2 Günter Bischof/Anton Pelinka, eds., The Americanization/Westernization of Austria (CAS 12) (New Brusnwick; Transaction, 2004).

3 Günter Bischof/Anton Pelinka/Ruth Wodak, eds., Neutrality in Austria (CAS 9) (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2000): Manfried Rauchensteiner, ed., Zwischen den Blöcken: NATO, Warschauer Pakt und Ősterreich (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2010); Oliver Rathkolb, Internationalisierung Österreichs seit 1945 (Österreich – Zweite Republik 15) (Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2006). On transatlanticism see Mary Nolan, The Transatlantic Century: Europe and America, 1890-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Jussi M. Hanhimäki/Benedikt Schoenborn/Barbara Zanchetta, Transatlantic Relations since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2012).

4 Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); Günter Bischof, “Das amerikanische Jahrhundert: Europas Niedergang - Amerikas Aufstieg,” Zeitgeschichte, vol. 28 (March-April 2001), 75-95.

5 This is the impression one is left with after reading the hitherto opened National Security Council files in the Bush Library in College Station, TX. While the Bush White House views the reform process in Poland and Hungary with baited breath (Bush even visits these countries in July 1989), the opening of the iron curtain along the Austro-Hungarian border is hardly noticed, see also George H. W. Bush/Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Vintage, 1998).

6 The State Department’s changing postwar geographic assignations of Austria were always politically motivated. The State Department’s official documentation Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) assigned Austria a “Central European” position along with West Germany in the volumes covering the years 1945 to 1960. In the 1961-63 volume Austria was moved eastward and grouped with Eastern Europe and, from Washington’s perspective, and presumably continues to be part of “Eastern Europe” until the end of the Cold War (the FRUS volumes are now being published for the first half of the 1970s). See Günter Bischof, “Verliert Österreich seinen guten Ruf? Österreichs Image in den USA nach der Bildung der neuen ÖVP/FPÖ-Regierung,” in: Heinrich Neisser/Sonja Puntscher-Riekmann, eds., Europäisierung der österreichischen Politik: Konsequenzen der EU-Mitgliedschaft (Vienna: WUV, 2002), 377-63 (here 39). In 1994, Clinton’s State Department elevated formerly communist Eastern Europe to “Central Europe” (see below).

7 Gunther Hauser, “ESDP and Austria: Security Policy Between Engagement and Neutrality,” in Bischof/Pelinka/Gehler, eds., Austrian Foreign Policy, 207-45.

8 Alexander Schröck, “Die US-Perzeption Österreichs in der Détente and Post-Détente-Ära,” in: Oliver Rathkolb/Otto Machke/Stefan August Lűtgenau, eds., Mit anderen Augen gesehen: Internationale Perzeptionen Österreichs 1955-1990 (Österreichische Nationalgeschichte nach 1945 2) (Vienna: Böhlau 2002), 35-86.

9 For three insider perspectives on the changing parameters of Austrian diplomacy and foreign policy and its “Western EUropeanization” and globalization, see Eva Nowotny, “Diplomats: Symbols of Sovereignty become Managers of Interdependence: The Transformation of the Austrian Diplomatic Service,” in: Bischof/Pelinka/Gehler, eds., Austrian Foreign Policy, 25-38; Peter Moser, Bewegte Zeiten: 40 Jahre im auswärtigen Dienst (TRANSATLANTICA vol. 5) (Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2011), 167-74; Thomas Nowotny, Diplomacy and Global Governance: The Diplomatic Service in an Age of Worldwide Interdependence (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2011).

10 In 1951 the legation in Vienna was upgraded to an Embassy; John G. Erhardt (1946-1950), Walter J. Donnelly (1950-1952), Llewelyn E. Thompson, Jr. (1952-1957), H. Freeman Matthews (1957-1962), James G. Riddleberger (1962-1967), Douglas MacArthur II (1967-1969).

11 Roy M. Huffington (1990-1993), Swanee Grace Hunt (1993-1997), Kathryn Walt Hall (1997-2001), Lyons Brown, Jr. (2001-2005), Susan Rasinski McCaw (2005-2007), David F. Girard-diCarlo (2007-2009), William Eacho (2009-)

12 Fredrich Höss (1987-1993), Helmut Türk (1993-1999), Peter Moser (1999-2003), Eva Nowotny (2003-2007), Christian Prosl (2007-2011), Hans Peter Manz (2011-)

13 Ferrero Waldner ran for the office of Austrian president in 2004 and lost the race; she then received the prestigious appointments of European Commissioner for External Relations (2004-9) and European Commissioner for Trade and Neighborhood Policy (2009-10). The outside world presumably perceived her role in Brussels as “European” rather than “Austrian.” Ever since the Balkans wars of the 1990s, the EU leadership often leaned on Austrian diplomatists in key diplomatic missions.

14 On “male bastions of power” see Gehler, “Vom EU-Beitritt zur EU-Osterweiterung,” in: Kriechbaumer/Schausberger, eds., Die umstrittene Wende, 491. Marlene Streeruwitz, Austrian writer and feminist and critic of the Schüssel government, charged that Ferrero-Waldner functioned like a man in the male dominated foreign ministry – in fact “she is a man” – see Tagebuch der Gegenwart (Vienna 2002) 7, cited in Ernst Hanisch, “Die Vergangenheitspolitik der schwarz-blauen Regierung,” in: Robert Kriechbaumer/Franz Schausberger, eds., Die umstrittene Wende: Österreich 2000-2006 (Vienna: Böhlau, 2013), 405.

