1 This independence had nonetheless limits where an independent Austrian voice would have clashed with the innermost core security interests of one of the two blocks. But as the track record proves, such limits had to be respected on very rare occasions only. In 1956, for example, they did not impede Austria from taking the initiative at the UN for a vote criticizing the Soviet Union for its invasion of Hungary.
2 The Austrian Chancellor Julius Raab in a session of the Landesverteidigungsrat (National Defense Council) on February 25th 1958.
3 On this matter, see for example Eric Frey, “Konferenzplatz Wien: Vienna as an International Conference Site,” in Global Austria, Contemporary Austrian Studies vol. 20, eds. Günter Bischof, Fritz Plasser, Anton Pelinka, and Alexander Smith (New Orleans: UNO Press, 2011), 147-60.
4 This has not remained the only instance of US pressure exercised to tangible effect while circumventing procedures prescribed by international law. This demonstrates not just the might of the US “hegemon”; but also the fact that the international economy functions on a level of its own, disconnected to a large extent from the web of legally binding international norms, such as those embodied in formal treaties or in resolutions of the UN Security Council.
5 In parts, this is due to their origins. Some of the more important media had been founded or supported by the Western occupying powers. Such was the case for the two mass circulation dailies, as well as for radio station “Red White Red,” established by the US and later merged into the Austrian Broadcasting Company - ORF.
6 Setting up this military or quasi-military force stood in contradiction to a prior agreement according to which Austria would have no military forces as long as a State Treaty had not been signed. The setting up of the B-Gendarmeries had undercut that commitment. The creation of the B-Gendarmerie had its counterpart, however, in the equally illegal setting up of a similar, thinly veiled military unit (Bewaffnete Volkspolizei) in Eastern Germany.
7 In a strictly formal/legal sense, membership with the UN is incompatible with permanent neutrality, as even neutrals are bound to implement economic sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. In practical terms, that caveat has been irrelevant in the times of Cold War, as the Soviet Union would have vetoed any decision of the UN Security Council that would have damaged its core interests. Austria therefore never ran the danger of having to support one sided UN sanctions against the Soviet Union that would have called into question its neutrality, officially defined as permanent and as directed against all sides, but which, in practice had been neutrality between the East and the West mainly.
8 With both of these steps having been in preparation well before the signing of the State Treaty and the re-gaining of full sovereignty. Not only was membership valued as symbol and — to a certain extent — as guarantor of the newly reclaimed sovereignty. It also corresponds to a more “activist approach” to international affairs, partly rooted in the desire to be seen and to be recognized; partly rooted in a national tradition quite different from the Swiss one.
9 That is before the reform of the Austrian army which was started in the seventies and which that shifted the emphasis towards a militia system. If fully implemented — which it never was — the reform would have resulted in an army which after full mobilization would have numbered 300,000 soldiers; that is about 4.5 percent of the Austrian population.
10 Actually, not four but five European states claim a status of being neutral: next to Switzerland Austria, Sweden and Finland, Ireland too defines itself in such terms. Its neutrality is, however, a special one, having its base in the political goal of distancing itself from the United Kingdom to which it had been attached up to the 20th century.
11 Defined not as a legally binding permanent neutrality but as a de facto non-adherence to military pacts.
12 In negotiations for the Moscow Memorandum the issue of guarantees had surfaced with the Soviet side asking what kind of guarantees Austria could offer against the danger of a new Anschluss with (Western-) Germany. The Austrian answered that such reassurance could be provided by a “guarantee similar to the guarantee offered to Switzerland by the Congress of Vienna.”
13 In connection with the Hungarian uprising and its subsequent repression by Soviet troops, that readiness echoed in a November 15, 1958 declaration of the US State Department, stating that any violation of Austria’s integrity would be considered a “serious threat to world peace” which the UN Security Council could act upon; but was unlikely to act upon given the fact that the Soviet Union could block any decision of this body by its veto. An even milder version of this “guarantee” was offered by the US on occasion of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet (Warsaw Pact) troops in 1968, with the US Secretary of State declaring that the US would have “an interest in Austria (as well as in Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Romania and Albania — the latter three not being the kind of company Austria aspired to be in).
14 These are the words of the UK ambassador negotiating the issue with his two Western colleagues in Vienna. This wording is used by Michael Gehler as a heading for the special chapter on the issue of a guarantee.
15 In particular, as posing the danger of weakening and undermining Germany’s resolve to be a firm part of a military alliance and toying with the idea of neutrality instead.
16 In the 1980s strategies on both sides changed somewhat, with the Warsaw Pact forces opting for a more defensive stance, and with NATO’s FOFA strategy including “defensive” airstrike deep into Warsaw Pact territory.
17 As of the late 1970s, the role of nuclear weapons became deemphasized as the risk involved in their actual use — and in the threat of their actual use — began to outweigh their military usefulness.
18 Among them, I myself who, at the time of being drafted, had become attaché in the diplomatic service already. The transition from purposeful, intense professional life to the stultifying emptiness of a life in the military barracks was a very depressing experience (alleviated later on by my being transferred to the precursor of the military academy).
