1 Peter Ludlow, “European Council: Wolfgang Schüssel Leaves his Mark,” Euro-Comment Briefing Note No 4.5/6 (August 2006): 2-3, 5.
2 Within two years of joining a coalition with the weaker Conservatives (ÖVP) under Schüssel, the Freedom Party was on the brink of disintegration and had lost a third of its electorate, much of which subsequently migrated to the chancellor’s People’s Party.
3 Profil, 30 October 2000, p. 48.
4 Ibid.
5 Mock too, was in a coalition with the stronger Social Democrats and was likewise confronted with harsh international criticism of Austria, in that case, for having elected Kurt Waldheim president.
6 Ludlow, “European Council,” 5.
7 Peter Pelinka, Wolfgang Schüssel—Eine politische Biografie (Vienna: Ueberreuter, 2003), 126-28.
8 It is also remarkable that Mock and Schüssel represented two opposing wings of the party in that the latter had been a top functionary representing business and employer interests from 1975 to 1991, whereas the former came from the ÖVP’s Federation of Workers and Employees.
9 In these years, Vienna became a seat of the United Nations and the permanent host to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. For most of the decade, Austria remained a focal point of international diplomacy, hosting a staggering array of high-level visitors and important conferences, while Austrian diplomats and politicians, with Kreisky at the center, played a significant role in numerous international initiatives.
10 Washington, for example, feared with some justification that sensitive U. S. technology circumvented stringent export controls by being shipped to Eastern Europe through Austria.
11 John Luchak, “Amerikanisch-österreichische Beziehungen von 1955 bis 1985: Neutralität und der Ost-West-Konflikt,” Ph. D. diss., University of Vienna, 1987, 229.
12 Paul Luif, On The Road to Brussels—The Political Dimension of Austria’s, Finland’s, and Sweden’s Accession to the European Union (Vienna: Braunmüller, 1995), 191.
13 Aside from the important question of the country’s international status as a neutral nation, the Austrian cabinet had insisted on the following additional conditions: Austria’s federal character had to remain intact, the economic competition in the Single Market was not to affect Austria’s social system, the domestic environmental standards and the “active environmental policy” would have to be maintained, “nationwide family farming” was to be protected, and the lingering dispute over international transit traffic through Austria would need to be resolved outside the accession framework. Heinrich Schneider, “Gerader Weg zum klaren Ziel? Die Republik Österreich auf dem Weg in die Europäische Union,” Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 23.1 (1994): 5-20, here 5.
14 Initially, the European Union opposed these reservations conveying its opinion to Austria officially in an avis issued on 31 July 1991. Brussels feared that Austria’s neutral status could conflict with article J (8) 2 of the European Union Treaty requiring unanimity for a resolution on joint action related to the common defense policy. Austria’s neutrality also threatened plans concerning the integration of the West European Union (WEU) into the European Union. In long negotiations with Brussels, Austria subsequently reduced the concept of neutrality to the “military core” (Herbert Hausmaninger, The Austrian Legal System [Vienna: Manz, 1998], 84), which the European Union eventually accepted in 1994.
15 It also reflected the tensions, especially manifest in the run-up to the 1989 national elections, between the two government parties as labor interests remained both profoundly skeptical of the EU/EC’s deregulatory agenda and wedded to the concept of Austrian neutrality.
16 Helmut Kramer, “Strukturentwicklung der Außenpolitik (1945-2005),” in Politik in Österreich—Das Handbuch, ed. Herbert Dachs et al. (Vienna: Manz, 2006), 807-37.
