1 Stefan Zweig, Die Welt von Gestern: Erinnerungen eines Europäers, 32nd ed. (Frankfurt: Fischer, 2000; orig. 1944), 246. The quote is from the English translation The World of Yesterday (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1964), 214.

2 For a comparison of different approaches, see for example Axel Dreher, Noel Gaston, and Pim Martens, Measuring Globalization: Understanding its Causes and Consequences (New York: Springer, 2008); or, for a short version available online, Axel Dreher et al., “Measuring Globalization — Opening the Black Box: A Critical Analysis of Globalization Indices,” Bond University Messages 32, September 2009, <epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=gdc&sei-redir=1#search=%22Measuring+Globalization:+Opening+the+Black+Box:%22> (23 March 2011).

3 See <www.globalisationindex.info/MGI/MGI.html> (20 March 2011).

4 See <www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/index/> (20 March 2011).

5 See <globalization.kof.ethz.ch/> (20 March 2011).

6 See <www. foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/16/metropolis_now> (20 March 2011).

7 See <www. mori-m-foundation.or.jp/english/research/project/6/pdf/GPCI2009_English.pdf> (20 March 2011). The reason for the rather high score is mainly the recognition of livability and environmental factors in this ranking.

8 See <www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/world2008t.html>. For more on the methodology of measurement see the regular research bulletins of the network at <www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/publicat.html>, particularly no. 2, also published as J. V. Beaverstock et al., “Globalization and World Cities: Some Measurement Methodologies,” Applied Geography 20, no. 1 (2000): 43-63.

9 The word as such originated in the mid-twentieth century. It first appeared in English dictionaries in the early 1960s, but did not become academically popular before the 1980s, when it was applied in business research, and generally in the 1990s, when it became the catchword it has been until today. Its first use in academic research is ascribed to Theodore Levitt, “The Globalization of Markets,” Harvard Business Review 61, no. 3 (1983): 92-102. It was further popularized in Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991).

10 This book—interestingly enough—is one of the rare examples of a text originally published in German as Geschichte der Globalisierung (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2003) and later translated into English as Globalization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).

11 The most prominent example of this strategy is the mixup of “globalization” with free trade, liberalization, or even progress.

12 For more on that see Andreas Exenberger, “Poverty and Globalization: Problem and Solution, or Two Sides of the Same Medal?” International Trade and Finance Association Working Papers 14 (2006), 4-7, <services.bepress.com/itfa/16th/art14>.

13 See prominently David Held and Anthony McGrew, eds., The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003).

14 Consequently, the term “globalization process” is needlessly doubling. It is not possible to live in a “globalized world,” because the end of the process is only a theoretical construct. See on that, for example, Malcolm Waters, Globalization (London: Routledge, 1995).

15 For further details, also on the distinction of “globalization” to “globality” and “globalism,” see Ulrich Beck, What is Globalization? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008). This book, originally published as Was ist Globalisierung? Irrtümer des Globalismus—Antworten auf Globalisierung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1997), is another of the rare examples of German books translated into English recently.

16 See for example Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Centuries, Vol. 3, The Perspective of the World (London: Collins, 1984); or Immanuel Wallerstein, World System Analysis: An Introduction (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).

17 For more details on the related concept of a “transitional TimeSpace,” see Immanuel Wallerstein, Unthinking Social Science: The Limits of Nineteenth-Century Paradigms (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).

18 See for example Richard E. Baldwin and Philippe Martin, “Two Waves of Globalization: Superficial Similarities, Fundamental Differences,” in Globalization and Labour, ed. Horst Siebert (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 3-58; Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999); and Robert T. Robertson, The Three Waves of Globalization: A History of a Developing Global Consciousness (London: Zed Books, 2003).

19 See very elaborate on that Harold James, The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). For contrary opinions, particularly on the embryonic stage of international institutionalization, see for example Alexander Nützenadel, “‘A World without Famine?’Internationale Ernährungspolitik im Zeitalter der Weltkriege,” Comparativ 3 (2007): 12-27. Essentially, even Adolf Hitler, another — in a diabolic way — historically “great” Austrian, connected people, albeit in the most hideous and disastrous way of world war and genocidal mass violence.

