Jest bowiem dosyć sił i na Szeremeta i na Chmielnickiego, czego świeżym dowodem były walki z obydwoma» (Wojna polsko-moskiewska: 94).

15 Ibid., 93.

16 Kroll P., Od ugody hadziackiej do Cudowna: 385

17 Wojna polsko-moskiewska: 95.

18 Ojczyste spominki w pismach do dziejów dawnej Polski, Diariusze, Relacje, Pamiętniki mogące do objaśnienia dziejów krajowych, tudzież listy historyczne do panowania królów Jana Kazimierza i Michała Korybuta oraz listy Jana Sobieskiego marszałka i hetmana wielkiego koronnego, z rękopisów zebrane przez Ambrożego grabowskiego, vol. I, Kraków, 1845: 166.

19 «Commissią hadziacką tak iako się w sobie zawiera Ichmość PP hetmani przysiegą swoią potwierdzić maią. Te zaś punkta które do xsięstwa Ruskiego w niey należą, że się y Wolnością Woiska Zaporowskiego mniej potrzebne znayduią y pokoiu wiecznego stałości którego sobie zobopólnie od Pana Boga szczerze życzemi mniey służące są, poprzysięga w zaiemnie Jego Mść Pan hetman Zaporowski z Woiskiem że przez Pułkowników swoich do Jego Kr. Mści odeszli, y one łaskawej Oycowskiey ręce podda» (Kaczmarczyk J., Działo się w obozie pod Cudnowem dnia 17 Octobra Anno 1660, in: Z dziejów Europy Środkowo – Wschodniej. A commemorative book presented to prof. dr hab. Władysławowi A. Serczykowi for his 60th birthday, E. Urwanowicz, A. Mironowicz i h. Parafianowicz (eds.), Białystok, 1995: 222).

20 The whole question related to the sejm is discussed by Ochman S., Sejmy lat 1661-1662. Przegrana batalia o reformę ustroju Rzeczypospolitej, Wrocław, 1977.

21 Wójcik Z., Traktat Andruszowski 1667 roku i jego geneza, Warszawa, 1959: 70.

22 Ibid., 34; Wójcik Z., Rywalizacja polsko – tatarska o Ukrainę na przełomie lat 1660-1661, «Przegląd historyczny», 1954, vol. xlv: 626.

23 The term indicates the man in charge of receiving complaints and petitions, and delivering them to the chancellors who presented them to the king.

24 Morstin do Lubomirskiego, Smiechowice 23 marca 1661, Biblioteka Polskiej Nauk w Krakowie (in further mentions – bpan Kr.), ms 1065: 229-232.

25 Ibid., 231.

26 «Circa approbationem Pactorum z Kozakami pilno Ichmość Panowie Posłowie attendent, aby tam co szkodliwego prawom i swobodom niestanyło naszym» (Instruction of the średzko voivodship from 28 March 1661, Biblioteka im. Raczyńskich w Poznaniu [in further mentions – BRacz.], MS 231, vol. II: 15).

27 Ibid.

28 Instruction of the Łęczyca voivodship from 28 March 1661, bpan Kr., MS 8327, Pawińskiego (in further mentions – TP), n. 10: 866.

29 Instruction of the Lublin voivodship dated 28 March 1661, ibid., MS 8323, TP, n. 6: 218ff.

30 Instruction of the Wołyń voivodship dated 28 March 1661, in: Arkhiv Jugo-Zapadnoj Rossii, izdavaemyj Vremennoj komissiej dlja razbora drevnikh aktov, vysochajshe utverzhdennoj pri Kievskom voennom, podol’skom i volynskom general-gubernatore (in further mentions – AJuZR), Part 2, vol. II, Kiev, 1888: 86-105.

31 Instruction of the halych sejm dated 21 May 1661, Akta grodzkie i ziemskie z czasów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z archiwum tzw. bernardyńskiego we Lwowie (in further mentions – agz), vol. xxiv: Lauda sejmikowe halickie 1575 – 1695, Lwów, A. Prochaska Press, 1931, n. 110: 176.

32 Instruction of the general sejm of the Mazovian Duchy dated 28 April 1661, bpan Kr., MS 8334, TP, n. 17: 154.

33 Instruction of the Lublin voivodship dated 28 March 1661: 218

34 «Lubo Rzpta rozlania krwie dalszemu w Ukrainie zabiegając paktami hadziackiemi pokój zawarła była, iż jednak maior stąd crescit belli molles a chciwa do buntów rebellizantów porywczość wzgardziwszy Reipublice benefficio sumpsit arma przeciwko panu i ojczyźnie […]», Instruction of the halych sejm dated 21 May 1661: 176.