17 Christian Schaller, “‘Ja’ oder ‘Nein’ zu ‘Europa’? Die österreichische Debatte im Vorfeld der Rekonstruktionsversuch,” in EU-Referndum. Zur Praxis direkter Demokratie in Österreich, ed. Anton Pelinka (Vienna: Signum Verlag, 1994) 49-85; Heinrich Schneider, Alleingang nach Brüssel: Österreichs EG-Politik . (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1990); Reinhard Heinisch, “Salvation and Villain: The Role of Europe in Austrian Politics and the Rise of the radical Right,” Politique européenne 14 (Autumn 2004): 165-87; Paul Luif, On The Road to Brussels; Reinhard Heinisch, Populism, Proporz and Pariah—Austria Turns Right: Austrian Political Change, Its Causes and Repercussions (Huntington, NY: Nova Science, 2002).
18 Kramer, “Strukturentwicklung der Außenpolitik,” 827.
19 Mock, Alois, ed., Das Balkan-Dossier: Der Aggressionskrieg in Ex-Jugoslawien—Perspektiven für die Zukunft (Vienna: Signum, 1997).
20 Kramer, “Strukturentwicklung der Außenpolitik,” 831.
21 Reinhard Heinisch, “Austria—Confronting Controversy,” in The European Union and the Member States, eds. Eleanor E. Zeff and Ellen B. Pirro (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001).
22 Fritz Plasser and Peter Ulram, “Meinungstrends, Mobilisierung und Motivlagen bei der Volksabstimmung über den EU-Beitritt,” in EU-Referndum: Zur Praxis direkter Demokratie in Österreich, ed. Anton Pelinka (Vienna: Signum Verlag, 1994): 87-119.
23 Otmar Höll and Sonja Puntscher-Riekmann, eds., The Austrian Presidency of the European Union: Assessment and Perspectives (Laxenburg: Laxenburg Working Papers, 1999).
24 Gerald Hinteregger, “Wo ist die Ost-Kompetenz Österreich’s?” Europäische Rundschau 26.4 (1998): 3-24; Michael Gehler, Der lange Weg nach Europa: Österreich vom Ende der Monarchie bis zur EU, vol. 1, Darstellung (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2002); Helmut Lang, Die österreichische EU-Rastpräsidentschaft 1998 (Frankfurt: P. Lang Verlag, 2002).
25 Kramer, “Strukturentwicklung der Außenpolitik,” 831.
26 Ibid., 831-32.
27 Jan Stankovsky, “EU-Erweiterung: Chances und Herausforderungen für die österreichische Wirtschaft,” in Europäisierung der österreichischen Politik—Konsequenzen der EU-Mitgliedschaft, ed. Heinrich Neisser and Sonja Puntscher-Riekmann (Vienna: WUV, 2002), 319-67, here 320.
28 This transport regiment consisting of 250 soldiers was deployed near Sarajevo and represented the first such mission by the Austrian Army. It was especially sensitive for Austria as a neutral country that the overall command lay with a U. S. and, thus, NATO commander.
29 Helmut Kramer and Vedran Dzihic, Die Kosovo-Bilanz—Scheitert die internationale Gemeinschaft? (Vienna: LIT Verlag, 2005).
30 . Petritsch was the EU’s chief negotiator during the Rambouillet Conference in 1999 designed to defuse the Kosovo crisis.
31 Busek became special EU coordinator for the Stability Pact with Southeastern Europe.
32 Following the UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 2002, Austria played a leading role in the “Network Human Security,” which seeks to enhance the cooperation between governments, NGOs, and international scholars in the area of human rights.
33 Austria was entrusted with the development of a proposal for a convention on the prohibition.
34 Paul Luif, “Wandel der österreichischen Neutralität—Ein sicherheitspolitischer Trittbrettfahrer,” Working Paper 18 (Vienna: ÖJIP, 1998), 363.
35 The relations between Austria and Israel had been especially sensitive ever since the Waldheim affair in 1986 when Tel Aviv had recalled its ambassador from Vienna. After Tomas Klestil became president in 1992 and after both he and Chancellor Vranitzky had expressed remorse and regret for the nation’s role in the Holocaust, bilateral relations were normalized. Nonetheless, Israel continued to monitor the activities of Haider and the FPÖ very closely.
