1 Founded under the name “Österreichische Mineralölverwaltung AG,” which means “Austrian Mineral Oil Administration, Inc.,” the company changed its name to “ÖMV Aktiengesellschaft” in 1974 and to today’s official title “OMV Aktiengesellschaft” (OMV AG) in 1995. In this paper, I exclusively use the corporation’s current name “OMV,” independent of the time period under consideration.

2 OMV is leading the business magazine trend Top 500 list of Austria’s biggest companies. See <www.trend. at/articles/0724/580/175720/die-top-500-oesterreichs-unternehmen#> (14 Nov. 2010).

3 See United Nations Economic and Social Council and United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations, “Transnational Corporations in World Development: A Re-Examination,” Commission on Transnational Corporations, 4th Session, New York, 15-26 May 1978, 158; and John H. Dunning, “The Distinctive Nature of the Multinational Enterprise,” in Economic Analysis and the Multinational Enterprise, ed. idem. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1974), 13, 15. A MNC is also called a multinational enterprise (MNE) or transnational corporation (TNC).

4 Ray Goldberg, “The Role of the Multinational Corporation,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 63, no. 2 (1981): 367.

5 Paul W. Beamish and John C. Banks, “Equity Joint Ventures and the Theory of the Multinational Enterprise,” Journal of International Business Studies 18, no. 2 (1987): 2.

6 Raymond Vernon, “Economic Sovereignty at Bay,” Foreign Affairs 47, no. 1 (1968): 114.

7 In a global industry like the world oil industry “transnational integration is a requisite of participation rather than a source of an incremental competitive advantage; it is inherent in the structure of the industry.” See Stephen J. Kobrin, “An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Global Integration,” Strategic Management Journal 12 (1991): 18.

8 The “supermajors” are BP, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Eni, ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, and Total. See Amy Myers Jaffe and Ronald Soligo, “The International Oil Companies,” The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, November 2007, 17, <www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/NOC_IOCs_Jaffe-Soligo.pdf > (11 Oct. 2010).

9 For detailed information on the SMV, see Walter M. Iber’s recent study Die Sowjetische Mineralölverwaltung in Österreich: Zur Vorgeschichte der OMV 1945-1955, Veröffentlichungen des Ludwig Boltzmann-Instituts für Kriegsfolgen-Forschung 15 (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2011) and the review of this book in this volume. See also Hans Seidel, Österreichs Wirtschaft und Wirtschaftspolitik nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Vienna: Manz, 2005), 429-79.

10 The bigger part of the Soviet dismantling of the Austrian industry actually was done before the Potsdam Conference. A summary listing the dismantled oil industry equipment is given in Iber, Die Sowjetische Mineralölverwaltung in Österreich, 49, 54.

11 Seidel, Österreichs Wirtschaft und Wirtschaftspolitik nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, 466.

12 Günter Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-55: The Leverage of the Weak (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 36.

13 Under the State Treaty the Republic of Austria was committed to deliver for a period of ten years 1 million tons of oil per year to Moscow. In the end, 6.52 million tons of Austrian oil had been shipped to the Soviet Union, of which 1.3 million tons were borne by OMV. See Friedrich Feichtinger and Hermann Spörker, eds., ÖMV-OMV: Die Geschichte eines österreichischen Unternehmens (Horn: Ferdinand Berger & Söhne, 1996), 92. The oil was not destined for consumption in the Soviet Union but was transferred to the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. See Iber, Die Sowjetische Mineralölverwaltung in Österreich, 215.

14 See Walter M. Iber and Otto Sova, “Von der Sonde ‘Gösting II’zum European Player OMV: Österreichs Erdölindustrie im 20. Jahrhundert,” 10 May 2009, <www.althofen.at/AvW_Museum/Geschichte_der_Chemie/Erdoelindustrie%2020%20Jh%20OMV.pdf> (15 Sept. 2010).

15 OMV obtained 100 percent ownership of Martha Erdöl Ges. m. b. H. and seventy-four percent of ÖROP Handels-AG, which was renamed as Elan Mineralölvertriebs-AG in 1968. The new OMV marketing organizations were operating almost 1,300 gas stations in Austria in the late 1960s. See Franz Mathis, Big Business in Österreich: Österreichische Großunternehmen in Kurzdarstellungen (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1987), 215.

16 Feichtinger and Spörker, eds., ÖMV-OMV, 101. In 1955, domestic oil production amounted to 3.6 million tons.

17 Iber and Sova, “Von der Sonde ‘Gösting II’zum European Player OMV.”

18 Feichtinger and Spörker, eds., ÖMV-OMV, 103.

19 Ibid., 105. OMV gained a fifty-one percent stake in the AWP, which branches off from the TAL at Würmlach in Carinthia. Furthermore, the company obtained a say in the future construction of refineries in Austria and concluded long-term deals for product purchases in Schwechat.

