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The Battle of Konotop 1659

 | 
Oleg Rumyantsev
, 
Giovanna Brogi Bercoff

The military cooperation between the Commonwealth, Zaporizhian Cossacks and Crimean Tatars in the period of the Hadjach Union and the battle of Konotop

Piotr Kroll

Texte intégral

1The Hadjach Union, signed in September 1658 and ratified by the Polish-Lithuanian diet in May 1659 was an unprecedented event in the history of the Polish and Ukrainian Nations. After ten years of bloody fighting both sides settled the compromise solution, creating the Commonwealth of Three Nations. They were forced to use such a measure because of the common threat from Russia. The Cremlin policy brought about changes in the so far attitudes of Warsaw and Chyhryn and this made the two capitals ready to compromise. The anti-Russian platform of agreement, which definitly shifted the balance of power in this part of Europe, was to become an important test for the Hadjach treaty. Ivan Vyhovs’kyj and his retinue knew, that the Tsar’s court would not consent a return of the Cossacks under the King’s power, since this would have signified a lessening of Russian positions. Nobody in the Cremlin would agree to a loss of the territorial achievements won in 1654-55, and a Polish-Cossack cooperation would have brought exactly to that result. So it was decided to submit Ukraine once again by all possible ways, especially by sending there military forces and conquering the revolted provinces. Thus, the possibility of giving the new union a permanent character depended on military cooperation between the Commonwealth and the Zaporizhian army, assisted by the allied Crimean Tatars.

2The Treaty of Hadjach was the result of the Russian danger that menaced both sides. After the death of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyj in 1657, the court of the Tsar attempted to achieve full subordination of Ukraine taking advantage of the need of the new Hetman to receive recognition of his election by the Tsar. At the beginning everything went smoothly, according to Vyhovs’kyj plans. The general Council in Korsun’ had entrusted the power to him and this deprived the Russians to interfere with manoeuvres in Ukrainian politics. However, the revolt of the Zaporizhian Sich, which decided to take advantage of the new situation and regain power against the Hetman, gave the Tsar the possibility to interfere in internal dissension between Cossacks. Somewhat later, the Zaporizhians who were inder the command of Iakov Barabash, got reinforcements from Martyn Pushkar, who was colonel of the Poltava regiment since 1649 and dreamed of arriving to Hetman’s power. The rebels appealed to the Tsar for help, accusing Vyhovs’kyj of high treason. At this point the court in Moscow had the chance to pressure the new Hetman, attempting to force him to accept conditions that restricted the autonomy of Ukraine and the Hetman’s independence which Russia considered too broad. In return they offered him the recognition of his election.

3The Cossacks, on their part, were afraid of the Commonwealth and its ally, the Crimean Khanate: they aimed at conquering Ukraine taking advantage of the internal dissensions caused by the death of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyj and of the rebellion of the Sich. In order to win the sultan’s support and his agreement to use Tatars against their former ally, Polish diplomacy informed Stambul that a war had broken out between the Cossacks and Russia. The Ottomans ordered the Khan and the Pasha of Sylistria, who had the authority to command armies of Moldavian and Valachian hospodars, to attack Ukraine together with Polish forces, immediately after the break of civil war in the country. In the same time Poles begun to concentrate their troops in Kam’janets’.

  • 1 Horobets’V., Elita kozats’koï Ukraïny v poshukakh politychnoï lehitymatsiï: stosunky z Moskvoju ta (...)
  • 2 Ibid., 190.

4Vyhovs’kyj and his retinue, on their side, were obliged to renew the alliance with the Crimean Tatars, which had been the Cossack’s allies years before, by several circumstancies: the policy of Moscow, the aggressive attitude of the Commonwealth, the course of the events (especially the rebellion in the Sich and Poltava) and the fact that Sweden – the new and only ally they could count on – was at a very great distance. The new situation, in turn, induced Vyhovs’kyj to attempt to improve Ukraine’s relationships with the Commonwealth, which was the ally of the Orde. The intent was to use the King as a kind of mediator, who could persuade the Tatars to help the Hetman against his opponents1. There were different reasons for trying to improve the relations with the Polish court. The Cossacks wanted to keep the Poles away from Ukraine in the moment of still worsening internal situation among Ukrainians; they also aimed at winning a potential ally if relations with Moscow would be to worsen in next future. The Hetman could not permit himself to to disregard the possibility of a reopening of Polish-Russian negotiations in the short time: such a possibility had to be avoided at all price, since it might cause great damage for Cossacks2. This latter reason soon lost its weigh, because at the turn of 1656 and 1657 Russians attempted to force the Commonwealth to ratify the treaty of Niemez, which had been signed in 1656. However, the King and his advisers disagreed, and this made a reopening of the conflict apparently unavoidable. As a consequence, Polish politicians decided to reach an understanding with Vyhovs’kyj, who was to face still growing troubles.

  • 3 Jerzy Stefan to I. Vyhows’kyi, Jassy 26th August 1657, Akty, otnosjashchiesja k istorii i Zapadnoj (...)
  • 4 Herasymchuk V., Vyhovshchyna i Hadjats’kyj traktatZapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva imeni Shevchenka» (...)

5Contacts between the two sides did not look well at the beginning. After the collapse of the Radnot Coalition, the Commonwealth wanted to exploit the turmoil in Ukraine. At the end of August 1657, the Moldavian hospodar Jerzy Stefan informed Vyhovs’kyj of the Crown Hetmans’order to concentrate the troops in Kam’janets’Podol’sk, after the Poles had been informed about the death of Khmel’nyts’kyj and the difficult position of the Cossacks. The hospodar informed of secret dealings between Poles and Rákóczi as well3. However, Jan Kazimierz hoped that Vyhovs’kyj would recognize his power and no military action was put into effect. When the situation in Ukraine stabilized, both sides signed armistice on April 21, 1658. The division of territory by the rivers Sluch and Horyn’ in Volhynia4 was the only result of the diplomatic negotiations carried out by the Volhynian castellan Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski and the Cossacks. For the latter it was a success, because they won a temporary peace on the western and northern frontier. Since both sides were threatened by Moscow, serious negotiations between Warsaw and Chyhyryn were reestablished and the Union of Hadjach became its fruit.

  • 5 Diarius compendiose zebrany świeżej consulty Warszawskiej A. 1658, BN 6635: 43-44v; Kubala L., Wojn (...)
  • 6 Wimmer J., Wojsko polskie w drugiej połowie xvii wieku, Warszawa, 1965: 112-113. In the first half (...)
  • 7 S. Bieniewski to P. Sapieha, Połonne 13th April 1658, ibid., 290-291; hrushevs’kyj M., Istorija Ukr (...)

6During these negotiations the Commonwealth did not hesitate to make use of some kind of demonstration of power. When senators and nobility accepted to begin debates with the Cossacks at the so called ‘Warsaw convocation’, it was decided to move more troops near Horyn’, in order to persuade the other side to accept the proposed agreement5. Soon Polish and Lithuanian troops started coming to Volhynia and joined other detachments, which were quartered there since before6. These maneouvres brought considerable complications in the negotiations. Vyhovs’kyj interpreted them as a preparation to attack Ukraine. Stanisław Bieniewski himself, the most important Polish negotiator, warned that this could lead to breaking the truce. He went on declaring that the decision of quartering Polish-Lithuanian troops were caused by a misunderstanding of the words spoken by Vyhovs’kyj’s plenipotentiary Teodozy Tomkiewicz: as a matter of fact the latter asked the Polish troops to be ready to move towards the truce line, but only after the clear signal from the Cossack’s capital Chyhyryn7. For the Hetman, the threat of a Polish aggression became a justification for opening negotiations with Poles in the eyes of the «black people» (czerń). At the same time it was a kind of protection against Poles, who could otherwise take advantage from worsening internal situation in Ukraine.

  • 8 P. Sapieha to S. Bieniewski, Kamieniec Litewski 15th January 1658 r., in: PKK, t. III: 263
  • 9 I. Wyhowski to S. Bieniewski, Chyhyryn 1st January 1658, in: herasymchuk V., Materialy do istoriï K (...)
  • 10 S. Bieniewski to S. Potocki, Połonne 10th July 1658, in: herasymchuk V., Materialy: 88-89; idem, Vy (...)

7There were some incidents on the western frontier of Ukraine, which caused tensions. In November 1657 Ivan Serbin, the Bratslav regiment’s colonel, moved his troops from Lachovychi to Kremenets’, to enlarge the territory subordinated to the Zaporizhian army. In the same time a few Polish companies attacked, without success, Medzhybizh to destroy the garrison of the Cossacks. The truce was broken by both sides in several occasions. In January 1658 colonel Samuel Kmicic alarmed the Lithuanian Hetman Paweł Jan Sapieha, that a few hundred Cossacks crossed Horyn’, and added that «more and more troups will arrive in the region. The commander declared that the Lithuanian divisions which had quarters near the truce line did in no way cause a breaking of the truce»8. Such actions were undertaken by colonels quartered near the frontier: they aimed at winning control over the territories between the Sluch and Horyn’. The Cossacks garrisons, which officially were ordered to stay in the estates of the nobles to protect them from attacks from enemies, had very similar motivations. Vyhovs’kyj and his retinue assumed, that garrisons were brought in at the request of the estates’ owners, like Samuel Leszczyński, and they would not be withdrawn. By that way the Cossack Hetman could control places like Kostjantyniv (Konstantynów), Zaslav, Medzhybizh, Ostroh, Stepan’ and Korets’9. From their side, Cossacks often complained about the actions of Lithuanian troops, because they often invaded the territory between the rivers. When Samuel Kmicic reached Horyn’, peasants fled away in masses from the village of Stepań, and Kostjantyn Vyhovs’kyj, who called himself colonel of Pinsk and Turov colonel, was extremely worried for the inhabitants of the principality of Slutsk and Polissja. Bieniewski, who feared that this could bring negotiations to failure, suggested to both the Crown Hetman and the Lithuanian Hetman to take troops entrusted to them back to the camp10.