36 Der Standard, 11 Oct. 1999.
37 Margaretha Kopeinig and Christoph Kotanko, Eine europäische Affäre: Der Weisen-Bericht und die Sanktionen gegen Österreich (Vienna: Czernin Verlag, 2000), 17.
38 He described the French President Jacques Chirac as someone “who had made every mistake one could possible make” (Kleine Zeitung, 30 Jan. 2000). Later he was also to call Chirac “a pocket Napoleon” (Der Standard, 27 Feb. 2000). During the same event in January, Haider referred to the Belgian government as “corrupt,” having “tolerated pedophiles” (ibid). One day later, he gave an interview to the Italian daily Corriere della Sera, in which he was quoted as warning against the EU’s enlargement and implicitly linking Austria’s position on Slovenia’s accession to the European Union with that country’s settlement of the claims of expelled ethnic Germans (Der Standard, 31 Jan. 2000).
39 Kopeining and Kotanko, Eine europäische Affäre, 23.
40 Heinrich Schneider, “Österreich in Acht und Bann: Ein Schritt zur politisch integrierten Wertegemeinschaft,” Integration 23.2 (2000): 120-48; Kopeinig and Kotanko, Eine europäische Affäre.
41 While Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel (cf. Ian Black “Europe Rallies Against Haider Coalition,” The Guardian, 4 Feb. 2000) vowed to “smash this government as quickly as possible” and President Chirac declared to maintain the sanction’s regime as long as an “extremist, xenophobic party is in the government,” EU Commission President Romano Prodi sent a telegram congratulating Schüssel and expressing his concern but also his hopes for “constructive cooperation” (Kopeinig and Kotanko, Eine europäische Affäre, 25).
42 “An Interview with the Secretary of State,” The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, PBS, 7 Feb. 2000.
43 Reinhard Heinisch, “Success in Opposition—Failure in Government: Exploring the Performance of the Austrian Freedom Party and other European Right-wing Populist Parties in Public Office,” West European Politics 26.3 (2003): 91-130.
44 Peter Pernthaler and Peter Hilpold, “Sanktionen als Instrument der Politikkontrolle—der Fall Österreich,” Integration 23.2 (2000): 105-19.
45 Some 66 percent of Austrians stated they were outraged by the sanctions. Naturally, the ratio was highest among conservative (82 percent) and freedom voters (84 percent) while relatively lowest among Green (47 percent) and Social Democratic supporters (37 percent). About one third (35 percent) did not believe in a quick end of the international boycott. However, only 19 percent wanted Austria to leave the Union, although that percentage (43 percent) was noticeably higher among FPÖ sympathizers (Der Standard, 4 March 2000).
46 See for example: “In the meantime, the EU’s decision to speak as one, against one of its own, is having its own fallout. It has given birth to a new Euroskepticism” […] The Change in the mood is a direct response to the heavy-handed tactics of the EU leadership in Brussels” (The Washington Post, National Weekly Edition, 14 Feb. 2000, 26B). “Haider and the Hypocrites: The Inclusion of a Slick and Sickening Fascist in the Democratically Elected Government of Austria has Provoked a Peculiar Season of Over-Reaction and Under-Reaction” (New Republic, 21 Feb. 2000). “[… T]he best antidote the EU member states could offer against Jörg Haider would be to make good on their own recent lofty rhetoric, supplementing their existing anti-immigration statutes with a genuine commitment to combating xenophobia at home” (Civilization, April/May 2000: 44). “’The Perils of Austracism’[…] It is time the European Union ended its absurd isolation of Austria. Divorce in haste, repent at leisure […] it is embarrassing, because the fourteen are already starting to squirm. They must now either climb down or risk getting into an even bigger mess […]” (Economist, 17 June 2000: 20).
