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    Detailed outline Full text Insufficient Explanations of Industrialization Urban Pre-Conditions of Industrialization Mass Demand of Large Cities Large Cities and Industrialization in Selected Countries Outlook Bibliography Footnotes Author

    Globalization and the City

    This book is reviewed by

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    Table of contents

    No Industrialization without Urbanization: The Role of Cities in Modern Economic Development

    Franz Mathis

    p. 23-38

    Full text Bibliography References Footnotes Author

    Full text

    1When we talk about the conditions and causes of the Industrial Revolution, we should first of all try to answer two basic questions: First, why was the industrialization process for a long time restricted to western and central Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, or Japan? And second, why did it happen – in these parts of the world – between the late eighteenth and the early twentieth centuries, why not before, why not afterwards? Many of the arguments that have been brought forward to explain the industrialization process so far will not stand the test when seen in the light of these two questions.

    Insufficient Explanations of Industrialization

    2Legions of historians and economists have regarded the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century as a European phenomenon and, therefore, have searched for typically European aspects of this process. All these attempts are bound to fail when we take into account that until very recently, eastern and southern Europe were to a great extent excluded from this process, which, on the other hand, took place in some non-European countries, too. To see the examples of countries like the U.S., Canada or Australia simply as a kind of extended European experience does not help, since the same could be argued for the still less developed Latin American countries, let alone the successful industrialization of non-European Japan towards the end of the nineteenth and in the beginning of the twentieth centuries.

    3Hardly more convincing is the imperialistic or colonial argument. If the theory was correct that claimed that European colonialism – to put it very simply – was responsible for successful industrialization in the colonialist countries and prevented such a process in its colonies, the early colonial powers such as Spain and Portugal would have had to be the first to industrialize. But, as we all know, the opposite was the case, with those two countries being among the last European countries to industrialize during the second half of the twentieth century. And what about countries like Switzerland, Sweden, Italy or Germany, which had no colonies when they started to industrialize? The theory of colonial imperialism cannot explain the following phenomena: The development of former colonies, like the highly industrialized United States, Canada or Australia on the one hand, and the lagging-behind of still little industrialized Bolivia, India, or Kenya on the other; the differences between the independent but still less developed China and highly industrialized Japan; Latin American countries, which, despite becoming politically independent in the early nineteenth century, had to wait till the end of the twentieth century to see the beginning of a broader industrialization process.

    4Similar discrepancies may be detected in the beginnings of industrialization on the one side and the beginnings of colonialism on the other. When countries like Britain, France and the Netherlands established their colonial empires in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, why did industrialization not start before the end of the eighteenth and even more so in the nineteenth century? Why did the often-cited raw materials from the colonies or the allegedly important markets in the colonies not become crucial for the industrialization of these countries before? Could it be that they were not that crucial after all? To answer this last question, let us take a closer look at the role that raw materials and potential markets played in the process of industrialization.

    5There is no doubt that modern mass manufacturing needs all kinds of raw materials. We all know that the first products to be manufactured in large quantities with the help of modern machines were textiles, especially cotton. In pre-industrial times, raw cotton was imported to Europe from the eastern Mediterranean. Later on, the southern states in the U.S. became the main supplier, providing most of the raw cotton needed to supply the modern spinning and weaving machines. What can we learn from this? First, in order to industrialize, a country does not have to produce the necessary raw materials within its own boundaries because they may be – and in fact have been – imported from abroad. Second, in order to import raw cotton, a country does not have to rely on its own colonies. Although British companies could have imported raw cotton from the British colony in India, they preferred – like other European companies – raw cotton from the by now independent United States, simply because it was cheaper. Companies anywhere else in the world could have done the same. Only during the American Civil War, when the supply from southern plantations was interrupted, did Britain and the rest of Europe turn to India.

    6But what about the second stage of industrialization, which is characterized by revolutionizing iron and steel production from about the mid nineteenth century onwards? Both iron ore and mineral coal needed to smelt the ore were easily available to European companies, which rendered them independent of overseas supplies. Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, as well as former Austria, had more than enough iron ore and coal to feed the growing number of furnaces, and countries such as Switzerland or Japan had no problems importing the iron and steel they needed. So again, what we have to ask is why the companies in some countries did exploit their own or imported resources of iron ore and coal and why others did not, and why they did it then and not much sooner.