20 See for example Andre G. Frank and Barry K. Gills, The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand? (London: Routledge, 1999); George Modelski, Tessaleno Devezas, and William R. Thompson, eds., Globalization as Evolutionary Process: Modeling Global Change (London: Routledge, 2008); and Robertson, The Three Waves of Globalization; but also Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O’Rourke, Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); and Michael D. Bordo, Alan M. Taylor, and Jeffrey G. Williamson, Globalization in Historical Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

21 See for example Barry K. Gills and William R. Thompson, eds., Globalization and Global History (London: Routledge, 2006); Anthony G. Hopkins, ed., Globalization in World History (London: Pimlico, 2002); Patrick Manning, Navigating World History: Historians Create a Global Past (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); John R. McNeill and William H. McNeill, The Human Web: A Bird’s Eye View of World History (New York: Norton, 2003); Margarete Grandner, Dietmar Rothermund, and Wolfgang Schwentker, eds., Globalisierung und Globalgeschichte (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2005); and Peter Feldbauer, Gerald Hödl, and Jean-Paul Lehners, eds., Rhythmen der Globalisierung: Expansion und Kontraktion zwischen dem 13. und 20. Jahrhundert (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2009).

22 Richard Baldwin and Philippe Martin regard this as decisive difference between the nineteenth and twentieth century waves, which is closely connected to the predominance of transport technology for the nineteenth, but communication technology for the twentieth century. See Baldwin and Martin, “Two Waves of Globalization.”

23 This changed considerably, because the Austrian film industry was seriously influenced by these losses and turned rather provincial after the war and almost inexistent later. With respect to more contemporary “exports,” particularly well-rewarded action star Arnold Schwarzenegger and Oscar-winning Christoph Waltz could be mentioned (besides—maybe—Michael Haneke and Christian Berger as internationally recognized and rewarded director and cinematographer, respectively).

24 Friedrich Stadler, “The Emigration and Exile of Austrian Intellectuals,” in Austria in the Twentieth Century, ed. Rolf Steininger, Gunter Bischof, and Michael Gehler (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2002), 134.

25 See Stefan Karner et al., eds., Der Wiener Gipfel 1961: Kennedy—Chruschtschow (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2011).

26 Between 1913 and 1937, the number of firms with more than 1,000 employees declined from seventy-four to only forty-nine, and overall employment dropped by almost half. Franz Mathis, “The Austrian Economy: Basic Features and Trends,” in Austria in the Twentieth Century, ed. Steininger, Bischof, and Gehler, 226.

27 Ibid., 233. These mountainous regions (especially Tyrol, Carinthia, and Salzburg) experienced considerable growth effects from tourism, including, as Mathis mentions, “the stimulating effect guests’purchasing power had on other sectors of the economy.”

28 Data until 2000 taken from Sylvia Leodolter and Rudolf Kaske, eds., Tourismus in Österreich: Zukunftsbranche oder Einstieg in die Arbeitslosigkeit (Vienna: Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte, 2001), 141, 143 (originally from the WIFO database of the Austrian Institute of Economic Research). Data for 2005 and 2009 taken from Statistik Austria, see <www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/tourismus/beherbergung/ankuenfte_naechtigungen/030028.html> (9 March 2011). Top 3 Concentration is calculated as sum of the squares of the respective shares of arrivals of those three countries with the highest share.

29 Data is taken from the online documentation of Statistik Austria, see <www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/bevoelkerung/bevoelkerungsstruktur/bevoelkerung_nach_staatsangehoerigkeit_geburtsland/022498.html> (9 March 2011).

30 The following data is presented in more detail in Andreas Exenberger, “Globale Solidarität? Über die Reichweite von Solidargemeinschaften,” in Solidarität: Vom Wert der Gemeinschaft, ed. Clemens Sedmak (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2009), 204-09. The data is based on Hermann Denz, “Solidarität in Österreich: Strukturen und Trends,” SWS-Rundschau 43, no. 3 (2003): 321-36, and Paul M. Zulehner et al., Solidarität — Option für die Modernisierungsverlierer (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 1996).

31 Data based on the Eurobarometer survey 69.2 in 2008 (<zacat.gesis.org>). Balance refers to a weighted balance of answers: Balance = [% Answer 1 + (½ * % Answer 2) – (½ * % Answer 3) – % Answer 4].

32 On “glocalization,” see Roland Robertson, “Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity,” in Global Modernities, ed. Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson (London: Sage, 1995), 25-44; and Zygmunt Bauman, “On Glocalization: Or Globalization for Some, Localization for some Others,” Thesis Eleven 54, no. 1 (1998): 37-49.

33 Additionally, forty-three percent agree that Austria’s voice counts in the EU, while forty-six percent disagree, and twenty-two percent agree that the Austrians’ voice counts in the EU, while sixty-five percent disagree.

34 Further, Austrians do regard EU membership as beneficial well below the EU average: thirty-six percent regard it as good, twenty-six percent as bad, and thirty-six percent as neithernor, while the EU-wide values are fifty-two, fourteen, and twenty-nine percent, respectively. Comparable is the picture only in Hungary; worse only in the United Kingdom and Latvia.