2 Cf. Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1985), 29.

3 As Alois Mock put it in an interview with the Tyrolian daily Tiroler Tageszeitung from 31 Dec. 1994 and 1 Jan. 1995.

4 Before Wolfgang Schüssel became Austria’s Foreign Minister in May 1995 until February 2000, he had served as secretary of the Austrian People’s Party’s Parliamentary group (1968-1975), then as General Secretary of the Austrian Economic League (1975-1991); then he became Minister of Economics (1989-1995). On 22 April 1995, he was also elected chairman of the Austrian People’s Party; then from January 1997 until February 2000 he acted as vice-chancellor and minister of foreign affairs at the same time. From February 2000 until the beginning of January 2007, he was the federal chancellor of Austria.

5 As for the highly recognized foreign policy era of Bruno Kreisky, cf. among others Otmar Höll, “The Foreign Policy of the Kreisky Era,” in The Kreisky Era in Austria, vol. 2, Contemporary Austrian Studies, ed. Günter Bischof et al. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994), 32-77. Alois Mock’s role in strengthening Austria’s orientation towards the European Community and his — reductionist, as some say — role in the Yugoslav secession wars is highlighted in Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context, vol. 14, Contemporary Austrian Studies, ed. Günter Bischof et al. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994), 8-12, and in Michael Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik der Zweiten Republik: Von der alliierten Besatzung bis zum Europa des 21. Jahrhunderts (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2005). Mock’s social democratic counterpart in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Federal Chancellor Franz Vranitzky, a former banker and previous minister of finance with little prior experience in foreign affairs, was also covered by this journal in volume seven (1999). He served from 1986-1997 as Austria’s federal chancellor and eventually became an important and successful foreign policy actor. He not only convinced his party, the SPÖ, to re-direct its goal towards the European Community in 1986/87, but also acted as a substitute to the then widely boycotted Austrian President Kurt Waldheim and represented “the other Austria” abroad and at home.

6 Cf. Helmut Kramer, “Strukturentwicklung der Außenpolitik (1945-2005),” in Politik in Österreich: Das Handbuch, ed. Herbert Dachs et al. (Vienna: Manz, 2006), 829.

7 Cf. Christian Schaller, “Die österreichische EG/EU-Diskussion in den Ländern,” in Österreichs europäische Zukunft: Analysen und Perspektiven, ed. Albrecht Rothacher et al. (Vienna: Signum, 1996), 191-94. For further analysis on structural changes, cf. Otmar Höll et al., “Austria: Structural Change through European Integration,” in Fifteen into One? The European Union and Member States, 2nd ed., ed. Wolfgang Wessels et al. (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2003), 337-54. In the preparation process for accession, a new Council for Integration Policy was founded by the coalition government in 1989, which not only tied up the social partners, but also all nine provinces, the municipalities, and the National Parliament.

8 Previously in 1991, Manfred Rotter had published a critical contribution on permanent neutrality: “Von der integralen zur differentiellen Neutralität,” Europäische Rundschau 3 (1991): 25-35. Ten years later, Waldemar Hummer in an article spoke about the final end of neutrality; see “Solidarität versus Neutralität: Das immerwährend neutrale Österreich vor und nach Nizza,” Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift (ÖMZ) 39.2 (2001): 147-66.

9 See: Höll et al., “Austria: Structural Change.”

10 For more information, see also Gregor Woschnagg, “The Priorities of the Austrian EU Presidency,” in The Austrian Presidency of the European Union, ed. Otmar Höll (Laxenburg: Österreichisches Institut für Internationale Politik, 1998).

11 The presidency of the Council of the European Union, which rotates every six months, is responsible for the functioning of the Council of the European Union and its many meetings during this period. There is still no single and elected president as envisaged by the preliminary Lisbon Reform Treaty, but the task is carried out by an entire national government and — what is important for small states — with the support of the Commission. Since 2006, new presidencies cooperate with the last and next one on a common political program.

12 See: Gregor Woschnagg, “The Priorities of the Austrian Presidency”, 32-33.

13 See Foreign Minister Schüssel’s Speech at the Royal Institute for International Affairs in London, 3 June 1998, “The Priorities of the Austrian Presidency of the European Union,” (mimeo).

14 Cf. Otmar Höll and Sonja Puntscher-Riekmann, The Austrian Presidency of the European Union: Assessments and Perspectives (Vienna: oiip, 1999).

15 This ambivalence could be interpreted as the result of the growing influence the radical right in Austria gained at that time, cf. Höll et al., “Austria: Structural Change,” 352.

16 Cf. Wilfried Spohn, “Austria, Europe and the Nation in Austrian National Identity,” in EURONAT project, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 2002/EURONETrep/A, 2-28.