  • 11 Opisanie krótkie wiadomości ukrainnych, przez Stanisława Bieniewskiego, kasztelana wołyńskiego, prz (...)

8Frictions were frequent not only in Volhynia, but in the Pinsk area too. During Rákóczi’s invasion many local nobles put themselves under Khmel’nyts’kyj’s protection. However, when the danger passed, a group of nobles attacked the men who had suggested that measure and their leader, the marechal of Pinsk Łukasz Jelski. They also sent away from Pinsk the Cossacks envoy, colonel Ivan hrusha, who was there since the turn of August and September. This was possible because hrusha had a small retinue and the nobility was supported by Lithuanian troops from the division of Paweł Sapieha11. Vyhovs’kyj refused to accept these events and tried several times to convince Bieniewski to order the Lithuanians to give that district back to the Cossacks.

  • 12 Informatio usług ku Rzeczpospolitej urodzonego Krzysztopha Peretiatkowicza, in: pkk, t. iii: 344
  • 13 Bieniewski to Jan Kazimierz, bmd, in: Kubala L., Wojny duńskie: 539, dodatek xiv

9From the very beginning military issues were integral part of negotiations. As mentioned above, Vyhovs’kyj wanted to exploit the threat of a Polish-Lithuanian agression to justify his diplomatic contacts with the envoys of the King. On the other side, the concentration of troops in Volhynia made his position difficult because it might bring to dangerous frictions. The Zaporizhian Hetman had to repress the revolt of Martyn Pushkar and the demonstration of power from Polish side risked to increase anti-Polish attitudes and to lead to an armed conflict. In March 1658 Bieniewski met with Pavlo Teterja, the Hetman’s envoy, who presented Vyhovs’kyj’s conditions12. First, the King was asked to make peace with Sweden – even with detriment for the Commonwealth – before the Tsar might do the same thing: If this condition was not accepted – it was said – perspectives for future Polish-Ukrainian agreement were menaced. Second, the royal court had to persuade the Khan to send immediate help for the Cossacks. Third, Polish forces were asked to be ready to intervene, though remaining at distance from the border. Teterja asked for mobilization of noble levée en masse probably from territories near Ukraine, as a kind of help against Moscow. Bieniewski expressed the opinion that «it would not go without that, because secret dealings should be supported by arms»13.

  • 14 . Vyhovs’kyj to S. Bieniewski, from the camp near Półjezierze 20th May 1658 r., in: pkk, t. III: 30 (...)

10The negotiations finished with an extension of the truce, but this did not stop the military incidents. In May, while fighting against the rebels on the other side of the Dnipro, Vyhovs’kyj wrote to Bieniewski with harsh words: «now, instead of mutual frankness, we receive information, that they are preparing forces against us. Some of the nobles threaten us in circular letters, that we will not reign in Ukraine much longer». He warned Poles against exploiting Cossacks’internal troubles, because «military actions taken by the Royal army would not bring any significant success, while they would probably turn the Cossacks into enemies of the Rzeczpospolita». He asked the Volhynian castellan to persuade both Hetmans to stop all armed activities14.

  • 15 Anonymous letter (Fr. Lisola?) to the Emperor, 8 th August 1658 r, in: herasymchuk V., Materialy: 1 (...)

11Thus, military factors played a very important role during the Polish-Cossacks negotiations which led to the Hadjach Union. On the one hand, Vyhovs’kyj made all he could to prevent Polish-Lithuanian armies from marching in Ukraine in the time of a heavy internal crisis, on the other he exploited the permanent threat menacing the western border to justify his contact with Bieniewski in the eyes of a part of the Cossacks and of the Cremlin. During the Diet Austrian envoys in Warsaw informed their authorities about the situation. Since Vyhovs’kyj did not have absolute power over the Cossacks – they wrote –, a part of his plans were to arrive to a secret agreement with the Poles. After this would happen, the King’s armies were to approach the Ukrainian border; then, the Hetman and his followers, might give exaggerated information about the Polish power and pretend to be afraid of it, thus having the possibility of convincing the «black people» (czerń) to accept the agreement with the Commonwealth as the only viable solution to a difficult situation15.

  • 16 Bul’vins’kyj A., Ukraïns’ko-rosijs’ki vzajemyny 1657-1659 rr. v umovakh tsyvilizatsijnoho rozmezhuv (...)

12More important from the Cossacks’ point of view was renewal of the alliance with Crimean Tatars. First, Ukraine was seriously threatened by their activities. In August 1657 information came to Chyhyryn that Tatars prepared an aggression on the southern frontier with the collaboration of Poles. Moreover, Cossack diplomacy was making efforts to improve relations with the Khanate, but this did not stop incursions in Ukraine, and at the beginning of December a diplomatic mission from the Khan came to Warsaw with the proposal of a common expedition against Cossacks and the liquidation of their state. The Hetman was soon informed about significant concentration of Tatar forces. They were ready to march into Ukraine, as soon as news about the outburst of the civil war would arrive16. Vyhovs’kyj decided to make an alliance with the Khanate to prevent the realisation of these plans, at the same time winning a new ally against rebellious Cossacks. The alliance with them turned out to be very effective. It permitted the Hetman to defeat Pushkar and Barabash with their regiments, who did not recognize his authority. The very presence of the Tatars in his camp strengthened his position among Cossacks. Without these reinforcements it would have been very difficult to hold the command, and his victory in Poltava gave him a chance to unite the country and reject the Russian pretensions. He however recognized, that the Tatar help would be not enough to oppose successfully the Russians, so he decided to reach an agreement with the Commonwealth, which was also the Tatars’ ally and at the same time Moscow’s foe.

  • 17 . Vyhovs’kyj to S. Bieniewski, from the camp near Półjezierze 20th May 1658 r., in: pkk, t. III: 30 (...)

13Thus, by the end, the Hadjach Union was signed in spite of all difficulties. It included some military points. First, the Cossacks’register was to count 60.000 men «according to their ancient liberties under the authority of the Ruthenian Hetman»17. The same paragraph mentioned that the Hetman had the right to recruit «mercenary soldiers», who were to stay under his command. They were to be paid from taxes approved by the Diet and raised in territories included in the Ruthenian Principality. The Hetman had the power to give that army the right to food supply in the royal and ecclesiastic estates located in the territory of the principality. These soldiers were to be equivalent to crown and Lithuanian armies (the so called komputowy), with the only difference that their commander was civilian officerof the highest range in the principality. The problem of the «mercenary soldiers» was not a subject of negotiations in Hadjach, since it has been discussed earlier. In the second half of August, the Warsaw court received the following information:

  • 18 J. Leszczyński to the King, Warsaw 5th September 1658, Czart, 388, k. 488, in: Kubala L., Wojny duń (...)

«Vyhovs’kyj needs an independent state, just like it is in Lithuania, and his second demand is to have the right to recruit german soldiers, what is not possible in Lithuania, [so that they may] become rather independent allies than citizens of a united body of the Commonwealth.»18

14The treaty included a very important statement: Polish and Lithuanian soldiers were prohibited to enter the territory of the principality. If their presence was necessary, the troops should be commanded by the Ruthenian Hetman.

15There were clauses about a possible war with Tsar as well. Vyhovs’kyj was afraid to be obliged to take part in a Polish-Russian conflict, while the Commonwealth, engaged in the North against Sweden, was unable to give sufficient support to the Cossacks. This was the reason why the treaty included the clause that:

  • 19 That clause was later deleted from text of the treaty. Herasymchuk V., Materialy: 117, footnote 88 (...)
  • 20 Ibid., 116-117.

if the King, together with the crown and Lithuanian lands, begins an offensive war against Moscow, the Cossack army will not have the obligation to participate in such conflict19. But if the Tsar does not want to return the Commonwealth its provinces and attacks it, all the forces will join and fight together, the army of the crown and Lithuania, and the Ruthenian Zaporizhian army, under the command of its own Hetman.20

16This was an attempt to please those Cossacks who did not approve the alliance with the Commonwealth and were afraid of a conflict with the Tsar, which could bring tragic consequences for Ukraine and the Zaporizhian army.

17Military matters, however, did not represent a really large part of the text of the treaty, although they in principle were fundamental for the consistency of the agreement itself. The common anti-Russian front, which was the main impulse compelling both sides to sign an agreement, would have required the full commitment in the conflict.

  • 21 Czart. 402: 245-246. See also: Kubala L., Wojny duńskie: 551-552.
  • 22 Tomkiewicz W., Unia hadziacka, «Sprawy Narodowościowe», r. xi, n. 1-2, Warszawa, 1937: 21.

18As a matter of fact, the Hetman was perfectly aware that the perspective of a return under Polish rule would rise strong resentment among Cossacks. He therefore attempted to negotiate the best possible terms for the latter, at the same time making concessions to the Poles. Thus, the text of the treaty included the following secret proclamation: «Deklarację wielmożnego Jana Wyhowskiego, Hetmana wojsk zaporoskich, na punkta niektóre w commisiej pod hadziaczem zawartej opisane, przy kończeniu tejże commisiej dana»21. Vyhovs’kyj declared that he would cut the number of registered Cossacks by half just after the end of the war against Moscow. It was not possible to do this immediately, because «present times need that a higher number appears in the treaty, otherwise, ordinary soldiers, removed from the register, may cause difficulties». In return, he demanded to give him exclusive command of the troops raised in the principality. He was not sure of the fidelity of the Cossacks, hence he organized his personal guard, whose duty was to suppress all rebellions and to strengthen his position in the Ruthenian principality.22

  • 23 Part of Vyhovs’kyj letter to Jan Kazimierz in: hrushevs’kyj M.: 329.
  • 24 Jan Kazimierz to commisaries, Warsaw, 30th August 165., in: Kubala L., Wojny duńskie: 447, footnote (...)

