1 Diary entry, 19 July 1914, in Christopher H. D. Howard, “The Vienna Diary of Berta de Bunsen, 28 June-17 August 1914,” Bulletin of the Institute for Historical Research 51 (1978): 215.
2 The standard biography of Berchtold remains Hugo Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold: Grandseigneur und Staatsman, 2 vols. (Graz: Styria, 1963); for general surveys of his foreign policy, see F. R. Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972); his The Habsburg Monarchy among the Great Powers, 1815-1918 (New York: Berg, 1990); and his “Österreich (-Ungarn) unter den Grossmächten,” in Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848-1918, vol. 4, pt. 1, Die Habsburgermonarchie im System der Internationalen Beziehungen, ed. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1989), 196-373. Also the author’s Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), and with Russel Van Wyk, July 1914: Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Coming of the Great War: A Brief Documentary History (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s Press, 2003), 42-72. Berchtold’s diary (with virtually no entries for July 1914 possibly as a result of deliberate cleansing) and his carefully crafted memoir notes are in the Nachlass Berchtold, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna. The official documents of the Foreign Ministry for this period are in the same archive. After the war Berchtold made occasional efforts to defend his actions in July 1914. See, e. g., Berchtold’s comments (probably 1919) on Roderich Gooss, Das Wiener Kabinett und die Entstehung des Weltkrieges (Vienna: L. W. Seidel, 1919) in the Nachlass Aehrenthal, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Karton 5. I am grateful to Dr. Peter Broucek for this citation. Also see Berchtold’s review of Serge Sazonov’s memoirs in “Russia, Austria, and the World War,” Contemporary Review 131 (April 1928): 422-32; and his interview with Bernadotte E. Schmitt, “Interviewing the Authors of the War,” (privately printed for the Chicago Literary Club, 1930), (www.chilit.org), 26-30. I am grateful to my research assistant, Tracey Omohundro, for discovering this interesting document.
3 The most recent restatement of the “Berlin pushing Vienna” thesis can be found in John C. G. Röhl, Wilhelm II: Der Weg in den Abgrund 1900-1914 (Munich: Beck, 2008), chs. 37-41; also see the earlier work by Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914, trans. Marian Jackson (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), chs. 19-22. The celebrated work of Luigi Albertini repeatedly made this point in The Origins of the War of 1914, trans. and ed. Isabella M. Massey, 3 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1952-57). In contrast, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., “Aggressive and Defensive Aims of Political Elites: Austro-Hungary Policy in 1914,” in An Improbable War: The Outbreak of World War I and European Political Culture before 1914, ed. Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson (New York: Berghahn, 2007), 61-74. For a superb overall account, balanced and nuanced, see Hew Strachan, The Outbreak of the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) which is also the first part of The First World War, vol. 1, To Arms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 1-102. Also see David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of the War: Europe 1904-1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 366-421, and his Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 3-35.
4 On Meréy’s views, see Fritz Fellner, “Die ‘Mission Hoyos,’” in idem., Vom Dreibund zum Völkerbund: Studien zur Geschichte der Internationalen Beziehungen, 1882-1919 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1994), 119; the essay appeared originally in 1976. On Redlich, see Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol. 1, 249-51; on Redlich’s views during the July crisis, see Schicksalsjahre Österreichs, 1908-1919: Das politische Tagebuch Josef Redlichs, vol. I, 1908-1914, ed. Fritz Fellner (Graz: Verlag Hermann Böhlaus, 1953), 233-45.
5 Sidney B. Fay, The Origins of the World War, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1928), vol. 2, 198; Bernadotte E. Schmitt, The Coming of the War 1914, 2 vols. (New York: George Scribner’s Sons, 1930), vol. 1, 264; Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 2, 125.
6 Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold; John Leslie, “The Antecedents of Austria-Hungary’s War Aims,” in Archiv und Forschung: Das Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv in seiner Bedeutung für die Geschichte Österreichs und Europas, ed. Elisabeth Springer and Leopold Kammerhofer (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1993), 375-94; Manfried Rauchensteiner, Der Tod des Doppeladlers: Österreich-Ungarn und der Erste Weltkrieg (Graz: Styria, 1993), 63-85; Williamson, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, 43-44, and ch. 10.