20 In 1969, OMV bought a five percent share in the AREPI (Agence de Recherche et d’Exploitation Pétrolière en Iran) consortium for the onshore exploration and production of oil along the Persian Gulf coast. The other participants were Elf-ERAP (thirty-two percent), the Italian AGIP (twenty-eight percent), the Spanish Hispanoil (twenty percent), and the Belgian Petrofina (fifteen percent).

21 According to the terms of the contract, the Soviet Union pledged to deliver over a period of twenty-three years 1.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas per year. In the following decades, further long-term gas supply deals with Moscow followed. Since 1968, more than 160 bcm of Russian natural gas were imported to Austria. For an overview of the business contacts that led to the revolutionary 1968 deal, see Georg Rigele, “Strom — Erdgas — Atom: Drei Schwerpunkte zur Energiegeschichte Niederösterreichs im 20. Jahrhundert,” in Niederösterreich im 20. Jahrhundert, Band 2, Wirtschaft, ed. Peter Melichar, Ernst Langthaler, and Stefan Eminger (Vienna: Böhlau, 2008), 427-28.

22 Herbert Rambousek, Die “ÖMV Aktiengesellschaft”— Entstehung und Entwicklung eines nationalen Unternehmens der Mineralölindustrie, Dissertationen der Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien 23 (Vienna: VWGÖ, 1977), 100.

23 Judy Dempsey, “OMV of Austria Aims to Become a Hub for Natural Gas,” The New York Times, 8 July 2007, <www.nytimes.com/2007/07/08/business/worldbusiness/08ihtomv.4.6553409.html> (3 Nov. 2010).

24 Feichtinger and Spörker, eds., ÖMV-OMV, 166.

25 Of its exploration budget of 800 to 1,000 million schillings per year, on average only 100 million were invested for the search of crude and natural gas in foreign countries. The lion’s share was budgeted for exploration in Austria. See ibid., 184.

26 Rambousek, Die “ÖMV Aktiengesellschaft”, 3. Rambousek noted as late as in 1977 that OMV’s main focus was on the Austrian energy business (p. 200). This refers to the company’s limited international orientation in those days.

27 Michaela Roiss, “Die Geschichte der österreichischen Erdölindustrie: Transformation vom verstaatlichten Versorger zu einem wettbewerbsfähigen europäischen Anbieter,” PhD. diss., University of Linz, 2004, 184-85.

28 Ibid., 223.

29 David Meindlhumer, “Die Auswirkungen des ersten und zweiten Ölpreisschocks auf die ÖMV: Eine wirtschaftsgeschichtliche und finanzwirtschaftliche Betrachtung,” Diplomarbeit, University of Linz, 2006, 92.

30 Feichtinger and Spörker, eds., ÖMV-OMV, 234. While funds had been divided equally between the domestic and foreign exploration divisions, with their fusion seventy-five percent were allocated to foreign activities and twenty-five percent to exploration on Austrian territory.

31 Ibid., 233-34.

32 See Robert Denk, “13%-Company”: Value Management im OMV Konzern, Controlling—Wissen & Praxis Band 3 (Vienna: WUV, 2002), 15. With the exception of the mid-1990s, these proportions remained relatively stable through the decade. In 1999, domestic output amounted to 13.89 mboe, and foreign production reached 13.26 mboe. In 2000, production in both zones equalled 14.2 mboe.

33 Roiss, “Die Geschichte der österreichischen Erdölindustrie,” 223.

34 See ibid., 193.

35 Quoted in John L. Kennedy, “OMV to Focus on Restructuring, Integrated Oil Operations,” Oil & Gas Journal, 11 Apr. 1994, 32.

36 All numbers were taken from Denk, “13%-Company”, 15.

37 In 1998, PCD Polymere was sold to Borealis, with OMV acquiring twenty-five percent in the latter. Today, OMV holds a thirty-six percent interest in Borealis. The remainder is held by IPIC.

38 Feichtinger and Spörker, eds., ÖMV-OMV, 225.

39 Kennedy, “OMV to Focus on Restructuring,” 34.

40 Denk, “13%-Company”, 17.

41 Feichtinger and Spörker, eds., ÖMV-OMV, 236.

42 Klaus Malle, Top oder Flop: Herausforderungen und Chancen für österreichische Unternehmen in der multipolaren Welt (Vienna: Linde, 2009), 117.