19Vyhovs’kyj also asked the King to send him as soon as possible «foreign troops» – calculated between one and five thousand men – «for internal security and a quicker evacuation of the Russians from Kyiv». He was aware, that the alliance with the Commonwealth meant war with Russia and wanted to strike first, in spite of the relatively high level of unpopularity of such plans among Cossacks. In August he wrote to the King, that he hoped to establish union between the Commonwealth and the Cossacks, and expressed his readiness to begin war against Russia in the name of Ukraine’s freedom, with the aim of easing the transition to the King’s service: «Russians want to win the power over Ukraine by tricky ways – he maintained –, May god defend us against it; if Ukraine turns down their authority under my leadership, it will be very difficult to bring her back after»23. At the end of August the King wrote to the commissaries charged of the negotiations with Russia, that «we had received information, or rather Vyhovs’kyj’s declaration, that he wants to begin open war against Moscow and frankly help us»24. After the Hadjach Union, when the court received information about the Cossack march into the Russian state’s southern provinces, the King and his councellors counted, that «Cossacks and Tatars forces, which marched with 100 000 men into Muscovy pursuing Romodanski [Romodanovskij], who had remained in Belgorod, will be able (according to their promises) to reach the capital, and this may give us better conditions for a peace».

  • 25 John Casimir to the Khan, camp near Torun?, bd (after 5th November, when it was announced in camp a (...)
  • 26 Jan Kazimierz to commissaries, camp near Thorun, 8th November 1658, Czart. 151, n. 124: 541-549; Cz (...)
  • 27 Senatus Consultum, Warsaw 31st August 1658, Czart. 401: 143-145; Jan Kazimierz to commisaries, Wars (...)
  • 28 M. Prażmowski to commisaries, camp near Thorun 15th October 1658, Czart. 151, n. 111: 495-497.

20However, the royal court did not realize, how much Cossacks had changed after the time of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi. Tore apart by internal social conflicts, deprived of a charismatic leader, they were not able to fight by themselves against Russia. On her side, Sweden engaged in war against Dania and this circumstance suggested Jan Kazimierz to concentrate Crown forces in Royal Prussia in Royal Prussia in order to win back lost fortresses, while engaging the Lithuanian army, Cossacks and Tatars in the war against Moscow. He decided to act that way, because the Swedish King, who in the previous time was not willing to begin parleys, «reportedly» became «more willing» at present25. From the point of view of the Polish elites, the eastern front represented only a secondary issue. The general opinion was that the change of power balance brought about in the region by the Cossacks’shift of loyalty, would persuade Moscow at least to resume negotiations, if not to bring back to the Commonwealth the territories conquered before. Negotiations were supposed stop Russian military activity in Lithuania. The most important attacks against Russia were to be launched in Ukraine by Cossacks forces. Vyhovs’kyj was also to support Paweł Sapieha’s division which fought on the Lithuanian left flank, backed by soldiers enroled by levée en masse (pospolite ruszenie) and Cossacks forces, commanded by colonel Ivan Nechaj. These forces were to attack the Tsar’s army, which was near Vilnius26. Simultaneously, both sides were to open negotiations: their course depended on military successes27. Such plan were based on several premises. First, it was thought that the Cossack’s transition to King’s service would incline Moscow towards compromise. Second, there always was hope that joint Cossack and Tatar forces may be able to force Moscow to make peace: this brought great expectations for the offensive Vyhovs’kyj planned to bring against Russia in autumn, and induced to adopt the more offensive variant of action (the Lithuanian army, supported by part of Crown forces, was to conquer back Belarus); in their imagination, the King’s counselors saw Cossack banners already on the Muscovite city walls. Third, it was assumed, that Cossacks would take over most of the tasks on the eastern front with a but small Polish support. Fourth, it was expected that the conflict in the East would last short time thanks to the overwhelming forces of the Commonwealth, and that it would be soon possible to engage joint Polish and Cossacks forces against Sweden. Moreover, the Polish part thought that Cossack-Tatar incursions would impede the success of the negotiations between Sweden and Russia, that had been initiated in autumn 1658 in Valiisaari near Narva: in that situation – it was thought – the Cremlin could be saved not by the small Swedish army, but by the peace with thetriumphant Commonwealth28.

  • 29 L. Jewłaszewski to Jan Kazimierz, Lublin 13th October 1658 r., Czart. 151, n. 110: 491-493.
  • 30 Colonel Michał Szemberk’s testimony, in: Akty JuZR, t. xv, n. 6: 303

21Vyhovs’kyj was aware that, after the union had been signed, military collaboration of both sides became the most important issue. Therefore, in the Hetmanate the support by Polish army was considered crucial. This was the reason why Ivan Kovalevs’kyj, one of the Cossack envoys who were on the way to Warsaw with the most important Polish negotiators, Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski and Ludwik Kazimierz Jewłaszewski, take advantage of the occasion to meet also with grand Crown Hetman Stanisław Rewera Potocki29. In the name of Vyhovs’kyj he asked him for Polish reinforcements. The Cossack Hetman made any effort to have closer relationships with the Polish commander, because he badly needed his consent for reinforcements and recruitment of mercenaries in Poland30.

  • 31 Ibid.

22For the King’s court it was clear that to support the Zaporizhian Hetman was a priority. Indeed, John Casimir ordered grand Crown Hetman to send to Ukraine part of his division already in November31, as soon as the Cossack envoy Teodozy Tomkiewicz sent to Toruń the information that Hetman «came back from Moscow with the Tatars, but without any great success and, while they [Tatars] returned to their country, he sought asylum in Chyhyryn, being uncertain of his fate, because he was afraid of his men». The Hetman thus asked for military help against rebellious subjects, who were willing to change sides once again and to join the party of young Jurij Khmel’nyts’kyj’s followers. To tell the truth, news were exaggerated, but in Ukraine the Polish army was badly needed as a clear sign of the correctness of the previous decision to cast the Cossack’s lot with the Commonwealth.

  • 32 Janas E., Konfederacja wojska koronnego w 1659 roku. Komisja lubelska i początek związku, in: Rzecz (...)

23The question, however, was whether the Polish-Lithuanian state had the possibility to give such help at that moment. Winter approached, part of the army – Jerzy Lubomirski’s division – still was engaged in Royal Prussia. True, after the end of the campaign against Rákóczi in 1657 the division of grand Crown Hetman was spending its time bivouacking in Volhynia, Bełz and Ruthenia provinces. Unfortunately, however, these troopes were not really available, because of pay arrears since the beginning of 1658. A special commission appointed by the Diet that year established that state’s debts towards the army counted more than 12 million zlotys32. The military commission, which should meet in Lublin at the beginning of January to solve this problem, was not gathered because the treasure was empty and soldiers’delegates declared a military «confederation» under the leadership of the Military Supervisor Mariusz Stanisław Jaskólski. Thus, it was impossible for the Polish court to support Vyhovs’kyj with adequate reinforcements.

  • 33 More about this topic in: Kasazhėtski K., Kampanija 1660 hodu ŭ Litve, «Arche», n. Minsk, 2006 (In (...)

24In Lithuania the situation was even more dangerous. The Lithuanian army had to fight against Russians, at the same time repulsing Swedish thrust against Courland and Samogitia. After the defeat in Werki and return of Jurij Dolgorukij’s army towards Smolensk, the Lithuanians divided their forces. The left wing went to the northern front, letting the right wing division to fight against Russians. However, the Lithuanian army faced the same problem as the Crown army: soldiers started to demand their pay and grand Lithuanian Hetman Paweł Sapieha had to stop his activities. When news came about Vyhovs’kyj aborting raid against Moscow and his return to Ukraine, it became clear, that the grand strategy of a common Cossack, Tatar and Lithuanian strike against Smolensk – let alone Moscow – could not be executed33. Above all, Lithuanians were reluctant to engage in negotiations with Cossacks, because they feared that any alliance with them would not only make negotiations with Moscow more difficult, but persuade Russians to engage in a war, which was to be destructive mainly for the grand Duchy of Lithuania. Sapieha mistrusted Cossacks also because his estates in Belarus were under their control: Stary Bychów (Bykhaŭ) was Ivan Nechaj’s headquarter.

  • 34 Cf. Babulin I. B., Bitva pod Konotopom 28 ijunja 1659 goda, Moskva, 2009: 5.
  • 35 Bul’vins’kyj A., Ukraïns’ko-rosijs’ki vzajemyny 1657-1659 rr.: 259. Small Tatar forcespated in the (...)
  • 36 Ibid., 276, 288. At the beginning of December Kiev voivode V. Sheremetev estimatd the its numer at (...)

25So, from the very beginning the military cooperation between Ukraine and Russia was very frail. An unsuccessful expedition to the borderlands of Russia in September, and two attempts to conquer Kyiv (defended by a few thousands strong garrison commanded by Vasilij Borisovich Sheremet’ev) ended in failure. Hard fighting with the army of grigorij Romodanovskij34 beyond the Dnipro brought to no result and proved that Cossacks were not able to defend themselves against Russian aggression without help from Commonwealth, even with Tatar support. It has to be acknowledged that Tatars participated in all expeditions of the Hetman. In July the Orde appeared in Chyhyryn under the command of kalga ghazi girei (later joined by nureddin Aadil girei), while simultaneously the main part of the Tatar force prepared for an Ottoman campaign in Transilvania35. Tatars took part in the unsuccessful expedition to the southern frontier zone of Russia in September 1658. An episode of this campaign shows how dangerous the situation was and gives evidence of the reasons of the Tatar support for Vyhovs’kyj: when the Hetman delayed the march of all his forces into Russia proper, Tatars became impatient and began to take iasiri not only in the enemy’s lands, but in Ukraine as well. This had a very bad influence on the Zaporizhian and was one of reasons that induced Vyhovs’kyj to interrupt the expedition and sent Tatars back with the only exception of 2 000 men36. However, Tatar reinforcements under Selim girei’s command took part in the expedition against Russians in winter 1659.