    7To give another example, the same was true with mineral oil later on. After Europe’s own and limited resources no longer sufficed to cover the growing need, European companies bought or produced oil in overseas countries. Most of these countries, especially those in Latin America or in West Asia, were no longer or had never been European colonies. On the other hand, what remains to be explained is why many countries that have had large quantities of mineral oil have not fully industrialized yet, as opposed to those that imported mineral oil because they did not have enough of it themselves. Thus, summing up what has been said about raw materials so far, it should have become clear that the existence or lack of raw materials can neither explain why some countries industrialized, nor can it explain why the raw materials, which had been there for millions of years, were not used more extensively before the nineteenth century.

    8The same is true for overseas or colonial markets. If they, as many still argue, had been crucial for industrialization, this process should have started long before the end of the eighteenth century; America was discovered around 1500, and the first colonies were established soon after. The first explanation for this delay may be found in population numbers. Recent figures compiled and presented by Jon Mathieu show that in 1500, out of an estimated world population of about 461 million people, over 70 per cent lived in Europe and Asia, continents that had traded with each other long before that time.1 Obviously – and understandably – the remaining 132 million living in America, Africa and Oceania could not trigger off an industrialization process in Europe as early as in the sixteenth century, and they were even less able to do so 300 years later. For in 1800, due to European violence and imported diseases, these three continents counted an estimated population of only 128 million, while Europe and Asia had grown to 826 million, which constituted 86 per cent of the world’s total population of 954 million at the time.2

    9With regard to Asia, we have to consider that, due to higher transportation costs, trade decreased with growing distances. Therefore, it should not surprise us that according to Patrick O’Brien, towards the end of the eighteenth century, about three quarters of European foreign trade (i. e. trade across national borders) took place inside of Europe and only about 5 per cent between Europe and Asia, let alone the much larger amount of internal trade within the European countries. Trade with the Americas accounted for 18 per cent, 10 for the northern and 8 for the southern continent.3 Thus, if markets did play a crucial role in the process of industrialization – which, in fact, they did – those markets could much rather be found in Europe herself, both within and outside national borders, and not overseas. This was not only due to population numbers, but also to the much lower purchasing power of native people in America and Africa, with many of them still living as hunters and gatherers and producing hardly any surplus to sell, and others being exploited by relatively small elites both native and foreign. Besides, before the introduction of railways and steamboats, pre-modern means of transportation drove up the prices for imported goods. Thus, high transportation costs, as well as low purchasing power in these parts of the world, reduced potential overseas markets for industrial goods from Europe to a very small number of people, most of them immigrants from Europe.

    Urban Pre-Conditions of Industrialization

    10Before I continue to reflect on the question of markets in more detail, I turn to some other conditions essential for successful industrialization such as capital, entrepreneurship, technology, labor force, and infrastructure. All of them are in some way related to cities and, therefore, to the hypothesis in the title of this paper. Successful, widespread industrialization depends on the extent to which the above conditions exist in a given economy. Or, in other words, successful industrialization is not possible without a certain amount of capital, entrepreneurs who invest it in industrial manufacturing, technology to enable industrial production, skilled and less skilled labor to operate the machines, and sufficient transportation systems to make the purchase of raw materials and the sale of manufactured products profitable. As these conditions are less likely to develop in an agrarian economy, a certain level of urbanization was necessary to obtain them.

    11In primarily agrarian economies with low population density, most of the people lived on a subsistence level. In general, they produced most of the basic goods they needed to survive by themselves and traded the little surplus they achieved with their neighbors or had to deliver it to a small elite of landlords. In the absence of a large customer base for specialized products, division of labor or specialization made little sense and even fewer profits. Trade on this small scale required little money; the chances to accumulate capital were scarce.