15 Reinhard Heinisch, “Unremarkably Remarkable, Remarkably Unremarkable: Schűssel as Austria’s Foreign Policymaker in a Time of Transition,” in: Gűnter Bischof/Fritz Plasser, eds., The Schűssel Era in Austria (CAS 18) (New Orleans-Innsbruck: UNO/iup, 2010), 147f.

16 See Nolan’s chapter “Imperial America, Estranged Europe” in: the Transatlantic Century, 356-73, 331 (quotation).

17 There is hardly any scholarly literature concentrating on the specific U.S. – Austrian relationship after the Cold War. Michael Gehler’s expansive chronicle of post-World War II Austrian foreign policy covers the post-Cold War foreign policy, but largely from the perspective of Austria’s integration in the EU and with a concentration on the various crises; he largely ignores the U.S. – Austrian relationship. See Österreichs Außenpolitik der Zweiten Republik, 2 vols. (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2005); the best analytical introduction is Heinisch, “Unremarkably Remarkable,” 119-58.

18 Former German foreign minister Joschka Fischer points out that Washington’s “unilateralist inclinations” started with the end of the Cold War, see “Between Kosovo and Iraq: The Process of Redefining the Transatlantic Relationship,” Bulletin of the German Historical Institute 41 (Fall 2007): 9-19 (quotation 13).

19 For a hard-nosed persuasive analysis, arguing for a steady demise of transatlantic relations since the Clinton era, long before 9/11, see Edwina S. Campbell, “From Kosovo to the War on Terror: The Collapsing Transatlantic Consensus, 1999-2002,” Strategic Studies Quarterly vol. 1, no. 1 (Fall 2007): 36-78.

20 The domestic political, diplomatic, and international legal aspects of the “EU-14 sanctions” have received considerable scholarly attention, see Erhard Busek/Martin Schauer, eds., Eine Europäische Erregung: Die “Sanktionen” der Vierzehn gegen Österreich im Jahr 2000. Analysen und Kommentare (Vienna: Böhlau, 2003); Waldemar Hummer/Anton Pelinka, eds., Österreich unter “EU-Quarantäne”: Die “Maßnahmen der 14” gegen die österreichische Bundesregierung aus politikwissenschaftlicher und juristischer Sicht. Chronologie, Kommentar, Dokumentation (Vienna: Linde, 2002).

21 The Bush II period has received the most scholarly attention, but usually from the perspective of deteriorating transatlantic relations. Apart from Margit Reiter’s chapter on the Austrian response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in Margit Reiter/Helga Embacher, eds., Europa und der 11. September 2011 (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2011), none of these works concentrate on Austria, see Waldemar Zacharasiewicz, ed., Transatlantische Differenzen/Transatlantic Differences (Vienna: Böhlau, 2004); Gustav E. Gustenau/Otmar Höll/Thomas

22 An exception is Franz Vranitzky, Politische Erinnerungen (Vienna: Paul Zsolnay, 2004).

Nowotny, eds., Europe – USA: Diverging Partners (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006); Michael Gehler, “From accidental disagreement to structural antagonism: the US and Europe: old and new conflicts of interest, identities, and values, 1945-2005,” in: Barry Eichengreen/Michael Landesmann/Dieter Stiefel, eds., The European Economy in an American Mirror (London: Routledge, 2008), 458-499; Friedrich Korkisch,” Die österreichische Sicherheitspolitik – Neue Aufgaben fűr die militärische Landesverteidigung,” in: Alfred Payrleitner, ed., Die Fesseln der Republik: Ist Österreich reformierbar? (Vienna: Molden, 2002), 151-70, see also the essays by Michael Gehler of Austrian foreign policy, Paul Luif on neutrality, and Gunther Hauser on security policy in: Kriechbaumer/Schausberger, eds., Die umstrittene Wende, 461-625.

23 Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Vintage, 2005); George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Broadway, 2011); Warren Christopher, In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for an Era (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1998); Madeleine Albright with Bill Woodward, Madame Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Hyperion, 2002); Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor (New York: Crown, 2011); Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011); Dick Cheney with Liz Cheney, In My Life: A Personal and Political Memoir (New York: Threshold, 2011); George Tenet with Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: HarperCollins, 2007).

24 he best detailed analysis of these dramatic events is Andreas Oplatka, Der erste Riss in der Mauer: September 1989 – Ungarn öfnet die Grenze (Vienna: Zsolnay, 2009).

25 “An Icy Reception for Austria’s Bid to Join European Community,” New York Times, May 1, 1989, D-8. For a sound scholarly analysis, see Paul Luif, On the Road to Brussels: The Political Dimension of Austria’s, Finland’s and Sweden’s Accession to the European Union (Vienna: Braumüller, 1995); for a useful survey see also Michael Gehler, Österreichs Weg in die Europäische Union (Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2009). Chancellor Vranitzky comments much more extensively on Austria’s “letter to Brussels” in 1989 than the iron curtain coming down, see Politische Erinnerungen, 312-344.

26 Günter Bischof, “Die Amerikaner, die Deutsche (Wieder) Vereinigung und Österreich,” in: Oliver Rathkolb/Georg Schmidt/Gernot Heiss, eds., Österreich und Deutschlands Größe: Ein schlampiges Verhältnis (Salzburg: Otto Műller, 1990), 224-34.