  • 37 Wójcik Z., Traktat andruszowski 1667 roku i jego geneza, Warszawa, 1959: 35-36; horobets’V., Hadjat (...)

26Its importance not withstanding, Khanate’s support could not ensure the victory for Cossacks. So Chyhyryn badly needed the presence of Polish and Lihuanian armies in the eastern theater of war. To make it possible, Vyhovs’kyj begun to convince the King to make a peace with Sweden. In his opinion success or failure of the Hadjach idea depended from this point. Swedes were waging war with both the Commonwealth and Russia: on the one hand this impeded the former to concentrate all efforts in the East, on the other it engaged a considerable part of the Russian army, thus restraining Moscow from intervention in Ukraine. The ‘Swedish card’ helped the Hetman to resist easier against Russian forces. Moscow’s military potential could be neutralized, if the Commonwealth and Sweden would come to terms quickly. Simultaneously this could break the peace negotiations between Stockholm and Moscow, which were started in May 1658. This kind of reasoning induced the Hetman to pressure Warsaw to finish the war in the North as soon as possible, even at cost of some concessions: not only would peace between Sweden and Russia would liberate Moscow from a war on two fronts, but it would allow Sweden to engaged against the Commonwealth in a more energetic way. Moreover, the end of war in the North would permit the Tsar to engage all his forces to bring Ukraine back under his rule, while Polish-Lithuanian forces would be engaged in Royal Prussia and Courland and would not be able to bring help to Cossacks. It should be remarked also that Moscow, forced to fight on two fronts – the Baltic and Lithuanian-Ukrainian – simultaneously, had to make a choice on which front to engage. Probably, for the Tsar, the question of ‘gathering Russian lands’ was to be considered more vital, and Moscow might abandon her ‘Baltic policy’ and the idea of getting access to the sea, and be obliged to begin negotiations with Sweden. Thus, the most important goal of Cossack’s diplomacy became to reach an agreement between Sweden and Poland, and to induce Charles X Gustav to stop negotiating with the Tsar37. Unfortunately, the plans of the Hetman failed. On the one side, the conditions offered by Sweden were unacceptable for Poles, on the other the King and his council considered the Northern front as more important and were not ready to loose any part of Royal Prussia. So, peace was impossible. It remains also questionable, whether the end of hostilities in Prussia and Samogitia at the turn of 1658-1659 would have brought substantial help for Vyhovs’kyj: the army had not been paid since several years and it would rather join Jaskólski’s confederation than go to fight in Ukraine.

27At the turn of 1658 and 1659, however, help for Cossacks was extremely necessary, as testified by Vyhovs’kyj’s letters. He feared that the Cossacks may change side to the Tsar’s benefit and made use of this argument to pressure the Polish court to send help and engage more actively in the eastern war. He wrote to crown chancellor, Mikołaj Prażmowski:

  • 38 I. Vyhov’skyi to M. Prażmowski, camp near Rzyszczew 15th January 1658 r., in: PKK, t. III: 318.

I will be glad, if some cavalry troops come with Łączyński’s dragoons. Otherwise, considering our frustrated hopes, I do not know, how to pull the people’s hearts to the King and the Commonwealth. Now I resist with my forces only and the enemy was defeated so many times, as he attempted to launch an attack. Soon my troops, which were sent by me beyond the Dnipro to suppress the civil war, which was instigated by the enemy, are going to succeed. However, promised reinforcements are badly needed to strengthen the people’s loyalty to the King and the Commonwealth, otherwise it will be very difficult to induce men to defend the border, which has been cleaned with support of the Khan.38

  • 39 V. Sheremet’ev to the Tsar, Kiev 31 st January 1659 r., in: Akty JuZR, t. xv, n. 6, cz. iv: Zdanovi (...)
  • 40 Kroll P., Od ugody hadziackiej do Cudnowa. Kozaczyzna między Rzecząpospolitą a w latach 1658-1660, (...)

28Vyhovs’kyj needed Crown forces in Ukraine to oppose Russians who were taking offensive, and to give a clear sign that Commonwealth considered an agreement with Cossacks as substantial. It was especially important for the «black people» who strongly opposed the perspective of a return of Ukraine under the dominance of Polish nobles. Crown reinforcements, like mercenary troops, could strengthen the Hetman’s position, weakened by lack of military success. Irritated, he begun to seek help in different ways. As Vasilij Sheremet’ev reported from Kyiv, at the beginning of December Vyhovs’kyj was supposed to have sent to Turkey an embassy led by Anton Zdanovich, asking for help and offering his subordination to the Sultan39. The contacts with the Ottomans were basically successful, but unfortunately it was too late: letters containing informations about Turkish and Tatar reinforcements arrived only in April 1660, when Jurij Khmel’nyts’kyj already was the new Zaporizhian Hetman. He sent the visir’s letters to the Tsar! They show, however, that Vyhovs’kyj was aware of his uncertain position and looked for an alternative to the alliance with the Commonwealth, in case the latter could not (or was not willing to) support Cossacks against Moscow, or in case the alliance with Poland would turn out to be not favorable for the Cossacks40.

  • 41 Jerlicz J., Latopisiec, albo kroniczka, wyd. K. Wł. Wójcicki, t. II, Warszawa, 1853: 14.
  • 42 Jemiołowski M., Pamiętnik dzieje Polski zawierający (1648-1679), ed. J. Dzięgielewski, Warszawa, 20 (...)
  • 43 Majewski W., Andrzej Potocki (zm. 1663), in: Polski Słownik Biograficzny (in furthertions – PSB), t (...)
  • 44 Summariusz krótki podanych recognitiej wojskowych do Skarbu Rzptej Koronnego przez Wielmożnego JMPa (...)
  • 45 Wimmer J., Materiały do zagadnienia liczebności i organizacji armii koronnej w latach 1655-1660, in (...)
  • 46 Jan Kazimierz to commissaries, camp near Toruń 12th December 1658, Czart. 151, n. 134: 585-586.

29When it became aware of the situation, Warsaw decided to sent a part of the division of the grand Crown Hetman. On November 16 these troops had gathered near Luck in Volhynia and marched towards Kyiv41. According to the sources, the rest of the division, «under the command of the Hetman’s lieutenant colonel Machowski, spent the rest of the year doing nothing substantial in their quarters near Sluch and Horyn’, and became a heavy burden for all Poland and Volhynia»42. Andrzej Potocki was charged with the command of the troops sent to Ukraine43, formed only by cavalry: 26 companies of Cossacks, 3 of Valachians, 5 of Tatars and the dragoons regiment of colonel Józef Łączyński44. The whole amounted to about 3600 soldiers45. In the middle of December the King informed the envoys he had sent to negotiate with the Tsar’s plenipotentiary as follows: «with god’s help Russians will be under pressure soon»; he expected the voivode of Vilnius [Paweł Jan Sapieha, grand Lithuanian Hetman] to continue the actions as planned and join his forces with colonel Nechai’s Cossacks. Cossacks were expected to attack together with Tatars and with the forces sent by the King46.

  • 47 About the Lithuanian campaign see: Kasazhėtski K., Kampanija 1660 hodu

30The beginning of 1659 seemed favourable for the allies. On the Lithuanian front Samuel Kmicic and Samuel Oskierko’s troops started cooperation with the Cossacks of Nechaj. It was announced that Hetman Sapieha was to come soon with all his army. Crown reinforcements appeared, giving hope for future. Unfortunately, soon all changed for the worse. The troops of the Tsar crushed the Kmicic regiments and the voluntary companies who supported them; later they defeated in the battle of Miadzioł the joint forces of Władysław Wołłowicz and Mikołaj Judycki. This was a really severe blow for Lithuanians47.

  • 48 The reasons were: controversion about ratification of hadjach treaty, lack of military success and (...)

31In Ukraine, the winter offensive of the Cossacks ended in fiasco, though they were supported by the regiment of Andrzej Potocki’s and the Tatars of Selim girei’s. They could not dislodge Russians from Left Bank Ukraine and regain control in the area, which remained faithful to the Tsar. Moreover, Vyhovs’kyj was informed that Aleksej Trubetskoj was approaching the Ukraine border with his army. At that moment much depended on the possibility of receiving military support from the Commonwealth, not only to fight against Russians, but also to strengthen the Hetman’s weakening position48.

32The Tatars realized how serious the matter was and supported the Cossack’s efforts to secure Polish reinforcements. They asked the King to send an army to Ukraine. In Winter 1659 visir Sefer gazi Aga wrote to crown chancellor Mikołaj Prażmowski as follows:

  • 49 Sefer gazi aga to M. Prażmowski, Bachczysaraj bd, agad akw dz. tatarski, k. 62, t. n. 413: 2.