35 Instruction of the Wołyń voivodship dated 28 March 1661: 90.

36 Instruction of the Kyiv voivodship dated 28 March 1661, AJuZR, Part 2, vol. II: 110.

37 Instruction of the Wołyń voivodship dated 28 March 1661: 90.

38 Quoted after Ochman S., Sejmy lat 1661-1662: 72.

39 Among other things, the Cossacks demanded confirmation of the hadiach pacts, guaranteeing freedom of Orthodox worship and the cancellation of the Union, guaranteeing liberties and rights to «the nation of Rus’», amnesty for the soldiers and everyone in the Cossack army, and an increase in the register to 70,000 men. See: Archiwum główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Branickich z Suchej, n. 124/147: 114-116; Ochman S., op. cit., 56ff; Istorija ukraïns’koho kozactva: 261.

40 Volumina Legum, vol. III: 357.

41 Kaczmarczyk J., Rzeczpospolita Trojga Narodów: 138.

42 Chukhlib T., Hadjach 1658 roku ta ideja joho vidnovlennja v ukraïns’ko – pol’s’kykh stosunkakh (1660-ti – pochatok 1680-kh rr.), Kyïv, 2008: 24.

43 Instructia na seym walny Warszawski, w roku 1664 dana ode mnie, hetmana, y wszytkiego Woyska je° Kr. Mci Zaporoskiego posłom naszym p. p. Michayłowi Radkiewiczowi, oboźnemu generalnemu, Samuelowi Frydrychowiczowi, pułkownikowi Białocerkiewskiemu, Swientosławowi Krzywickiemu, pisarzowi Woyska je° Kr. Mci Zaporoskiego, w obozie pod Lisianką, mca nouembra dnia trzydziestego, Biblioteka Muzeum Narodowego im. Czartoryskich w Krakowie (in further mentions – BCz), MS 402: 545-586; see also horobets’V., Elita kozats’koï Ukraïny v poshukakh politychnoï lehitymatsiï: stosunky z Moskvoju ta Varshavoju, 1654-1665, Kyïv, 2001: 422-443; Chukhlib T., op. cit., 25n; Drozd J., Stosunek polskich elit do «propolskiej» orientacji w łonie Kozaczyzny za czasów hetmaństwa Pawła Tetery, in: Od Zborowa do NATO (1649-2009). Studia z dziejów stosunków polsko-ukraińskich od xvii do xxi wieku. Monografia naukowa – Historia, red. M. Franz, K. Pietkiewicz, Toruń, 2009: 221-223.

44 See Kłaczewski W., W przededniu wojny domowej w Polsce. Walka sejmowa lat 1664-1665, Lublin, 1984.

45 Quoted after Dąbrowski J. S., Polskie elity wobec Kozaczyzny oraz Moskwy w latach 1661- 1668, «Studia historyczne», 2001, r. xliv: 580.

46 Instruktia wyraźna od nas wszystkiej starszyzny, oboźnego, sędziów generalnych, pisarza i asawułów, pułkowników, atamanii, towarzystwa i czerni wojska jkm wiernie przychylnego zapor. teraz z jednostajnej rady naszej Łysiańskiej, zwołana na 22 II 1666 r. na sejm niniejszy do Naj. jkmpnm i wszystkiej Rzpltej posłom naszym powierzona, BCz, MS 402: 615-634; Krykun M., Instrukcija poslam vijs’ka zaporoz’koho na varshavs’kyj sejm1 666 roku i vidpovid’korolja Jana Kazymyra na neï, «Ukraïna Moderna», 1997-1998, ch. 2-3, Lviv, 1999: 311-349.

47 Perdenia J., Hetman Piotr Doroszenko a Polska, Kraków, 2000: 87-93; Chukhlib T., Hadjach 1658 roku: 28-29.

48 Dąbrowski J. S., Polskie elity wobec Kozaczyzny oraz Moskwy: 82.

49 Ibid.

50 Krykun M., Instrukcija poslam vijs’ka zaporoz’koho: 320-349.

51 For further information on the Pidhajci Campaign see Majewski W., Podhajce – letnia jesienna kampania 1667 r., «Studia i Materiały do historii Wojskowości», 1960, vol. iv, Part 1: 47-93; Wójcik Z., Jan Sobieski 1629-1696, Warszawa, 1983: 130-150.

