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L'américanisation en Europe au xxe siècle : économie, culture, politique. Volume 1

 | 
Isabelle Lescent-Giles
, 
Dominique Barjot
, 
Marc de Ferrière

Première partie. Sources et origines

American influence on German manufacturing before World War I: the case of the Ludwig Loewe Company

Wolfram Fischer

Résumé

L’introduction du « Système américain de manufacture » par la société Ludwig Loewe de Berlin lors de sa fondation en 1870 offre un excellent exemple, et sans doute l’un des mieux documentés, sur la manière d’organiser la production selon les méthodes du « management scientifique ». Ses caractéristiques sont : une étroite coopération entre construction et production, une concentration sur un nombre réduit de produits, la standardisation, l’interchangeabilité des pieces, le contrôle de la qualité, la mesure précise des coûts de production, mais aussi une large information sur l’entreprise, un marketing actif et une politique dynamique de relations publiques. La déqualification de la force de travail ne fait cependant pas partie des methode de management et n’en constitue pas un des objectifs.

Texte intégral

1During early industrialisation German manufacturing industry, particularly machine building, looked towards England. Swiss, French, and Belgian influences also are documented. And quite a number of indigenous German entrepreneurs founded successful manufacturing firms. Most of them were practical men, mechanics, locksmiths etc. some co-operated with merchants and bankers. German manufacturing thus was part of the Western European pattern of industrialisation.

  • 1 F. Reuleaux, Briefe aus Philadelphia, Braunschweig, 1877, reprint Weinheim, Olms (1983), p. 22. Quo (...)

2This started to change in the last decades of the century. It has often been maintained that the turning point came when the director of the Berlin Gewerbeakademie Franz Reuleaux, who observed for the Prussian government the Chicago World Pair of 1876, had corne to the conclusion that German products were “cheap and bad” in comparison with other, mainly American manufacturing goods. His “Letters from Philadelphia” started a lively discussion amongst German engineers, industrialists and civil servants. In his fourth letter he praised above all the American machine-tool industry: “Particularly brilliant is American manufacturing in the realm of machine-tools [...] Richness of new practical ideas, surprisingly skilful fitting for special purposes, a heightening precision in the construction of co-operating parts and an increasing elegance of the exterior appearance characterise the American production in this field”. But he added: “The most talent to compete with the American machine-tool builders has perhaps Germany”.1

3While Reuleaux stimulated a public discussion, some German entrepreneurs and engineers had been in the United States already earlier to learn from the American experience and to tranfer it to Germany. One of them was Ludwig Loewe (1837-1886) who was to become one of the most successful industrialists in the in the late 1870s and early 1880s. Unlike his better known contemporary and competitor Emil Rathenau (1838-1915) and unlike most other founders of German machine-tool factories, Loewe and his younger brother Isidor (1848-1910), who succeeded him as owner of the Ludwig Loewe Company, did not have any technical training. They were neither artisans nor engineers. Since they had not grown up in these traditions they may have looked without bias over the ocean. Ludwig Loewe went there before he opened his own firm in 1870, and he, his brothers, and the leading engineers of the firm would cross the ocean again and again. Not only this: The Loewes also hired very early American engineers even if they did not speak a word of German. Interpreting for them was the first job of the young engineer Georg Schlesinger (1874-1949) when in 1897 he entered the firm after graduation from the Technical University of Charlottenburg near Berlin. In interaction with his American counterparts Schlesinger soon would become one of the most important innovators in the German machine-tool industry, and he helped to make the Loewe company into a leading enterprise in the construction of machine tools, before in 1904 he was appointed to the first professorship of machine-tools, factory construction and factory management in Germany at his alma mater.

  • 2 For the biographies of the brothers see W. Treue, «Ludwig und Isidor Loewe», p. 97-109, in W. Treue(...)
  • 3 W. Fischer, “Herkunft und Anfänge eines Unternehmers: Heinrich Lanz 1859-1970. Vom Landmaschinenhän (...)