Twice we sent reinforcements for Cossacks against Moscow and we have sent now good troops again […] in the name of Khan, all beys, murzas and orda I ask you to persuade the King and senators to send forces to Lithuania as help for Cossacks as soon as possible […] If you will not send troops for Cossacks to aid against Moscow, it would be regarded as a hostile act towards Crimea and we would be in great enmity.49

33Khan Mehmed gerei IV, who just started preparations for the Ukrainian campaign, formulated a very similar request:

  • 50 Mehmed gerei IV to Jan Kazimierz, Suren 15th March 1659 r., ibid., t. 78, n. 410: 2

It would be good and useful that Your grace the King ordergrand Crown Hetman to come with all his forces to aid the Zaporizhians, or, instead of him, Jerzy Lubomirski, Crown Field Hetman. We just inform Your Majesty […] that we need infantry and artillery more than cavalry, and I very much ask for that.50

  • 51 Mehmed gerei IV to Jan Kazimierz, bmd (1659 r.), agad akw dz. tatarski, k. 62, t. 86, n. 418: 2.
  • 52 Mehmed gerei IV to Jan Kazimierz, Bakhchysaraj 14th May 1659, ibid., t. 75, n. 408: 2

34Thus, the Crimean Khanate was more and more engaged on Cossack’s side in its struggle against Russia. Tradition, interest and policy dictated such behaviour. The secutiry of the Khanate itself was put in danger if Russians were able to subordinate Ukraine, exactly as the position of the Cremlin was menaced by the alliance of Tatar with Cossacks. The Khan wrote to the King in these terms: «If the treacherous and astute Muscovite invade Ukraine and take it under his power, if – god prevent – he subdues it with the Cossacks, this would cause great pain in Poland and would perturb the Khanatea as well»51. In other occasion he argued: «if Muscovite armies were to capture Ukraine – god defend us – this would be very harmful to you and we would not have peace either»52.

35The Khanate realized that aid for Vyhovs’kyj was necessary, otherwise Moscow would bring Ukraine once again under its power and bring Russia dangerously closer to the Khanate’s border and strengthen it in fight against the Polish-Tatars coalition. The Khan wrote to the King with some anxiety:

  • 53 Mehmed gerei IV to Jan Kazimierz, Suren 15th March 1659, ibid., t. 78, n. 410: 2

There are a few thousands Cossacks, which are faithful to Moscow, so if, god defend, the Zaporizhian Hetman will be defeated even in small degree, these Cossacks, like others who are supporting him now, quickly will surrender to Moscow, persuaded by its false promises. We reported to you through our envoy that Russians have distributed some leaflets among Zaporizhians and make czerń more rebellious. This should be avoided, in order to make impede the enemy to become more powerful.53

  • 54 Karacz bey do I. Vyhovs’kyj, Suren bd (April 1659), ibid., t. 83, n. 415: 2

36The bey of Perekop too was inclined to a stricter cooperation between Tatars and Cossacks. After his return from the winter campaign he reported to Vyhovs’kyj: «I reported to the Khan all the friendliness you show to him and to the whole Orde all the time»54.

37The return of Selim girei and Karach bey’s Tatars from Ukraine and rumours about new, substantial Russian forces appearing near Ukrainian borders persuaded the Khan to send Vyhovs’kyj new reinforcements, led by nureddin and Szirim bey. Gazi gerei was dispatched to the Azov region to launch a diversionary raid. Crimean diplomacy tried by all means to incite Calmuks to rebel against Moscow and still strived for Polish aid:

  • 55 Mehmed gerei IV to Jan Kazimierz, Suren 15th March 1659, ibid., t. 78, n. 410: 2

It would be honest and useful that the King orders the grand Crown Hetman to come with all his forces to aid Zaporizhians, or instead of him, Jerzy Lubomirski, Crown Field Hetman. We only reported to Your Majesty […] that we need infantry and artillery more than cavalry, what I am asking for.55

  • 56 RWM: 261. An agree was won by Cossack’envoys, herman hapanovich and a Stomatenko, who stayed in Sta (...)
  • 57 Bul’vins’kyj A., Ukraïns’ko-rosijs’ki vzajemyny: 353.

38Following the Cossack’s requests ad taking in account the threat coming from Moscow, the Ottoman Porte agreed that Crimea may intervene with all its forces to rescue Vyhovs’kyj and his followers. The Khan begun to prepare an expedition to Ukraine56. The main forces under the Khan’s personal command were to come with aid to the Zaporizhian Hetman, the ordes of Nogai were to launch an attack against the towns in the Belgorod region and territories situated at the east of the Don57.

  • 58 Summariusz punktów i uniżonych próśb, które jaśnie wielmożny JeMć Pan hetman Wojska Zaporoskiego ze (...)

39While looking for help to repulse the Russian aggression, the Hetman tried to change some clauses of the Hadjach Union during the extraordinary Diet, which had begun in the middle of March. Among his propositions some points concerned the army. It was asked, among others, to reassess all decrees endowed by the parliament on military discipline and to give the Ruthenian Hetman the same power over the army as the Crown Hetmans’. Taxes collected for military purposes from Ukrainian districts and controlled by the royal administration, should be paid to the Ruthenian treasure in order to provide for mercenary soldiers for the principality. Since the process of organization of the treasure and tax system required time, the Hetman asked the Crown Treasure to pay for reinforcements for three years. In return Zaporizhian army promised to support the Commonwealth with forces twice bigger than the Crown troops, which were to be sent to Ukraine58.

40Unfortunately, the Poles disagreed with all the propositions of the Cossacks. The position of the Commonwealth improved considerably in the last few months, so that the court begun to withdraw from some of the clauses of the primary treaty, among others such important issues as the liquidation of the Brest Union. The number of registered Cossacks remained 30.000 men, as it has been established by the Hadjach treaty, but the formula was added «or how the most noble Zaporizhian Hetman inscribes in his register following the needs». This gave the Hetman the possibility to change the number of registered Cossacks according to the situation; on his side the Hetman could keep under his command 10 thousands mercenary soldiers, paid from taxes voted in the Diet and gathered in the principality.

  • 59 Podhorodecki L., Kampania polsko-szwedzka 1659 r. w Prusach i Kurlandii, SMhW, IV, 1958: 217; Wimme (...)
  • 60 Janas E., Konfederacja wojska koronnego w latach 1661-1663, Lublin, 1998: 27-32.

41Indeed, Warsaw understood that the Cossacks could not be left without help, since this might end with their complete defeat or with a change of loyalty. Thus, the council of war in May decided that all the divisions of grand Crown Hetman, numbering 17 thousands men (10 500 cavalry, 4300 dragoons, 2700 infantry) would support Vyhovs’kyj59. Unfortunately, because of problems with providing for their pay, the court was not able to dismantel the confederation of Jaskólski before September and could not persuade the soldiers to march in Ukraine60.

  • 61 Mehmed gerei IV to Jan Kazimierz, Bachczesaraj 14th May 1659, agad, akw, dz. tatarski., k. 62, t. 7 (...)

42Tatars did not disappoint Vyhovs’kyj. In May, the Khan’s envoy Suliman aga reported to the King about his intention to give personal support to the Cossacks with all his forces. He insisted with the King to send the Crown army in Ukraine and to march personally into Lithuania to support the local army and attack Moscow too. He threatened: «So if you will not give any reinforcements to us […], we inform you, that you yourselves would break our friendship»61.

  • 62 Jan Kazimierz to Mehmed girei IV, Warszawa bd. [1659.], ibid., k. 62, t. 17, n. 348: 3; k. t. 42, n (...)
  • 63 See: Babulin I. B., Bitva pod Konotopom: 15.

43Jan Kazimierz recognized that the situation was very serious. He assured the Khan that Crown forces would march in Ukraine together with Suliman aga and ordered Lithuanians to start war activity against Moscow62. He promised that all Crown forces, with infantry and ordnance, would go to Ukraine as soon as treaty would the Crown army, nor the Lithuanian troop could bring any help to the Cossacks. Only Tatars were able to sustain Vyhovs’kyj with substantial aid. This appeared very clearly during the Khonotop campaign, where only a very little part of the Polish troops took part in action (subunits and probably the dragoon regiment of Józef Łączyński). What is more interesting, Andrzej Potocki’s companies did not participate. Vyhovs’kyj was afraid about the security of his back and preferred to leave them near Kyiv to blockade the garrison. Tatar’s reinforcements, numbering about 30-35.000 men63, come to rescue Vyhovs’kyj and their presence was crucial to win the battle over the part of the Russian army which was formed by the divisions of Semën Pozharskij and grigorij Romadovskij. According to one relation, the Orde commanded by the Khan entrapped Pozharskij’s forces, encircling and destroing them. In the next phase of the battle, Tatars supported Cossacks by hitting the soldiers of Romodanovskij in the back: that action decided the fate of this stage of the battle. The presence on the theater of action of the extremely mobile Tatar cavalry permitted the allied army to gain great advantage from better understanding and better knowledge about the dislocation of the Russians and terrain where they were. Nimble Tatar troops were able to reach information about the enemy, at the same time making it almost impossible for him to take prisoners and receive informations. During the battle they proved their usefulness by entrapping part of Russian forces, encircling them and attacking them from the back. The author – or probably authors – of the battle plan, took the best advantage of their characteristic way of dealing: skillful maneuvering and speed. It should be remembered, however, that in both actions Tatars had decisive advantage of number over the Russians.

  • 64 Envoys’instruction does not exist, its text could be reconstructed using: Respons urodzonym Krzyszt (...)

44In spite of hthe spectacular victory in the battle, the Hetman continued his efforts to win Commonwealth’s military aid. After the battle an embassy led by Krzysztof Łasek, the colonel of the Hetman’s mercenary forces, was sent to Warsaw. The envoys were to pass on an official announcement about the victory and insist on receiving military and financial help from Poland. The Hetman demanded the Crown army to be dispatched to Ukraine, while the Lithuanian forces were to make a diversionary attack against Russians in Belarus. Vyhovsk’yi was particularly irritated by the fact that the Lithuanians did not intervene to rescue colonel Nechaj who was besieged in Stary Bychów (Bykhaŭ)64. He was followed by Crown Master of the Camp, who wrote to Jan Kazimierz:

  • 65 A. Potocki to Jan Kazimierz, camp in Rutek 4th August 1659, in: pkk, t. iii: 362. was probably a me (...)