52 Pisma do wieku i spraw Jana Sobieskiego, vol. I, Part 1, Acta Historica res gestas Poloniaestrantia ab anno 1507 usque ad annum 1795, vol. II, Kraków, F. Kulczycki Press, 1880: 291.

53 Wójcik Z., Jan Sobieski 1629-1696: 144

54 Matwijów M., Ostatnie sejmy przed abdykacją Jana Kazimierza 1667 i 1668, Wrocław, 1992: 116.

55 Ibid., 125.

56 Dąbrowski J. S., Polskie elity wobec Kozaczyzny oraz Moskwy: 89ff.

57 Instrukcja od Doroszenki i wojska zaporoskiego dana na sejm koronacyjny do króla i stanów posłom Iwanu Demidenku byłemu oboźnemu wojskowemu i Sawie Kowielskiemu pisarzowi czerkaskiemu r. 1669 oktobra 3 dnia do Warszawy wyprawionym dano, BCz, MS 402: 677-684.

58 Perdenia J., Hetman Piotr Doroszenko a Polska: 192

59 A detailed analysis of the instruction was made by J. Perdenia, ibid., 218-222.

60 Cf. «Rozkaz ode mnie hetmana i całego wojska do Michała Wujechowicza (Wożewicz) generalnego pisarza wojskowego, hermana hapanowicza byłego sędziego wojskowego i z nimi różnych ludzi pułkowych na komisję wyznaczoną w Ostrogu zgodnie z radą wojskową posłanym posłom i komisarzom naszym do rozmów z komisarzami polskimi od króla, Rzptej i W. Ks. Lit. 10 V 1670 r.», in: Akty, otnosjashchiesja k istorii Juzhnoj i Zapadnoj Rossii sobrannye i izdannye Arkheograficheskoj Komissieju, vol. ix, Sankt Peterburg, 1887: 196-208.

61 Ibid.

62 Pisma do wieku i spraw Jana Sobieskiego: 526

63 Wójcik Z., Między traktatem andruszowskim a wojną turecką. Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie 1667-1672, Warszawa, 1968: 250.

64 Ibid.

65 Quoted after Perdenia J., Hetman Piotr Doroszenko a Polska: 410

66 Cf.: Punkta główniejsze przez które wojsko wszystkiego, imieniem wszystkiego narodu ruskiego wolności dopraszając się, do powinnego Panu poddaństwa przystąpić chce, Woliński J., Jan III a sprawa Ukrainy 1674-1675, off-print from „ Sprawy Narodowościowe”, r. VIII, n. 4, Warszawa, 1934: 23-27.

67 Ibid., 25.

68 Ibid., 26ff.

69 Respons na punkta, pod imieniem wojska J. K. M. P. N. M. rycerskiego podane, ibid.,

70 Chukhlib T., Het’mani i Monarxy. Ukraïns’ka deržava v mižnarodnix vidnosinax 1648-1714, Kyïv/Nju Jork, 2003: 178.

71 Chukhlib T., Ukraïna ta Pol’sha pid čas pravlinnja korolja Jana Sobes’koho. Polky vtračenoho miru, «Ukraïns’kyj Istoryčnyj Žurnal», 2002, n. 1: 41.

72 Perdenia J., Stanowisko Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej wobec spraw Ukrainy na przełomie XVII -XVIII w., Wrocław/Warszawa/Kraków, 1963: 15.

73 Wojtasik J., «Wojsko JKMci i Rzplitej zaporoskie» w dobie króla Jana III Sobieskiego, in: Od Żółkiewskiego i Kosińskiego do Piłsudskiego i Petruly. Z dziejów stosunków polsko-ukraińskich od XVI do XX wieku, redaktor naukowy J. Wojtasik, Warszawa, 2000: 70.

74 Quoted after Perdenia J., op. cit., 17.

75 Chukhlib T., Het’mani i Monarxy: 281.

76 Wójcik Z., Jan Sobieski 1629-1696: 307.

Auteur

Professor of Early-Modern History at the University of Białystok, Poland. His last book (Religia i Kozaczyzna Zaporoska w Rzeczypospolitej w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku, Warsaw 2008) focuses on the problems of religion in the Ukrainian society of the first half of the 17th century and on the political relationships between Cossacks and Poland.

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