    12All this changed as population density increased in certain areas. With more people around, it became gradually easier and more feasible to earn one’s living from buying and selling or from producing and selling goods to others. Denser populations in restricted areas raised the number of potential customers and reduced the price of goods as a consequence of lower transportation costs. Division of labor and specialization began to make sense; markets emerged and grew into cities by attracting more people offering goods and services to each other. Barter proved more and more insufficient; money payments were being introduced instead. The chances for the accumulation of capital rose.

    13These chances, however, were anything but equally divided among urban populations. In general, we may observe that trade – long-distance trade in particular – offered better chances for accumulating capital than crafts or local trade. The longer the trade route, the smaller the number of people involved and the larger the potential profit margins. At the same time, long-distance trade required more entrepreneurial spirit, which distinguished long-distance merchants not only from local merchants and craftsmen, but also from landlords. As long as dependent farmers paid their rents in goods or in money, they had little incentive to invest their money in an entrepreneurial way. Thus, urban merchant capital rather than the capital of rural landlords was invested in economic undertakings. In other words, it was not capital in general that was needed for industrial investment, but commercial capital, the kind that was and still is primarily created in cities. Therefore, it makes sense when Robert Lopez associates the emergence and rapid spreading of cities in medieval Europe, in particular between the eleventh and the fourteenth centuries, with a commercial revolution.4 Medieval urbanization provided commercial capital, which was an indispensable precondition for later industrialization.

    14And yet, this first stage of urbanization was not at all restricted to Medieval European cities. Similar cities with a comparable potential of capital accumulation had emerged long before in ancient times and in several other parts of the world, in particular in the Mediterranean and in parts of Asia. As in Europe before the eighteenth century, these cities met the indispensable preconditions for industrialization, but they lacked the additional circumstances necessary to fuel the existing capital into industrial enterprise.5

    15The same may be said for technology, another indispensable precondition for modern industrialization. It is obvious that machine-based manufacturing needed skills that exceeded the technical knowledge of a farmer, who cultivated fields and raised animals in a rather simple way. Instead, modern manufacturing may be regarded as an offspring of traditional crafts, which relied strongly on the technical skills. Such traditional manufacturing developed primarily – though not exclusively – in cities. Thus, wherever they emerged, cities not only provided merchant capital but also technical skills, long before technology began to be taught in technical schools and universities.

    16It is true that some of the early machine-based production processes such as the spinning and weaving of cotton asked for relatively few skills and could therefore be carried out by unskilled rural people as well. When it came to inventing, installing and repairing modern machinery, however, skills and knowledge gathered in metalworking professions proved indispensable. Thus we may find modern textile mills in rural areas, but machine-building enterprises such as locomotive factories were almost exclusively limited to cities.

    17However, the emergence of technically less demanding production facilities in rural areas depended on another precondition of modern industrialization, which, in this case, was not urban. The relative overpopulation generated by constant population growth provided a surplus of cheap labor, which could be profitably employed in modern factories. As long as low population density allowed rural people to live relatively well on agriculture alone, they had no reason to turn to the much harder and sometimes almost inhumane work in the early factories. Few people were ready to turn to low-income factory work until the growing population density, combined with limited resources of land, made it difficult for them to earn their living in agriculture. And yet, no matter how cheap these workers were, potential entrepreneurs hesitated to employ them without large enough markets for the goods they produced. Cities played an essential role in the creation of such markets.

    18Finally, a sufficient infrastructure is another important precondition for successful industrialization. In an agrarian subsistence economy with little exchange and trade, there was little need for an efficient transportation system. With the emergence of cities, however, not only the growing trade within the cities but also between them lead to the building of roads and waterways. It is obvious that, later on, this traffic infrastructure facilitated the exchange of even larger amounts of goods produced in mechanized factories. Without efficient transportation systems, these goods might have become too expensive to be sold in a profitable way. After all, we should remember that modern means of cheap mass transportation, such as railways and steam ships, were introduced some decades after the beginning of the industrialization process, which they no doubt helped to accelerate.