The Zaporizhian Hetman badly needs foreign troops; since the foreign soldiers remain obedient, it is necessary to send him dragoons and, if possible, about 3.000 men infantry as well as soon as possible. My regiment, or rather squadron, is there, others are neaby; order them, Your Majesty, to march, and the Hetman will be content with that. Otherwise, god defend us, he may look for the other solution, about which he wrote to me in the letter, which I am sending now to Your Majesty. It is sure, that hammaty, his envoy to the Ottomans, was warmly received.65

  • 66 T. Karczewski to K. W. Pac, camp near Busk 20th July 1659, ibid., 357.

45Such opinion was common to many people. As Colonel Tomasz Karczewski reported, Cossacks openly said that, if the King did not send stronger forces, they would break down the weak crown regiments: «For god’s sake, the King has to think about Ukraine: thanks god and without our aid, the situation of the Hetman improves, it is not good that there are no troops of our’s there.»66

46However, the state of the Crown army, although it had improved, did not allow to come to aid to the Cossacks. The Hetman knew about the difficulties caused by the army’s confederation, so his envoys brought a letter addressed directly to the Crown soldiers. The King’s court looked at this initiative with favor and even insisted that the envoys

  • 67 Respons, in: pkk, t. iii: 366.

hurry up with the letter of the Kievan voivode [Vyhovs’kyj] addressed to the army, which may bring some good effect in the soldiers’attitudes, the more so if they will tell personally the soldiers how much affection Vyhovs’kyj and his Cossacks demonstrate for common Fathereland, which was liberated by them from the enemy; this may be an example for the soldiers and incite them to similar actions for common good.67

  • 68 One of the reason of these events was fear of Russian conquest of these territiories.body doubted, (...)

47It remains unknown whether the Cossack’s envoys arrived to L’viv and had an influence on the dissolution of the confederation. The latter lasted until the beginning of September, and as a matter of fact ir delayed the rise of military aid for Cossacks during their fight against Russia. This had catastrophic consequences not only for Vyhovs’kyj himself, but mainly for the Hadjach Union. The Hetman begun to loose the support of the Cossack elite. By the end of August a rebellion led by the colonel of Perejaslav Tymofij Tsytsjura and by Vasyl’Zolotarenko broke out in the regions beyond the Dnipro68. They asked for help from Vasilij Sheremet’ev and Aleksej Trubetskoj. Thus, all Left Bank Ukraine returned under the Tsar’s regime. The Right Bank found itself in very difficult, though not hopeless situation. The rebels could count only on the support of the weakened Kievan garrisons, while the Russian forces near the Ukrainian border – at least in the first phase of events – seemes not to show interest in meddling in Ukrainian internal strifes. Soon arrived also informations about the quieting of the crown army in Ukraine. Their aid was indispensable, since Vyhovs’kyj was perfectly aware that Trubetskoj would not wait idle and soon would support the rebels. An attack to the Right Bank was to be expected and there would be no chance to oppose the Russians successfully.

48Unfortunately, time was passing and the Crown army did not show any desire to support the Cossacks. In the second half of September, as the situation worsened, the Cossack elite, which up to this moment remained faithful, forced Vyhovs’kyj to resign and elected a new Hetman, Jurii Khmel’nyts’kyj. At the beginning this did not imply a break with the Commonwealth. The possibility of keeping control over Ukraine depended on the quick arrival of the Crown’s armys to Ukraine. Andrzej Potocki and Ivan Vyhovs’kyj, who probably knew the situation the best, wrote again to underline the need of showing a concrete presence of Polish troops. The latter particularly insisted in the request to bring them as soon as possible in Ukraine. He wrote to Stanisław Potocki:

  • 69 I. Vyhovs’kyj to S. Potocki, camp near Kotelnia 6th October 1659, in: pkk, t. iii: 373. See: I. Vyh (...)

The only thing to wait for is the King’s instruction, so that you order the troops, which should have been sent to Ukraine long time ago, to march towards the border. This would permit to win back the pleb, which is greedy for new thing and even if it does not remember its oath, it would be faithful to King and Fatherland, seeing the king’s army readiness.69

  • 70 „ If Cossacks had received our substantial aid, many of them would have been friendful to the King, (...)
  • 71 Jakub Potocki, son of Cracow castellan was to command these troops, K. Tyszkiewicz NN, Lwów 5th Sep (...)
  • 72 Ibid., 538.
  • 73 J. Jerlicz, t. II: 31-32. J. Tarnowski to A. Trzebicki, Lvi’v 6th October 1659, Czart. 152, n. 319; (...)
  • 74 A. Potocki to Jan Kazimierz, camp in Rutek 4th August 1659, in: pkk, t. iii: 362.

49Other witnesses reported about the need of using bigger forces too70. But there was no sign, that such solution would be executed. Though at the beginning of September the army’s confederation was dissolved, grand Crown Hetman delayed the beginning of action. His division was supposed to join forces with the Master of the Camp about 29th September (Saint Michael’s day), but the plan was not executed. Stanisław Potocki sent only 12 companies of cavalry on the 9th of September71. A few days earlier, Crown Field Secreatry Jan Fryderyk Sapieha, who was not sutisfied with the order to lead Polish auxiliary corps to Lithuania, had expressed his desire to march to Ukraine with help for Potocki and Vyhovs’kyj72. On the 25th of September he set out from L’viv leading 3 regiments of cavalry and a few pieces of ordnance, to reinforce the troops of the Master of the Camp, which were very weakened73: already at the beginning of August the Master had reported «that there are only about 1.500 serviceable men»74.

  • 75 A. Potocki to Jan Kazimierz, camp in Kotelnia 25 października 1659, ibid.,

50Sapieha and Potocki joined their forces between 17th and 25th October, too late to have any influence on the Right Bank Cossack elite, who decided to begin negotiations with Russia75.

  • 76 Janas E., Konfederacja: 33.
  • 77 J. Jerlicz, t. II: 31-32. J. Tarnowski to A. Trzebicki, Lvi’v 6th October 1659, Czart. 152, n. 319; (...)
  • 78 Jan Kazimierz to J. S. Lubomirski, Warszawa 6th September 1659, B pan i pau w Krakowie, 1065: 249; (...)

51May the indecision of Crown Hetman be considered surprising? He was influenced by the bad state of his troops, even after the confederation had been dissolved.76 Andrzej Potocki persuaded him to act with care: «come to Zaslav as soon as possible – he wrote – and send to Ukraine men who are ready near Zaslav. It seems to me, that it would be better, if you remain in Zaslav, not going far away until you may gather a dozen or so thousands of infantry and good ordnance»77. Stanisław Potocki had similar thoughts: he declared that the reason for his inactivity was, that he still waited for infantry and ordnance78. As a result, the Crown army remained inactive all the time when the fate of Ukraine was at stake.

  • 79 Petrovs’kyj M., Ukraïns’ki dijachi xvii viku: Timish Tsytsjura, in: «Zapysky istorychnofilolohichno (...)
  • 80 Horobets’V., Elita: 207-208.

52The fall of Vyhovs’kyj was essentially caused by the attitude of the Commonwealth towards the Cossacks and the Hadjach Union. The abandonment of the original agreement, the exploitation of the Cossaks’difficult situation to enforce on them concessions in matters that were very sensitive to them (e. g. the Brest Union or the Ruthenian Principality’s enlargement), the Polish indifference towards their troubles – all this undermined the trust of the Cossack elites to the agreement with the Commonwealth and, by that way, to his leader. When they decided to sign the treaty and recognize the King’s authority, the Hetman and his retinue knew how unpopular the treaty was among Cossack society. They were forced to do that by the course of events and the growing aggressiveness of the Tsar, who wished to restrict Cossack autonomy. Both sides, Polish and Cossack, had a common purpose and a common enemy. The treaty was based on this fact, but both sides lacked good will, trust and faith in a deed that remained unfinished. The question of the return of the Polish nobility to their estates was controversial, and the Hetman was right in delaying the decision in this matter for better times; the Tsar, however, used this issue as a pretext to raise feelings of uncertainty among the czerń. At the same time, contrary to the great hopes and the expectations of the Hetman, the Commonwealth did not support Ukraine in the war against Moscow. It is understandable that the Cossacks felt exploited by the court in Warsaw and treated as a mere screen between Poland and the Russian army. Left to themselves, they were not able to hold off Russian aggression indefinitely. Beyond the Dnipro it was very clear who would become Moscow’s target at first turn. In order to avoid the possibility «that Moscow and Cossacks [faithful to her] may say that they were taken by the sword»79, the local elites changed their loyalty. This was the beginning of the Hetman’s end. His position in the army depended on the success of his policy, it depended from the deeds of the Commonwealth. However, the Polish court did not want to engaged itself in direct conflict with the Tsar and begin armed activity before the war with Sweden would be over. The King recognized the seriousness of the situation and the necessity to give Cossacks some help, since they acted as a cover against Russia. However, the complicated internal position (the confederation of the unpaid army, the effort of the Lithuanians to end war in the east as soon as possible and their reluctance to the idea of union with the Cossacks) hindered any effective action, what determined Vyhovs’kyj fate. Without Polish aid the Hetman did not have enough force to guarantee his country’s security when Russian aggression and internal opposition became stronger80.

53One of the best Polish experts of Ukrainian matters, the Volhynian castellan Stanisław Kazimierz Bieniewski had a clear perception of the situation, as it appears from his letter to the bishop of Cracow Andrzej Trzebicki:

  • 81 S. K. Bieniewski to A. Trzebicki, Kijany 28th October 1659, Czart. 394, n. 20: 219.