43 Quoted in David Knott, “How to Survive the Merger Battle,” Oil & Gas Journal, 1 Dec. 1997, 38.

44 OMV, Was wir 2003 bewegt haben: Bericht zum Geschäftsjahr, 25, 30. With the Bayernoil acquisition, OMV raised its share in the Transalpine Pipeline (TAL) to twentyfive percent. For this and all other OMV annual reports (Geschäftsberichte and OMV in Zahlen) referred to in this article, see <www.omv.com/portal/01/com/!ut/p/c4/ 04SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3hfA0sPN89Qo1BHE08DpyBTE3dfAwjQD05J1S _IdlQEAHT_Ke8!/ > (12 Nov. 2010).

45 “Romania: Government Approves Petrom Privatization,” Petroleum Economist, July 2004.

46 OMV, Was wir 2005 bewegt haben: Der OMV Konzern in Zahlen, 3, 5.

47 Ibid., 6, 11.

48 With IPIC’s increase of its interest in OMV first to 19.2 percent at the end of 2008 and then to twenty percent in December 2009, the proportion of shares in free float has dropped to 48.5 percent, with ÖIAG’s 31.5 percent stake remaining unchanged.

49 Quoted in OMV, Wachstum im mitteleuropäischen Öl-und Gasgeschäft: Geschäftsbericht 2006, 11

50 See, for example, the interview with Wolfgang Ruttenstorfer by Miriam Koch, “OMV-Boss Wolfgang Ruttenstorfer: ‘ An meinem Sessel wird absolut nicht gesägt,’” Format, 27 Aug. 2009, <www.format.at/articles/0935/525/249723/omv-boss-wolfgang-ruttenstorfer-an-sessel> (19 Oct. 2010); and Chris Bryant and Delphine Strauss, “OMV Pays € 1bn for Control of Petrol Ofisi,” Financial Times, 24 Oct. 2010, <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9f627ec2-de02-11df-88cc-00144feabdc0.html#axzz16OYZ4g7W> (25 Oct. 2010).

51 N. J. Watson, “Mol’s Downstream Deliveries,” Petroleum Economist, November 2008.

52 Derek Brower, “Surgutneftegaz Marches into Hungary,” Petroleum Economist, May 2009.

53 Denk, “13%-Company”, 18.

54 Jaffe and Soligo, “The International Oil Companies,” 17.

55 Rambousek, Die “ÖMV Aktiengesellschaft”, 140. Already by the late 1970s, “OMV’s goal to make of Austria a hub in the European gas network was successfully realized by the company” (p. 141, see also p. 204).

56 See Andrea Gilardoni, The World Market for Natural Gas: Implications for Europe (Berlin: Springer, 2008), 65.

57 Rambousek, Die “ÖMV Aktiengesellschaft”, 141.

58 Commission of the European Communities, “Second Strategic Energy Review: An EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan,” COM (2008) 781 final, Brussels, 13 Nov. 2008, 4.

59 Gilardoni, The World Market for Natural Gas, 73.

60 Christophe-Alexandre Paillard, “Russia and Europe’s Mutual Energy Dependence,” Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 2 (2010): 67.

61 The development of Nabucco primarily stalls because of lacking supply commitments by Caspian natural gas producers. Azerbaijan hesitates to make any commitments and has supply contracts with Russia. Gazprom has also secured large parts of Kazakhstan’s and Uzbekistan’s production. Turkmenistan drops out for the time being because of the unsettled status of the Caspian Sea and Iran is not considered a politically opportune supplier. See, for example, Oliver Geden and Andreas Goldthau, “Das Luftschloss Nabucco,” Der Standard, 27 Jan. 2009, 31; Kirsten Westphal, “Die Nabucco-Erdgaspipeline und die Europäer,” Russlandanalysen 176, 30 Jan. 2009, 15-16; and Heinz Kramer, “Die Türkei als Energiedrehscheibe: Wunschtraum und Wirklichkeit,” SWP-Studie, S 9, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, April 2010, 6, 21-22.

62 This is the official schedule by Nabucco Gas Pipeline International, the company responsible for the project. According to Günther Oettinger, EU commissioner for energy, Nabucco will come on stream in 2018 at the earliest. See Cerstin Gammelin, “Nabucco-Pipeline kommt später,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 25 March 2010. RWE and Reinhard Mitschek, managing director of Nabucco, deny any delays. According to Mitschek, the project is “absolutely on track.” See Interview with Reinhard Mitschek by Reuters Insider on 26 May 2010, <insider.thomsonreuters.com/link.html?ctype=group_channel&chid=3&cid=107536&shareToken=Mzo3ZTViMzQzYS0yZWRlLTRlMmYtYmJhMy1jOGFkNGU2NTBhZDc%3D%0A> (22 Nov. 2010).

63 Quote of Andris Piebalgs. See “Commissioner Piebalgs Recalls European Commitment to Nabucco Project in a Conference Held in Budapest,” Press Release by the European Commission, IP/07/1338, Brussels, 14 Sept. 2007, <europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1338&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> (22 Nov. 2010).