    Mass Demand of Large Cities

    19After having shown how a first wave of urbanization created a number of indispensable preconditions for modern industrialization, such as large, machine-based factories and mass production, we must still remember that many of them – both in ancient times or in the Middle Ages – had already emerged long before modern industrialization started. To understand why the Industrial Revolution was not triggered before the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries and why – for a long time – it occurred in only a very limited number of regions, we must now turn to a second phase of urbanization. This second stage of urbanization was no longer characterized by the emergence of an additional number of still relatively small cities of some thousand inhabitants, but much more by the enormous growth of existing cities, which reached populations of several hundred thousand and even a million or more people.

    20According to Paul Bairoch and others, in 1900, Europe counted six times as many cities with more than 5,000 inhabitants than a hundred years before.6 In the same period, the number of large cities with more than 200,000 people rose even faster, from 8 to more than 50; most of them were situated in western and central Europe.7 Nine of them had already passed a population of one million. A similar density of large cities could only be observed in the north eastern part of the United States and in Japan, with about 20 and 6 cities respectively with more than 200,000 inhabitants in 1900. Fewer than 10 cities of comparable size had emerged in the much larger central and southern America, only 7 in British India.8

    21This unprecedented growth of cities resulted from both a faster population growth and a rising exodus from rural areas due to overpopulation. In Europe, between 1800 and 1900, the overall population grew almost as fast as during the three centuries before.9 And the percentage of people living in cities, which had stagnated at about 12 per cent between 1500 and 1800, rose to 38 per cent by 1900.10 An even sharper rise of both the overall population and the percentage of people living in cities could be observed in the United States at the same time.11

    22But how could a relatively large number of big cities induce the process of industrialization? Apart from the favorable preconditions discussed before, which were more amply provided by large cities than by smaller ones, the much larger demand for all kinds of goods made the decisive difference. What distinguished modern factory production from traditional crafts was its much larger output. Mass production, however, could only be profitable when the demand was big enough. Thus, it is no surprise that early industrialization in the form of machine-based mass production took primarily place in or near urban centers such as London, Paris, Vienna, Berlin on the European side of the Atlantic, and Boston, New York City, Philadelphia, Chicago on the American side.

    Large Cities and Industrialization in Selected Countries

    23Let us now take a closer look at some examples of industrialization as a consequence of large cities, beginning with Britain. It is more than pure chance that England was the first region to industrialize towards the end of the eighteenth century and that London was the first city to reach one million people around 1800, at a time when Paris as the second largest European city still stood at about half a million.12 During the 50 years before, the population living in cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants had nowhere else in Europe grown as fast as in Britain, where the number of those cities had risen from six to 23. And yet, this dramatic rise in urban population resulted in an urban structure that was not so different from the situation on the continent, with most of the larger cities on both sides of the Channel housing between 20,000 and 100,000 people. Thus, it must have been London that made the difference. Between 1772 and 1815, the number of warehouses in London trading in cotton products rose from 120 to 729,13 which reflects the rapid growth of a market that could be supplied by companies from all over England due to relatively short distances. In 1787, British manufactories produced ten times more cotton yarn and cloth than they did in 1760, and in 1815, they produced more than 20 times as many cotton goods than they did in 1770.14

    24Once the process of industrialization had started in Britain, potential entrepreneurs on the continent could follow suit, but not all of them did. Mass-produced, machinemade cotton products were much cheaper than traditional, hand-made goods. In order to compete with them successfully and to render factory production profitable, at least two conditions were necessary: a sufficient supply of cheap labor and a sufficient demand from large markets.

    25Two regions in today’s Austria may serve to illustrate the point. With regard to demand, no other city grew as fast as Vienna, from 175,000 people in 1754 to over 400,000 one hundred years later and to about 2 million in 1910.15 Vienna’s demand for cotton textiles was largely covered by companies established in the Vienna basin south of the city from the early 1800s onwards, soon followed by other companies that turned to factory production in order to profit from the growing demand. Up to 60 per cent of the 80 manufacturing companies of today’s Austria that employed more than 1,000 people on the eve of World War I were situated in the Vienna area and the neighboring regions of Lower Austria.16

    26Quite different from Vienna was the situation in the very western part of the country, in today’s province of Vorarlberg. Here, because of overpopulation, a sufficient and cheap supply of workers was demanding jobs and therefore willing to work in factories. Soon after 1800, several cotton mills were established, with five of them growing into large businesses with over 1,000 employees before 1914, more than twice as many as in the larger provinces of Tyrol, Salzburg and Carinthia together.17 And yet, potential entrepreneurs could not have employed so many people profitably if there had not been large enough markets in the surrounding regions of a highly urbanized upper Italy, Switzerland or southern Germany and, later on, in the more remote Vienna.