I understand that you know about the change of the situation in Ukraine, caused by the cursed confederation of the army. Our Fatherland was paralised in the moment when it needed all her forces at the most. We have decided Vyhovs’kyj’s fate pushing the Commonwealth again in troubled waters and giving the enemy, the Muscovite Tsar every reason to rejoice.81

54About the cause of his own fall, Vyhovs’kyj wrote that

some of the commanders, though they have many times received orders from the King to bring me help, have only tried to keep me quiet with letters, but have never executed the orders and do not execute them now. It would have been much better to receive a clear statement that they were not in condition to send reinforcements rapidly, because in that case I would have taken the situation in my hands myself, I could have left the Tatars in the regions beyond the Dnipro or sent for fresh troops to Crimea, or could have gathered Tatars in the field, trusting in god, that rebels would not become dominant. But I was quietened with promises of quick aid, when I was in Polonne, Chudniv, Kotelnja, I put all my trust in this hope, believing, that when they would came, neither Russians would be able to gather their forces, nor rebels would dare to attempt to destroy us.»

55The Hadjach Union survived less than a year. Its failure was caused mainly by military reasons, especially by the mistaken estimation of the course of events on the Northern front, and by the exceedingly optimistic evaluation the Polish politicians gave of the Cossacks’possibility to fight with success against Russian regular forces. The Tatar aid, though valuable, was not sufficent to balance the lack of Polish and Lithuanian regular troops. This would have been not only a concrete support for the Zaporizhian army, but a very clear sign, that the court of the King considered their Ukrainian ally as important partner.

Notes

1 Horobets’V., Elita kozats’koï Ukraïny v poshukakh politychnoï lehitymatsiï: stosunky z Moskvoju ta Varshavoju, 1654-1665, Kyïv, 2001: 188.

2 Ibid., 190.

3 Jerzy Stefan to I. Vyhows’kyi, Jassy 26th August 1657, Akty, otnosjashchiesja k istorii i Zapadnoj Rossii, sobrannye i izdannye Arkheograficheskoj komissieju, (in further mentions – Akty JuZR), t. IV, n. 1: 1-2.

4 Herasymchuk V., Vyhovshchyna i Hadjats’kyj traktatZapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva imeni Shevchenka», lxxxix) (in further mentions – ZNTSh), 1909: 60; Kubala L., Wojny duńskie i pokój oliwski 1657-1660, Lwów, 1922: 90; Smolij V. A.-Stepankov V. S., Ukraïns’ka natsional’na revoljutsija XVII st. (1648-1676 pp.), Kyïv, 1999: 222; Jakovleva T., Het’manshchyna v druhij polovyni 50-kh rokiv XVII stolittja: Prychyny i pochatok Ruïny, Kyïv, 1998: 239.

5 Diarius compendiose zebrany świeżej consulty Warszawskiej A. 1658, BN 6635: 43-44v; Kubala L., Wojny duńskie: 433; Dąbrowski J. S., Ugoda hadziacka na sejmie 1658 roku, in: W kręgu Hadziacza A. D. 1658. Od historii do literatury, pod red. P. Borka, Kraków, 2008: 56-59. Both of grand hetmans, Crown and Lithuanian, were appointed as commisaries, just like S. K. Bieniewski and L. K. Jewłaszewski.

6 Wimmer J., Wojsko polskie w drugiej połowie xvii wieku, Warszawa, 1965: 112-113. In the first half of February, grand Crown hetman reinforced, at the King’s order, Polish troops quartered in Volhynia. See: S. Potocki to S. Bieniewski, Robczyce 13th February 1658, in: Pamjatniki, izdavaemye Vremennoju Kievskoju komissieju dlja razbora drevnikh aktov, (in further mentions – PKK), t. III, Kiev’, 1898: 276-277.

7 S. Bieniewski to P. Sapieha, Połonne 13th April 1658, ibid., 290-291; hrushevs’kyj M., Istorija Ukraïny-Rusy, t. x, Kyïv, 1998: 306-307.

8 P. Sapieha to S. Bieniewski, Kamieniec Litewski 15th January 1658 r., in: PKK, t. III: 263

9 I. Wyhowski to S. Bieniewski, Chyhyryn 1st January 1658, in: herasymchuk V., Materialy do istoriï Kozachchyny XVII viku, n. 25, L’viv, 1994: 44; S. Bieniewski to S. Koryciński, Połonne 27th January 1658 r., in: pkk, t. III: 266. See: hrushevs’kyj M.: 297-298.

10 S. Bieniewski to S. Potocki, Połonne 10th July 1658, in: herasymchuk V., Materialy: 88-89; idem, Vyhovshchyna: 70-71.

11 Opisanie krótkie wiadomości ukrainnych, przez Stanisława Bieniewskiego, kasztelana wołyńskiego, przesłane królowi, styczeń 1658 r., in: PKK, t. III: 269-270; hrushevs’kyj M.: 287-305.

12 Informatio usług ku Rzeczpospolitej urodzonego Krzysztopha Peretiatkowicza, in: pkk, t. iii: 344

13 Bieniewski to Jan Kazimierz, bmd, in: Kubala L., Wojny duńskie: 539, dodatek xiv

14 . Vyhovs’kyj to S. Bieniewski, from the camp near Półjezierze 20th May 1658 r., in: pkk, t. III: 301.

15 Anonymous letter (Fr. Lisola?) to the Emperor, 8 th August 1658 r, in: herasymchuk V., Materialy: 103-104.

16 Bul’vins’kyj A., Ukraïns’ko-rosijs’ki vzajemyny 1657-1659 rr. v umovakh tsyvilizatsijnoho rozmezhuvannja na skhodi Jevropy, Kyïv, 2008: 198.

17 . Vyhovs’kyj to S. Bieniewski, from the camp near Półjezierze 20th May 1658 r., in: pkk, t. III: 301.

18 J. Leszczyński to the King, Warsaw 5th September 1658, Czart, 388, k. 488, in: Kubala L., Wojny duńskie: 532, dodatek x.

19 That clause was later deleted from text of the treaty. Herasymchuk V., Materialy: 117, footnote 88 (p. 135).

20 Ibid., 116-117.

21 Czart. 402: 245-246. See also: Kubala L., Wojny duńskie: 551-552.

22 Tomkiewicz W., Unia hadziacka, «Sprawy Narodowościowe», r. xi, n. 1-2, Warszawa, 1937: 21.

23 Part of Vyhovs’kyj letter to Jan Kazimierz in: hrushevs’kyj M.: 329.

24 Jan Kazimierz to commisaries, Warsaw, 30th August 165., in: Kubala L., Wojny duńskie: 447, footnote 83; horobets’V., Hadjats’ka uhoda 1658 r. v konteksti mizhnarodnykh realij: pro et contra, L’viv (ZNTSh, ccxxxviii), 1999: 106; idem, Elita: 196.

25 John Casimir to the Khan, camp near Torun?, bd (after 5th November, when it was announced in camp about battle of Werki), Archiwum główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie (in further mentions – agad), Archiwum Koronne Warszawskie (in further mentions – akw) dział tatarski, k. 62, t. 40, n. 372: 6; ibid., k. 62, t. 41, n. 373: 2-3.

26 Jan Kazimierz to commissaries, camp near Thorun, 8th November 1658, Czart. 151, n. 124: 541-549; Czart. 401: 145-146. They were to be supported by crown hetman S. Potocki’s division. See: Dąbrowski J., Polsko-moskiewskie rokowania pokojowe w 1658 roku, in: Rzeczpospolita w latach Potopu, red. J. Muszyńska i J. Wijaczka, Kielce, 1996: 102.

27 Senatus Consultum, Warsaw 31st August 1658, Czart. 401: 143-145; Jan Kazimierz to commisaries, Warsaw 31st August 1658, Czart. 151, n. 84: 345-347; K. Pac to commisaries, Zakroczym 10th September 1658, in: Kubala L., Wojny duńskie: 571-576, dodatki, n. xxxvi; Dąbrowski J., Polsko-moskiewskie rokowania: 102.

28 M. Prażmowski to commisaries, camp near Thorun 15th October 1658, Czart. 151, n. 111: 495-497.

29 L. Jewłaszewski to Jan Kazimierz, Lublin 13th October 1658 r., Czart. 151, n. 110: 491-493.

30 Colonel Michał Szemberk’s testimony, in: Akty JuZR, t. xv, n. 6: 303

31 Ibid.

32 Janas E., Konfederacja wojska koronnego w 1659 roku. Komisja lubelska i początek związku, in: Rzeczpospolita w latach potopu, pod red. J. Muszyńskiej i J. Wijaczki, Kielce, 1996: 205.

33 More about this topic in: Kasazhėtski K., Kampanija 1660 hodu ŭ Litve, «Arche», n. Minsk, 2006 (In this place I would like to thank the author for making Polish version of this book available to me).

34 Cf. Babulin I. B., Bitva pod Konotopom 28 ijunja 1659 goda, Moskva, 2009: 5.

35 Bul’vins’kyj A., Ukraïns’ko-rosijs’ki vzajemyny 1657-1659 rr.: 259. Small Tatar forcespated in the unsuccessful siege of Kyiv, commanded by Danilo Vyhovs’kyj.

36 Ibid., 276, 288. At the beginning of December Kiev voivode V. Sheremetev estimatd the its numer at 6 000 men, V. Sheremet’ev to Tsar, Kiev 31 st January 1659, in: Akty JuZR, t. xv, n. 6, cz. iv: 297.

37 Wójcik Z., Traktat andruszowski 1667 roku i jego geneza, Warszawa, 1959: 35-36; horobets’V., Hadjats’ka uhoda 1658 r.: 107; idem, Elita: 197.

38 I. Vyhov’skyi to M. Prażmowski, camp near Rzyszczew 15th January 1658 r., in: PKK, t. III: 318.

39 V. Sheremet’ev to the Tsar, Kiev 31 st January 1659 r., in: Akty JuZR, t. xv, n. 6, cz. iv: Zdanovich was to stay at the King’s court before his mission to Stambul, negotiating military help for the Cossacks and talking about conditions of the Polish-Cossack agreement. Unfortunately, it is unknown, if his embassy was executed.