27 Andrew E. Harrod, “Austrian Neutrality: The Early Years, 1955-1958,” Austrian History Yearbook 41 (2010): 216-46 (esp. 238-45); see also David McIntosh. “In the Shadow of Giants: U.S. Policy Toward Small Nations: The Cases of Lebanon, Costa Rica, and Austria in the Eisenhower Era,” in: Gűnter Bischof/Anton Pelinka, eds., Austro-Corporatism: Past – Present – Future (CAS 4) (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1996), 222-79.

28 Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik, II, 664.

29 Heinisch, “Unremarkably Remarkable,” 126. Under international law though, neutrality does not prohibit political preference and does not include civil wars unless the rebels are recognized as belligerents. I thank Hanspeter Neuhold for this clarification.

30 Anton Pelinka cited in Gehler, “Vom EU-Beitritt zur EU-Osterweiterung,” in: Kriechbaumer/Schausberger, eds., Die umstrittene Wende, 473; see also Luif, “Austria’s Permanent Neutrality,” in: Bischof/Pelinka/Wodak, Neutrality in Austria, 143-48.

31 As Richard Holbrooke argues perceptively about the vicious circle of Europe and the U.S. expecting the other to take care of the problem: “In this sorry sequence, Europe and the United States proved to be equally misguided. Europe believed it could solve Yugoslavia without the United States; Washington believed that, with the Cold War over, it could leave Yugoslavia to Europe. Europe’s hour had not dawned in Yugoslavia; Washington had a dog in this particular fight. It would take four years to undo these mistakes — four years before Washington belatedly and reluctantly, but decisively, stepped in and asserted leadership” [Holbrooke’s emphasis].” See Holbrooke, To End A War, 29.

32 Ivo H. Daalder stresses these deep disagreements and the “Atlantic divide” over Bosnia, see Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy (Washington: Brookings, 2000); See the chapter “Horror in the Balkans” in Albright, Madame Secretary, pp. 224-44. The best inside view of the Bosnian crisis and the making of the Dayton Accords is the very readable memoir by Richard Holbrooke, To End A War (New York: Random House, 1998).

33 Anton Pelinka, Nach der Windstille: Eine politische Autobiographie (Vienna: Braumüller, 2009), 149.

34 William G. Hyland, Clinton’s World: Remaking American Foreign Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 29-49 (quotation 38). More defensive of their policies are three of the premier actors on Clinton’s foreign policy team, see the chapters “Bringing Peace to Bosnia,” in: Warren Christopher, In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 343-71, and the chapter “Horror in the Balkans,” in: Albright, Madam Secretary, 224-44; Holbrooke, To End A War.

35 The American memoirists are characteristically ungenerous in giving key European players such as Petritsch any credit.

36 So summarized by Austria’s top-Balkans expert Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch, see his essay “Recent Balkans Diplomacy from the Austrian Perspective,” in Bischof/Pelinka/Gehler, eds., Austrian Foreign Policy, 264-79.

37 Steven Philip Kramer argues that in the first post-Cold War European crisis in Yugoslavia Germany was called upon to act as “‘normal’ nation through its unilateral recognition of Croatian independence” but it backfired, see “The Return of History in Europe,” Washington Quarterly 34/4 (Fall 2012): 8i-91 (here 83).

38 Great tensions characterized the formulation of Austrian foreign policy during these years within the governing SPÖ-ÖVP coalition. Chancellor Vranitzky and Vice Chancellor and Foreign Miniter Mock did not see eye to eye in the alignment of foreign policy issues, see Vranitzky, Politische Erinnerungen, 149, 201-204 and passim.

39 Ex-Chancellor Franz Vranitzky served as the EU envoy in Albania; Wolfgang Petritsch as a EU special envoy and chief negotiator at the Rambouillet Conference for Kosovo, as well as EU Special High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina as did Valentin Inzko (the High Representative was the highest authority under the Dayton/Paris Agreement);

40 The newly elected President Bush had visited Kosovo in 2001 and was “appalled by the lethargic UNO presence more than two years after the war had ended.” Condoleezza Rice recalls that the “President had opined that Kosovo seemed to be where European government sent their washed-up diplomats rather than their best and brightest.” She adds: “I couldn’t disagree,” see No Higher Honor, 191.

Stefan Lehne served as EU “foreign minister” Javier Solana’s Balkan coordinator; the EU appointed former Vice Chancellor Erhard Busek as its special Stability Pact Coordinator in the Balkans as did Albert Rohan in the role of Martti Ahtisaari’s number two.

41 “Austria, Finland and Sweden in Europe’s New Security Plans,” New York Times, June 29, 1995. The Austrian Parliament did pass Art 23 (f) as Constitutional amendments to avoid legal problems with the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties of the European Union.

42 Heinisch, “Unremarkably Remarkable,” 122. On Mock see also Martin Eichtinger/Helmuth Wohnout, “Alois Mock – Pioneer of European Unity,” in: Günter Bischof/Fritz Plasser/Eva Maltschnig, eds., Austrian Lives (CAS 21) (Innsbruck-New Orleans: UNO/iup Press, 2012), 164-86, and idem Alois Mock: Ein Politiker schreibt Geschichte (Graz: Styria, 2008).

43 “Geography is the reason that NATO would it more convenient to have Austria in rather than out,” see “Torn by NATO Debate, Coalition Parties Can’t Devise a Security Policy: Neutrality Issue Deeply Divides Austria,” New York Times, July 8, 1998.