47 When, for example, the Austrian Minister of Social Affairs, Elisabeth Sickl, spoke at the EU’s first ministerial meeting after the boycott was launched, the French and Belgian ministers walked out. Subsequently, also the senior Italian official (Italy had sent no minister at all) left demonstratively, resulting in the cancellation of the ministerial photo opportunity and planned social agenda. At the EU summit in Freira, Portugal, there was an embarrassing discussion about who would be standing next to whom when the official photograph was taken. Then, at the Lisbon Council meeting, all the other countries shunned the hotel in which the Austrian delegation stayed for fear one might run into FPÖ politicians in an elevator or corridor. A request by the Austrian Chancellor to discuss the boycott in the formal meetings was rejected by the EU-14.
48 . At an EU meeting, delegates appeared wearing a button with a crossed-out bow-tie, the trademark of the Austrian Chancellor, who subsequently switched to regular ties.
49 Upon learning that the Austrian Minister of Defense was a member of the FPÖ, his Belgian counterpart Andre Flahaut protested at the Council meeting in Sintra, Portugal, and subsequently ordered all bilateral military contacts between Austria and Belgium suspended. German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping expressed support for his Belgian counterpart and criticized especially the ÖVP for “having broken their promise to go into opposition.” (Der Standard, 28 February 2000).
50 The government’s catalogue included all the following. 1) Organizing opinion surveys in all member countries coordinated by an Austrian survey research institute, the results of which greatly strengthened the position of the Austrian government because the poll suggested majorities in each of the 14-EU countries favored an end to the sanctions. 2) The Austrian foreign ministry, through its embassies and consulates, began an increased information campaign about the political situation in Austria and the government’s policies. The government also announced it was compiling a comprehensive report on the state of racism, anti-Semitism, and anti-foreigner sentiments in Austria. 3) The provincial governments were asked to reach out especially across their borders to neighboring regions. 4) The government also sought to organize special “Austria days” in each of the fourteen member countries, particularly in Paris, London, and Madrid. These events coincided with visits by the Austrian foreign minister to maximize media attention. For the fall of 2000, the government planned a special “international media action day.” 5) The government’s plan also foresaw activating special international elite networks of “friends of Austria,” such as Austrians living abroad or members of Austria clubs and various cultural societies. 6) A host of measures aimed at preventing EU institutions from conducting business as usual. Austria thus continued to demand that the sanctions be placed on the agenda of Council meetings. Moreover, the Austrian chancellor traveled to Brussels in July, forcing a meeting with Commission President Romano Prodi.
51 Profil, 31 July 2000.
52 There was only one nation, France, in which a relative majority (42 percent vs. 40 percent) felt that the ÖVP-FPÖ government represented a danger to democracy and human rights in Austria. In thirteen of fourteen member nations, as well as in Switzerland, more than 50 percent of the people surveyed felt the boycott should be lifted (but vigilance maintained). These sentiments were most pronounced in the small countries of Greece (74 percent), Denmark (73 percent), Switzerland (71 percent), and Finland (68 percent), where the concern about outside intrusion was traditionally high. Among the big four member states, the populations of Germany (72 percent) and Italy (65 percent) were noticeably more supportive of an end to the sanctions than those in the UK (51 percent) and France (46 percent) (Der Standard, 14 June 2000).