7 The quote is from G. P. Gooch, “Berchtold,” in Before the War: Studies in Diplomacy, vol. 2 (London: Longmans, Green, 1938), 373. On the appointment, see Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol. 1, 247-48; also Solomon Wank, “The Appointment of Count Berchtold as Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister,” Journal of Central European Affairs 23 (July 1963): 143-51.
8 On the Habsburg foreign policy establishment, see William D. Godsey, Jr., Aristocratic Redoubt: The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office on the Eve of the First World War (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1999). Also see the historical essay on the Foreign Ministry by Helmut Rumpler in Die Habsburgermonarchie im System der Internationalen Beziehungen, 1-121.
9 On Berchtold’s early career, see Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol. 1, 1-48.
10 On his language skills, see ibid., 9-10.
11 On the relationship, Hugo Hantsch, “Erzherzog Thronfolger Franz Ferdinand und Graf Leopold Berchtold,” Historica (Vienna, 1965), 175-98; Robert A. Kann, “Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand und Graf Berchtold als Aussenminister, 1912-1914,” Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 22 (1969): 246-78; Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., “Influence, Power, and the Policy Process: The Case of Franz Ferdinand, 1906-1914,” The Historical Journal 17 (June 1974): 417-34.
12 This assessment of Berchtold is based on a detailed study of his diary, his memoir notes, and from an analysis of his diplomatic correspondence, first when in St. Petersburg and later as foreign minister.
13 On the overall situation from Berchtold’s perspective, see Rauchensteiner, Der Tod des Doppeladlers, 27-36; Williamson, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, 164-89. On the monarchy as a whole, see Steven Beller, Francis Joseph (London: Longman, 1996), 200-19; Robin Okey, The Habsburg Monarchy: From Enlightenment to Eclipse (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001), 369-80.
14 For example, see the diary entry for 16 February 1914 in which the emperor praised his efforts and conferred on him the order of St. Stephen; Nachlass Berchtold, Karton 2.
15 On the visit, see Berchtold’s diary entry, 14 June 1914, ibid; Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol. 2, 544-45.
16 On Tisza, see Gabor Vermes, István Tisza: The Liberal Vision and Conservative Statecraft of A Magyar Nationalist (New York: East European Monographs, 1985), and on Burián, the valuable diary extracts for the summer of 1914 in István Diószegi, “Aussenminister Stephan Graf Burián: Biographie und Tagebuchstelle,” Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös Nominatae, Sectio Historica 7 (Budapest, n. p., 1966): 161-208. For a view of Tisza as a foreign policy player, see “Der Dirigent: Tisza und die äussere Politik,” Graz Tagespost, 18 Apr. 1914; a copy of this is, interestingly, in the Militärkanzlei des Generalinspektors der gesamten bewaffneten Macht [Franz Ferdinand], fasz. 198b, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv-Kriegsarchiv, Vienna (hereafter KA).
17 On Berchtold’s relations with the Habsburg military, see Günther Kronenbitter, “Krieg im Frieden”: Die Führung der k. u. k. Armee und die Grossmachtpolitik Österreich-Ungarns, 1906-1914 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003), 369-519; also William D. Godsey, Jr., “Officers vs. Diplomats: Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy in Austria-Hungary, 1906-1914,” Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 46 (1998): 43-66.
18 On Berchtold at the Delegations in Budapest, see his diary entries from 28 April to 27 May 1914, Nachlass Berchtold, Karton 2.
19 The first volume of Solomon Wank’s biography of Aehrenthal provides new insights into the elite thinking on the question of Russia in the years before the annexation crisis: In the Twilight of Empire: Count Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal (1854-1912), Imperial Habsburg Patriot and Statesman (Vienna: Böhlau, 2009).
20 On Tisza’s irritation at the Russian actions, see Tisza to Berchtold (tel.), 14 June 1914, in Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914, ed. Ludwig Bittner and Hans Uebersberger, 8 vols. (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1930) [hereafter cited ÖUA, with volume and document number]: 8, no. 9861; see the explanation of the visit given by Ottokar Czernin, the Habsburg minister in Bucharest, on 17 June 1914, ibid., no. 9875. On the earlier tensions, Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., “Military Dimensions of Habsburg-Romanov Relations During the Era of the Balkan Wars,” in East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars, ed. Béla K. Király and Dimitrije Djordjevic (New York: East European Monographs, 1987), 316-37. On Russian machinations among the Ruthenians, see Z. A. B. Zeman, The Breakup of the Habsburg Empire, 1914-1918 (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 1-35.