44 “PFP provided a road map to NATO membership,” see Albright, Madam Secretary, 212.

45 Quoted in New York Times, July 8, 1998.

46 A classic text of the Greens’ anti-American, anti-hegemonic posture is Peter Pilz, Mit Gott gegen Alle: Amerikas Kampf um die Weltherrschaft (Suttgart: dva, 2003).

47 Hauser, “ESPD and Austria,” in: Bischof/Pelinka/Gehler, eds., Austrian Foreign Policy, 207-45. For a dense and insightful discussion of the contested 1998 “options report,” see Heinrich Schneider, “Der sicherheitspolitische ‘Optionenbericht’ der österreichischen Bundesregierung: Ein Dokument, das es nicht gibt – ein Lehrstück politischen Scheiterns,” in: Erich Reiter, ed., Jahrbuch für international Sicherheitspolitik 1999 (Hamburg: E. S. Mittler, 1998), 419-96.

48 Markus Krottmayer, Die Neutralitätsfalle: Österreichs Sicherheitspolitik in der Sackgasse (Vienna: LIT, 2009).

49 Pelinka, Nach der Windstille, 151.

50 Gehler, “Vom EU-Beitritt zur EU-Osterweiterung,” in: Kriechbaumer/Schausberger, eds., Die umstrittene Wende, 481.

51 Campbell, “From Kosovo to the War on Terror,” 42-6 (quotation 44).

52 Moser, Bewegte Zeiten, p. 102.

53 Schűssel was in charge of Austrian foreign policy, especially EU-policy, for 11 years, first as Foreign Minister (1995-2000), then as chancellor (2000-6). Unlike Mock, he was a neophyte without a vision – always giving priority to domestic affairs, he left Austrian foreign policy frequently isolated and “standing alone”, see Heinisch, “Unremarkably Remarkable,” 123f, 131ff, 148f, 150; for the opposite view, see the Plassnik essay in this volume.

54 When Richard Holbrooke became Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (EUR) in the summer of 1994, he reorganized the European Bureau’s Central European division to reflect “the new emphasis we wished to place on that region.” The “outdated” Office of Eastern European Affairs was abolished on Holbrooke’s first day in office in September 1994 and three news offices – one of them dealing with “Central Europe” – were created “reflecting the post-Cold War realities of Europe.” “Eastern Europe” was banned from the official State Department vocabulary and replaced with “Central Europe.” Holbrooke laments: “Unfortunately, most people, including the media, still use the outmoded phrase.” See To End a War, 7f.
Daniel Hamilton, who was Holbrooke’s policy adviser in EUR, remembers the arcana of Washington “bureaucratics” at the time: “We created a new office of Nordic-Baltic affairs, (EUR/NB) taking the Balts out of the former Soviet orbit and the office that had previously been reporting to officials responsible for relations with Soviet Union and then the former Soviet Union. Politically speaking, that was the major change. Clinton had appointed Strobe Talbott to deal with relations with the then-crumbling Soviet Union; The intention had been to split the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, a huge bureau that accounted for about half of the memos and traffic going to the Secretary’s office, into two, with Strobe overseeing the Soviet bureau, which was transitioning to the New Independent States. But Congress--particularly Jesse Helms, then head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee--objected to this, claiming that Clinton was accepting the notion of a Russian ‘’ sphere of influence.’ ’ So the result was an awkward bureaucratic arrangement in which the New Independent States were simply placed directly in the Secretary’s office (hence the bureaucratic designation S/NIS). It was thus not a separate bureau, so avoiding the

55 Albright, Madame Secretary, 210, 211.

Jesse Helms problem. But the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs became simply the Bureau for European Affairs, and the Assistant Secretary for that Bureau, eventually Holbrooke, did not have the NIS under his portfolio. Talbott also moved from this original posting — which was not confirmed by the Senate — to become Deputy Secretary of State, and he continued to oversee relations with Russia and NIS, including many other areas. In the Bush years the Bureau was made once again Bureau for European and Eurasian Affairs, and continues to be so under Obama.”
Hamilton adds: “The office including Austria at the time was labeled AGS, standing for Austria, Germany, Switzerland, a Germanic clustering. This office did report to a Deputy Assistant Secretary in EUR whose portfolio also included an office called Western Europe (EUR/WE), with countries like Spain, Portugal, France, etc. A separate office dealt with the UK and Benelux. In recent years, however, there have been other reorganizations at office level, so that Germany is now part of EUR/WE, and Austria and Switzerland are part of EUR/CE, or Central Europe. There is also EUR/SCE, which deals with countries in Southeastern Europe. The organization usually has to do with resources as much as priority themes. It could change again under a new Secretary.” Personal e-mail Daniel Hamilton to author, February 6, 2013.

56 GZ. 3.42/10/03, “NATO und Österreich aus US-Sicht,” E-Mail Moser to Foreign Ministry, Sept. 2, 2003, Peter Moser Private Papers, CenterAustria. Even though this report was written in September 2003, the arguments used were as relevant for the 1990s debates. This revealing document is added in toto as an appendix to this essay. We are grateful to

57 On Schűssel’s leadership style, see David Wineroither, Kanzlermacht – Machtkanzler? Ambassador Moser for sharing it.

58 “Austria Coalition Sworn In as Diplomatic Fallout Rises,” New York Times, Feb. 5, 2000, A-6.