4Ludwig Loewe, however, did not start as a machine-tool manufacturer. He and his brother were born in a small catholic Thuringian town of Jewish parents.2 Ludwig left school with 13, went into retail textile business in his home town. 1858, at the age of 21, he opened his own business as a wool merchant on commission in the thriving Prussian capital of Berlin. He travelled a lot and looked for opportunities and seems to have been fascinated by technical novelties. One of these were agricultural tools and machinery which then were mainly imported from England. He had them repaired and sold. It may have been more than mere accident that in the same year another merchant, Heinrich Lanz, trading mainly in agricultural goods, went from Lake Constance to the city of Mannheim on the river Rhine to import and sell English agricultural implements. Out of this enterprise grew within several decades the largest factory for agricultural machinery on the European continent.3

  • 4 Quoted in Spur, Fischer 2000: 57 and Treue 1990: 98, more extensively in: F. Wegeleben, Die Rationa (...)

5Ludwig Loewe was even more fascinated by a machine which recently had become a mass product in the United States and was about to conquer also Europe: the sewing machine. Loewe took his young brother and an engineer, trained in weapons making, from his Thuringian homeland to America before he opened his own factory in Berlin in 1870. Amongst the factories they visited was the then already famous weapon producer Colt. From the very beginning he tried to imitate the “American System of manufacture”, that is the mass production of a single product by a systematic use of exchangeable parts. In his first annual report he explained the reason why he wanted to use this method: “The idea which forms the fundament of our enterprise from the very beginning and which has not yet been realised anywhere in Europe we found there (in America) on a grand scale. All important factories (in the US) occupy themselves only with the production of a single System and try to do this in an excellent and massive way by producing automatic (“durchaus selbsttätige Einrichtungen”) devices for the special purposes of their machines... From the biggest machine to the smallest tool every working material belongs to a standardised System”.4

6Loewe also pointed in this first of his annual business reports to the necessity of a “scientific management” by exact calculation and self cost accounts and to the value of a System of gauges which allows precise manufacturing. It was not only American technology but also organisation and management of an industrial enterprise which he wanted to introduce into his own firm.

7Putting these observations and principles into reality was not that easy. The American machine-tools which he wanted to use for his production of sewing machines did not arrive in time; so he had some built at home imitating the American originals, but he could not successfully compete with the American sewing machines from Howe and from Singer. He tried to lower the prices — to no avail; then he tried to raise the quality and the prices — again without success. While in the first year his firm had produced 8421 sewing machines, the production sank to 1147 in following year. Bankruptcy threatened.

8In this awkward business prospect the political situation helped. Prussia had just won the war against France, but had realised that the French hand weapons had been superior to the Prussian ones. The army was to be supplied with better guns. The model was Mauser 71, a rifle produced in Württemberg by the family-owned Mauser factory. The state-owned rifle factories in Prussia were unable to change to the new standards quickly enough. Mauser itself was to small to produce enough weapons alone. They needed 66 parts for their rifles. Loewe was chosen to produce two of them, the sight and the extractor. These were small, but complicated parts and they needed precise manufacturing. This was exactly what Loewe wanted to do, and he was successful. Soon orders for igniting charges of artillery weapons came in. Orders from Russia and Turkey followed.

9While the sales of weapons and weapon parts in 1875 amounted to nearly six rimes the sales of machinery, Loewe did not give up his original plans to establish American-like production methods and standards in his own factory and help others to do so by delivering machine tools to them. In 1876 he sent his leading engineers again over the ocean. Already in 1873 he had begun to sell machine tools to other factories and he used the experience won by he production of weapons and the surplus from the sales of weapons to improve and expand this part of his business.

10In 1875 Isidor Loewe, the younger brother of Ludwig, joint the enterprise at the age of 27. He soon took over the strategic business part while his elder brother spent more rime in politics: first as a member of the Berlin city parliament, then also in the Prussian diet, the Abgeordnetenhaus, and in the Reichstag, the German national parliament. He belonged to the progressive wing of the liberal party which was led by the famous Berlin physician Rudolf Virchow.

11Isidor Loewe developed an ingenious business strategy. On the one hand he expanded by a far-reaching diversification of his interests; on the other he developed the Loewe Company into a centre of production for machine tools which could he installed in a lot of his other enterprises. One of his first move was to bye with the help of bankers the majority of Mauser, the leading German firm for small fire arms, and to participate in other weapon-producing firms, not only in Germany but also in Belgium. The finishing touch in this respect was the formation of a German weapons and munirions combine, the Deutsche Waffen-und Munitionsfabriken A G in 1896 which had its business headquarters in Berlin. At the beginning of the XXth century it employed more than 11000 persons and was one the largest German industrial enterprises.