21 For Vienna’s knowledge of the Serbian political situation, see, e. g., the report from Minister Wladimir Giesl to Berchtold, 12 June 1914, ÖUA, 8, no. 9844. Also Barbara Jelavich, “What the Habsburg Government Knew about the Black Hand,” Austrian History Yearbook 22 (1991): 131-50.
22 On the overall issue of Austro-German relations, see Jürgen Angelow, Kalkül und Prestige: Der Zweibund am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges (Cologne: Böhlau, 2000) and on the larger alliance, Holger Afflerbach, Der Dreibund: Europäische Grosssmacht- und Allianzpolitik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg (Vienna: Böhlau, 2002). For the problems of alliance relationships, see Patricia A. Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
23 Berchtold’s diary entries recount his conversation with Kaiser Wilhelm and his subsequent briefing of Franz Joseph on 26 March 1914, Nachlass Berchtold, Karton 2; also the entry for 16 May 1914 when Berchtold complained that Habsburg ambassador to Berlin, Ladislaus Szögyény-Marich, had been unable to convince Berlin of the threat from Serbia, ibid. Also Berchtold to Szögyény, 16 May 1914, ÖUA, 8, no. 9674. See Röhl, Wilhelm II, 1038-66, for the German perspective.
24 Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol. 2, 545-51. Berchtold had been thinking about these issues since the summer of 1913; see Erlass nach Berlin, 1 August 1913, ÖUA, 7, no. 8157. Tisza had also peppered him with suggestions; e. g., his memorandum, 15 March 1914, that stressed a coordinated German-Habsburg effort in the Balkans, ibid., no. 9482. Also see the insightful memos from Ludwig von Flotow, a senior Ballhausplatz official, May 1914, ibid., 8, no. 9627, and Count Heinrich Apponyi, a Habsburg attaché in Berlin and great friend of Wilhelm II, dated May 1914, in the Politisches Archiv, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, PA I/582 [hereafter PA].
25 The original memorandum was drafted by Baron Franz Matscheko and edited by Count Johann Forgách by 24 June 1914; Matscheko and Berchtold then re-edited it before 28 June. The document would be edited again, altered slightly, and then sent with Count Alex Hoyos to Berlin on 4 July. The first draft is in ÖUA, 8, no. 9918; the revised is no. 9984. For a very useful summary of the history of the document and the changes made before its dispatch to Berlin, see H. Bertil A. Petersson, “Das österreichisch-ungarische Memorandum an Deutschland vom 5. Juli 1914,” Scandia 30 (1964): 138-90.
26 Franz Kinsky to Berchtold (tel.), 28 June 1914, PA I/810/(82).
27 Berchtold wrote a brief memoir account of the fallen archduke; see Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol. 2, 552-56.
28 For a somewhat sympathetic view of the murders, see Vladimir Dedijer, The Road to Sarajevo (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966). See also David James Smith, One Morning in Sarajevo 28 June 1914 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2008).
29 On this see Mark Cornwall, “Serbia,” in Decisions for War 1914, ed. Keith Wilson (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 55-96; David MacKenzie, Apis, the Congenial Conspirator: The Life of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijevic (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1989); and Williamson and Van Wyk, July 1914, 15-42.
30 See the analysis in Kronenbitter, “Krieg im Frieden”, 462-74; Rudolf Jerábek, Potiorek: General im Schatten von Sarajevo (Graz: Styria, 1991), 88-96. On the unrest in Bosnia-Herzegovina, see Potiorek to Krobatin, 29 June and 2 July (tels.) 1914, ÖUA, 8, nos. 9948, 9993; Potiorek to Leon von Biliński (the Common Finance Minister in charge of the two provinces), 30 June and July 3 (tels.), ibid., nos. 9961, 9974, 9993, 10020-21, 10025. Potiorek had come to detest Biliński; see Conrad to Berchtold, 7 July 1914, ibid., no. 10113.