    27This takes me to the example of Italy, which offers another interesting case with regard to the importance of cities for industrialization. During the second half of the nineteenth century, the northern part of the country in particular experienced rapid industrialization. As late as in 1871, regional differences in estimated per-capita incomes were not too spectacular, with the north slightly above and the south somewhat below the national average. During the following decades, however, due to rapid industrialization, the gap widened dramatically, so that in 1951, per capita incomes in the northwest had risen to a level almost three times and in the northeast almost twice as high as in the south.18 Despite various other reasons put forward to explain these different developments, they may all be reduced to a decisive difference in urban structures. But unlike England, where one particularly large city made it the first country to industrialize, the cluster of several large cities in a limited area favored industrialization in northern Italy.19

    28It is true that around 1800, three of the larger cities with more than 100,000 people, Rome, Naples and Palermo, were located in the south and only two, Milan and Venice, in the north. However, among those cities that counted more than 20,000 inhabitants, 24 were situated in the north and only 8 in the south.20 Thus, the few large cities in the south, although they also stimulated industrialization, remained somewhat “isolated islands in a sea of highly rural regions” and developed strongly dualistic economies, not unlike so many former and present countries in the so-called Third World. In the north, by contrast, several larger industrial regions emerged, such as the region of Milan, which included the neighboring cities of Brescia, Bologna, Varese, Como and Pavia, each of them having developed into centers of industrial production with populations between 80,000 and 200,000 people.21 Although Italy entered modern industrialization relatively late with only 765,000 cotton spindles in 1876, more than 80 per cent of them had already been installed in the cotton mills of Piedmont, Lombardy and Liguria, only 12 per cent in the region around Naples and Salerno.22 40 years later, on the eve of World War I, both the number of spindles and the share of the north had risen to 4.6 million or about 90 per cent, whereas Campania’s share fell to only 6 per cent.23 How much a cluster of larger cities could serve as a source of demand and capital becomes evident when we compare the number of joint stock companies and their overall capital. In 1863, 372 such companies existed in the north, only 50 in the south, and the capital invested in the former was more than 14 times as much as in the latter.24

    29Similar regional differences may also be observed in the United States. Due to mass immigration from Europe, which in the nineteenth century concentrated heavily on the northeast, urbanization in the northeast developed faster than in the south. Contrary to the export-oriented and plantation-based economy of the south, from which only a few Americans benefited, more people in the northeast became part of a market economy. In 1840, when traditional modes of production still prevailed, personal income in New England and the Middle Atlantic states was already almost twice as high as in the south – a gap that would widen in subsequent decades.25

    30And yet, while such a market economy was no doubt an indispensable precondition for industrialization, it still was not sufficient to kick it off since concentrated mass demand did not emerge until the second half of the nineteenth century. Due to continued immigration, in 1850 there were only 6 cities with more than 100,000 people, but by 1900, there were at least 20, 6 of them with populations of more than half a million. New York City counted almost three and a half million inhabitants, Chicago 1.7 and Philadelphia 1.3 million, followed by St. Louis, Boston, Baltimore, and Pittsburgh with about half a million. Besides, most of the other big cities could be found within the relatively small, north eastern region between Boston, Chicago, and Washington (D. C.).26 Given this concentration of cities in the northeast, it is no surprise that the industrialization process developed much faster here than elsewhere. It began in New England with the factory production of cotton textiles in the early nineteenth century and expanded to the Middle Atlantic states and to the midwest during the following decades; the industry now included other consumer and producer goods. The south, however, accounted for only a small fraction of the nation’s industry, both before and after the Civil War. As late as 1909, about three quarters of the value added in manufacturing originated in the New England, the Middle Atlantic and the North East Central states.27 At the same time, industrialization reduced the number of people employed in northeastern farming. Contrary to the U. S. as a whole, where about 36 per cent of the active population was still employed in farming by 1900, the rate had fallen to 12 and 13 percent in New England and the mideast. It was still at about 60 percent in the south.28