12Another feature of Loewe’s business strategy was the early acknowledgement of the importance of research and development. In 1898 he founded together with the other great German weapons and munitions manufacturer, Duttenhofer, the Centralstelle für wissenschaftlich-technische Untersuchungen GmbH, a research station for ballistics, explosives and munitions in Neu-Babelsberg near Potsdam which developed duralumin, a material which was to become important for the construction of cars and planes. Here research was also done for Loewe’s machine-tool factory when the loading capacity of balls, ball races and ball bearings were tested.

  • 5 J. Kocka, “Siemens und der aufhaltsame Aufstieg der AEG”, Tradition, 17, 1972, p. 125-142.

13Loewe also participated in the young electrical engineering industry. Again he learned from the American industry. In 1891 he acquired a licence from the Thomson-Houston Electric Company in Boston for the production of their machines and equipment for Northern, Central, and Eastern Europe and founded, again with the help of several banks, one year later the Union Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft which became a competitor and later partner in Emil Rathenau’s Allgemeine Elektrizitätsgesellschaft (AEG). In the buildings of the Ludwig Loewe machine-tool factory it produced electrical tramways for Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen, Munich, and Brussels and was three year later already the market leader in Central Europe. Since 1896 Union built also special machinery like dynamos, generators, signal Systems for ships, mines, Steel-and ironworks, rock borers, movable boring machines, most of all, however, electrical motors for railways, tramways and cranes, e.g. for the Hamburg harbour. It equipped streets and large halls with arc lamp and produced also small electrical motors for the use in the handicraft industry. It also pioneered the electrical equipment for the forerunners of the Berlin city railway System. In 1904 it merged with Rathenau’s AEG, which then was about to overtake the oldest German firm in electrical engineering, Siemens & Halske.5

14Loewe also formed partnerships in several other undertakings connected with electricity like the operation of tramways, the delivery of electrical equipment to Spain and Latin America, the production and delivery of printing equipment, in licence of an American patent holder, and the German Niles Works which produced the program of the Niles Tool Works in Hamilton (Ohio). Finally Isidor Loewe was one of the earlier entrepreneurs in the nascent automobile industry. While the decisive inventions had been done in Cologne by Otto and Langen since 1867, in Mannheim by Carl Benz and in Cannstatt near Stuttgart by Daimler and Maybach in the 1880ies, Loewe and Duttenhofer founded a a motor-and motor vehicle factory in Marienfelde near Berlin. Characteristically for Loewe was that he took two licences: one for a gasoline motor from Daimler, another for an electric vehicle from the Columbia & Electric Vehicle Comp. in Hartford, Connecticut. For a while the German companies competed, then, again in a characteristic move, a group lead by Duttenhofer, Loewe and Lorenz took over the majority of the Daimler-Motoren-Gesellschaft and merged both companies; the Marienfelde factory became part of Daimler and still exists today within the Daimler-Chrysler Company. Electric vehicles did not play a big role any more. In this case German, not American technology triumphed.

15But again and again it was American technology Loewe tried to promote in Germany, usually using his good relations to Jewish and non-Jewish bankers to finance such business transactions. In this way he built several very complex groups of firms which he could influence; some of them resembled American trusts. At the centre of all his enterprises remained, however, the Loew company itself, which Isidor Loewe, following his brother, formed into one of the leading German firms for machine tools. He did this partly by using his influence in the growing number of firms he fully or partly controlled to sell Loewe products to them. Thus he tended to monopolise the deliveries of equipment to most of the German weapon producers including the state-owned Prussian weapon factories. This too can be seen as an Americanisation of business behaviour since this was exactly the strategy of some of the big companies in the United States in these decades before the Anti-Trust Law tried to limit their power.

  • 6 Wegeleben, 1924: 41 f. Quoted in Spur and Fischer: 92.

16After the death of the engineer Barthelmes whom Julius Loewe had taken to America in 1870 his mother company was directed by another engineer, Julius Pajeken. He too stayed in contact with the developments on the other side of the ocean and travelled there several times. It is said, that he identified himself so much with the “American ways and spirit” that some American technical journals took him for an American.6

  • 7 G. Schlesinger, “60 Jahre Edelarbeit”, in Ludw. Loewe & Co. Actiengesellschaft Berlin 1869-1929, Hg (...)
  • 8 Wegeleben 1924: 36, Spur, Fischer 2000: 61.