Die Regierung Schűssel im historischen und internationalen Vergleich (Vienna: LIT, 2009), and the essays in Kriechbaumer/Schausberger, eds., Die umstrittene Wende.

59 GZ. 3.1/59/00, “Neue Bundesregierung; Imageschäden in den USA – Gegenstrategie,” E-Mail Moser to Foreign Ministry, Mar. 1, 2000, and GZ. 1.30/45/03, Aug. 28, 2003, “Abschlussbericht: 4 Jahre USA, Rűckblick,” E-Mail Moser to Foreign Ministry, Aug. 28, 2033, both Peter Moser Private Papers, CenterAustria.

60 Ibid..

61 For a summary of these events see Michael Gehler, “Präventivschlag als Fehlschlag: Motive, Intentionen und Konsequenzen der EU-14 Sanktionsmaßnahmen gegen Österreich 2000,” in: Busek, ed., Eine Europäische Erregung, pp. 19-74, and the Suppan essay in this volume. The Schüssel government and the Austrian press were quick to castigate the EU-14 “measures” as “sanctions” in order to unleash a patriotic backlash against the European Union, see Pelinka, Nach der Windstille, 154-58.

62 Gűnter Bischof, “Watschenmann der europäischen Erinnerung”? Internationals Image und Vergangenheitspolitik der Schüssel/Riess-Passer-ÖVP/FPÖ-Koalitionsregierung,” in: idem/Michael Gehler/Anton Pelinka, eds., Österreich in der EU: Bilanz einer Mitgliedschaft (Vienna: Böhlau, 2003), pp. 445-78; Gűnter Bischof/Michael S. Maier, „ Reinventing Tradition and the Politics of History: Schűssel’s Restitution and Commemoration Policies,“in Gűnter Bischof/Fritz Plasser, eds., The Schűssel Era in Austria (CAS 18) (New Orleans-Innsbruck: uno press-iup, 2010), pp. 206-34; on Schüssel’s „ politics of history “and the restitution negotiations, see also the essays by Robert Kriechbaumer, Ernst Hanisch and Michael Gehler in Kriechbaumer/Schausberger, eds., Die umstrittene Wende, pp. 183-210, 397-416, 497-508.

63 For a tight summary of the spillover of “the Americanization of the Holocaust” ever since the “Waldheim fiasco” of the late 1980s, see Christian Thonke, Hitlers Langer Schatten: Der műhevolle Weg zur Entschädigung der NS-Opfer (Vienna: Böhlau, 2004). For a comparative perspective on the international politics of restitutions after totalitarian regimes, see Oliver Rathkolb, ed., Revisiting the National Socialist Legacy: Coming to Terms with Forced Labor, Expropriation, Compensation, and Restitution (Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2002).

64 One such group was the Claims Conference pressuring “the Austrian government to acknowledge complicity during the Nazi regime and to improve reparations to Jews”, see” Holocaust Group to Step Up Pressure on Austria for Reparations,” New York Times, July 20, 2000, A-5.

65 Stuart E. Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice: Looted Assets, Slave Labor, and the Unfinished Business of World War II (New York: Public Affairs, 2003), 298.

66 On the spillover effects of the “Americanization of the Holocaust” ever since the 1980s “Waldheim fiasco”, see Thonke, Hitlers Langer Schatten, 88-105.

67 The Times dedicated a story to Moser’s “nightmare” days, see “Diplomat Picks Up the Pieces of Austria’s Broken Image,” New York Times, Feb. 14, 2000, 14.

68 This episode is recounted in Moser, Bewegte Zeiten, 145; see also “Iraq-Reise: Entsetzen űber Haiders Besuch bei Saddam,” Der Spiegel, Feb. 12, 2002 http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/irak-reise-entsetzen-ueber-haiders-besuch-bei-saddam-a-182066.html (accessed February 5, 2013).

69 Peter Moser is the rare ambassador to write memoirs. These memoirs are a great source of information for historians and intimately document this period of Austrian-American relations exceptionally well, see his Bewegte Zeiten, pp. 101-21; see also GZ. 1.30/45/03, Aug. 28, 2003, “Abschlussbericht: 4 Jahre USA, Rűckblick,” E-Mail Moser to Foreign Ministry, Aug. 28, 2033, Peter Moser Private Papers, CenterAustria. Based on reports like this one and a treasure trove of personal papers, Moser wrote these memoirs while serving as the Marshall Plan Chair at UNO in 2009/2010. He donated these private papers to CenterAustria at UNO and they are utilized here for the first time.

70 A good introduction to the larger issues of Nazi art theft in Austria are the essays in Verena Pawlowsky/Harald Wendelin, eds., Enteignete Kunst: Raub un Rűckgabe – Österreich von 1938 bis heute (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2006); for the larger background of Nazi art politics, see Jonathan Petropoulos, The Faustian Bargain: The Art World in Nazi Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

71 For a good summary of the complex legal and diplomatic issues, see Moser, Bewegte Zeiten, 102, 136-42; see also the documentary Adele’s Wish by Terence Hunter, Calendar Films 2008.

72 Moser, Bewegte Zeiten, pp. 142-44. Eva Male, the Washington correspondent of Die Presse, reported that the Bush administration wanted to get to know one of the few conservative chancellors in Europe, was grateful for the Austrian support in the “war on terror” (Austria had allowed overflights and cooperated in tightening the banking laws), and wanted to pay tribute to Austria’s restitution legislation compensating Holocaust victims, see “Post 9/11: Zusammenarbeit zur Terrorbekämpfung/Sanktionen u. Haider kein Thema,” Die Presse, Nov. 2, 2011.