    31Finally, I should like to throw a brief look on Japan, which, though about a hundred years later, had much in common with pioneering Britain. As was the case in Britain and several other countries, Japan’s industrialization started with the mechanization of consumer industries based on silk and cotton, both of them looking back to a long tradition.29 With the introduction of machine-based manufacture, the production of cotton yarn grew by a factor of fourteen from 1886 to 1897.30 In the years before World War I, the number of mechanical spindles was almost 20 times higher than it had been a quarter century before, and the number of people operating them had grown from 6,000 to over 100,000.31 As late as 1936, China, with a population of about seven times higher, produced less cotton yarn than Japan.32 And as in England, the expanding home market at the beginning stimulated mass production; later on, growing quantities of the production were exported.33

    32As in England, rapid urbanization led to the growing home market, although, in Japan, it was not just one particularly large city but at least two. As late as 1875, Tokyo had fewer than 800,000 inhabitants; by 1900, however, already one and a half million people lived within the city limits, and presumably more than 5 million in the larger metropolitan area.34 Only 400 kilometers to the south of Tokyo, Osaka increased its population from less than half to over one million during the second half of the nineteenth century.35 Furthermore, close to Osaka, Kyoto and Kobe boasted several hundred thousand inhabitants each before the turn of the century. As a consequence, a highly industrialized belt developed between Tokyo and Osaka, not unlike the so called “industrial coffin” between London and Manchester about a century before.36

    Outlook

    33To conclude, the examples of Britain, Austria, Italy, the United States, and Japan should suffice to support my argument that urbanization – in a first and in a second stage – provided both indispensable preconditions and crucial incentives for industrialization. It would be tempting to test my theory with other examples both in the so-called developed and developing countries. It is obvious that recent rapid industrialization in countries like Brazil, Mexico, India or China – to name but a few – has been concentrated in large metropolitan areas. Some final figures show in what spectacular way the number of urban centers has increased worldwide during the last decades: In 1940, there were only 5 mega cities with more than 5 million people – Tokyo, New York, London, Paris, and Osaka-Kobe – all of them situated in the First World; sixty years later, at the turn of the millennium, their number had risen to 45, with 34 of them located in the Third World.37 As I have demonstrated, the causal link between their growth and strong, regional industrialization can hardly be ignored.

    Bibliography

    DOI are automaticaly added to bibliographic references by Bilbo, OpenEdition’s bibliographic annotation tool. These bibliographic references can be downloaded in APA, Chicago or MLA formats.