17When in the middle of the 1890s the decision was taken to built a new factory complex for the machine tool production which “in design and equipment had to be at the very height of its time and would incorporate the best which Germany and America possessed in this particular area”7 Pajeken took several other engineers and foremen with him. The business report for 1896 explained the intention in great clarity: “What our company in machine-tool production strove at unswerving from the very beginning under enormous difficulties cornes now to an ultimate success in the German machine-building industry. It is the application of the American production System which rests on the principle of the division of labour, using machines of most precise and advantageous construction and effectuation”.8

18Three American engineers were hired to help with the construction and equipment of the new factory. It was at this very moment when the young academic engineer Georg Schlesinger entered the firm. He later reported:

  • 9 Schlesinger 1929: 68. Spur and Fischer 2000: 63.

The leading engineer, Mr. Libby, did not speak a word of German. I was his interpreter when he had to communicate with the workshop or the technical bureau, later his personal assistant, a bit later the manager of the preparatory office which had not only to form all the equipment for production (devices, tools, gauges, tool cribs, workbenches etc.) according to American principles, but also the main types of machine tools (universal milling machines, turning and turret lathes, slotting machines etc.)”.9

  • 10 V. Benad-Wagenhoff, “Rationalisierung vor der Rationalisierung. Der zweite Umbruch in der Ferigungs (...)

19All homogeneous working procedures were concentrated in one workshop and a continuous flow from the raw material to the final product was organised which meant a shortening of transport lines and storage rime. The specialisation of production of a few types of machines, especially turning, milling, screwing, and grinding machines and the production for stock, made it possible and profitable to produce large numbers of machines of the same construction and to use highly specialised tools, machines and devices. This was exactly what would be called “rationalisation” after World War I, when it became the big reform program of German industry.10 Thus, Loewe was ahead of his time for about twenty years.

20Another feature of Americanisation at the Loewe factory was standardisation. Georg Schlesinger was the leading figure. When all the parts were produced according to the same standard, they became exchangeable, and this again helped saving costs by reducing spoilage. Calculation became easier, controlling more important. Both were applied not only in the workshops but also in planning and accounting. In an English language publication called Machine Tools. Small Tools and Gauges. Castings the firm explained 1902 its “Principles of Manufacture” as follows:

  1. Specialization: i. e. the production of a limited variety of machines and small tools of the highest quality, manufactured by special plant.

  2. The manufacture of machines and small tools in large quantifies for stock; this ensures quick delivery, low prices, and excellence of product.

    • 11 Spur, Fischer 2000: 63.

    The installation of such fittings and accomodations as enables all employees to work under the healthiest and most comfortable conditions”.11

21Statements like this demonstrate that the Ludwig Loewe Company also understood two other principles of American business: marketing and public relations. They were proud of what the had achieved and they wanted others, competitors, customers, but also the more general public to know. This led them to open their workshops for visitors. They invited competitors to look at them. There was nothing to hide. This contrasted with the ancient European tradition of secrecy. Particularly if an artisan, workshop or engineer believed to be ahead of others they tended to keep strangers out of their shops. This was different at Loewe’s. Everybody should feel welcome.

  • 12 H. Tlschhrt, Aus der Entwicklung des Loewe-Konzerns., Berlin, Loew, 1911, p. 156. Quoted in Spur, F (...)
  • 13 Wegeleben 1924: 5. Quoted in Spur and Fischer: 65, fa. 63.

22Some of the contemporary observers praised Loewe effusively. In 1911 one of them wrote: “The Loewe group has created the German machine tool and small tool idustry. As Emil Rathenau has made us independent from America in electricity, so has the Loewe Corporation done in the case of precision machines and tools. Without precision machines our industry would be unthinkable”.12 And in 1924 a survey about the German machine tool industry called Loewe “a pioneer for the realisation and prototype of the American principle”.13

23A more critical observer, the Austrian-born professor for machine construction at the Technical University of Charlottenburg, Alois Riedler, then the leading figure in his field in Germany, characterised Loewe rather as an imitator then a pioneer. In his opinion Loewe did not only imitate American technology, but also the entrepreneurial style of Emil Rathenau, his great contemporary whom Riedler praised after his death in 1915. In a comparison of both Riedler wrote in 1916:

  • 14 A. Riedler, Emil Rathenau und das Werden der Groẞwirtschaft, Berlin, Julius Springer, 1916, p. 184. (...)