31 For Conrad’s account of the conversation, see Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, Aus meiner Dienstzeit, 1906-1918, vol. 4 (Vienna: Rikola, 1923) [hereafter, Conrad, AMD ], 30-32; also see Conrad to Berchtold, 30 June 1914, PA XL, 188; Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol. 2, 557-58. War Minister Krobatin also pressed the military solution when he met with the foreign minister on 30 June 1914. In addition, Berchtold was soon receiving a steady stream of reports from Belgrade on the belligerent, almost joyful attitude of the Serbian press about the assassinations; Wilhelm von Storck to Berchtold, 29 June (tel.), 1 July (tel.) 1914, ÖUA, nos. 9941 and 9963.
32 Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol. 2, 558-60, based on the memoir accounts.
33 Ibid., 560-61; Tisza to Franz Joseph, 1 July 1914, ÖUA, no. 9978. For insights into Tisza’s concerns during the July crisis, see the correspondence in Count Stephan Tisza: Prime Minister of Hungary: Letters (1914-1916), trans. Carvel de Bussy (New York: Peter Lang, 1991), 1-16. On Vienna’s early knowledge of the investigation into the plot, Potiorek to Biliński, 2, 3, and 5 July (tels.) 1914, ÖUA, 8, nos. 9991-92, 10023, 10066-68.
34 Potiorek, sensitive to the security failures in Sarajevo, sent copious and numerous memoranda on the volatile situation in Sarajevo and by implication throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and with any tidbit that linked the assassins to Belgrade; see, e. g., Potiorek to Krobatin, 29 June (tel.) 1914, ibid., no. 9948; Potiorek to Biliński, 30 June (tel.) and 3 July 1914, ibid., nos. 9962, 10021. The Potiorek files in the Kriegsarchiv contain a full set of the July reports; KA, A12: A: 1914 (323B). The Habsburg military attaché in Belgrade, Otto Gellinek, filed numerous reports as well; see, e. g., Gellinek to Conrad, 4 July (tel.) 1914, PA I/811; a complete set are in the KA, MA/Belgrad, fasz. 8.
35 For Hoyos’record of his talk with Viktor Naumann on 1 July 1914, see ÖUA, no. 9966; it has been widely reprinted as evidence of German pressure on Vienna. Tschirschky’s report of 30 June 1914 in which he urged Vienna to move cautiously drew Wilhelm’s famous retort, “Who authorized him to act that way?” and this is often cited as part of the pattern of German pressure on Vienna rather than a not surprising reaction to the comments of an ambassador; the full report is in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents Collected by Karl Kautsky, ed. Max Montgelas and Walther Schücking (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924) [hereafter Kautsky, Outbreak], no. 7; this document has been reprinted many times. The July reports from the German military attaché, Count Karl von Kageneck, to Berlin offer further insights into the decision process in Vienna; see Günther Kronenbitter, “Die Macht der Illusionen: Julikrise und Kriegsausbruch 1914 aus der Sicht des deutschen Militärattachés in Wien,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 57 (1998): 519-50.
36 Conrad, AMD, 34.
37 On the interview with the emperor, see Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol. 2, 562-64; for copies of the revised memorandum and the personal letter of 2 July 1914, see ÖUA, 8, no. 9984. For the report of the conversation with Tschirschky, see ibid., no. 10006; the report is dated 3 July 1914. Also see Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol. 2, 568-69.
38 On Tisza’s proposed changes, see his 5 July 1914 telegram that reached Vienna at 11:50 a. m. that Sunday; ÖUA, 8, no. 10070.
39 Berchtold to Szögyény, 4 July (tel.) 1914, ibid., no. 10037. That same day Berchtold was forcibly reminded of the need for clarity from Berlin, for Tschirschky now talked of the need for immediate action, while Szögyény from Berlin reported that Undersecretary Arthur Zimmermann (who was acting for honeymooning Foreign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow) urged no humiliating demands on Serbia; ibid., nos. 10038 and 10039.