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    Chapman, S. D. (1987). The Cotton Industry in the Industrial Revolution (1–). Macmillan Education UK. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09832-3
    Clough, S. B. (1964). The Economic History of Modern Italy (1–). Columbia University Press. https://doi.org/10.7312/clou93370
    Engerman, S. L., & Gallman, R. E. (Eds.). (2000). The Cambridge Economic History of the United States (1–). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/chol9780521553070
    Engerman, S. L., & Gallman, R. E. (Eds.). (2000). The Cambridge Economic History of the United States (1–). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/chol9780521553087
    Lopez, R. S. (1976). The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages 950–1350 (1–). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511583933
    Engerman, S. L., & Gallman, R. E. (Eds.). (2000). The Cambridge Economic History of the United States (1–). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/chol9780521553070
    Mosk, C. (2016). Japanese Industrial History: Technology, Urbanization and Economic Growth (1–). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315291734
    O’Brien, P. (1982). European Economic Development: The Contribution of the Periphery. The Economic History Review, 35(1), 1. https://doi.org/10.2307/2595100
    Rule, J. (2014). The Vital Century (1–). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315836386
    Chapman, S. D. The Cotton Industry in the Industrial Revolution. []. Macmillan Education UK, 1987. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09832-3.
    Clough, Shepard B. “The Economic History of Modern Italy”. []. Columbia University Press, March 2, 1964. https://doi.org/10.7312/clou93370.
    Engerman, Stanley L., and Robert E. Gallman, eds. The Cambridge Economic History of the United States. []. Cambridge University Press, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1017/chol9780521553070.
    Engerman, Stanley L., and Robert E. Gallman, eds. The Cambridge Economic History of the United States. []. Cambridge University Press, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1017/chol9780521553087.
    Lopez, Robert S. “The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages 950–1350”. []. Cambridge University Press, 1976. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511583933.
    Engerman, Stanley L., and Robert E. Gallman, eds. The Cambridge Economic History of the United States. []. Cambridge University Press, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1017/chol9780521553070.
    Mosk, Carl. Japanese Industrial History: Technology, Urbanization and Economic Growth. []. Routledge, 2016. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315291734.
    O’Brien, Patrick. “European Economic Development: The Contribution of the Periphery”. The Economic History Review 35, no. 1 (February 1982): 1. https://doi.org/10.2307/2595100.
    Rule, John. The Vital Century. []. Routledge, 2014. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315836386.
    Chapman, S. D. The Cotton Industry in the Industrial Revolution. [], Macmillan Education UK, 1987. Crossref, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09832-3.
    Clough, Shepard B. The Economic History of Modern Italy. [], Columbia University Press, 2 Mar. 1964. Crossref, https://doi.org/10.7312/clou93370.
    Engerman, Stanley L., and Robert E. Gallman, editors. The Cambridge Economic History of the United States. [], Cambridge University Press, 2000. Crossref, https://doi.org/10.1017/chol9780521553070.
    Engerman, Stanley L., and Robert E. Gallman, editors. The Cambridge Economic History of the United States. [], Cambridge University Press, 2000. Crossref, https://doi.org/10.1017/chol9780521553087.
    Lopez, Robert S. The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages 950–1350. [], Cambridge University Press, 1976. Crossref, https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511583933.
    Engerman, Stanley L., and Robert E. Gallman, editors. The Cambridge Economic History of the United States. [], Cambridge University Press, 2000. Crossref, https://doi.org/10.1017/chol9780521553070.
    Mosk, Carl. Japanese Industrial History: Technology, Urbanization and Economic Growth. [], Routledge, 2016. Crossref, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315291734.
    O’Brien, Patrick. “European Economic Development: The Contribution of the Periphery”. The Economic History Review, vol. 35, no. 1, Feb. 1982, p. 1. Crossref, https://doi.org/10.2307/2595100.
    Rule, John. The Vital Century. [], Routledge, 2014. Crossref, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315836386.

    This bibliography has been enriched with all the bibliographic references generated by Bilbo via CrossRef.

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    Footnotes

    1 Mathieu (2011), 87.

    2 Mathieu (2011), 87.

    3 O’Brien (1982), 4.

    4 See Lopez (1971).

    5 See Mathis (2011).

    6 Bairoch et al. (1988), 282.

    7 Bairoch et al. (1988), 280; Mitchell (1980), 425-426.

    8 Köllmann (1965), 112, 135-136, 244 and 295.

    9 From 76 million around 1500 to 188 million in 1800 and to 405 million in 1900; Mathieu (2011), 87.

    10 Mathieu (2011), 88.

    11 Population in the U.S. rose from 5 million in 1800 to over 30 million in 1860 and about 90 million in 1900; Köllmann (1965), 44 and 125. The percentage of people living in cities with more than 2,500 inhabitants rose from 15% in 1850 to 40% of the total population in 1900; Smolenski (1972), 601.