If a great work opens new avenues this forms a model, and if in business life somebody takes the lead and creates a novelty others have to catch up. One calls them followers or imitators. Such emulation is, however, unavoidable, is forced and effected by each great progress. Loewe followed the course of Rathenau immediately and in short distance like a shadow. Ludwig Loewe and his successors were not technicians, they were skilful merchants who oriented themselves in technical and business questions precisely at Rathenau, and who always openly admitted the immediate imitation. The shadow-play began already in the founding years. The producer of sewing machines undercut Rathenau when the captured French Chassepot rifles had to be redesigned and got the order. Out of this developed the great rifle business and later the German weapons factory. When the electrical trams became important, Rathenau went to America and purchased the patents of Sprague, Loewe shortly later the patents of Thomson-Houston and offered to Rathenau the fusion of both companies, which Rathenau refused since also in business life one could not marry twice. When AEG bloomed Loewe, founded in 1892 the Union with a risky financing scheme”.14

24This judgement may have been somewhat biased since it was written in an eulogy for Rathenau, but it demonstrates again the skilful business behaviour of the Loewe brothers who — knowing that they were no experts in technology — tried to keep up with the best technology they could find in the fields they entered and who recruited able engineers to put this endeavour into practice. Hiring the young academic engineer Georg Schlesinger at the beginning of his career at the age of 23 and keeping him as an adviser after he had taken up a professorship at the Technical University of Charlottenburg seven years later, was a particular fortunate move, because Schlesinger was one of the most creative construction engineers of his time and a very skilful designer of factory outlay and the organisation of production.

  • 15 Spur, Fischer 2000: 65.

25The business success of the Ludwig Loewe Company can be measured in different ways: As far as the number of employees is concerned Loewe belonged to the upper five percent of German industry; it paid very high dividends to its shareholders, 10% even when in a recession after 1900 more then 5000 corporations did not pay any dividend; and it belonged to the five Berlin firms — AEG, Borsig, Loewe, Schwartzkopf, Siemens & Halske — which received special articles when the Association of German Engineers (Verein Deutscher Ingenieure, VDI) celebrated its fiftieth anniversary in 1906.15

26It is not surprising that the engineers of the Ludw. Loewe Company and their academic advisers were amongst the first to discuss Taylor’s proposais to organise efficient factories. Schlesinger, e.g. knew his work before it was translated into German. He was also amongst the first to recognise the importance of the invention of high-speed Steel for the machine tools by White and Taylor. Like many other European engineers he and the Ludw. Loewe Company did not adapt “Taylorism” fully. They felt that the skilled labourer was too valuable and too independent to be subdued to very stringent rules and restrictions in his activities to simple manipulations, but they learnt from Taylor that the preparation of the work process could be improved and that construction and production engineers ought to co-operate more closely.

  • 16 J. Kocka, Unternehmensverwaltung und Angestelltenschaft am Beispiel Siemens 1847-1914, Stuttgart, K (...)
  • 17 J. Scholtyseck, Robert Bosch und der liberale Widerstand gegen Hitler 1933 bis 1945, München, C. H. (...)

27It is not known how many German factories followed Loewe’s example in introducing the “American System of manufacturing”. This is partly a problem of sources: Many German firms did not keep records of what they were doing in the workshop, and even less published their methods to improve their public relations. Amongst the few known examples are, however, Siemens & Halske, the forerunner of German electrical industry. Already around 1870 they followed the advice of Ludwig Loewe to establish an “American assembly room”, equipped with American machines. But they did it hesitating and only for a few products like torpedos and telegraphs. Later in the century they invested into special machines which could be easier handled, also by women, tried to cut the authority of the masters and put the planning of production process away from them into so-called “group-offices”.16 Others like Bosch maintained that they had developed their System of manufacture on their own, parallel to Taylor.17 Heinrich Lanz, however, took the advice of Georg Schlesinger, the Berlin professor and former Loewe engineer, when he tried about the same time as Bosch (1903-1904) to introduce more efficient production processes. Both, Bosch and Lanz, were patriarchs in their firms with very good relations to their workforces. But both met with furious strikes of their workforces for the first time in their career when they dared to “Americanise” the production processes. Both were disenchanted.