53 Profil, 21 Aug. 2000, p. 23.
54 Profil, 10 July 2000, p. 26; Profil, 31 July 2000, pp. 30-31.
55 Kopeining and Kotanko, Eine europäische Affär, 31.
56 The report’s conclusions were as follows (excepts): “The legal situation of applicants for asylum is similar to that in other European Union countries. In our assessment the current government continues Austria’s traditionally open policy towards refugees. […] As in other European Union countries such a refugee rate creates problems of social integration. We have however not discovered any indications that the new Austrian government has deviated from the principles followed by its predecessors.” (Martti Ahtisaari et al., Report, adopted in Paris on 8 Sept. 2000, sec. 40, p. 14, http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/report.pdf (accessed 22 Nov. 2008). “[…] It can be stated that the policy of the Austrian government as to immigration shows a commitment to common European values” (Ahtisaari et al., Report, sec. 51, p. 17). The three wise men acknowledged also the existence of “areas with certain problems,” which included “extremely short periods for appealing asylum decisions” (a practice amended after a ruling by Austria’s Constitutional Court in 1998), the great reliance on charitable organizations to care for refugees, detaining applicants “even without the realistic possibility of returning them to a third country or their country of origin,” and “holding a relatively high number of minors in detention” (Ahtisaari et al., Report, sec. 14, p. 14). The report dedicated an extensive part of the document to an “evaluation of the political nature of the FPÖ” and concluded it was a “right-wing populist party with extremist expressions” (Ahtisaari et al., Report, sec. 92, p. 27), but that “[w]e have gained the impression that the overall performance of the Ministers of the FPÖ in government since February 2000 cannot be generally criticized” (Ahtisaari et al., Report, sec.104, p. 30). About the sanctions, the wise men’s committee clearly stated that they had outlived their purpose: “It is our opinion however that the measures taken by the XIV Members States, if continued, would become counterproductive and should therefore be ended. The measures have already stirred up nationalist feelings in the country, as they have in some cases been wrongly understood as sanctions directed against Austrian citizens” (Ahtisaari et al., Report, sec. 116, p. 33).
57 The were media reports that Frowein and Ahtisaari may have favored a harsher verdict concerning Austria and that there had been disagreements about the final version of the report. In order to create a fait accompli, Oreja allegedly leaked the report to the media (Kopeinig and Kotanko, Eine europäische Affäre, 33).
58 See “EU Lifts Sanctions Against Austria,” 12 Sept. 2000, http://www.CNN.com/2000/WORLD/europe/09/12/vienna.eu.02/index.html (accessed 15 Nov. 2008).
59 Anselm Skuhra and Michael Merlingen, “Der österreichische Vorsitz der OSZE—Ein Rückblick,” in OSZE-Jahrbuch, ed. Institut für Friedensforschung (Hamburg: U of Hamburg P, 2001).
60 Gerda Falkner, “The EU 14’s “Sanctions” Against Austria: Sense and Nonsense,” European Community Studies Review 14.1 (2001): 14-20, here 15.
61 See the proposal by the Austrian Delegation concerning Articles 7 and 46 of the EU Nice Treaty Negotiations, CONFER 4782/00 ANNEX 2 Brussles, 6 September 2000.
62 Der Standard Online, 14 April 2002.
63 Der Standard Online, 8 April 2002.
64 Profil, 25 Sept. 2000, p. 33.
65 Der Standard Online, 2 Sept. 2002.
66 Profil, 27 Oct. 2000, p. 64.
67 The Economist, 2 Sept. 2000, p. 44. It should also be pointed out that the plant was not without controversy in the Czech Republic itself and was built to a standard not as advanced as that in Western Europe. Points of Austrian criticism were the containment shell of the reactor bloc and the heat exchange system, which, in the case of an accident, were said to allow internal contamination to reach the outside world.
68 Lázló Kiss et al., “Die Regionale Partnerschaft: Subregionale Zussammenarbeit in der Mitte Europas,” Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 32.1 (2003): 57-75.
69 While government representatives were also noticeably absent from internationally well-attended events held in memory of the victims of Fascism (for example, a Mauthausen commemoration in May 2001, the anniversary of the Lidice massacre), FPÖ officials nonetheless found time to attend pan-Germanic manifestations and right-wing vigils. A high-ranking Freedom official even likened Austria’s postwar occupation to the Nazi regime, referring to the Allies as “tyrants” (Der Standard Online, 11 July 2002, http://derstandard.at/ (accessed 15 Nov. 2008).
70 For examples, see Max Preglau, “Rechtsextrem oder Postmodern? Über Rhetorik, Programmatik und Interaktionsformen der FPÖ und der FPÖVP-Koalition,” unpublished manuscript (Innsbruck: U of Innsbruck, 2002).