40 Fellner’s “Die ‘Mission Hoyos’” remains a valuable introduction to this controversial mission. He cites evidence to suggest that Hoyos seized the chance to go because he wanted a military solution to the Serbian issue. In his article he reprints a 1917 memoir note by Hoyos of the trip.
41 The translation is from July 1914: The Outbreak of the First World War: Selected Documents, ed. Imanuel Geiss (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967), 77; the original is Szögyény to Berchtold, 5 July (tel.) 1914, ÖUA, 8, no. 10058. Also see Röhl, Wilhelm II, 1082-86; Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol. 2, 567-71; Rauchensteiner, Der Tod des Doppeladlers, 70-73.
42 The translation is from Geiss, ed., July 1914, 79; the original is Szögyény to Berchtold, 6 July (tel.) 1914, ÖUA, no. 10076; Hoyos claimed to have done most if not all of the drafting of the telegram.
43 The diary fragments are in Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol. 2, 569-70; Berchtold to Tisza, 6 July (tel.) 1914, ÖUA, 8, no. 10091. See Conrad’s record of the discussion with Berchtold, Conrad, AMD, 39-40; on the harvest leave issue, Williamson, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, 199-200, and his “Confrontation with Serbia: The Consequences of Vienna’s Failure to Achieve Surprise in July 1914,” Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 43 (1993): 168-77.
44 Tschirschky to Jagow, Kautsky, Outbreak, no. 18; Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol. 2, 572-76.
45 These lines are taken from Geiss, ed., July 1914, 80-86. The full minutes of the meeting are in ÖUA, 8, no. 10118, and in Miklós Komjáthy, ed., Protokolle des Gemeinsamen Ministerrates der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie (1914-1918) (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1966), 141-50; also see Williamson, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, 197-200; Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol. 2, 574-82. Press leaks about the conference and its aftermath led to a confrontation between Berchtold and Biliński over the issue; see, e. g., Berchtold to Biliński, 11 July and Biliński to Berchtold, 13 July 1914, ÖUA, 8, nos. 10209 and 10211. One article in the Neue Freie Presse on 8 July 1914 noted the conference had lasted six hours and discussed the threat posed by Greater Serbdom to the monarchical principle, while the article that offended Berchtold of 9 July had talked of “Imminent Steps in Belgrade,” ibid.
46 Berchtold to Franz Joseph, 7 July (tel.) 1914, ÖUA, 8, no. 10116; diary entry, 8 July 1914, in Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol. 2, 570; Berchtold to Tisza, 8 July 1914, ÖUA, 8, no. 10145. On 8 July at 6 p. m. Berchtold met with Conrad, Forgách, Burián, Hoyos, and Karl von Macchio, first section chief of the Foreign Ministry, to discuss the terms of the ultimatum and its delivery in fourteen days after the harvest leaves and investigation were ended. At the meeting the foreign minister expressed the desire for Conrad and War Minister Krobatin to go on leave “to give the appearance that nothing was happening,” Conrad, AMD, 61-62. Yet even as Berchtold pushed ahead, one of his chief aides, Forgách belittled the foreign minister and wondered if he would really act; Forgách to Meréy, 8 July 1914, Nachlass Meréy, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna. The Habsburg press chronicled Berchtold’s travels to and from Bad Ischl; see, e. g., Fremdenblatt, the semi-official press organ of the Foreign Ministry, 9 and 21 July 1914.
47 Diary entry, Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol. 2, 570-71, 586-89; Tisza to Franz Joseph, 8 July 1914, ÖUA, 8, no. 10146. On 10 July Conrad reported that Berchtold, just back from Bad Ischl, had found the ruler to “be for action against Serbia and only had concerns about unrest in Hungary,” Conrad, AMD, 70; also see Tschirschky to Jagow, 10 July (tel.) 1914, Kautsky, Outbreak, no. 29.