73 The ups and downs of U.S. – Austrian relations can also be gleaned from the writings of Austrian reporters that covered the Clinton and Bush years. For a superficial book written by a television journalist in the breathless style of a diarist, see Eugen Freund, Mein Amerika: Bestandaufnahmen, Beobachtungen, Berichte 1995-2001 (Klagenfurt: Wieser, 2001). For more thoughtful reflections by a print journalist, see Eva Male, “I feel like I have two homes, or maybe none at all… Four years [1999-2003] in the United States as a Correspondent for the Austrian Daily Die Presse,” in: Gűnter Bischof/Anton Pelinka/Hermann Denz, eds., Religion in Austria (CAS 13) (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2005), 165-75.

74 For a comparison of the Pearl Harbor and the 9/11 attacks within their respective historical contexts, see John W. Dower, Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor/Hiroshima/9-11/Iraq (New York: W. W. Norton, 2010).

75 The profound shock produced by the 9/11 attacks and deep-seated fear and paranoia about more attacks is a principal theme in the memoirs of all the members of the Bush administration, see Melvyn P. Leffler, “The Foreign Policies of the George W. Bush Administration: Memoirs, History, Legacy,” Diplomatic History 37 (April 2013): 190-216 (esp. 199f).

76 Margit Reiter, “Signaturen des 11. September, 2001 in Österreich,” in idem/Embacher, eds., Europa und der 11. September 2001, 161-92

77 Joschka Fischer believes that the U.S. abandoned its consensual Cold War modus operandi within a multilateral transatlantic framework in the final Clinton years, drawing the wrong conclusions from the Kosovo air campaign, arguing that “coalition war” was too complicated and “going it alone” was easier, see “Between Kosovo and Iraq,” 13.

78 Anatol Lieven, American Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 72-80.

79 “Iraq _ Krieg: Dick Cheney hat ein reines Gewissen,” Die Presse, March 20, 2013 http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/1378658/IrakKrieg_Dick-Cheney-hat-ein-reines-Gewissen?_vl_backlink=/home/politik/aussenpolitik/1377526/index.do&direct=1377526 (accessed March 22, 2013); Cheney is similarly dismissive of critics in his memoirs.

80 Campbell, “From Kosovo to the War on Terror,” 46-61; Ivo H. Daalder/James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington: Brookings, 2003).

81 “Was Österreichs Neutralität alles nicht verbietet. Teilnahme an kollektiver Selbstverteidigung,” Die Presse, Sept. 26, 2001; see the op-ed – critical of Austrian “neutralism”--by Wolfgang Streitenberger, “Solidarität: Was verstehen die Österreicher darunter? Eine beunruhigende Frage,” die Presse, Sept. 25, 2001; see also Gehler, “Vom EU-Beitritt zur EU-Osterweiterung,” in: Kriechbaumer/Schausberger, eds., Die umstrittene Wende, 512f..

82 “Austria permitted the use of its airspace for flights associated with CIA extraordinary rendition, and may have assisted with the apprehension of an Austrian resident extraordinary rendition victim.” See Open Society Justice Initiative, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition (New York, 2013), 67f (here 67) http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/globalizing-torture-20120205.pdf (accessed Feb. 7, 2013); see also “54 Staaten halfen CIA mit verschleppten Terrorverdächtigen, “Der Standard, Feb. 5, 2013, http://derstandard.at/1358305742204/Bericht-54-Staaten-halfen-CIA-mit-verschleppten-Terrorverdaechtigen (accessed Feb. 7, 2013).

83 For excellent analyses of Bush’s foreign policies see Timothy Naftali’s essay on the war on terror and Fredrick Logevall’s essay on Bush Iraq invasion in Julian E. Zelizer, ed., The Presidency of George W. Bush (Princeton, 2010), 59-113. Leffler notes that the doctrine of preemption (drafted by Rice’s friend Philip Zelikow) did not play as prominent a role in the White House as many of Bush’s critics have it – it was designed more to be an ideological statement like the famous “NSC 68” document, see Leffler, 203.

84 Cheney keeps insisting that terrorists at WMD were the principal causes of the U.S. war against Iraq, see Cheney, In My Life, 411-20; Rice gives a more nuanced explanation, No Higher Honor, 194-24; Rumsfeld claims surprise, when it became clear that Saddam’s alleged WMD caches were not found and the debate shifted to democracy promotion after intelligence failure —(“the shift to democracy seemed to some as a way to change the subject”), Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 500; Tenet asserts that the WMD threat in Saddam’s Iraq was manufactured in Washington – it was an obsession with people like Cheney. The U.S. “did no go to war in Iraq solely because of WMD, I doubt it was even the principal cause. Yet it was the public face that was put on it,” see At the Center of the Storm, 301-39 (quotation 331). Leffler surely is correct in arguing that the Bush era memoirists like to “blame one another” when trying to “blunt the attacks of their critics,” see Leffler, “Foreign Policies of Bush,” 206

85 Rumsfeld insists that the comment was “unintentional” and amused that it “entered the vernacular”; he was surprised that it “touched a raw nerve”, see Known and Unknown, 444f.