64 Quoted in Ali Tekin and Paul A. Williams, “EU-Russian Relations and Turkey’s Role as an Energy Corridor,” Europe-Asia Studies 61, no. 2 (2009): 338.

65 Commission of the European Communities, “Second Strategic Energy Review,” 17.

66 “Croatia: OMV to Push Ahead with LNG Plant,” Petroleum Economist, April 2007.

67 International Energy Agency, Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Austria 2007 Review (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2008), 81.

68 Ibid., 76.

69 OMV, The Baumgarten Natural Gas Station, <www.omv.at/SecurityServlet/secure?cid=1191498070547> (22 Nov. 2010).

70 Quoted in Anita Orban, Power, Energy, and the New Russian Imperialism (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008), 161.

71 M. K. Bhadrakumar,“A Pipeline into the Heart of Europe,” Asia Times, 30 June 2007, <www.atimes.com/atimes/central_asia/if30ag01.html> (24 Oct. 2010).

72 See Janusz Bugajski, Expanding Eurasia: Russia’s European Ambitions (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008), 89.

73 Luke Anthony Patey, “State Rules: Oil Companies and Armed Conflict in Sudan,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 5 (2007): 1009. For OMV’s Sudan engagement, see also Jemera Rone, Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003), 626-29.

74 Patey, “State Rules,” 1006.

75 European Coalition on Oil in Sudan, “Unpaid Debt: The Legacy of Lundin, Petronas and OMV in Sudan, 1997-2003,” Utrecht, June 2010, 5, <www.ecosonline.org/reports/2010/UNPAID_DEBT_textonlyweb.pdf> (7 Aug. 2010).

76 See Ritt Goldstein, “Die OMV als Komplize bei Kriegsverbrechen im Sudan?” Wiener Zeitung, 15 June 2010.

77 The United Nations Security Council has passed the following resolutions punishing Iran for non-cooperation on its nuclear activities: resolution 1737 of 23 December 2006 (first round of sanctions), resolution 1747 of 24 March 2007 (second round), resolution 1803 of 3 March 2008 (third round), and resolution 1929 of 9 June 2010 (fourth round).

78 Igor Tomberg,“Iran in the European Gas Market: A Russian Point of View,” Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri), October 2009, 15, <www.ifri.org/files/Energie/Tomberg.pdf> (8 Oct. 2010).

79 Ibid., 9. U. S. authorities have put pressure on American pension funds with sizeable investments in Shell and other energy companies. The idea was that the funds would force the companies to withdraw from Iran by threatening them to divest their interests.

80 See Jakob Zirm, “Energie: OMV wartet auf den Regimewechsel im Iran,” Die Presse, 28 July 2010.

81 Matthias Küntzel, “What does Austria and OMV want?”, Vienna, 9 May 2007, <www.cafecritique.priv.at/OMV-PK_engl.html> (7 Oct. 2010); and Diana Gregor, “Austria’s Marriage with Iran—Support for Nuclear Program versus Historic Responsibility,” Talk at The Yale Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of Antisemitism (YIISA), Yale University, New Haven, 4 Feb. 2010, <www.yale.edu/yiisa/dianagregorpaper2410.pdf> (8 Oct. 2010).

82 Christian Wüst, “Ölrausch im Weinviertel,” Der Spiegel, 43/2005, 204.

83 Denk, “13%-Company”, 18.

84 Malle, Top oder Flop, 119.

85 OMV’s current E & P activities cover seventeen countries on four continents, i. e. Austria, Faroe Islands, Ireland, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, and United Kingdom in Europe; Iraq, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, and Yemen in Asia; Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia in Africa; as well as Australia and New Zealand. Additionally, the company maintains representative offices in Abu Dhabi, Ashgabat, and Tehran.

a Revenues and net profits of CNPC, Gazprom, Statoil, Total, Eni, and OMV were calculated on the basis of he exchange rates as of 31 Dec. 2009, i.e. USD 1 = CNY 6.8279 = RUB 30.3076 = NOK 5.7767 = EUR 0.6942.

b Values (market capitalization) as of 31 March 2010 according to the Financial Times Global 500 Index. For OMV, market capitalization as of 31 Dec. 2009.

c The costs of and loss of market value due to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010 are not included.

d PetroChina

e Petroleum Intelligence Weekly‘s ranking of the world‘s top 50 oil companies. Due to their vast reserves and high production, Saudi Aramco is no. 1 and NIOC of Iran no. 2.

f Fortune‘s ranking of the world‘s 500 largest corporations.

g The costs of and loss of market value due to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010 are not included.

h Of which 28,984 Petrom Group.