48 On the Wiesner mission, the study by Friedrich Würthle, Die Spur führt nach Belgrad: Die Hintergründe des Dramas von Sarajevo 1914 (Vienna: Molden, 1975) remains valuable. On 13 July Wiesner reported by telegram as settled fact that three of the conspirators had been armed in Serbia and smuggled across the border and that two Serbian officials had been responsible for the weapons; he would name them in the dossier as among those to be punished; ÖUA, 8, no. 10253. On the drafting of the ultimatum, see the memoir account by Musulin, Das Haus am Ballhausplatz: Erinnerungen eines österreichisch-ungarischen Diplomaten (Munich: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1924), 222-34. General Potiorek disagreed with Wiesner’s decision not to describe Serbian governmental participation in the plot; there must have been someone, he argued, in a message to Krobatin, 14 July 1914, Kriegsministerium Präs., 1914, 81-10/60, KA.
49 Szögyény to Berchtold, 9 July (tel.) and 12 July 1914, ÖUA, 8, nos. 10154, 10214. For the files on “harvest leave” and the operational war plans against Serbia, see KA, Gstbs., Operationsbüro, fasz. 43.
50 Burián diary extracts, 9, 10, 12, and 14 July 1914, “Aussenminister Stephan Graf Burián,” 206; on Burián’s role in the crisis, see Leslie, “The Antecedents of Austria-Hungary’s War Aims,” 342-44. On Tisza’s change of views, see Berchtold to Franz Joseph, 14 July 1914, ÖUA, 8, no. 10272; Vermes, István Tisza, 228-31; József Galántai, Die Österreichisch-Ungarn Monarchie und der Weltkrieg (Budapest: Corvina Kiadó, 1979), 251-77; also Tschirschky to Bethmann Hollweg, 14 July 1914, Kautsky, Outbreak, nos. 49-50.
51 Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol. 2, 591-96; Williamson, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, 200-01. One sign of the shift in attitudes: on 12 July Redlich doubted war would come and on 15 July the bellicose Hoyos assured him it would, Redlich, Schicksalsjahre Österreichs, vol. 1, 236-38.
52 Berchtold to Szögyény, 15 July (tel.) 1914, ÖUA, 8, no. 10276; Berchtold to Meréy, 15 July (tel.) 1914, ibid., no. 10289. For Berlin’s irritation at the delays, see Szögyény to Berchtold, 16 July (tel.) 1914, ibid., no. 10296.
53 Berchtold’s memoranda of conversations with Tschirschky about Italy, 20 and 26 July 1914, ibid., no. 10398, 10715; Tschirschky’s reports are in Kautsky, Outbreak, nos. 94 and 212. Also, e. g., Berchtold to Meréy and Szögyény, 28 July (tel.) 1914, ÖUA, no. 10909; Röhl, Wilhelm II, 1090-166.
54 Meréy to Berchtold, 18 July (tel.) 1914, ÖUA, 8, no. 10364, and Berchtold to Meréy, 20 July (tel.) 1914, ibid., no. 10418; also see Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 2, 222-26.
55 The minutes of the meeting of 19 July 1914 are in ÖUA, 8, no. 10393, and also in Komjáthy, ed., Protokolle des Gemeinsamen Ministerrates, 150-54; reprinted in part in Geiss, ed., July 1914, 139-42. Conrad also reprints the minutes and then at the end noted that during the Balkan wars the governments had pledged no territorial changes and that “after the war no one concerned himself with it,” Conrad, AMD, 92, 87-91; also Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol. 2, 599-602.
56 Ibid., 602-03. Berchtold gave Tschirschky a copy of the ultimatum late on 21 July 1914; Szögyény would deliver the formal copy to Berlin on 24 July 1914, ÖUA, 8, nos. 10478, 10400.
57 The terms of the ultimatum are in ibid., no. 10395; the belated dossier, dated 25 July (tel.) 1914, ibid., no. 10654. Also see Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol. 2, 605-16. On the Russian actions on 24 July 1914, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr. and Ernest R. May, “An Identity of Opinion: Historians and July 1914,” Journal of Modern History 79 (June 2007): 367-68. On 23 July Biliński and Potiorek queried Berchtold on what would happen if Belgrade accepted all of the demands; would they ask for more? Berchtold replied that he would wait and see what happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Berchtold to Tisza, 23 July (tel.) 1914, PA I/810.