86 Gűnter Bischof, “American Empire and Its Discontents: The United States and Europe Today,” in: idem/Michael Gehler/Volker Kühnhardt/Rolf Steininger, eds., Towards a European Constitution: A Historical and Political Comparison with the United States (Vienna: Böhlau 2005), pp. 185-207; Reinhard Heinisch, “Ungeliebt und unverstanden – die Beziehungen zwischen den USA und Europa aus amerikanischer Sicht,” in: Reiter/Embacher, eds., Europa und der 11. September 2001, 193-220; William W. Boyer, “Confronting Transatlantic Discord: Major Policy Differences between the United States and Europe,” in: Zacharasiewicz, ed., Transatlantische Differenzen, pp. 79-94; Philip Gordon, “Bridging the Atlantic Divide,” Foreign Affairs 82/1 (January/February 2003): 70-83. This deep “transatlantic divide” was also extensively analyzed in a special report prepared by the Austrian Embassy for the Foreign Ministry, “Wie tief ist die Krise in den Transatlantischen Beziehungen? Eine Übersicht über Zustand und Zukunft der transatlantischen Beziehungen aus amerikanischer Sicht,” Peter Moser Private Papers, CenterAustria.

87 Rice, Ho Higher Honor, 202, 212-15.

88 Gehler, “Vom EU-Beitritt zur EU-Osterweiterung,” in: Kriechbaumer/Schausberger, eds., Die umstrittene Wende, 513. Gehler adds that the Iraq War was a major defeat for U.S. diplomacy and its failure in building a solid “coalition of the willing.”

89 For an excellent summary of Austria’s 9/11 responses, see Margit Reiter, “Signaturen des 11. September 2001 in Österreich,” in idem/Embacher, eds., Europa und der 11. September 2001, 161-92.

90 “Umfragen; Österreicher lehnen Militärschlag gegen Irak ab,” Die Presse, Nov. 2, 2003; “Kein Konsens in Österreich zu Iraq-Krieg,” Die Presse, March 25, 2003.

91 Pilz, Mit Gott gegen alle, 260. Green Party foreign policy spokesperson Ulrike Lunacek attacked Bush Ambassador Lyons Brown in an open letter printed in Der Standard for using napalm bombs again in Iraq, having learned no lessons from Hiroshima/Nagasaki and Vietnam, see her collection Zwischenrufe: Kolumnen, Kommentare, Interviews Vienna: Milena, 2006), 219-21.

92 “Guter Glauben,” Der Standard, Jan. 8, 2003.

93 On the long history of Austrian anti-Americanism, see Günter Bischof, “Two Sides of the Coin: The Americanization of Austria and Austrian Anti-Americanism,” in: Alexander Stephan, ed., The Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti-Americanism after 1945 (New York: Berghahn 2006), 147-81.

94 See his article “The Iraq Crisis and the Future of the Western Alliance,” in idem, The Cold War and After: History, Theory, and the Logic of International Politics (Princeton, 2012), 281-311.

95 Martin Sajdik/Michael Schwarzinger, European Union Enlargement: Background, Developments, Facts (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2008).

96 Heinisch, “Unremarkably Remarkable,” 137-40; Gehler, “Vom EU-Beitritt zur EU-Osterweiterung,” in: Kriechbaumer/Schausberger, eds., Die umstrittene Wende, 514-20.

97 Günter Bischof/Michael S. Maier, “’ Sie Kommen’: From Defeat to Liberation – German and Austrian Memory of the Allied “Invasion” of June 6, 1944,” in: Michael Dolski, Sam Edwards, John Buckley, eds., D-Day in History and Memory: Comparative Perspectives on the Normandy Invasion [Denton: University of North Texas Press, forthcoming in 2013].

98 For the “Vienna Summit Declaration, see http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/june/tradoc_129053.pdf (accessed Feb. 6, 2012); see also Eva Nowotny, “Die östereichische

99 “Bush’s Visit to Vienna Is Marked by Tension,” New York Times, June 21, 2006.

EU-Präsidentschaft in Washington - - sechs spannende Monate in den transatlantischen Beziehungen,” in: Anton Pelinka/Fritz Plasser, eds., Europäisches Denken und Lehren: Festschrift für Heinrich Neisser (innsbruck: iup, 2007), 213-218 (here 215).

100 “Die verrücke Welt des George W. Bush: Wie tickt der mächtigste Mann der Welt wirklich?,” Profil, June 17, 2006.

101 “Bush bei Fischer: Bundespräsident sprach Guantanamo an,” Der Standard, June 22, 2006.

102 See Ian Buruma’s op-ed “Auf den Spuren einer Liebeskrankheit namens ‘Obamamania’,” Der Standard, Nov. 7, 2008.

103 “Barack Obama – Der Mann des Jahres: Wie der neue Präsident das Jahr geprägt hat,” Profil, Jan. 1, 2009.

104 She shaped NATO consensus on Afghanistan, hammered out tighter sanctions on Iran, and a new missile defense strategy while antagonizing Russia less, see Michael O’ Hanlon, “State and the Stateswoman: How Hillary Clinton Reshaped U.S. Foreign Policy – But Not the World,” Foreign Affairs, Jan. 29, 2013 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138793/michael-e-ohanlon/state-and-the-stateswoman (accessed Feb. 2, 2013).

105 Philip S. Gordon’s remarks on “U.S. Relations with Central Europe” delivered at the Center for European Policy Analysis, Sept. 20, 2012, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2012/197986.htm (accessed Jan. 7, 2013).