19 My friend Anton Pelinka — a frequent contributor to this journal — told me about an incident during his own military service when the commanding officer instructed the recruits to simulate “clearing of terrain infested by guerilla fighters.” This is what the German army had been instructed to do in Yugoslavia during World War II. In Austria and for the Austrian army, the roles would have to be reversed. The Austrians should have been the guerilla fighters, defending against an overpowering, armor-clad occupier.
20 From 1958 on, Austria had taken measures to make its military neutrality less obviously one-sided. Flights of NATO military aircraft over Austria’s territory which had been tolerated in the past were prohibited. Arms purchases were increasingly made in other European neutral countries and some even in Warsaw Pact countries.
Nonetheless NATO ties remained close. One example being the “Königswarte listening station” located on the Eastern slope of Austria’s easternmost hill, with its electronic devices capable to intercept the military radio transmissions deep in Warsaw Pact territory. The installation was paid for and equipped by the US with Austrian military not even in a position to decipher the listening tapes which were sent directly to Western Germany.
21 There are personal and historic reasons for Bruno Kreisky responding so positively to the proposals of General Emil Spannocchi to switch to an asymmetric version of warfare. Kreisky had internalized lessons from the 1934 Austrian civil war. These were reinforced when he served as an assistant to the Austrian president (and ex-general) Theodor Körner in 1951/1953. Theodor Körner was one of the first in the military to recommend that strategy to weaker belligerents.
22 The Swiss — with a smaller population and with a country more easily defended than Austria with its vast East West extension — they could mobilize twice that number. According to this rough calculation, the mobilized strength of the Austrian army would have had to amount to 900,000 soldiers if the army should have been given a true chance of being effective in the defense of the territory.
23 Such as securing frontiers as they did in 1956 at Hungarian border.
24 The State Treaty contains a provision (similar to provision in peace treaties with other European nations) that forbade Austria the possession of “rockets.” This was interpreted to apply to both anti-tank and air to air, as well as to air to surface missiles. A fighter plane equipped with board canons or machine guns only, was however defenseless against fighter planes equipped with air to air missiles (as all fighter planes nowadays are). The lack of such weapons seriously handicapped the whole of Austria’s defense efforts. One of the contributors to the book under review claims that this deficiency too, was due to the negligence of politicians who had not pressed hard enough for an interpretation of the State Treaty that would have allowed Austria to acquire these weapons (whose effectiveness had been proven in the 1973 Arab – Israeli war). The reproach is not substantiated by facts. The ministers of defense and even the heads of government had tried repeatedly to seek from the Soviet side consent to such an interpretation of the relevant clauses of the State Treaty. After all, these articles in the State Treaty have their origin in the Allied experience with the long-range German rockets in World War II. But these had been offensive weapons unlike the anti-tank and surface -to-air missiles which clearly were of a defensive nature. Yet such Austrian entreaties yielded no results. At that time, some of the Austrian military had suggested that Austria should go ahead anyhow, disregarding Soviet objections. But wiser politics prevailed. Acting in clear violation of the State Treaty would have permitted the Soviet Union to start a procedure provided for in the treaty, with Austria slipping into the role of the accused and becoming object again and pawn in the East West gamble and confrontation. That was not a price worth paying. Anyhow, at the dusk of the Communist era, Austria was then in a position to acquire these defensive short range missiles.
25 I noted as significant a phrase in the contribution of Hannes Philipp who reveals this detail but adds that this state of affairs was troubling not in itself but because no proper attention had been given to gaining quick and secure access to ammunition “stored beyond the Austrian borders.”
26 Or of a preemptive East West war on Austria’s territory alone.
27 But this was not an opinion of conservatives only. Some on the liberal Left chimed in too (as for example the prominent Social Democrat Joseph Cap).
28 That is a likely but not a necessary consequence — as demonstrated by NATO member Norway with its very active policies of promoting peace and negotiated solutions to conflicts.
29 It confirmed the Austria’s identity in particular by stressing neutral Austria being different from NATO member Germany. Stressing differences to Germany was essential if seen against the historic background of early 20th century, when many Austrians had failed to identify with their newly created, smallish successor state to the Austrian empire and had considered themselves as kind of Germans in exile.
30 Enthusiasm for NATO that had been widespread among Austrian conservatives in particular, was dampened further by the “Western” countries deciding on some sort of sanctions when, after the breakup of the “big” left-right coalition, the leading conservative party — ÖVP — teamed up with the populist/nationalist Freedom Party to form a new governing coalition. The Freedom Party is difficult to classify under traditional categories. But it certainly also represents tendencies evident in some European parties of the extreme, and potentially non-democratic European Right such as the “Vlaams Belang” in Belgium.
31 Substantiating a quip of one of my colleagues: neutrality is what the European neutrals define it to be.
32 As Austria, most other midsized and smaller members of the Union are also ready to strengthen the common to the detriment of the national; and that in particular even in the realm of security policies. Bigger EU member still might harbor more illusions about their capacity to affect outcomes when acting alone.