71 Der Standard Online, 1 Jan. 2002, http://derstandard.at/ (accessed 15 Nov. 2008).
72 Specifically after the attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004, Vienna stated that in cases of terrorism and in solidarity with other European nations, it would make its military resources available since such threats involved non-state actors and therefore did not affect the country’s constitutional restrictions on neutrality.
73 Anselm Skuhra, “Österreichische Sicherheitspolitik,” in Politik in Österreich—Das Handbuch, ed. Herbert Dachs et al. (Vienna: Manz, 2006), 838-61, here 856.
74 Ibid., 855.
75 Paul Luif, “Österreich,” in Jahrbuch der europäischen Integration 2003/2004, ed. Werner Weidenfeld und Wolfgang Wessels (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004), 367-70, here 369.
76 Anselm Skuhra, “Österreichische Sicherheitspolitik,” 857.
77 “EU ‘on Precipice’ over Turkey,” CNN, 3 Oct. 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/10/03/eu.turkeytalks0800/index.html (accessed 15 Nov. 2008).
78 “EU warns Austria on Turks,” The Guardian, 1 Oct. 2005.
79 Rainer Hermann, “Feiertag für Chauvinisten” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 Oct. 2005, http://www.faz.net/s/RubDDBDABB9457A437BAA85A49C26FB23A0/Doc~E57B43A0062B14EFDB26D7638D3EE98FB~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html (accessed 15 November 2008).
80 “Schüssels kroatische Karte,” Berliner Zeitung, 5 Oct. 2005.
81 “Austria Repeats Turkey Objections,” BBC News, 1 Oct. 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4299626.stm (accessed 15 Nov. 2008).
82 In the context of a different research project, this author conducted structured interviews with Austrian civil servants in preparation for the second Austrian EU Presidency in the context of which ministerial officials complained repeatedly that they already had to attend some eighty bilateral and multilateral preparatory meetings which were a strain on a small civil service.
83 Peter Ludlow, “Dealing with Turkey—The European Council of 16-17 December 2004,” EuroComment Briefing Note No. 3.7 (Feb. 2005): 1-56, here 39.
84 UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw in meetings with his Austrian counterpart stated: “It is a frustrating situation but I hope and pray that we may be able to reach agreement.” (Vincent Boland and Daniel Dombey, “Straw Holds Out Hope for Turkey’s EU Entry Talks,” Financial Times, 2 Oct. 2005, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e7750a02-3369-11da-bd49-00000e2511c8.html [accessed 15 Nov. 2008.])
85 The Conservatives not only lost 8.7 percent and the governorship in Styria, but also expected heavy losses in the upcoming votes in Burgenland and Vienna.
86 Membership talks with Croatia had been suspended after the chief prosecutor of the international war crimes tribunal on former Yugoslavia ruled that Zagreb was failing to help track down an indicted war criminal General Ante Gotovina. The European Union made the question of cooperation with the tribunal in The Hague a condition for starting entry talks.
87 “EU ‘on Precipice’ over Turkey,” CNN, 3 Oct. 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/10/03/eu.turkeytalks0800/index.html (accessed 15 Nov. 2008).
88 Referring to an exclusive Christian/Western “occidental” conception of Europe.
89 Stefan Lehne is Javier Solana’s Balkan coordinator, Albert Rohan serves as Stability Pact Coordinator Ahtisaari’s number two, and Erhard Busek had previously been the EU’s Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact.
90 Peter Ludlow, “The Austrian Presidency of the EU,” EuroComment Briefing Note 4.1 (Dec. 2005): 1-31.
91 Ludlow, “European Council,” 5.
92 Ibid., 2-3.
93 Ludlow, “Austrian Presidency,” 25.
94 Ibid., 5.
95 Ludlow, “European Council,” 59.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid., 60.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Cf. Datum, July 2008: 27-31.
101 Ibid., 67.