58 Macchio to Berchtold, 25 July (tel.) 1914, Berchtold to Macchio, 25 July (tel.) 1914, ÖUA, 8, nos. 10703-05.
59 Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol. 2, 612-16; also Albert von Margutti, The Emperor Francis Joseph and His Times (New York: George H. Doran, 1921), 312-20, where he portrays a less belligerent ruler than other accounts; Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 2, 374-76.
60 For an official summary of the mobilization actions taken, some as early 24 July 1914 (moving the Danube naval flotilla), see the official record in the papers of General Conrad von Hötzendorf, KA, Conrad B 1450/114, prepared by Rudolf Kundmann, one of his aides; also Kronenbitter, “Krieg im Frieden”, 504-19; Rauchensteiner, Der Tod des Doppeladlers, 87-99.
61 For the most recent review of the German actions, see Röhl, Wilhelm II, 1097-175; also Annika Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke: The Origins of the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 182-226.
62 Hoyos to Schiessl, 26 July 1914, ÖUA, 8, no. 10772.
63 Conrad, AMD, 131-34; Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol. 2, 617-20; on the first fighting, see the draft article by Kurt Peball, “Die Beschiessung Belgrads zu Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges,” no date but mid-1980s, KA, E/1755/58. On British views and Berchtold’s pushing back, see Ambassador Albert Mensdorff to Berchtold, 27 and 28 July (tels.) 1914, ÖUA, 8, nos. 10812-13, 10893-94; Berchtold to Mensdorff, 28 and 29 July (tels.) 1914, ibid., nos. 10891-92, 10972.
64 Rauchensteiner, Der Tod des Doppeladlers, 92-94; Robert A. Kann, Kaiser Franz Joseph und der Ausbruch des Weltkrieges (Vienna: Böhlau, 1971).
65 On 27 July Conrad still thought that Germany would deter Russia; the next day he told Berchtold he had to know by 1 August whether Russia would be in the war. On 30 July Conrad learned of Russian mobilization in Warsaw, Kiev, Odessa, and Moscow, but nonetheless sent the troops southward. That same day Franz Joseph authorized full mobilization to start on 1 August; Conrad, AMD, 132-48; Kronenbitter, “Krieg im Frieden”, 498-505; Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol. 2, 636-38.
66 . Röhl, Wilhelm II, 1126-49; Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol. 2, 630-34; Conrad, AMD, 151; Williamson, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, 205-08. The minutes of the Common Ministerial Council are in ÖUA, 8, no. 11203 and Komjáthy, ed., Protokolle des Gemeinsamen Ministerrates, 154-58; reprinted in part in Geiss, ed., July 1914, 318-22. For German reports from Vienna, see Tschirschky to Jagow, 30 July (tel.) [actually sent at 1:35 a. m., 31 July 1914], Kautsky, Outbreak, no. 465, and Franz Joseph’s letter to Wilhelm, 31 July (tel.) 1914 in which he indicated the war with Serbia would proceed, ibid., no. 482; Kronenbitter, “Krieg im Frieden”, 507-09.
67 Scott D. Sagan, “1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Intractability,” International Security 11 (Fall 1986): 151-75, and Jack S. Levy, “Preferences, Constraints and Choices in July 1914,” International Security 15 (Winter 1990/91): 151-86; Williamson and May, “An Identity of Opinion,” 383-87.
68 Joseph Baernreither, a Habsburg foreign policy expert, expressed this view in October 1913 after a visit to Sarajevo said: “We have got either to annihilate Serbia, or, if we cannot do that, learn to live with it. Tertium non datur”; Joseph M. Baernreither, Fragments of a Political Diary, ed. Joseph Redlich (London: Macmillan, 1930), 246. Also Solomon Wank, “Desperate Counsel in Vienna in July 1914: Berthold Molden’s Unpublished Memorandum,” Central European History 26 (Sept. 1993): 281-310.
69 Leslie, “The Antecedents of Austria-Hungary’s War Aims,” 307-94, remains indispensable. For what the principals thought about the war, see Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol. 2, 644-47; Conrad, AMD, 114-21, and for an insightful analysis later, Kronenbitter, “Krieg im Frieden”, 516-30.
70 For the most recent summary of Habsburg military plans and Conrad’s role in them, see Günther Kronenbitter, “Austria-Hungary,” in War Planning 1914, ed. Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 24-47.