17 Cf. Batsheva Tsur and News Agencies in the Jerusalem Post, 4 February 2000.

18 “Statement from the Portuguese Presidency of the European Union on Behalf of the XIV Member States,” 1 Feb. 2000. Cf. also a. o. Otmar Höll, “Österreich unter Beobachtung,” in Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Internationale Politik 2000 (Vienna: Böhlau, 2001); and Anton Pelinka and Waldemar Hummer, Österreich unter “EU-Quarantäne”: die “Massnahmen der 14” gegen die österreichische Bundesregierung aus politikwissenschaftlicher und juristischer Sicht, Chronologie, Kommentar, Dokumentation (Vienna: Linde, 2002).

19 A very well explained and sound analysis of the context and its impact is given from an Austrian “outsider”; cf. Lonnie R. Johnson, “On the Inside Looking Out: An Essay on Austria’s New ÖVP-FPÖ Government, Jörg Haider, and Europe,” Working Paper 00-1, Austrian Fulbright Commission, Vienna, June 2000.

20 At the occasion of a speech Wolfgang Schüssel gave in Strasbourg only some days before the “sanctions” were put in place, some members of the European Parliament showed unconcealed hatred, as one of my interview partners told me.

21 Hans Magenschab, a well-known Austrian journalist and later on speaker of former Austrian Federal President Thomas Klestil, published in the daily Der Standard from 5/6 February 2005 that he had been a witness at the Istanbul OSCE summit in middle November of 1999 when Wolfgang Schüssel promised Jacques Chirac and some other EU politicians that the ÖVP would not form a coalition government with the FPÖ.

22 My argument, published shortly after the sanctions had been lifted, can be found in Höll, “Österreich unter Beobachtung.”

23 The concept of “strategic” partnership aimed at engaging in closer cooperation and searching for common interests and positions with Austria’s neighboring countries that were candidates for the European Union in respect to their future membership. Neither in the European Union, nor in the countries mentioned above, did the notion of “strategic” partnership raise positive feelings; the concept had not been elaborated upon and discussed with them. Obviously it was made public too early, probably as a reaction of defiance because of the “sanctions.”

24 For more information about the Regional Partnership, see Làszló J. Kiss, “Die ‘ Regionale Partnerschaft’: subregionale Zusammenarbeit in der Mitte Europas,” Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 32.1 (2003): 57-65.

25 Typical examples of poor or missing coalition building were the issues of road traffic and the nuclear power plant Temelin in the Czech Republic. In the first case, Austria cooperated in Brussels, but at home castigated the Union for mismanagement. On the second issue, Austria’s behavior politically incriminated relations with the new members in the East.

26 As in previous cases when the Chancellery and Foreign Ministry belonged to the same party, the Chancellor’s influence dominates over the Foreign Ministry’s and its political main directions.

27 A Presidency in the first half of the year is called a “full-time Presidency” because it covers work over six months, whereas a Presidency during the second half of the year — normally — carries a lighter workload because during summer time (at least July and August) Brussels is “on holiday.”

28 Social scientists all over Europe time and again have been urging governments to integrate the EU “demos,” the citizens, better into the Union by giving them more and clear information about, communication with, and participation in EU institutions and overall EU political matters, but obviously more or less in vain.

29 Four strategic topics in the European Council’s multi-annual strategic program were proposed: to create jobs and enhance growth, to secure and develop the EU’s social model, to rebuild confidence in the Union among citizens, and to further establish the European Union as a strong and reliable global partner.

30 Cf. Eurobarometer 69 (Spring 2008), http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/standard_eu.htm , accessed 29 Dec. 2008. Obviously due to the global financial and economic crisis the appreciation of EU-membership among Austrians rose in almost all dimensions, cf. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb70/eb70_de_nat.pdf.

31 See also Heinz Gärtner, “Die Metamorphose der österreichischen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik am Beispiel der Neutralität,” in Schwarz-Blau: Eine Bilanz des “Neu-Regierens,” ed. Emmerich Talos (Vienna: LIT, 2006), 312ff.

32 See the interview with Ursula Plassnik in the Austrian weekly Der Falter 8/2005, 23 February 2005.

33 The self understanding of the ÖVP as a the “natural European Party” is well expressed by Wolfgang Schüssel at the occasion of the already above mentioned speech in the London Royal Institute for International Affairs, on 3 June 1998:
Our history and our self-definition has always been a supranational one, whether you put it in the context of the Holy Roman Empire of German Nation or into the context of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Thinking and living in a larger European framework and in supranational structures is not an alien concept to us. There is, one would say in today’s language, a genetic predisposition, and the historic memory is still alive.

34 For more and extended reflections on Austria’s future tasks in its foreign and security policy see Eva Nowotny’s the far-sighted essay “Österreichische Außenpolitik vor neuen Aufgaben”, in Themen der Zeit II, ed. Franz Vranitzky (Vienna: Passagen Publ., 2009), 185-93.