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Freiheit und Pluralismus

Robert Reick


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77Frankfurt, Harry G. (1971), “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, The Journal of Philosophy 68, S. 5-20.

78— (1973), “Coercion and Moral Responsibility”, in: Hondrich 1973.

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84— (1999b), “Expressive Liberty, Moral Pluralism, Political Pluralism: Three Sources of Liberal Theory”; William and Mary Law Review 40, S. 869-907.

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87Goodin, Robert E. & Jackson, Frank (2007), “Freedom from Fear”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 35/3, S. 249-65.

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92Griffin, James (1977), “Are There Incommensurable Values?”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 7, S. 39-59.

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