40 Kroll P., Od ugody hadziackiej do Cudnowa. Kozaczyzna między Rzecząpospolitą a w latach 1658-1660, Warszawa, 2008: 143.

41 Jerlicz J., Latopisiec, albo kroniczka, wyd. K. Wł. Wójcicki, t. II, Warszawa, 1853: 14.

42 Jemiołowski M., Pamiętnik dzieje Polski zawierający (1648-1679), ed. J. Dzięgielewski, Warszawa, 2000: 266-267.

43 Majewski W., Andrzej Potocki (zm. 1663), in: Polski Słownik Biograficzny (in furthertions – PSB), t. xxvii: 770-773

44 Summariusz krótki podanych recognitiej wojskowych do Skarbu Rzptej Koronnego przez Wielmożnego JMPana Andrzeja z Potoka Potockiego oboźnego koronnego, winnickiego etc. starosty w Warszawie die 7 lipca 1660 anno, agad, Archiwum Skarbowe Koronne, dz. 86, ks. 46: 151-153. Akty JuZR, t. xv, n. 6, cz. IV: 303-304 (Colonel Michał Szemberk’s confession). Dragoon’s regiment took a part in the siege of Toruń and probably in the first half of November was sent from there to Ukraine. See: Nowak T., Oblężenie Torunia w roku 1658 r., Toruń, 1936: 93. Author mentioned it among Polish troops, located near Toruń on 6th November to mention it afterwards no more. In Summariuszu are mentioned to: Stefana Piasoczyński’s dragoon’s company and other od Polish infantry. For J. Łączyński see his biogram, in: PSB, t. xviii: 313-314.

45 Wimmer J., Materiały do zagadnienia liczebności i organizacji armii koronnej w latach 1655-1660, in: «Studia i Materiały do historii Wojskowości» (in further mentions – SMhW), IV, 1958: 502-533.

46 Jan Kazimierz to commissaries, camp near Toruń 12th December 1658, Czart. 151, n. 134: 585-586.

47 About the Lithuanian campaign see: Kasazhėtski K., Kampanija 1660 hodu

48 The reasons were: controversion about ratification of hadjach treaty, lack of military success and threat of strong, as was supposed, Russian army’s intervention in Ukraine. Vyhovs’kyj was willing to raise his prestige, so he formulated the idea, according to that presence of Polish army near Dnepr would not be enough and King should come personally, see: I. Vyhovs’kyj to B. Leszczyński, Chyhyryn 9th April 1659, Bossol. 189: 1073.

49 Sefer gazi aga to M. Prażmowski, Bachczysaraj bd, agad akw dz. tatarski, k. 62, t. n. 413: 2.

50 Mehmed gerei IV to Jan Kazimierz, Suren 15th March 1659 r., ibid., t. 78, n. 410: 2

51 Mehmed gerei IV to Jan Kazimierz, bmd (1659 r.), agad akw dz. tatarski, k. 62, t. 86, n. 418: 2.

52 Mehmed gerei IV to Jan Kazimierz, Bakhchysaraj 14th May 1659, ibid., t. 75, n. 408: 2

53 Mehmed gerei IV to Jan Kazimierz, Suren 15th March 1659, ibid., t. 78, n. 410: 2

54 Karacz bey do I. Vyhovs’kyj, Suren bd (April 1659), ibid., t. 83, n. 415: 2

55 Mehmed gerei IV to Jan Kazimierz, Suren 15th March 1659, ibid., t. 78, n. 410: 2

56 RWM: 261. An agree was won by Cossack’envoys, herman hapanovich and a Stomatenko, who stayed in Stambul at the turn of Winter and Spring 1659. It was necessary, since simultaneously the Ottomans were engaged, among other things, in Balcan conflict (against Rákóczi and his allies) and counted on Crimean aid.

57 Bul’vins’kyj A., Ukraïns’ko-rosijs’ki vzajemyny: 353.

58 Summariusz punktów i uniżonych próśb, które jaśnie wielmożny JeMć Pan hetman Wojska Zaporoskiego ze wszystkim Wojskiem Zaporoskim i narodem ruskim, do JKMci i wszystkiej Rzeptej wnosi, wyd. D. Oljanchyn (ZNTSh, ccxxii), 1991: 329-339.

59 Podhorodecki L., Kampania polsko-szwedzka 1659 r. w Prusach i Kurlandii, SMhW, IV, 1958: 217; Wimmer J., Wojsko polskie: 123.

60 Janas E., Konfederacja wojska koronnego w latach 1661-1663, Lublin, 1998: 27-32.

61 Mehmed gerei IV to Jan Kazimierz, Bachczesaraj 14th May 1659, agad, akw, dz. tatarski., k. 62, t. 75, n. 408: 2; ibid., t. 86, n. 418: 2.

62 Jan Kazimierz to Mehmed girei IV, Warszawa bd. [1659.], ibid., k. 62, t. 17, n. 348: 3; k. t. 42, n. 374: 3-4. The King justified himself before Khan, saying that he would continue his fight against Sweden and maintained that peace was very close. He promised that, immediately after a treaty would be signed, all Crown forces, with infantry and ordnance, would go to Ukraine, with aid from his allies.

63 See: Babulin I. B., Bitva pod Konotopom: 15.

64 Envoys’instruction does not exist, its text could be reconstructed using: Respons urodzonym Krzysztophowi Łaskowi, pułkownikowi, Kazimierzowi Czyżewskiemu, strażnikowi, Samu elowi Kurbackiemu, setnikowi szapowałowskiemu i Iwanowi Zabielle, na puncta, podane od wielmożnego Jana Wyhowskiego, wojewody generalnego kijowskiego i hetmana ziem ruskich, posłom do JKM wyprawionym, dany z cancellaryi wielkiej koronnej. D. 19 augusti 1659., in: pkk, t. iii: 364-367. See: Jan Kazimierz to P. Sapieha, Warszawa 20th August 1659, L’vivs’ka naukova biblioteka imeni Vasylja Stefanyka nan Ukraïny, fond 103, n. 1712.

65 A. Potocki to Jan Kazimierz, camp in Rutek 4th August 1659, in: pkk, t. iii: 362. was probably a merchant of greek origin, who organized the Ukrainian custom system in B. Khmel’nyts’kyj’s and I. Vyhovs’kyj’s time. Sometimes he was sent on intelligence missions.

66 T. Karczewski to K. W. Pac, camp near Busk 20th July 1659, ibid., 357.

67 Respons, in: pkk, t. iii: 366.

68 One of the reason of these events was fear of Russian conquest of these territiories.body doubted, that the Cremlin never would let Ukraine slip from its hands.

69 I. Vyhovs’kyj to S. Potocki, camp near Kotelnia 6th October 1659, in: pkk, t. iii: 373. See: I. Vyhovs’kyj’s letters to Jan Kazimierz, near Kotelnia 6th and 20th October 1659, ibid., 371, 379.

70 „ If Cossacks had received our substantial aid, many of them would have been friendful to the King,” T. Karczewski to NN, camp near Kotelnia 18th October 1659, Czart. 2105: 182.

71 Jakub Potocki, son of Cracow castellan was to command these troops, K. Tyszkiewicz NN, Lwów 5th September 1659, APKr., Archiwum Sanguszków 51, n. 190: 537.

72 Ibid., 538.

73 J. Jerlicz, t. II: 31-32. J. Tarnowski to A. Trzebicki, Lvi’v 6th October 1659, Czart. 152, n. 319; P. Vidoni to Apostolicae Sedes, Warszawa 4th and 25th October 1659., in: Litterae nuntiorum apostolicorum Ucrainae illustrantes, coegit P. Athanasius, g. Welykyj OSBM, vol. x, Rzym, 1965: 44, 49. According to information from Milan, Sapieha led 27 cavalry’and 14 dragoons’companies Milan 5th November 1659, ibid., 51.

74 A. Potocki to Jan Kazimierz, camp in Rutek 4th August 1659, in: pkk, t. iii: 362.

75 A. Potocki to Jan Kazimierz, camp in Kotelnia 25 października 1659, ibid.,

76 Janas E., Konfederacja: 33.

77 J. Jerlicz, t. II: 31-32. J. Tarnowski to A. Trzebicki, Lvi’v 6th October 1659, Czart. 152, n. 319; P. Vidoni to Apostolicae Sedes, Warszawa 4th and 25th October 1659., in: Litterae nuntiorum apostolicorum Ucrainae illustrantes, coegit P. Athanasius, g. Welykyj OSBM, vol. x, Rzym, 1965: 44, 49. According to information from Milan, Sapieha led 27 cavalry’and 14 dragoons’companies Milan 5th November 1659, ibid., 51.

78 Jan Kazimierz to J. S. Lubomirski, Warszawa 6th September 1659, B pan i pau w Krakowie, 1065: 249; J. Tarnowski to A. Trzebicki Lviv 6th October 1659, Czart. 152, n. 85: 319.

79 Petrovs’kyj M., Ukraïns’ki dijachi xvii viku: Timish Tsytsjura, in: «Zapysky istorychnofilolohichnoho viddilu UAN», kn. xxiv, Kiev, 1929: 101, dodatki, n. 1.

80 Horobets’V., Elita: 207-208.

81 S. K. Bieniewski to A. Trzebicki, Kijany 28th October 1659, Czart. 394, n. 20: 219.

Auteur

Professor of History at the University of Warsaw, Poland. His many publications deal with social, military and political problems of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 17th century. His book Od ugody hadziackiej do Cudnowa. Kozaczyzna między Rzecząpospolitą a Moskwą w latach 1658-1660 (Warsaw 2008) brings new insight in the complex realtionships among Poles, Ukrainians and Russians.