    12 These and the following numbers are taken from Bairoch (1988).

    13 Chapman (1990), 31.

    14 Landes (1965), 274; Rule (1992), 35.

    15 Sandgruber (1995), 107.

    16 Mathis (1987), 372-385.

    17 Mathis (1990), 71.

    18 Cohen/Federico (2001), 15.

    19 See Mathis (2007).

    20 Bairoch (1988), 40-49.

    21 Chiellino et al. (1983), 36-37.

    22 Hertner (1985), 747; Clough (1974), 63.

    23 Cafagna (1977), 327; Clough (1974), 63.

    24 Clough (1974), 167.

    25 Gallman (2000), 53.

    26 Köllmann (1965), 135-136.

    27 Heim (2000), 117.

    28 Margo (2000), 213.

    29 For a general overview on Japanese industrial history see Mosk (2001).

    30 Landes (1999), 387.

    31 Hentschel (1986), 134.

    32 Perkins (1975), 120.

    33 Mathis (2006), 228.

    34 Bronger (2004), 169.

    35 Bronger (2004), 167 and 169.

    36 Mosk (2001), 102.

    37 Bronger (2004), 20.

    Author

    Franz Mathis

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    Globalization and the City

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    1 Mathieu (2011), 87.

    2 Mathieu (2011), 87.

    3 O’Brien (1982), 4.

    4 See Lopez (1971).

    5 See Mathis (2011).

    6 Bairoch et al. (1988), 282.

    7 Bairoch et al. (1988), 280; Mitchell (1980), 425-426.

    8 Köllmann (1965), 112, 135-136, 244 and 295.

    9 From 76 million around 1500 to 188 million in 1800 and to 405 million in 1900; Mathieu (2011), 87.

    10 Mathieu (2011), 88.

    11 Population in the U.S. rose from 5 million in 1800 to over 30 million in 1860 and about 90 million in 1900; Köllmann (1965), 44 and 125. The percentage of people living in cities with more than 2,500 inhabitants rose from 15% in 1850 to 40% of the total population in 1900; Smolenski (1972), 601.

    12 These and the following numbers are taken from Bairoch (1988).

    13 Chapman (1990), 31.

    14 Landes (1965), 274; Rule (1992), 35.

    15 Sandgruber (1995), 107.

    16 Mathis (1987), 372-385.

    17 Mathis (1990), 71.

    18 Cohen/Federico (2001), 15.

    19 See Mathis (2007).

    20 Bairoch (1988), 40-49.

    21 Chiellino et al. (1983), 36-37.

    22 Hertner (1985), 747; Clough (1974), 63.

    23 Cafagna (1977), 327; Clough (1974), 63.

    24 Clough (1974), 167.

    25 Gallman (2000), 53.

    26 Köllmann (1965), 135-136.

    27 Heim (2000), 117.

    28 Margo (2000), 213.

    29 For a general overview on Japanese industrial history see Mosk (2001).

    30 Landes (1999), 387.

    31 Hentschel (1986), 134.

    32 Perkins (1975), 120.

    33 Mathis (2006), 228.

    34 Bronger (2004), 169.

    35 Bronger (2004), 167 and 169.

    36 Mosk (2001), 102.

    37 Bronger (2004), 20.

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    Mathis, F. (2013). No Industrialization without Urbanization: The Role of Cities in Modern Economic Development. In A. Exenberger, P. Strobl, G. Bischof, & J. Mokhiber (Eds.), Globalization and the City (1–). innsbruck university press. https://books.openedition.org/iup/1357
    Mathis, Franz. “No Industrialization Without Urbanization: The Role of Cities in Modern Economic Development”. In Globalization and the City, edited by Andreas Exenberger, Philipp Strobl, Günter Bischof, and James Mokhiber. Innsbruck: innsbruck university press, 2013. https://books.openedition.org/iup/1357.
    Mathis, Franz. “No Industrialization Without Urbanization: The Role of Cities in Modern Economic Development”. Globalization and the City, edited by Andreas Exenberger et al., innsbruck university press, 2013, https://books.openedition.org/iup/1357.

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    Exenberger, A., Strobl, P., Bischof, G., & Mokhiber, J. (Eds.). (2013). Globalization and the City (1–). innsbruck university press. https://books.openedition.org/iup/1352
    Exenberger, Andreas, Philipp Strobl, Günter Bischof, and James Mokhiber, eds. Globalization and the City. Innsbruck: innsbruck university press, 2013. https://books.openedition.org/iup/1352.
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