106 Gati feels that democratization is being arrested in the region in places such as Hungary and that the U.S. should “put democracy promotion and integration promotion first on its agenda” to complement security-military concerns, see his keynote address at the U.S. -Central European Strategy Forum, Sept. 20, 2012, http://www.cepa.org/ced/view.aspx?record_id=362 (accessed Jan. 7, 2012).

107 See the Karin Krichmayr Interview with Margit Reiter, Der Standard, Oct. 30, 2012, http://derstandard.at/1350259872261/Obama-wurde-eingemeindet-als-einer-von-uns (accessed Dec. 15, 2012).

108 On the latency of Austrian anti-Americanism and its deep traditions in the elites, see the interviews with Andrei Markovits, “Obama ist das quintessentielle Amerika,” Der Standard, Oct. 2, 2012, and Margit Reiter, “Obama wurde eingemeindet als einer von uns,” ibid., Oct. 30, 2012, and Gűnter Bischof, “Abrufbereiter Antiamerikanismus,” Profil, Dec. 10, 2010, 26.

109 David Milne, “Pragmatism or what? The future of US foreign policy,” International Affairs 88 (2012): 935-51.

110 Turkey therefore is considering joining the Shanghai Group and abandoning its goal of accessing the European Union, see Burkhard Bischof, “Europa den Rűcken kehren? Erdogan denkt darüber nach,” Die Presse, Jan. 31, 2013 http://diepresse.com/home/meinung/kommentare/leitartikel/1339028/Europa-den-Ruecken-kehren-Erdogan-denkt-darueber-nach (accessed Jan 31, 2013).

111 Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden to the Munich Security Conference, Feb. 2, 2013 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/02/remarks-vice-president-joe-biden-munich-security-conference-hotel-bayeri (accesed Feb. 4, 2013).

112 Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008).

113 For the parameters of such a EUropean common foreign policies within a highly heterogeneous Union, where the U.S.’s fundamental role within NATO has changed from a supportive to a divisive one, see Werner Link, “Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer gemeinsamen Außenpolitik,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 63/6-7 (Feb. 4, 2013): 23-30 (for the U.S. and NATO, see p. 25).

114 Burkhard Bischof, “Österreichs Sicherheitspolitik ist auf die Krankenwägen gekommen,” Die Presse, Jan. 22, 2013, http://diepresse.com/home/meinung/gedankenlese/1334795/Oesterreichs-Sicherheitspolitik-ist-auf-die-Krankenwaegen-gekommen (accessed Jan. 22, 2013).

115 The cables from the U.S. Embassy in Austria represent a relatively small number in the massive 250,000 “Secret US Embassy Cables” database in Wikileaks http://wikileaks.org/cablegate.html. For a report on the Austrian cables, see Otmar Lahodynsky, “Nebenrollenspiele,” Profil, Dec. 13, 2010, 25-27; Thomas Seifert, “Wiener WikiLeaks: Rückzug in die geistige Alpenfestung,” Die Presse, Dec. 5, 2010; Helmar Dumbs, “Die US-Not mit den störrischen Älplern,” Die Presse, Dec. 5, 2010; Wikileaks: Die wichtigsten Enthüllungen auf einen Blick,” Die Presse, Dec. 3, 2010.

116 See the op-ed by Christian Ortner, “Doktor Freuds Heimat und ihr unheilbarer Amerika-Komplex,” Die Presse, Dec. 9, 2010. Ortner saw the roots in the deep-seated anti-Americanism of Austrians in both the resentments of the older generation who never felt liberated but occupied by the Americans after World War II, and the “anti-capitalist poses” of the younger generation of lefty 1968ers.

117 Busek quoted in ibid., 27.

118 With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. “is seen as getting so little benefit from its continuing commitment to the security of Europe,” see Trachtenberg, The Cold War and After, 308f (“dying”, p. 309).

119 John Arquilla, “America in Decline,” Foreign Policy http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/28/america_in_recline (accessed Jan 30, 2013); see also Leon Wieseltier, Washington diarist: “Welcome to the Era of the Light Footprint Obama finally finds his doctrine,” New Republic, Jan. 29, 2013, http://www.newrepublic.com/tags/washington-diarist (accessed Jan. 30, 2013)

120 Kramer, “The Return of History in Europe,” 84.

121 Bruce Stokes special to CNN, “A big year for transatlantic ties?,” http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/01/14/a-big-year-for-transatlantic-ties/ (accessed Jan. 16, 2013).

122 Nolan, The Transatlantic Century, 9, 366-373; negotiating between these differing European and American values discourses has become a big challenge in bilateral diplomacy, see Nowotny, “Die östereichische EU-Präsidentschaft in Washington - sechs spannende Monate in den transatlantischen Beziehungen,” 217.

123 Lieven, American Right or Wrong, 48-87.

124 GZ. 1.30/40/03, “Abschlussbericht: 4 Jahre USA, Rückblick,” E-Mail Moser to Foreign Ministry, Aug. 28, 2033, both Peter Moser Private Papers, CenterAustria

125 The reference here, of course, is to Robert Kagan’s controversial essay Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Knopf, 2003).

126 See Tony Judt’s review essay “The Good Society: Europe vs. America,” in: Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century (New York: Penguin, 2008), 393-409; see also Nolan, Transatlantic Century, 331-73.

1 This hitherto unpublished document is in the collection of Personal Papers that Ambassador Peter Moser donated to CenterAustria at the University of New Orleans and has been translated by Inge Fink (Department of English, UNO) from German into English. We would like to thank Peter Moser for providing us with the document and Inge Fink for her translation.