28Less disturbing was the introduction of new methods for white collar workers, particularly engineers. The Loewe System of standards and measurement, e. g. fixed gauges, was adopted by many firms before in 1918, after the experience of World War I with its mass production not only of weapons, an executive committee of German industry introduced a general System of standards. Some firms also adopted the Loewe System of bookkeeping which again was modelled after the American System and was propagated by the Ludw. Loewe Company since it beginnings. Certainly Ludwig Loewe was not the only German enterprise to adopt the “American System of manufacture”, but it was one of the earliest and probably the one firm in Germany which propagated it most vividly in order to demonstrate its own modernity and to find followers.

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Notes

1 F. Reuleaux, Briefe aus Philadelphia, Braunschweig, 1877, reprint Weinheim, Olms (1983), p. 22. Quoted in G. Spur, W. Fischer (eds.), Georg Schlesinger und die Wissenschaft vom Fabrikbetrieb, München/Wien, Carl Hanser, 2000, p. 54. Most of the material in this article is taken from this book and the literature quoted therein.

2 For the biographies of the brothers see W. Treue, «Ludwig und Isidor Loewe», p. 97-109, in W. Treue, W. König (eds.), Berlinische Lebensbilder, vol. 6, Techniker, Berlin, 1990, Colloquium. p. 97-109.

3 W. Fischer, “Herkunft und Anfänge eines Unternehmers: Heinrich Lanz 1859-1970. Vom Landmaschinenhändler zum Fabrikanten”, Zeitschriftfür Unternehmensgeschichte 3, 1979, p. 27-44 and W. Fischer, Ein Jahrhundert der Landtechnik. Die Geschichte des Hanses Heinrich 1859-1958, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2002.

4 Quoted in Spur, Fischer 2000: 57 and Treue 1990: 98, more extensively in: F. Wegeleben, Die Rationalisierung im deutschen Werkzeugmaschinenbau. Dargestellt an der Entwicklung der Ludw. Loewe & Co. A.G. Berlin, Julius Springer, 1924, p. 161.

5 J. Kocka, “Siemens und der aufhaltsame Aufstieg der AEG”, Tradition, 17, 1972, p. 125-142.

6 Wegeleben, 1924: 41 f. Quoted in Spur and Fischer: 92.

7 G. Schlesinger, “60 Jahre Edelarbeit”, in Ludw. Loewe & Co. Actiengesellschaft Berlin 1869-1929, Hg. zum sechzigjährigen Jubiläum der Firma von der Gesellschaft für elektrische Unternehmungen-Ludw. Loewe & Co. Aktiengesellschaft, Berlin, 1930, p. 83.

8 Wegeleben 1924: 36, Spur, Fischer 2000: 61.

9 Schlesinger 1929: 68. Spur and Fischer 2000: 63.

10 V. Benad-Wagenhoff, “Rationalisierung vor der Rationalisierung. Der zweite Umbruch in der Ferigungstechnik 1895-1914”, Technikgeschicbte, 1989, p. 56, Spur, Fischer 2000: 63.

11 Spur, Fischer 2000: 63.

12 H. Tlschhrt, Aus der Entwicklung des Loewe-Konzerns., Berlin, Loew, 1911, p. 156. Quoted in Spur, Fischer: 65, fn. 63.

13 Wegeleben 1924: 5. Quoted in Spur and Fischer: 65, fa. 63.

14 A. Riedler, Emil Rathenau und das Werden der Groẞwirtschaft, Berlin, Julius Springer, 1916, p. 184. Quoted in Spur, Fischer 2000: 65, fn, 63.

15 Spur, Fischer 2000: 65.

16 J. Kocka, Unternehmensverwaltung und Angestelltenschaft am Beispiel Siemens 1847-1914, Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 1969, p. 120 ff„ 217 ff„ 337 ff.

17 J. Scholtyseck, Robert Bosch und der liberale Widerstand gegen Hitler 1933 bis 1945, München, C. H. Beck, 1999, p. 23 and 568, G. Spur et al., Automatisierung und Wandel der betrieblichen Arbeitswelt, Berlin/New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1993, p. 55.

Auteur

Freie Universität Berlin

© Publications de l’Institut de recherches historiques du Septentrion, 2002

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